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Social movements that fundamentally challenge the status quo struggle to connect
theory and practice by framing advocacy messages in ways that serve the utilitarian
purpose of resonating with mainstream public values while also demonstrating
deontological integrity in authentically reflecting their own radical ideology. This study
examines the animal rights movement's framing challenges in transforming
discriminatory worldviews against nonhuman animals (l\THAs) to create respect for them
as inherently valuable subjects. U.S. animal rights organizations CAROs) increasingly
focus on protecting animals exploited for food, and this dissertation examines frames
used in such food advocacy campaigns of five national AROs: Compassion over Killing,
Farm Animal Rights Movement, Farm Sanctuary, People for the Ethical Treatment of
vAnimals, and Vegan Outreach. Using textual analysis of ARO advocacy and interviews
with ARO leaders, this study analyzes how and to what extent AROs do or could
construct less speciesist frames that resonate with a largely speciesist American public.
Findings reveal AROs framed problems with agribusiness around farmed animal
cruelty and commodification, human and environmental harm, and unnecessary killing.
Solution frames suggested consumers eat a total or largely plant-based diet, and some
proposed industry welfare reforms. To motivate audiences, AROs appealed to values,
such as: compassion, sentience, moral consistency, desire to make a difference, choice,
pleasurable and convenient food, belonging, life, concern for fellow human beings,
honesty, American populism, naturalness, freedom, and American pride.
Strategically, AROs leaders applied both deontology and utilitarianism in
choosing to prioritize NHA altruism rather than human self-interest, but most leaders
favored utilitarianism in choosing to privilege animal welfare over animal rights for
wider appeal. Overall, while some ARO messages supported animal rights, promoting
veganism and respect for NHA subject status, many frames used animal welfare ideology
to achieve animal rights solutions, conservatively avoiding a direct challenge to the
dominant human/animal dualism.
Changes to framing strategy are prescribed in support of frame transformation,
such as emphasizing injustice, respect, freedom, life, and a shared animality. This
deontologically aligns animal rights theory with advocacy practice in a way that also
strategically incorporates both environmental ethics and human rights and merges nature
and culture.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Social Movement Framing Dilemmas
For those who believe society needs a fundamental change to the status quo in
favor of increased justice and equality, how should they create such change? Social
movement leaders have asked this question for centuries. By analyzing their attempts,
scholars of social movements have determined some of the criteria necessary to enact
major social changes. They suggest social movement organizations (SMOs) take
advantage ofpolitical opportunities, successfully mobilize and build resources, and frame
issues in ways that are meaningful and resonate with the public (McAdam, McCarthy, &
Zald, 1996). But the nuances of how to successfully accomplish all of these tasks for
different issues, and in different times and places, are still in need of investigation.
Perhaps most applicable to communication scholarship is the framing process, as
it is how social movements create shared meaning and participate in the signifying
process. Frames make things meaningful, organize experiences, and guide actions (Snow
et aI., 1986). Frames can be conceived as a reductionist presentation strategy that is
informed by ideology, meaning a guiding belief system and worldview (Oliver &
Johnston, 2005). Snow & Benford (1988) defined the three core tasks of social movement
collective action frames as (1) diagnostic (defining the problem and possibly attributing
2blame), (2) prognostic (defining solutions), and (3) motivational (encouraging collective
action in enacting solutions).
Social movement leaders may agree on the core problem and even its cause or
solution, as they are informed by a similar ideology, but these leaders may become
divided and struggle over determining the "right" approach to expressing and framing
issues for the public. The answer to what is the "right" approach depends on if one's
version of right is more teleological or more deontological. Teleological, or ends-
oriented, approaches, such as utilitarianism, emphasize what is most effective at creating
the desired behavioral changes that SMOs believe support the greater good. On the other
hand, deontological approaches emphasize what is most authentic to and compatible with
the SMO's ideology and values, which is related to the broader principle of ensuring
one's communication means are ethical.
For example, in fighting widespread discrimination, a challenging movement,
meaning a social movement that is counter-hegemonic and seek radical change (Tarrow,
1998), can choose an expedient message that waters down the radical aspects of its
message or even contradicts and ignores its non-discriminatory values, to some degree,
but resonates with many people to encourage small changes. This expedient message may
strategically utilize accepted discriminatory stereotypes or appeal only to the public's
self-interest. Or an SMO who is part of a challenging movement can, conversely, choose
a more ideologically congruent approach that challenges discrimination and does not
compromise its values but may not resonate with as many people. Ideally, the best
3approach would be both effective with the public and, at the same time, congruent with
the SMO's values and vision.
While pragmatic, utilitarian questions of "what works" are important and popular
to ask, in this dissertation I prioritize the deontological question of what approach or
means is most fitting and authentic for challenging movements, especially in the framing
process, so that they construct messages that are representative of the transformational
values they aim to instill in society. The assumption is that what is true to a challenging
movement's ideology should be publicly communicated as such, in most cases, both to
emphasize honesty and integrity in means and to achieve the desired ends of transforming
discriminatory worldviews. This is inspired by Foucault's (2000) statement encouraging
radical criticism as a necessary constructor of discursive transformation: "For a
transformation that would remain within the same mode of thought, a transformation that
would only be a certain way of better adjusting the same thought to the reality ofthings,
would only be a superficial transformation" (p. 457). By expressing their oppositional
ideology, social movement discourse should result in people having "trouble thinking
things the way they have been thought" (p. 457).
Animal Rights Movement Framing Dilemmas
An example of a challenging movement struggling over the best framing
approach is the animal rights movement. Animal rights can be defined as a duty-based or
deontological ethic that grants nonhuman animals the right to privacy and freedom from
human intrusion (Hall, 2006a; Regan, 1983). It argues against use and domination in
favor of freedom. Animal rights is ideologically more radical than animal welfare.
4Animal welfare can be defined as a mainstream Western philosophy that regulates animal
exploitation to reduce the suffering of nonhuman animals who are under human control
(Francione, 1996; Hall, 2006a). Francione (1996) stated that animal welfare has the
following characteristics: (a) it recognizes animal sentience but believes nonhuman
animals are not as worthy of moral respect as are humans, (b) it recognizes the property
status of nonhumans while wanting to limit the rights of property owners, and (c) it
accepts trading away the interests ofnonhumans in favor of human interests only if the
latter are deemed significant and necessary.
The animal rights movement seeks a transformation in values from one that
discriminates against other animals, as being less morally relevant than humans, to one
that conceives of other animals as inherently valuable subjects with interests that deserve
respect, more similar to how humans respect each other as subjects (Francione, 1996;
Regan, 2003; Singer, 1990). A desired consequence of this worldview transformation
would be an end to the domestication, enslavement, and exploitation of nonhuman
animals by humans. To end exploitative practices, animal rights organizations (AROs)
often struggle over whether to use a welfare-oriented frame that is more mainstream and
less threatening to human's moral status or a rights-oriented frame that is more "radical"
but authentic to the ARO's justice philosophy of directly combating the species
discrimination, or "speciesism," that is common in Western society (Francione, 1996;
Hall,2006a).
For example, should AROs help nonhuman animals used in laboratories and
farms by improving their living conditions (appealing to people's compassionate values
5or even self-interest), or should AROs demand an end to animal use in these industries
(appealing to people's values for justice and freedom)? Or is it philosophically logical to
seek welfare reform and abolition simultaneously? If the former welfare frame is more
effective at enacting some tangible improvements in public behavior toward nonhuman
animals, is that preferable to a rights frame that may not produce as many behavioral
changes, or not as immediately, but may encourage the public to start critiquing their
fundamental belief that it is justifiable to use other animals as a means to an end?
Another line of inquiry related to social movement framing asks whether
appealing to an individual's self interest is counterproductive to the long-term goal of
getting society to be more altruistic toward a new category of oppressed beings (Cox,
2006; Evernden, 1985). If AROs seek a more altruistic society, should they emphasize
altruistic values, even ifthat might not be the quickest path to effect some changes? For
example, If an ARO can convince more people to stop eating animals, or to eat fewer
animals, by appealing to legitimate human health concerns, is that preferable to a moral
suasion approach that appeals to people's sense ofjustice and empathy toward others -
nonhuman animals in this case? The former, self-interested health frame might be an
easier or more persuasive way to get an audience member to stop eating animals, but
because the frame does not fundamentally challenge hegemonic views toward other
animals, the new vegetarian may see nothing wrong with supporting fur, leather, hunting,
or animal experimentation. Would it not be more authentic, and even more strategic in
the long run, if each separate animal rights campaign, whether it be against farms,
laboratories, circuses, or fur, was informed by the same, core non-speciesist ideology
instead of separate appeals to self-interest or "practical" anthropocentric concerns? I
would suggest that the ideal frames are the ones that both resonate with people and
openly ask for the kind of radical change in speciesist worldview that is necessary to
promote all animal rights issues in the long term.
Similar tactical questions were posed by Francione (1996), an activist and legal
scholar, who advocates that AROs should more openly express animal rights ideology:
Although many animal rights organizations claim to embrace the complete
abolition of animal exploitation as a long-term goal, they often couch this
message in more "conservative" terms in order to make their message more
acceptable to the public. The problem with this approach is that it allows animal
exploiters to respond that animal advocates are not honest or that they have some
"secret," agenda, which is arguably harmful to the overall credibility of the
movement. (p. 117)
In addition to linking expression of ideology with honesty and communication ethics,
Francione advocates that activists should control the discourse so it remains focused on
nonhuman animals and moral issues instead of human self-interest.
Dissertation Topic and Methodology
I will be examining the role of values and ideology in the framing process of
challenging movements by looking at the specific case of how five national AROs in the
United States currently frame issues and values in their advocacy related to food and
farmed animals. Because most AROs do not have broad campaigns promoting animal
rights in general, communication scholars must study animal rights ideology through the
6
7more specific campaign issues that AROs address, such as food, as these campaigns
express organizational priorities and provide a vision for the kind of values and better
world they envision.
To express animal rights values, ARO food campaigns promote diets that are
vegan (totally plant-based) or vegetarian (meat-free) and critique the use and exploitation
of animals for food, especially in animal agribusiness and commercial fishing. These
food campaigns may include some of the same concerns that animal welfare
organizations address, namely demanding less cruel treatment of farmed animals. But the
latter frame does not specifically promote non-speciesist values, or animal rights
ideology, as it fails to critique the right of humans to domesticate and use other animals
for human food. In this dissertation, I argue in favor ofAROs demonstrating ideological
integrity by emphasizing their non-speciesist values in food advocacy. The analysis
examines the ways in which ARO food messages promote non-speciesist values and/or
promote anthropocentric values or values that are more moderate, mainstream, and
expedient. These latter values can be altruistic, as in showing kindness toward farmed
animals, and/or they can be self-interested, as in valuing one's health through eating safe,
healthy food and living in a clean environment.
Through a textual analysis of ARO food advocacy materials, I examine how
AROs construct other animals and frame their issues, paying particular interest to the
construction and framing of the human animal and values regarding other animals. The
reason for this focus on human values is that one can assume that ARO campaigns will
likely show nonhuman animals as sentient beings who suffer greatly, but the real question
8is do humans care enough to do anything to improve the situation for these animals? We
humans are the only species who can change this situation, as we endorse it legally,
financially, and socially through the common habit of farming animals, fishing, and
meat-eating. Therefore, the positioning of the human subject will be examined in terms of
what values AROs are suggesting that humans do or should possess.
For example, are some of these values representative of the non-speciesist values
animal rights activists possess? How are humans made to see themselves in relation to
other animals, and does this representation challenge the false human/animal dualism that
serves as the justification of humans , systematic discrimination of other animals? Hall
(2006a), an activist and legal scholar, agreed that AROs should emphasize humans in
terms of interrogating our values: "The essential question is about us - those in the class
that, at any given time, decides, argues, declares, and objectifies. What creates our
interest in domination?" (p. 75).
To examine ideology in activist frames and discourse, I conduct in-depth phone
interviews with ARO directors and textual analysis oftheir current print and electronic
food advocacy materials, such as Web sites, videos, brochures, leaflets, advertisements,
and collateral materials. To serve as illustrative examples, the five AROs most actively
engaged in national food advocacy in the United States are selected. The research
questions are largely informed by communication theory, particularly social movement
literature on framing and, to a lesser degree, communication ethics, all of which are
discussed in Chapter Three. The research is also informed by Western philosophy
regarding humans' relation to other animals, including animal rights, environmental
9ethics, and vegetarian philosophy, which is thoroughly discussed in a separate theory
chapter on animal issues in Chapter Two.
These two theory chapters inform an analysis of the framing process and the
AROs' communication strategies as well as the ideological content and meaning ofthat
communication. This expresses a belief that the communication process is not just a
vehicle that can be separated from the communicator or the meaning he/she creates (Hall,
1997). In this way, for animal rights advocacy to have integrity, it should connect theory
and practice by connecting animal ethics with communication ethics.
Through analyzing food advocacy and talking to ARO leaders, I determine
answers to what and how questions, such as: what problems and solutions do AROs
define through their frames; what values do AROs say humans possess or should possess;
to what extent are these values self-interested or altruistic; how do AROs create
alignment between their values and those of the public; and to what extent are these
values congruent with animal rights ideology and the ARO's mission. Additionally, the
interview method helps answer questions relating to why frames are constructed as they
are and to understand how animal rights leaders explain and justify their framing choices
in terms of ethics and ideology.
All ofthis description leads to a prescriptive question about the implications of
ARO framing choices for animal ethics, communication ethics, and communication
strategy. This is discussed in the conclusion chapter, including an examination of frames
that are most supportive of animal rights ideology and/or are examples of frame
transformation, a frame alignment process that promotes a change in value systems or
10
ideology (Snow et aI., 1986). I believe this transfonnation in humans' conception of
themselves in relation to other animals is a necessary component of any societal
progression toward animal liberation. The question is, do major AROs agree, and, if so,
how do they construct less speciesist frames that resonate with a largely speciesist
American public?
Significance ofthe Study
At first glance this dissertation topic of animal rights and fanned animal issues
might seem narrow and trivial in comparison to the more prioritized, anthropocentric
topics Americans are accustomed to seeing in the news media and exploring in academia.
If critical/cultural studies notions of hegemony are applied to this situation, it explains
that just because a topic, like animal rights in general or fanned animal exploitation in
particular, has been marginalized in society and therefore seemingly has little influence
does not mean that it is unimportant or deserves to be. The construction of knowledge in
this dissertation raises the status of the topic and also remedies the lack of attention
nonhuman animals receive in academia, particularly in communication studies.
But the topic has importance whether academics study it or not. The ARO
advocacy material problematizing animal-based food reaches millions of people a year,
and not just as a fleeting advertisement that may go unnoticed but typically as
infonnation that is sought out by individuals (Web sites) or willfully accepted when
offered (leaflets). Yet, admittedly, it is still a minority voice when compared to the
prominence of daily discourse generated by the animal food industry and its retailers.
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But this minority voice protecting nonhuman animals serves an important
function of openly critiquing the major discourse on food in all other mainstream media,
as that discourse rarely includes an animal rights perspective that challenges the basic
premise that it is acceptable to raise and kill someone else for food (Freeman, in press). In
daily consumption of mainstream media discourse, a viewer would not typically be
alerted to ethical issues involving the environment or other animals in relation to food.
Food is usually constructed around the concepts of pleasure, nutrition, or economics not
around the concepts ofjustice, ethics, and sustainability (Freeman, in press). These
attempts by AROs to make production and consumption of animal-products an ethical
issue, or at least a problem, represent an important challenge riot only to mainstream food
industry discourse but also to American social norms and basic ideals about who it is
morally acceptable to use and kill and who pays the cost for America's food choices.
While the goals of this dissertation could be accomplished by examining the
framing of other animal advocacy issues besides food, such as vivisection or fur, food
was selected because it has become a major focus of the animal rights movement in the
last decade. AROs have acknowledged that animal agriculture and commercial fishing
are responsible for the overwhelming majority of nonhuman animals killed in the United
States (FARM Death Toll, 2007). The relevance of the food issue is increased by the fact
that it involves the majority ofthe public more directly than other animal issues because
most Americans are raised eating animal products, while most do not wear fur,
participate in sport hunting, or conduct animal experimentation. On a personal level,
12
animal agriculture and vegan campaigns are closely related to my own advocacy,
scholarship interests, and experience over the last decade.
Food choices are a key issue for animal rights in general because if people
continue to breed, grow or capture, and kill other animals for food when it is unnecessary
for survival, then the animal rights movement will not be able to gain significant rights
for animals in any other area in which they are commonly exploited (Francione, 1996;
Hall, 2006a). For example, why would humans not endorse experimentation on other
animals to potentially save human lives or use animal fur for wannth when society allows
the needless killing of animals for food every day, ultimately making their lives cheap
compared to humans? In actuality, the purpose of animal slaughter is more for pleasure
and profit than for nutritional necessity (ADA, 2003), but it will be hard for anyone to
envision human society not being reliant on domestication of nonhuman animals if
humans' continue to believe their sustenance depends on it.
How the Study Contributes to Society
The findings ofthis dissertation should contribute not only to academia but to the
strategic communication efforts of social movements, particularly the animal rights
movement. If this dissertation aids AROs in framing food issues and reducing the amount
of animal products consumed, there would arguably be a multitude of social benefits for
other animals, humans, and nature. When people choose plant-based foods, especially if
they are local and organic, it contributes to sustainability and decreased animal
exploitation and suffering. U.S. animal agriculture is responsible for the raising and
killing of more than 10 billion land animals annually when one counts those killed at
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USDA slaughterhouses, the millions ofmale chicks killed at egg hatcheries, and the
millions of other animals who are estimated to have died before slaughter. The Farm
Animal Rights Movement (FARM Death Toll, 2007) uses USDA statistics to tally the
annual death toll by species in comparison to the previous year:
The 2007 total of 10,378 million includes 39 million cattle and calves (about even
with the 38.7 million in 2006), 121 million pigs (up 2.6% from 118 million), 4
million sheep and goats, 10 million rabbits, 317 million turkeys (up 5% from 302
million), 28 million ducks (down 7% from 30 million), 9,409 million "broilers"
(down slightly from 9,428 million) and 450 million laying hens (up 5% from $426
million).
The suffering inherent in modem, intensive farming and mass slaughter is tremendous
and worthy of increased attention as a serious moral crisis (Derrida, 2004; Pollan, 2006;
Singer & Mason, 2006). Fish and birds, the animals Americans eat in the highest
numbers, are excluded from federal humane slaughter laws, leaving them largely devoid
of legal protection.
In addition to raising land animals, humans also raise fish in close confinement
(aquaculture) as well as commercially hunt them in the world's oceans, reputedly causing
the near extinction of many sea species, which has widespread ecological repercussions
(Singer & Mason, 2006). The sea animal lives taken are only recorded by weight, not by
individual, but it is estimated that 17 billion animals from the sea are eaten in America
annually, not including the approximately 25 percent additional lives lost and wasted as
"bycatch" (Singer & Mason, 2006, p. 112). If one includes sea animals in addition to land
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animals, Americans are responsible for the killing of more than 3 million nonhuman
animals every hour of every day.
If there were no other food humans could eat to survive, then these deaths may be
more justifiable, although the numbers need not be so high, but the existence of at least a
million American vegans, people who eat only plant-based foods, proves animal products
are largely if not completely unnecessary to human survival if a variety of plant proteins
are accessible (Maurer, 2002). The American Dietetic Association (ADA, 2003)
acknowledged the health benefits of a balanced plant-based diet at meeting human
nutritional requirements. Because plant foods contain fiber but do not contain any
cholesterol nor as much saturated fat as most animal foods, the ADA acknowledged the
role of a plant-based diet in preventing diseases common to Americans:
Vegetarians have been reported to have lower body mass indices than
nonvegetarians, as well as lower rates of death from ischemic heart disease;
vegetarians also show lower blood cholesterol levels; lower blood pressure; and
lower rates of hypertension, type 2 diabetes, and prostate and colon cancer.
(ADA, 2003, Abstract section)
This is not to suggest that one cannot be healthy on a diet that includes minor amounts of
animal products, especially if organic, but this information is provided just to
acknowledge that a plant-based diet can sustain a healthy life and often times one that
includes less health risks than meat-eaters face.
Animal-based foods are related to both issues of nutritional excess and deficiency.
Considering America's obesity crisis and the prediction that because of the diseases
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related to obesity children today may not live as long as their parents, healthy food
choices need to become a national priority (Pollan, 2006; Singer & Mason, 2006).
Another critical humanitarian health crisis is the millions of people worldwide who die of
hunger-related causes annually due in part to inequitable food distribution. America
produces enough plant food to feed the hungry worldwide, but the nation inefficiently
uses most of its plant crops, particularly grain and soy, to fatten farmed animals, which
also unsustainably uses other life-sustaining resources, such as water and energy (Global
Hunger Alliance, n.d.; Robbins, 1992; Well-Fed World, n.d.).
This alludes to environmental problems associated with animal agribusiness.
Magazine editors at the World Watch Institute (World Watch, 2004) concluded:
The human appetite for animal flesh is a driving force behind virtually every
major category of environmental damage now threatening the human future -
deforestation, erosion, fresh water scarcity, air and water pollution, climate
change, biodiversity loss, social injustice, the destabilization of communities and
the spread of disease. (p. 12)
Similarly damning, a report by the United Nations (UN) (FAO, 2006) described animal
agriculture as "one of the most significant contributors to today's most serious
environmental problems" (para. 2), acknowledging it as a major contributor to water
pollution, land degradation, loss of biodiversity, and deforestation, including tropical
rainforest destruction. The UN (FAO, 2006) reported that "livestock now use 30 percent
of the earth's entire land surface, mostly permanent pasture but also including 33 percent
of the global arable land used to producing feed for livestock" (para. 8). Confined animal
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feeding operations, also called "factory farms," and all the plant crops required to feed
these billions of animals, cause pollution and use significantly higher amounts of
resources such as soil, water, land, and energy than does a plant-based diet (Singer &
Mason, 2006).
Human-induced climate change is perhaps the largest crisis facing the world, as it
has the potential to kill most of the living beings on this planet. The UN concluded that a
meat-based diet is a major culprit in contributing to global warming because raising
livestock generates 18 percent ofthe world's greenhouse gas emissions, proving even
more damaging than transportation (FAO, 2006). And as the United States and Europe
tighten their environmental and animal welfare regulations, a continued demand for
animal-based foods sends factory farms to developing countries, exporting the
environmental, health, and welfare problems across the globe (Nierenberg, 2003).
How the Study Contributes to Academia
This dissertation will contribute to bodies of knowledge in social movement
theory, framing, rhetoric, public relations and advocacy communication, communication
ethics, critical/cultural studies, and animal ethics by examining how organizations in
challenging movements utilize and construct values in the framing process. It particularly
examines how SMOs might use progressive ideology to inform frames in an attempt to
transform values and how these values can be made resonant with the public. It analyzes
how and why an SMO may choose to avoid espousing its ideology in frames, in some
cases, in an attempt to effect a desired change either by appealing to more accepted
values or by an indirect appeal to a different issue of greater concern to the public. The
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latter utilitarian framing approach may be more effective in some ways and create greater
resonance, but it may pose ethical and strategic issues.
This dissertation should help build knowledge regarding the framing process,
especially in social movement literature and particularly in the frame transformation
alignment process, which Benford and Snow (2000) regard as understudied. Additionally,
it contains elements that help build a foundation for the weak literature on social
movement public relations strategies and ethics, as the public relations literature mainly
emphasizes corporate or mainstream organizational communication (Holtzhausen, 2000;
Smith & Ferguson, 2001). Finally, it builds knowledge on the communication strategies
of the animal rights movement specifically, forming the basis for a typology of ARO
framing of food issues and vegetarianism. It also contributes to theory building in animal
rights ideology and how it can be strategically communicated.
Researcher Perspective
Following the critical/cultural studies research paradigm, I bring a critical and
engaged perspective to this project which should be openly acknowledged. As an activist,
I have worked to improve the strained, unhealthy, and inequitable relationship between
humans and all other animals and the natural world. As an academic, I am motivated to
study how communication can improve this relationship so it is more equitable and just.
Because the animal rights and environmental movements contribute to creating these
more equitable relations, they are a natural research focus. These movements are an
extension of human social justice movements which work toward moral progress, such as
movements to help women and racial minorities overcome oppression.
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I became involved in animal rights and environmental issues in 1989 and consider
myself a grassroots activist in these movements, especially the animal rights movement.
Toward that end, I have founded and run several grassroots organizations that support
animal rights, such as a vegetarian society in Southwest Florida and a campus animal
rights group at the University of Georgia. During the writing of this dissertation, I served
as Co-Director of University of Oregon's student animal rights group, Students for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals. Due to my concerns about exploitation of animals, I try to
minimize my personal contribution to this exploitation, such as through adopting a
vegetarian then vegan diet in the mid 1990s. Because of the magnitude of animal
exploitation in the food industry and the myriad social and environmental benefits to
which veganism contributes, I believe that promoting a vegan diet should be a priority for
the animal rights movement as well as the environmental movement. Therefore, I have
made animal agribusiness and food a priority in my own activism as well as in my
academic research.
This personal engagement in the topic of study offers research benefits and
limitations. The risks include being too close to the data to see its strengths and,
particularly, its weaknesses or being hesitant to be too critical ofthe AROs. The benefits
include having a deep knowledge and understanding of animal rights issues and their
strategic communication challenges, based on personal experience. I am also able to
easily gain access to ARO leaders and earn their trust, as I am a fellow member ofthe
movement. In addition, the passion I have for the topic and its importance serves as a
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daily motivation for the research process and creates a sincere desire to produce rigorous,
high quality results that are helpful to the movement and foundational to academia.
Word Choice
In this dissertation, I use the termjarmed animal instead ofjarm animal to
acknowledge that farming is something done to these beings, or forced upon them, not
something inherent to their nature - just as other scholars have chosen to use the term
enslavedperson instead oflabeling someone a slave (Allen, 2006; Brown, 2004;
Dunayer, 2001; Spiegel, 1996). Additionally, to help linguistically deconstruct the
human/animal dualism, I emphasize that humans are animals by using the term
nonhuman animal (NHA), instead ofjust animal, when it is necessary to distinguish all
animals other than humans.
Dissertation Overview
To begin to examine ARO framing dilemmas related to ideology and values in
food advocacy, the next chapter, Chapter Two, offers a broad context on Westem
society's views on NHAs, the philosophical strengths and challenges of animal rights
ideology and its deconstruction of the human/animal dualism, the development of the
American animal protection movement, and views on vegetarianism. Chapter Three
provides a framework for academic literature and theory on strategic communication,
especially as it relates to social movements and their framing challenges, including
framing animal rights and vegetarianism, specifically. Chapter Four outlines the seven
research questions, explains the textual analysis and interviewing methods used to answer
them, and describes the five AROs and their food advocacy text that was selected for
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examination. Chapter Five provides the findings from the analysis of the first six research
questions, comprising the descriptive and empirical portion of the analysis explaining
how AROs are framing food issues and why. Chapter Six serves as a discussion and
conclusion, comprising the prescriptive portion of the analysis. It answers the last
research question regarding the implications of ARO framing choices in terms of
communication theory and animal ethics, it connects theory and practice by making
framing recommendations in support of ideological integrity and frame transformation,
and it discusses the findings' application to communication theory and literature.
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CHAPTER II
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW ON HUMAN
AND NONHUMAN ANIMAL RELATIONS
Introduction
In this chapter I cover broad territory in reviewing Western society's past and
current relationships with and beliefs about fellow animal beings, including views on
nature and using other animals for food. I also use this chapter to explain animal rights
ideology and activism, exploring its strengths and attempting to overcome its
contradictions. This animal rights ideology serves as a philosophical basis for my
disseliation analysis assessing the ways in which animal rights organization (ARO)
message frames are informed by or suppOliive of this ideology.
I begin broadly with the history of Western philosophy regarding other animals
and progress to explain modem animal rights philosophy and the philosophical
challenges of deconstructing the false human/animal dualism. I consider environmental
ethics as an umbrella philosophy promoting a non-anthropocentric worldview, so I
explore the challenges and logic of situating animal ethics within environmental ethics to
gauge how the two may mutually inform animal activism. I then cover the history of
animal rights activism and vegetarian activism in the United States, ending with a review
of the development of vegetarian ethics throughout Western history and the status of
vegetarianism today.
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Major philosophical themes of this chapter include: defining what constitutes
necessary use and suffering of other animals in human ethics; deciding if and how human
ethics, particularly as it relates to eating animals, is informed by both nature and culture
in moderating the human propensity for excess; reconciling the holistic/group ethic of
enviromnental philosophy with the individualistic ethic of human and nonhuman animal
(NHA) rights; reconciling whether animal rights philosophy is too humanist to encourage
humans to embrace their animality; and exploring a place for the concept of diversity in
an animal rights philosophy built on promoting similarity. By addressing strengths and
weaknesses in animal ethics, enviromnental ethics, and vegetarian ethics, I hope to
bolster the philosophical approach to animal activism through a much deeper
understanding of how to foreground the logical fallacies which undermine the humanist
discourse that both animal rights activists and animal exploiters struggle to define.
History ofWestern Thought on Other Animals
Since its birth in ancient Greece, Western philosophy has largely focused on a
privileging of the human subject. Schmidtz (2002) claimed that philosophy has
historically been an examination ofthe following three anthropocentric projects:
determining human's essence, specifying how humans are different from all other
species, and specifying what makes humans morally important. Dallery (1999) also noted
how few philosophies had anything to say about human-animal kinship, yet philosophers
were, "obsessively concerned to establish the difference between human and animal
nature" (p. 252). Singer, a utilitarian philosopher and NHA advocate, chastised the field
of philosophy for its inherent anthropocentrism, claiming it had failed both to challenge
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accepted beliefs and to justify its assumption of human dignity (Linzey & Clarke, 2004).
Singer (1990) pointed out how convenient this uncontested anthropocentrism is by
asking, "Why should we not attribute 'intrinsic dignity' or 'intrinsic worth' to ourselves?
Fellow humans are unlikely to reject the accolades we so generously bestow on them, and
those to whom we deny the honor, are unable to object" (p. 239).
As Singer insinuated, most philosophies are not only focused on humans, they
also assume humans are morally superior. Taylor (1993) claimed that the following three
traditions were mainly responsible for constructing the idea of human superiority: Greek
humanism and its privileging of man's rationality; Cartesian dualism which divided
animals into humans who possess a mind and a soul and other animals who only possess
a body; and the Judeo-Christian "great chain ofbeing" that ranks God first followed in
descending order by angels, humans, animals, plants, and inanimate objects.
Cavalieri (2006) organized Western philosophy's changing view of other animals
into three key historical periods: the debates over kinship versus separation in Classical
Greece; Descartes' mechanization of nonhuman animals in the 1i h century's scientific
revolution; and concerns over animal welfare and rights due to the industrialization of
animal agribusiness post WWII. This section explores animal philosophies according to
these three historical periods, prior to examining recent philosophies in more depth in
upcoming sections.
Ancient Times to Renaissance
Some ancient Greeks proposed a kinship between all animals. Pythagoras
believed in the transmigration of souls between humans and other animals, and Plato
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believed in humans originating from a more harmonious relationship with other animals
(Cavalieri, 2006). In contrast, Aristotle believed in hierarchies and supported a notion of
some men, all women, and all NHAs as rightfully existing for the utility of others (Linzey
& Clarke, 2004). While Porphyry argued against this exploitative view of other animals,
Aristotle's view prevailed at supporting the old order of slavery, likely because it was
more easily amenable to emerging Christian views (Cavalieri, 2006).
Lawrence (1995) described the pre-Christian Classical World as possessing a
more fluid notion of species and noted that some ancient (and current) pagan belief
systems view nonhuman animals as gods, even though many societies hunted and
consumed animals. But the Church sought to distinguish itself from paganism by
privileging the human man as dominant among animals. St. Augustine and St. Thomas
Aquinas aided this by denying other animals any intellect and emphasizing a Biblical
notion of man's rightful dominion over irrational brute creatures. Medieval philosophers
built upon this religious dogma to assign all NHA behavior to pure instinct, in opposition
to the reasoned behavior ofmen (Lawrence, 1995). French Renaissance author Michel de
Montaigne was one of the few of the era who espoused the many qualities other animals
shared with humans, saying it was only out of "foolish arrogance and stubbornness that
we put ourselves before the other animals, and remove ourselves from their condition and
fellowship" (Linzey & Clarke, 2004, p. 111).
Scientific Revolution through the Mid 20th Century
Another influential period in defining animal philosophy was the scientific
revolution, particularly the philosophies of the 1i h century scientist Rene Descartes
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through his construction of the mindlbody dualism (Lawrence, 1995). Explicit in
Cartesian philosophy is the notion that NHAs do not possess the conscious mind of
humans, and nonhuman bodies are more akin to automata. Descartes assigned
nonhumans no souls, no language, and no sensations, which strategically enabled
expansion of vivisection without guilt or charges of cruelty (Lawrence, 1995). While
animal use for a human purpose, such as scientific discovery, was viewed as acceptable,
the level of suffering seen in vivisection became an issue (Cavalieri, 2006). A Cartesian
logic provided scientists an excuse to dismiss the cries from nonhumans as mere
"mechanical reactions" (Lawrence, 1995, p. 76). This division between humans and
nonhumans is still reflected in a general scientific rule to avoid anthropomorphizing
nonhumans in research.
Other 1i h century philosophers bolstered Descartes' mindlbody dualism that
characterized nonhumans as lacking mental faculties (Linzey & Clarke, 2004). For
example, Hobbes privileged humans' language skills and believed speech was necessary
to create thoughts which could create a system ofjustice. Locke admitted that some
nonhumans could reason but privileged humans' ability to reason abstractly. Similar to
Kant, Locke protected a human's right not to be used as a slave but determined it was
acceptable to use NHAs so long as they were put to good use in the service ofhumanity.
Both philosophers held the general sentiment of the time that it was wrong to cause a
nonhuman to suffer wantonly, as that constituted cruelty. The primary reason animal
cruelty was deemed immoral, however, was out of an anthropocentric concern that it lead
to inhumanity in dealings with other humans (Linzey & Clarke, 2004).
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By the 18th and 19th centuries, animal suffering had become more of a concern,
especially among utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill and also
Reverend Herman Daggett and Kantian philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (Linzey &
Clarke, 2004). All acknowledged the sentience ofmany animals, meaning their ability to
feel mental and physical pain and pleasure, and called for restrictions in human's use of
them to only what was necessary - such as for food and certain useful research. Their
concern for sentience prompted them to call for greater humane treatment of the animals
humans were using.
Human's ability for abstract thought and higher consciousness was a focus of 19th
century philosophers Schopenhauer, Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche (Linzey & Clarke,
2004). While they all believed abstract thought was a differentiating feature of humans
and other animals, not everyone conceived of it as a benefit for humanity. Schopenhauer
and Nietzsche both critiqued humans' abstract thoughts as alienating us from a
connection to the natural world. Nietzsche believed humans' evolution as social animals
necessitated a sophisticated communication system, but the high level to which abstract
thought had developed was now harmful by privileging the shallowness and superficiality
ofthe symbolic over the real. Conversely, Hegel saw humans' knowledge of universals
positively, as a way to transcend the immediate, providing a mechanism for control over
thoughts, principles, and development. Marx viewed human consciousness as enabling
self-awareness as a free being, creating the freedom to produce beyond need.
In the late 19th century, American zoologist J. Howard Moore preached against
human bias and the discrimination ofNHAs in anticipation of Singer's (1990) notion of
27
speciesism. Moore noted, "The philosophies of this world have all been framed by, and
from the standpoint of, a single species, and they are still managed and maintained in the
interests ofthis species" (Walters & Portmess, 1999, p. 128). Moore called humans
bigoted, saying humans had become the "butchers ofthe universe" (p. 129). Noting the
value ofnecessity in determining ethical actions, Moore claimed that humans sacrifice
the sacred interests of others for themselves - even if those interests are merely "human
comfort, curiosity, or pastime" (p. 130). To describe human mistreatment of other
animals, Moore often used crime terminology, believing discrimination against NHAs
was akin to other crimes, such as racism and exploitation in general:
There is, in fact, but one great crime in the universe, and most ofthe instances of
terrestrial wrong-doing are instances of this crime. It is the crime of exploitation -
the considering by some beings of themselves as ends, and of others as their
means - the refusal to recognize the equal, or the approximately equal, rights of
all to life and its legitimate rewards - the crime of acting toward others as one
would that others would not act toward him. (Walters & Portmess, 1999, p. 133)
Moore referred to humans as "a globeful oflip-virtuous felons!" (Walters &
Portmess, 1999, p. 131), especially noting the hypocrisy of Christians who ridiculed those
animal activists who were trying to do something about this "hemorrhage wide as the
continents" (p. 131). Similarly, Romain Rolland, the writer, pacifist, and Nobel Laureate
noted that most humans not only refused to acknowledge their cruelty toward other
animals as criminal, but they criticized anyone who defined these actions as such.
Rolland stated: "Thousands of animals are uselessly butchered every day without a
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shadow of remorse. If any [man] were to refer to it, he would be thought ridiculous. And
that is the unpardonable crime" (p.137). Rolland acknowledged that ifthose who were
sympathetic to animals did not admit that suffering was part of nature, they could be
derided as sentimentalists. But despite admitting the harsh reality of nature, Rolland
encouraged humanity to lesson the amount of suffering it caused when it could chose to
do so, such as with diet (Walters & Portmess, 1999).
Although Moore mentioned rights for nonhumans, it was the 19th century British
writer, teacher, and humanitarian Henry Salt who is credited with first transferring the
concept of human rights to nonhumans, proposing the two causes were connected
(Walters & Portmess, 1999). Salt conceived ofNHAs as individuals who deserved to live
their lives within the same limited freedoms that humans enjoyed, where violence (and
restrictions on freedoms) was only justified when absolutely necessary. Twentieth
century theologian and physician Albert Schweitzer expanded on this by extending
humans' ethical responsibilities out not only to other sentient animals but also to all
living species (Linzey & Clarke, 2004). Schweitzer defined ethical behavior as that which
encourages life and avoids injury and destruction where possible. This philosophy of
reverence for life earned Schweitzer the 1952 Nobel Peace Prize. Schweitzer
acknowledged that because nature often requires the sacrifice of other lives to sustain life,
it was a "painful enigma" (Walters & Portmess, 1999, p. 148) for him to know how to
live by his ethic in this world. As with other philosophies, necessity serves as a guideline;
Schweitzer explained, "Whenever I injure life of any kind I must be quite clear as to
whether this is necessary or not" (Walters & Portmess, 1999, p. 149).
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In summary, Cavalieri (2006) contended that even though some philosophers of
this period critiqued Cartesian reduction of animal sentience and cognition, "Descartes'
complacent humanism set the stakes so low that the best most critics managed to do was
to go back to a (softened) version of Aristotle's doctrine of animal slavery" (p. 60).
Descartes essentially limited the discourse to one of welfare not rights. According to
Cavalieri (2006):
Instead of starting from the question, "How much do animals count?" it started
from the question, "How much can animals suffer, if at all? This led to a dispute
about animals' mental capacities, with the main normative problem - "Are we
entitled to inflict suffering on animals at all?" - disappearing in the background.
(p.59)
Mid to Late 20th Century
Cavalieri (2006) proposed the third key moment in animal philosophy arose in
response to the advent of intensive farming ofNHAs for food in the post WWII era. This
was part of philosophy's contempt for instrumental reason's promotion of uncontrolled
technology and objectification of nature. Cavalieri posited that when it came to the
animal research industry, Descartes was proactive in ethically justifying the scientific
status quo so it could develop unhindered, but with animal agribusiness, the industry was
reactive in attempting to justify itself in response to philosophical criticism regarding the
practice of factory farming. While Heidegger and Derrida both critiqued agribusiness by
comparing it to Nazi death camps, with Derrida being more critical, they both sti1llargely
maintained a privileging of the subject as human. Cavalieri (2006) credited Singer with
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transferring the egalitarianism of modem philosophies and asking for moral consistency
in applying it to other sentient beings.
Building on fellow utilitarians Bentham's and Mill's concerns for the interests of
other animals in centuries previous, in the 1970s Singer proposed that all sentient animals
should have their like interests given equal consideration (Singer, 1990). Singer (1990)
defined sentience as the ability to suffer and experience happiness, both of which are key
concerns in a utilitarian calculation of maximizing pleasure versus pain. Singer claimed
that sentience, even more so than intelligence, was the most morally relevant trait a being
possesses, as sentience is the common denominator humans respect most in each other.
To prove this, Singer used marginalized case examples showing humans still care about
the interests of sentient, developmentally-challenged humans, regardless of their
intelligence level.
If people argued that the morally relevant trait was simply being human, instead
of sentience or intelligence, Singer (1990) accused them of species discrimination
because they failed to provide a reason for the moral relevancy of species in ignoring the
like interests of others. While Singer admitted that it initially seems logical to claim that
favoring the interests of one's own species is similar to how one naturally favors the
interests of one's own family group, Singer revealed the inconsistency in this argument
by saying it would lead to 'racism or sexism if applied to showing favoritism for one's
own racial or gender group. Singer argued that when humans elevate the status of their
own species, they effectively lower the status of others, making humans guilty of species
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discrimination. To label this discrimination against NHAs, Singer (1990) used the tenn
"speciesism" (p. 6).
Speciesism is linked with racism and sexism, as there are strong parallels in how
women and people of color have been discriminated against by being compared to lowly
and irrational animals (Adams, 1990; Singer, 1990; Spiegel, 1997). While Midgley
(1984) sees race as a more arbitrary category, biologically-speaking, than species or
gender, the author agreed that rights movements on behalf of race, gender, and species
are ultimately all working toward the same goal of defeating "unfairness" or
"unreasonable biases" (p. 101). Biases enable hierarchies, which often lead to
mistreatment, where the "superior" group feels justified sacrificing the major interests of
the "inferior" group to satisfy their own minor interests (Singer, 1990).
Regan, a deontologist, was also one of the first contemporary philosophers to ask
for moral consistency in humans' dealings with other animals, paying NHAs similar
courtesies as are shown to other people under a human rights model (Linzey & Clarke,
2004; Regan, 1983). Regan (2004) emphasized rights over interests by declaring humans
should respect the right to life and liberty of all individuals who are subjects of a life,
regardless of species. Regan (2004) explained that what many animals share, particularly
mammals, is that "we are each of us the experiencing subject of a life, a conscious
creature having an individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness
to others," (p. 185) and so we all have inherent value. Under Regan's deontological
viewpoint, it is immoral to treat those with inherent value as though they are just a utility;
all who have inherent value have it equally. Therefore, the fundamental wrong in society
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is humans' systemic view of other animals as resources, and Regan calls for abolition of
humans' industrial exploitation of them.
Varner (1998), an environmental philosopher, discerned that the difference
between Regan's view and Singer's is that the former is more of a rightist while the latter
is more of a welfarist. But I discern overlapping elements between both philosophies, as
they each seek fairness in extending the egalitarian notions of respect society has for all
humans out to other fellow sentient, conscious beings. They both differ from a more
broad-based philosophy like Schweitzer's reverence for all life, as they exclude plants
and less conscious animals, such as oysters. And with both Regan and Singer, levels of
sentience and individual consciousness still come into play, as species thought to more
clearly possess these human traits become more deserving of moral relevance.
Midgley argues that humans should care about NHAs based on humans exercising
compassion, not based on the other animal's interests or rights, as compassion is less
abstract and does not ask that all animals be treated equally (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992).
Compassion does not require the anthropomorphic identification with other animals
based on similar mental states of consciousness. One simply needs to feel sympathy to
avoid causing others to suffer. Some feminists, such as those using Gilligan's ethic of
care, find Singer and Regan's arguments too individualistic, abstract, and rationalistic and
prefer to emphasize kinship and community or connection. They believe we should act
not out of duty but out of sympathy and love.
In conclusion, Cavalieri (2006) declared that the post-Cartesian era is over and
Western society is now back to the debate that is over 2,000 years old, the "original
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Greek appraisal of the worth of other animals" (p. 66). Society is moving beyond the
limited arguments over cruelty and pleas for more compassion and is challenging the idea
that NHAs should be enslaved. For the first time in history, using philosophical means,
"it is now possible to defend the idea that animal lives have value" (p. 66).
The following section includes an expanded exploration of modem, animal-
related philosophies from poststructuralist and posthumanist scholars in cultural studies
who discuss the strengths and weaknesses of philosophies on NHAs and the role of
language and communication in the struggle to transform speciesist discourse. I begin
with a discussion, primarily inspired by Derrida, on the basic need to deconstruct the
human/animal binary that is at the root ofWestern philosophy's justification for its
discrimination against NHAs.
Poststructural and Posthumanist Philosophies Regarding the
False Human/Animal Dualism
Justification for Addressing the Question ofHumans' Animality
The two main reasons that Derrida (1995,2002,2004) claimed the human/animal
binary should be deconstructed are because (1) philosophy has largely failed to properly
address the issue, calling into question the very validity of current philosophies, and (2)
the effects of this dualism result in untold violence and suffering for nonhuman animals.
Beginning with the latter point, Derrida (1995, 2002, 2004) described Western culture's
treatment of animals as violent. And while a certain amount of violence towards other
animals is both natural and traditional, Derrida criticized it in its modem form as
"industrial, scientific, technical violence" (2004, p. 64) that results in "unprecedented
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proportions ofthis subjection ofthe animal" (2002, p. 394). Derrida (2002) claimed, "it is
all too evident that in the course of the last two centuries these traditional forms of
treatment of the animal have been turned upside down by the joint development of
zoological, ethological, biological, and genetic forms of knowledge" which result in the
"inseparable techniques of intervention" (p. 394) that now literally transform animals into
objects.
Derrida (2004) denigrated the mass slaughtering ofNHAs as the "'techno-
scientific' pathologies of the market or of industrial production" (p. 65). Consider the
condemning terminology Derrida (2004) used in the following quote explaining the need
to combat both industrialized violence against animals and extinction of species:
I have sympathy (and I insist on that word) for those who revolt: against the war
declared on so many animals, against the genocidal torture inflicted on them often
in a way that is fundamentally perverse, that is, by raising en masse, in a
hyperindustrialized fashion, herds that are to be massively exterminated for
alleged human needs; not to mention the hundreds of species that disappear each
year from the face of the earth through the fault of humans who, when they don't
kill enough, let them die - supposing that the law could ever be assured of any
reliable difference between killing and letting die! (p. 67)
This quote also expresses Derrida's lack of faith in the law and the animal rights
movement's proposed use ofthe law, based on a humanist model of human rights, as the
philosophical basis for solving this problem.
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Derrida (2004) did not propose a direct solution but suggested that the industrial
violence against animals must and will change, particularly because the "spectacle man
creates for himself in his treatment of animals will become intolerable" (p. 71) due to the
negative "image of man it reflects back to him" (p. 73). Derrida predicted change will
occur gradually, "this transformation will no doubt take centuries, but I repeat, I do not
believe that we can continue to treat animals as we do today" (p. 73).
Derrida (2002) did not debate animal suffering, saying "no one can deny the
suffering, fear, or panic, the terror or fright that humans witness in certain animals" (p.
396). Further, Derrida (2004) explained that for humans it is our shared status as animals
that enables this empathy: "we know what animal suffering is, we feel it ourselves" (p.
70). This last statement involves the human animal in Derrida's (2004) "question of
animality" (p. 62), a question Derrida described as "not one question among others" (p.
62) but as "decisive ... in itself and for its strategic value" (pp. 62-63). Emphasizing the
fundamental importance of the animal question to philosophy, Derrida stated:
It also represents the limit upon which all the great questions are formed and
determined, as well as all the concepts that attempt to delimit what is "proper to
man," the essence and future of humanity, ethics, politics, law, "human rights,"
"crimes against humanity," "genocide," etc. (p. 63)
Derrida (2004) called for an extension of the trace to the "entire field of the
living" (p. 63) and lamented that, instead, what dominated human culture and
philosophical discourse on the subject of "something like 'the animal'" (p. 63) was "the
gravest, most resistant, also the most naIve and the most self-interested presuppositions"
36
(p. 63). Derrida criticized the fact that this philosophical discourse is built upon the
"phonocentrism or the logocentrism that always trusts in a simple and oppositional limit
between [Man] and the Animal" (p. 63). Wolfe (2003), a posthumanist scholar, also
critiqued the fact that cultural studies is predicated on the idea that the subject is human,
with an implicit and fundamental repression of the "question of nonhuman subjectivity"
(p. 1). Likewise, Derrida (1995) stated the question of the animal is constituted within the
broader philosophical debate over defining the who in the subject and emphasized its
fundamental importance to all social problems:
There is no need to emphasize that this question of the subject and of the living
"who" is at the heart of the most pressing concerns ofmodem societies, whether
they are deciding birth or death, including what is presupposed in the treatment of
sperm or the ovum, surrogate mothers, genetic engineering, so called bioethics or
biopolitics ..." (p. 283)
Derrida (2004) claimed that the way post-Cartesian philosophy has treated "THE
(so called) animal is a major sign of its logocentrism and of a deconstructible limitation"
(p. 63). Derrida referred to their discourse as hegemonic but optimistically predicted that
what problematizes it and "resists" (p. 63) it is the fact that "there is a multiplicity of
living beings" (p. 63) that humans cannot deny we are part of by continuing to delimit
this variety into false categories of human and animal. The purpose of deconstruction, in
this regard, is to limit the violence done towards animals. Deconstruction does not seek
"to destroy the axiomatics of this (formal and juridical) solution, or to discredit it, but to
reconsider the history of law and of the concept of right" (p. 74).
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This section goes on to further analyze the discursive tensions in the
human/animal binary, such as: inconsistent definitions of the term animal, the struggle to
avoid speciesist language, the inability to define the human border, debates over whether
species should be defined by physical or mental traits, paradoxes over the concept of
humanity, whether ethics and compassion are cultural verses natural traits, and whether
animal rights should promote principles of animal similarity or diversity. By seeking
some clarity regarding these paradoxes and tensions, I hope to strengthen the logical basis
on which animal rights philosophy can inform animal rights campaign messages.
Inconsistent Definitions ofthe Term "Animal"
One reason Derrida (2004) claimed that the reductionism inherent in the
human/animal binary is problematic is because all other animal species do not constitute
a singular group: "I am suspicious of the appellation 'Animal' in the singular, as ifthere
were simply [Man] and the Animal, as if the homogenous concept THE Animal could be
extended universally to all nonhuman forms ofliving beings" (p. 63). Similarly, in the
introduction to the book What is an Animal? (1988), Ingold, the editor and
anthropologist, described scholarly discussions about the inconsistencies inherent in the
multiple meanings of the very term animal. Midgley noted that animal has two
definitions with differing connotations - a "benign" one that includes humans and a
"negative" one that not only excludes humans but represents what is "inhuman or anti-
human" (in Ingold, 1988, p. 4). These different connotations, related to whether animality
is inclusive or exclusive of humans, both represent and cause inconsistencies. For
example, Coy highlighted the contradiction that occurs in animal welfare philosophies
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that sometimes use animal to mean innocent, "dumb beasts" upon which humans should
take pity and other times as living beings on par with humans in their possession of a full
range of feelings (in Ingold, 1988). Regarding the former negative connotation, Dunayer
(2001) noted that to call a human an animal is an insult, "nonhuman animal terms insult
humans by invoking a contempt for other species. The very word animal conveys
opprobrium. Human, in contrast, signifies everything worthy" (p. 2). Dunayer stated that
when someone says "humans and animals" they commit a "verbal ruse" (p. 11) by
denying the benign definition of animal that includes humans in the animal kingdom.
Similar to Midgley, Tanner explained the two opposing conceptualizations of
animality as (1) a "domain or kingdom" (which includes humans - a scientific taxonomy
that takes into account ecological connections/dependence) and (2) a "condition" (which
excludes humans and is "opposed to humanity") (in Ingold, 1988, p. 4). In the latter
conceptualization, human culture is separated from nature, which is seen as the NHAs'
domain. This anti-human condition of being an "animal" represents the distinction
between "natural" behaviors devoid of values or reasons and the process humans go
through to become enculturated and overcome this animality.
Struggle for Non-Speciesist Terminology
Given this problematic double-meaning ofthe word animal, it is challenging to
find a non-speciesist term to denote the proper respect for NHAs. Other animals could be
called nonhuman animals, as I chose to use throughout this dissertation, or other-than-
human animals, as both of these labels remind humans that they are animals too. But both
of these labels still mark them as an "Other" in negation to the dominant term of human,
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such as non-white expresses a racial hierarchy. Activists sometimes refer to NHAs using
the term being, as in sentient being or living being, but this still does not carry the weight
of human being as far as indicating an implicit dignity; there is no similar English term
denoting "animal dignity." Instead of finding a new term for other animals, humans could
redefine themselves by using the term human animal instead ofjust human to remind
them oftheir mutual status as animals; this may help eliminate the use ofthe term animal
as an insult toward humans (Dunayer, 2001). Alternately, humans could simply refer to
all animals as persons and distinguish them, humans included, based on species names,
when needed.
It does seem like some new terms are needed to properly denote the new value
humans should be placing on what Derrida (2004) referred to as "the multiplicity of
living beings" (p. 63) and our mutual status as members of one group. Some might find
Derrida's (1995) and Wolfe's (2003) term infra-human too clinical, so perhaps Mitchell's
humanimal is the best neologism proposed yet (Wolfe, 2003). In addition to carefully
phrasing existing words to increase respectfulness toward other animals, I believe the
creation of new terms is necessary to circumvent the speciesism inherent in a discourse
built to reflect the human/animal dichotomy at the heart ofthe Western worldview.
Inability to Define Human Borders
In the debate over definitions of animal, Derrida (2004) preferred to embrace
complexity instead ofhomogeneity, emphasizing that there are many differences that
could be characterized as "uncrossable borders" (p. 66) among all animals, even among
humans; this diversity cannot be reduced to just one definitive border between humans
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and all other animals, "There is not one opposition between [man] and [non-man]; there
are, between different organizational structures of the living b~ing, many fractures,
heterogeneities, differential structures" (p. 66). Ucko echoed this claim that the
borderlines are blurred, even between mammals and other animals, "Contrary to the
normal assumption, the borderline between humans and animals, or more specifically
between humans, and birds, fish or invertebrates, is anything but obvious, clear and
immutable" (in Ingold, 1998, p. xii).
In fact, Derrida (2004) stated it was very difficult to identify any trait that is
uniquely "proper of [man]" or exclusive to humans, "either because some animals also
possess such traits, or because [man] does not possess them as surely as [he] claims" (p.
66). Like Derrida, Ingold (1988) stated "no matter the trait chosen, either some people do
not exhibit it or else members of some other species do" (p. 25), and Clark (1993) also
pointed out that whatever hallmark humans use to distinguish humanity from other
animals, there are always some humans who fail to qualify. This is reminiscent of
Singer's (1990) contention that there are some NHAs who possess more so called
"human" capabilities than marginalized cases of humans, such as infants or people with
mental illnesses or disabilities.
Championing the trait oflanguage as a connecting trait, Derrida (1995) explained
how the notion of differance (meaning's fluidity) related human language to that of other
animals:
I am thinking in particular ofthe mark in general, ofthe trace, of iterability, of
differance. These possibilities or necessities, without which there would be no
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language, are themselves not only human. It is not a question of covering up
ruptures and heterogeneities. I would simply contest that they give rise to a single
linear, indivisible, oppositiona11imit, to a binary opposition between the human
and the infra-human. And what I am proposing here should allow us to take into
account scientific knowledge about the complexity of "animal languages," genetic
coding, all forms of marking within which so called human language, as original
as it might be, does not allow us to "cut" once and for all where we would in
general like to cut. (pp. 284 - 285)
For Derrida, the trait oflanguage that might represent this border between species is
analogous to a cut in the subject, which can be marked wherever humans choose. Derrida
(1995) lobbied for the cut to include NHA languages.
Other scholars have noted this same futile humanistic struggle for humanity to
find a line it can draw in the sand based around one uniquely human characteristic.
Lawrence (1995) detailed the many allegedly "human" traits throughout history that
failed to be proven exclusively human, such as: making tools, teaching cultural practices,
practicing rituals, having unique personalities, being aware of death, building and
transforming nature, creating art, practicing altruism, possessing language, and
experiencing wonder. Dunayer (2001) pointed to some evidence that traits that define
humanity in the dictionary, such as a highly developed brain, organized speech, and
abstract reasoning, are not unique to only the human animal in all cases. In a later
subsection, one caveat I suggest is that the only trait that seems to define most humans is
acting excessively beyond what is natural or necessary. However, Midgley (2004) argued
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that philosophers should not be asking what makes humans different from other animals,
as we are all complex beings who share many qualities, so searching for one
differentiating factor is reductionist and futile. Midgley proposed that philosophers ask
what is the best thing about human life, and answer it according to traits which other
animals may also share.
Defining the Moral Boundary between Species
While there does not appear to be a distinct division separating all humans from
all other animal species, Elstein (2003) contended that even species is a rather contested
and arbitrary, socially-constructed category. Elstein applied ethical reasoning to
demonstrate the subjectivity and self-interested motivations of scientific categories and
how different types of sciences, and cultures, have different, largely instrumental, criteria
by which they distinguish species. Elstein (2003) cited Darwin (1859), one of the
pioneering scientists most associated with the concept of species, as saying that species
categories are largely put in place for sake of convenience and are primarily based on
resemblance. Darwin claimed that the term species "does not essentially differ from the
term 'variety'" (p. 52). Darwin believed that species is an indefinable category where
differences between animals were more a matter of degree than kind. Elstein (2003)
claimed that, although these degrees of difference represent varying gaps between
species, there is no clear way to determine how much of a gap has any moral
significance.
Elstein (2003) suggested all moral philosophers should start specifying what they
mean when they say "species," as it is not an essential or self-explanatory label that
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should continue to be taken for granted. Elstein claimed that a common logical fallacy is
for people to say that species distinctions are based on some physical or biological trait,
when it is really mental traits that they prioritize. Physical traits (such as ability to mate,
DNA similarities, or physical resemblance) do not sufficiently warrant the exploitation or
mistreatment of a species, while mental traits (such as language use, intelligence, or
sentience) form the real basis for why people say species divisions matter. Elstein did not
address spiritual traits, such as possession of a soul.
Elstein's (2003) contention that mental distinctions trump physical ones was
echoed by Clark (in Ingold, 1988) who stated this physical definition of species variance,
where "individuals of a species are linked by their genealogical connection, as actual co-
descendants of a common ancestor or as potential co-ancestors of a common descendant"
(p. 3), does not provide a very distinct characteristic to which all individuals within the
species relate. The moral boundary between species must be determined by something
more significant and specific than biology.
To answer this call and be more consistent, Elstein (2003) posited that moral
philosophers should switch to defining species by mental traits rather than physical ones.
In quite a radical idea, Elstein proposed reducing the myriad of animal species down to
four different (but not mutually exclusive) "moral species concepts" (p. 16) which are
based on an animal's ability to (1) plan for the future, (2) experience boredom, (3) suffer
pain, and/or (4) feel emotions. While this may be an ethical improvement on the more
arbitrary way philosophers currently make moral decisions about the treatment of others,
I would contend that Elstein fails to acknowledge the complications of hegemonic power
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in creation of knowledge (Foucault, 1980). Humans would still maintain the power to
define mental traits of nonhumans in ways that could just continue to serve human
instrumental or commercial interests.
Despite these practical challenges, Elstein (2003) was astute to raise the question
of what differences have moral relevancy because it is perhaps the most fundamental and
vulnerable question at the heart of the human/animal dualism; it also serves to trouble
animal rights philosophy as well. Singer (1990) claimed that sentience was the true moral
distinguishing factor in human society, and Regan (2003) proposed the key factor was
being a conscious subject of a life. Both of these can be seen as a broader version of the
privileging of mental traits that Elstein (2003) proposed. They still necessitate a
hierarchy, to some extent, where categories of animals must be deemed sentient and
conscious enough to warrant fair treatment as a subject; for example, mammals and birds
may qualify while oysters or insects may not, or to a lesser extent.
Paradoxes Surrounding the Concept of "Humanity" in Critiquing Speciesism
A large part of humanity's "unease" (Derrida, 2004, p. 73) about its mistreatment
ofNHAs in Western culture is based on a contradiction between the lofty humanist moral
values humans claim to have and the way that "human kindness" is often not reflected in
humans' actual relations with other animals; humans' actions seem largely based on self-
interested rather than altruistic values. Dunayer (2001) suggested the word humanity is
both speciesist and unjustified, as it implies that kindness is an inherent part of each
human's nature, yet many examples can be given of individual humans failing to show
compassion. Likewise, Dunayer critiqued the common use of the phrase human kindness,
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as ifthe two words naturally fit together, whereas the term animal kindness seems foreign
and senseless to the ear. The latter is because humanist discourse precludes association of
kindness with nonhumans, but Dunayer (2001) contested this notion by providing some
compelling examples of NHA altruism by mammals, birds, and fish.
Some sociobiologists would likely attribute these altruistic acts in species to
instinctual self-interest, theorizing the altruism is biologically motivated to ensure the
survival of one's genes, even if the benefit to oneself is not immediately apparent and the
action seems compelled by reason (Ridley, 1996). Yet while Dunayer's (2001) anecdotal
evidence of nonhuman altruism is not scientifically generalizable to the entire species,
Dunayer claimed that the very fact that certain individuals (human and nonhuman) act
with kindness towards others, while other individuals ofthe same species in similar
circumstances do not, demonstrates that instinct is not always the motivating factor
determining altruistic behavior.
Mitchell (in Wolfe, 2003) surmised that humans must have some empathy for
NHAs because the notion of extending rights to NHAs is "irresistible" (p. ix) on some
level. Mitchell explained that this underlying sympathy causes humans to feel both a
sense of resistance and anxiety regarding their treatment of nonhumans. The anxiety
stems from human discomfort over a faint awareness that "human life as now constituted
is based on the mass slaughter of billions of animals accompanied by untold suffering"
(p. ix). Derrida (2004) predicted that this "industrial, scientific, technical violence" (p.
64) towards NHAs must and will change, albeit over centuries, because it will become
"more and more discredited" and "less and less tolerable" (p. 64) as it becomes visible.
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Derrida (2004) believed a driving force of this change was that this violence "will
not fail to have profound reverberations (conscious and unconscious) on the image
humans have of themselves" (p. 64). Because humans have a high opinion of their moral
values, bearing uncomfortable witness to the violence they cause is key to facilitating
change. This is why Derrida (2004) referred to this violence as an "intolerable" and a
"spectacle" (p. 71). Derrida asked interviewer Roudinesco, "If you were actually placed
every day before the spectacle of this industrial slaughter, what would you do?" (p. 71),
and before changing the subject, Roudinesco replied that she would not eat meat anymore
and would live somewhere else because she prefers not to see it. This answer illustrates a
point Derrida (2002) made about humanity's need to avoid acknowledging the violence:
No one can deny seriously, or for very long, that men do all they can in order to
dissimulate this cruelty or to hide it from themselves, in order to organize on a
global scale the forgetting or misunderstanding of this violence. (p. 394)
On one hand, Derrida's (2002) and Mitchell's (in Wolfe, 2003) statements admit
that humans' collective mistreatment and murder of other species causes us to feel guilty,
indicating that these philosophers adhere, to some extent, to the humanist notion that we
are a "compassionate" species, yet they also admit that instead of humans mobilizing our
supposed compassionate values to end this violence, most of us willingly avoid directing
our hearts and minds to this "spectacle" (Derrida, 2004, p. 71) choosing to remain
uncomfortably complicit instead. Likewise, Dunayer (2001) stated that one way humans
avoid feeling guilty is to construct the notion that ''unjustified killing is murder only if the
victim is human" (p. 4). Dunayer claimed humans "prefer to couch nonhuman
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exploitation and murder in culinary, recreational, and other nonmoralistic terms" (p. 4).
The need for this detached language also indicates that Dunayer paradoxically shares
humanist notions that humans feel a sense of shame and guilt over their violence toward
animals. This humanism is apparent in Dunayer's (2001) critique ofthe deceptive use of
the English language: "Speciesism is a lie, and it requires a language oflies to survive.
Currently, our language denies the harm that humans routinely inflict on other animals;
linguistically, both the victims and the perpetrators have disappeared" (p. ix). Hence it
seems safe to agree with Derrida's (2002) idea that a human is indeed the "animal at
unease with itself' (p. 372) - the animal who suffers anxiety over the suffering they cause
to other animals, forcing them to hide behind the lies of a speciesist discourse.
Dunayer's (2001) positions described above reveal the complexity of the
humanist tension in relation to animal rights, since Dunayer conceived ofhumans as a
moral enough species to know they need to deceive themselves linguistically in order to
continue being speciesist, yet paradoxically stated humans are not inherently moral
enough to live up to the term humane. Dunayer did not deny that humans have the
capacity to be moral, only that morality and kindness are traits limited to just the human
speCIes.
A major conflict is that the very idea that we should treat nonhumans better may
be humanist, in other words, promoting an essentialist and superior view of the human
being, as it may privilege humans with a certain ethical status presumably not found in
other animals. I contend that if animal activists were to be truly morally consistent,
instead of supporting an implicit paternalism or dominionism toward other animals, they
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would have to expect all other animals to have ethical standards and duties too (albeit
based on their individual capacities and freedom of choice) because activists claim that
species differences are more of degree than kind. This is a conundrum. But when it
comes to the supposedly humanist ethical standards, is it possible these principles are
actually derived from nature instead of culture, and, therefore, might naturally apply to
all, or at least some, social animal species?
The Nature versus Culture Debate Applied to the Ethics ofCompassion
To explain this idea of a "natural" ethic, consider that human ethics generally
value the compassionate tendency for humans to protect the weak or innocent, such as
children, from predation and exploitation by the strong; this protection from exploitation
is the basis of social justice movements, and on the surface it appears to be in opposition
to the harshness of a "survival of the fittest" view of nature. Yet, humans' ethical
prohibition against causing harm is legally limited to harm in excess of what is necessary
for one's survival, and this is a principle in line with what other animals practice in nature
that ensures ecological balance. Despite ethical standards, clearly, many humans do
practice exploitation of the weak, and to excess of other animals (consider child
pornography, slave labor, factory farming, greenhouse gas emissions,
genocide/extinction, etc). In fact, I argue that the one trait that does distinguish the human
species among most other animal species is their ability to do most things (both "good"
and "bad") to excess of what is natural or needed.
Throughout history, philosophers have acknowledged humans' propensity for
excess, and they have discussed this tendency in both positive and negative terms (Linzey
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& Clarke, 2004). For example, Aristotle noted that humans could be the most wicked,
cruel, lustful and gluttonous beings imaginable if we misused our prudence and valor
(Linzey & Clarke, 2004). Porphyry believed animals are sentient, rational beings who
"likewise have vices, and are envious; though their bad qualities are not so widely
extended as in men: for their vices are of a lighter nature than those of men" (in Walters
& Portmess, 1999, p. 39). Hobbes said that language allows humans to benefit from
society and laws but that humans can also use speech for misdeeds, like lying and
teaching bad behavior, so that "[man] errs more widely and dangerously than can other
animals" (in Linzey & Clarke, 2004, p. 19). Hobbes posited that humans are also more
destructive for unjust reasons than are other animals:
So just as swords and guns, the weapons of [men], surpass the weapons of [brute]
animals (horns, teeth, and stings), so [man] surpasseth in rapacity and cruelty the
wolves, bears, and snakes that are not rapacious unless hungry and not cruel
unless provoked, whereas [man] is famished even by future hunger. (p. 19)
Implying that there are also natural guidelines outside human ethical systems, Michel de
Montaigne said "animals are much more self-controlled than we are, and keep with
greater moderation within the limits that Nature has prescribed" (in Linzey & Clarke,
2004, p. 106).
As humans seek to move beyond natural limits, they create additional choices,
which leads to excess. Herder blamed this on humans' sense of free will: "whilst animals
on the whole remain true to the qualities oftheir kind, man alone has made a goddess of
choice in place of necessity" (in Linzey & Clarke, 2004, p. 35). Rousseau admired
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humans' free will to resist instinct and choose our behavior, specifically our ability to
improve ourselves. But to Rousseau this free will was also the "source of all human
misfortunes" (in Linzey & Clarke, 2004, p. 33) which "producing in different ages his
discoveries and his errors, his vices and his virtues, makes him at length a tyrant both
over himself and over nature" (p. 33). Burke described a human as one who is corrupted
by hislher pursuit of perfection to ascend in hierarchies and is given to excess in this
pursuit; Burke especially noted humans' excessive use of symbols and tools (Foss, Foss
& Trapp, 1991).
Coward argued that humans' excess production created hierarchies and social
inequalities at an unnatural level, while "in animal societies there's a startling absence of
complex accumulation and unequal distribution of resources" (in Linzey & Clarke, 2004)
p. 96). Mason (1993) proclaimed the source of humanity's excess accumulation to be
agriculture. The domestication of animals about 11,000 years ago created a transition for
many human beings to a more sedentary, agricultural way oflife. Agricultural surpluses
created divisions of wealth. In order to protect this wealth, patriarchal warrior cultures
developed, creating oppressive systems of control labor such as slavery and imperialism.
While forager societies often viewed other animals with wonder, respect, and partnership
(not that some of these societies did not cause extinction or suffering), herder/agrarian
societies were more likely to disempower animals in order to control and demystify them.
Thus, many societies came to view domesticated animals as commodities and wild
animals as competition and pests (Mason, 1993). According to these viewpoints,
agriculture is responsible for creating human's ability to live in excess of the natural
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limits that tend to guide most other animal societies and keep them from creating the vast
accumulations of wealth and resulting social inequalities human society's often exhibit;
this excessive human lifestyle relies upon an instrumental view of other animals and
nature.
I believe that if humans are characterized by excess, which can lead to both
comfort and poverty, good and bad, then an ethical system becomes necessary for
purposes of restraint. Western philosophers often lauded humans' ability to think
abstractly because it leads to our free will, which leads to our ability to control and
choose our behaviors; control was implied to be a positive ability to demonstrate restraint
- in the face ofboth the "sins" of excess choice in a human society and a supposed
animal instinct born from nature (Linzey & Clarke, 2004). Ancient Western philosophy
valued temperance and restraint as ethical virtues, including restraint in food choices
(Singer & Mason, 2006). Yet, while humans have the ability to individually show
restraint in the face of choice, as a whole some claim humans excessively decrease choice
in environmentally problematic ways. Callicott (1993) called humans "devolutionizers"
for the mass extinctions they cause, and Pollan (2006) claimed that humans are
"homogenizers" who use science to simplify natural complexity, such as with
monoculture crops decreasing natural diversity. Both of these unflattering claims of
human uniqueness fit within the broader label of humans as an excessive species who are
in need of ethics as a form of restraint.
Environmental philosophy often credits human ethics to biology and evolution,
stating ethical behavior is natural, and what is natural is, thereby, good. Aldo Leopold's
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(1993) land ethic conceived of ethics as biological, where there is naturally a "limitation
on freedom of action in the struggle for existence" (p. 215). Callicott (1993) believed this
was influenced by Darwin's evolutionary theories of humans as a social animal needing
to create kinship. Callicott argued that ethics would have preceded reason in humans'
evolutionary process because humans needed to have complex linguistic skills which
come from being social, and being social requires some limitations on individual
freedoms. Darwin, as well as David Hume and Adam Smith, all contended that ethics
rested on feelings and sentiments, which were found in the animal kingdom (Callicott,
1993). Darwin said that natural selection would privilege those with feelings, as they
would be more likely to produce humans who behave in socially acceptable ways. This
echoes Ridley's (1996) and Kropotkin's (2004) contention that cooperation is more
natural than competition to highly social animals, such as humans. This complements the
Nietzschean notion of humans being the "sickliest" (Nietzsche, 1977, p. 580) of the
animals for straying so far from their instincts. Nietzsche believed it was healthier for
humans to follow their instincts rather than suppress them to fit a religious model of
morality.
Callicott (1993) argued that nature is not immoral, as "intelligent moral behavior
is natural behavior" (p. 129). Rolston (1993) also argued for a natural ethic where right is
determined by an ability to sustain life rather than just sustaining pleasure. Rolston said
that the is/ought principle, usually seen as specious, can make sense in nature because as
humans use science or experience to describe how nature functions and explore the
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intricate relationships and hannony, they discover that what is often or frequently is what
ought to be; and it becomes hard to know where facts end and values begin.
I contend that because the human practice, by some individuals, of exploiting or
hanning other weaker animals to excess goes against hannonious or ecological principles
often found in nature, perhaps humans' ethical system promoting compassion and
protective justice is actually based on "natural" principles - both the principle of
cooperation to gamer social support and the principle of moderation for ecological
balance. I believe our fundamental ethical principles are, or should be, based on the idea
of taking only what we need for our basic survival, complementing the principles of deep
ecology (Devall & Sessions, 1985), with any excess acts ofhann constituting exploitation
and a breach of ethics. Ultimately, this moderation is what most other animals already
practice, making all animals equally subject to these same ethical guidelines; this notion
of equality avoids the humanist tendency to imply that humans should be kind to other
animals because we are ethically superior beings. So while we can admit that humans'
ethical system may be highly complex and impressive when compared to that of other
animals, this high level of sophistication appears to be necessary to restrain our special
propensity for excessive hann. Therefore, when AROs promote animal rights on ethical
grounds, they should take care not to insinuate that all ethical principles are limited to the
realm of humanity or that it makes us "better," as that might unintentionally reinforce the
problematic human/animal dualism and related notions of human superiority that lead to
discrimination against NHAs.
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Tensions over Whether Animal Rights Strategies Should Promote Similarity or Diversity
Contradictions between animal rights and humanism. These inconsistencies
associated with humanism and animal activist goals also caused Derrida and some
posthumanist scholars to critique the philosophical basis of animal rights, while still
remaining sympathetic to the need to end the modem institutionalized violence towards
nonhumans. Derrida (2004) contended that animal rights is a flawed concept so long as it
models itself after a juridical concept of human rights, as the notion of human rights is
based on a humanist "post-Cartesian human subjectivity" (p. 64) that has led to the very
oppression that animal activists seek to end:
Consequently, to confer or to recognize rights for "animals" is a surreptitious or
implicit way of confirming a certain interpretation ofthe human subject, which
itself will have been the very lever ofthe worst violence carried out against
nonhuman living beings. (p. 65)
In fact, Mitchell advised fellow posthumanist scholars to study humanism, as it is
essential to addressing questions related to speciesism:
"Speciesism" is ritually invoked in the denigration of others as animals while
evoking a prejudice that is so deep and "natural" that we can scarcely imagine
human life without it. The very idea of speciesism, then, requires some
conception of "the posthuman," an idea that makes sense, obviously, only in its
dialectical relation with the long and unfinished reflection on species being that
goes by name of humanism (in Wolfe, 2003, p. xiv).
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Wolfe (2003) criticized the fact that Singer and Regan's animal rights
philosophies are based on humanism, "thus effacing the very difference of the animal
other that it sought to respect" (p. 8). It is true that the tensions between the priorities of
similarity and difference are essential to the paradox present within animal rights. Birke
and Parisi (1999) stated, "The tension between our similarity and our difference from
other animals, moreover, informs much of the political and philosophical tension around
debates on animal rights" (p. 57). But Ingold (1988) clarified a misconception by stating
it is not anthropocentric to show how a particular human trait, even a positive one, is
unique to our species, as every species is also likely to have something unique about it.
Ingold contended that it is anthropocentric, however, to compare nonhumans to humans
and expect them to have the same capacities in order to deserve respect, which is
something that some animal activists do.
Promoting similarity. This anthropocentrism is especially apparent in Singer and
Cavalieri's Great Ape Project (1993) where they use nonhuman primates as a bridge
species to gain "animal rights" before other animals, based on apes' obvious similarity to
humans. But anthropocentrism is arguably apparent, to a lesser degree, in Singer's (1990)
and Regan's (1983) theories that use a shared trait between human and nonhuman
animals, such as sentience and consciousness, as a reason to include NHAs in our sphere
of moral concern. This tactic of promoting sameness and a connection between humans
and nonhumans is also indicative of any argument suggesting that there are few, or no,
traits that humans possess that are not also possessed by, at least, some other animal
species (Clark, 1993; Derrida, 2004; Dunayer, 2001; Ingold, 1994; Lawrence, 1995).
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However, before chastising animal rights for implicitly promoting humanism, one
must determine whether the activist's line of argumentation is based more on the desire to
build nonhumans up in the "noble" likeness of humanity (expanding humanity to include
other animals) or based more on the desire to knock humans down offtheir self-
constructed moral pedestal, encouraging them to embrace, instead of shun, their innate
animality (expanding animality to include humans). The distinction between the two
approaches is key. The latter approach of encouraging humans to embrace their animality
is, perhaps, less humanist and more morally tenable. But it is less commonly used,
presumably for the utilitarian reason that it more directly challenges humanism and
comes across as more threatening to the status and esteem of the very humans who must
be convinced.
Embracing human animality. Yet, if animal activists fail to use the latter approach
to convince humans to respect their animality instead of despise it, humans may never
treat other animals with more respect. Agamben (2004) noted that our humanity is
currently based on how much we control the animal within ourselves, as Western
metaphysics defines humanity in opposition to animality. This relates to a politics of
excluding someone who must still simultaneously be included. Agamben's (2004)
analogy is that the animal in each human is like the sacred [man] of Roman law who may
be killed without the killing being considered murder. The animal is held in such an
ambiguous place that is both external and internal, where he/she is subject to death
without remorse. Agamben proposed a Heideggerian-inspired path of creating a more
meaningful life through creating more meaningful, and less instrumental, relationships
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with other animals, saying that would simultaneously improve humans' sense of the
animal in themselves and, thus, their treatment of other animals.
Abram (1997), an environmental phenomenologist, suggested deconstructing the
mind/body dualism that parallels the human/animal and subject/object dualisms by
beginning to privilege the body as a source of knowledge. Abram (1997) encouraged
humans to begin to reaffirm their bodies and physical senses as a communicative site of
gaining wisdom about the entire natural world instead ofjust relying on human symbolic
communication and limiting knowledge to anthropocentric realms. By embracing the
"primitive" sensual communication most humans have lost, they would expand their
knowledge by beginning to relearn and value what other species are communicating. If
the body were not separated from, and inferior to, the mind, then humans would not use
the supposed superiority of the human mind's ability to reason abstractly as an excuse to
reduce other life to mere bodies devoid of wisdom. The body, whether human or
nonhuman, would be enlivened as a subject rather than being reduced to an object
(Abram, 1997).
Asking humans to begin to respect the body's wisdom and to embrace their
animality is perhaps a philosophically rigorous approach to promoting animal rights, but
it is not as pragmatic as the more humanist approach of proving NHA likeness to humans.
The 1arter recognizes that because people place a high value on supposedly "humanist"
traits (such as intelligence, kindness, emotional sensitivity, symbolic communication,
education, artistic talent, and spirituality), it is only reasonable that animal activists
appeal to the fact that NHAs also share some ofthese respected traits when trying to
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convince humans to have higher respect for NHAs (Ba1combe, 2006; Fouts, 1997;
Friend, 2004; Masson & McCarthy, 1995; Page, 1999). This tactic of emphasizing like
traits was used successfully to gain human rights for historically oppressed groups of
humans (Bormann, 1971; Campbell, 1989). Therefore, Derrida's and Wolfe's suggestion
that animal rights philosophies should be less humanist and should avoid this human
rights or "likeness" model of social justice is unsettling and challenging to conventional
activist wisdom on achieving social progress for oppressed groups.
Promoting difference and diversity. Another philosophical problem with the tactic
of emphasizing that NHAs share many valued "human" traits is that it runs the risk of
reducing other animals to lesser categories of "sub-humans." Wolfe (2003) explained that
different species cannot be expected to possess "qualities, potentials, or abilities that are
realized to their fullest in human beings" (p. 53). This could leave NHAs forever stuck in
the role of diminished or immature humans, just as humans would always be a
diminished version of cats, chimpanzees, birds, fish, or any other species.
Activists and philosophers may also find it counterproductive to insinuate that
NHAs are close to being humans but are just under-developed. Dunayer (2001) posited
that, from an evolutionary perspective, species should not be ranked as more or less
"primitive" (p. 13) against the benchmark of humans serving as the "advanced" (p. 13)
species. Dunayer clarified, "species don't evolve toward greater humanness, but toward
greater adaptiveness in their ecological niche" (p. 13). This is reflected in the fact that
Darwin did not believe in ranking species as higher or lower (Dunayer, 2001).
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The case against promoting similarities seems to lead to the somewhat
counterintuitive argument of promoting differences in order to gain equality for other
animals. On the surface this flies in the face of reason. However, toward this goal, Ingold
(1988) endorsed Coy's position that, "to defeat anthropocentrism, we must stop
interpreting statements about the disabilities of other species as assertions of their
inferiority" (p. 10). While other species are different, they are by no means failed or
lesser versions of humans.
In exploring the idea of embracing differences, it is useful to acknowledge that the
advanced stages of some human social justice movements in the United States have also
moved in this direction, as they now promote diversity. The problem with the earlier
human rights approach to gaining equality by emphasizing the similarities between
human groups (i.e. men and women, whites and blacks, or heterosexuals and
homosexuals) was that the historically oppressed groups (or some might say the
"marked" or "inferior" side of the binary) were then forced to assimilate into the
dominant group's world and live by the standards set by white, Western, heterosexual
males. Just as many activists in the civil rights movement do not advocate for complete
"colorblindness," under the premise that it would wipe out some distinguishing traits that
some individuals value and generally disrespects difference, so too the animal rights
movement should not expect people to be blind to the many splendid variances among
animals. Activists should ask people to respect these differences, as certainly
"biodiversity" is respected as a strength from the standpoint of ecological values.
Diversity in both human society and nature is not limited to groups or species but applies
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to individuals within groups/species as well, or else it promotes reductionist biological
essentialism (Clark, 1993).
But as a caveat to totally abandoning approaches that favor inclusion/similarity,
women's rights activists and abolitionists did not have to "concede" that women and
people of color were not as smart as Caucasian men (which was the general constructed
fallacy that historically justified their lower status) by arguing that they deserved rights
anyway because America should value diversity. Many would rightly agree that human
activists need not concede this, since the capabilities of women and people of color are
obviously more likely to closely resemble the capabilities of others of their own species
than nonhumans' do to humans. But does this mean that animal activists must concede
that NHAs are not as smart (or communicative or kind or sensitive) as humans but say
that these differences should not matter in order to gain respect/rights? Many may not
want to or feel it is truthful to fully concede that humans and other animals are so
completely different.
Blending similarity and diversity. Therefore, the best position may be a blended
one that embraces both the fundamental commonalities that provide kinship and the
specific differences that provide diversity. While people may come to value NHAs and
respect diversity, the concern is that they will still prioritize fellow humans over other
animal species if they do not see some similarity that connects all animals together and
gives them a reason to value other species on the same level as they value their own
species. As a base connecting trait, I suggest that Regan's (2003) idea of being a
conscious "subject of a life" may be the best option; it combines principles of both
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sameness and difference, and subjective consciousness is broad enough to include many
species yet still allow for diversity within and among species. It could be compared to the
base connecting trait ofpersonhood that has allowed for equality among races, genders,
and ethnicities, while still allowing for diversity. Singer's (1990) notion of sentience is
quite similar and could also work, as long as the focus expands beyond concerns over
bodily suffering and emphasizes their individual life and personhood. Perhaps if animal
rights campaigns encouraged people to embrace diversity and their own animality it
would mitigate some ofthe problematic humanism inherent in animal rights expanding a
human rights model.
The ideas of Deleuze and Guattari (2004) seem to support this notion of blending
regarding human-animal relations, as they say animals serve to rupture notions of identity
and sameness. In the article "Becoming Animal," they use the Nietzschean idea of
becoming over being to emphasize animal-becoming as a way to free the subject from its
humanistic straightjacket. They privilege notions of expansion, multiplicity, mutuality,
heterogeneity, and rhizomes over more contained notions of classifications,
identification, essentialism, and linear progression. Becoming is considered more real
than being, as it contains difference and acknowledges how everything is implicated in
everything else (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004).
James Urpeth (2004) interpreted Deleuze and Guattari (2004) as seeking a plural
monism that enables humans to escape their self-imposed boundaries into more
impersonal mutual terrain - a de-territorializing of life that emphasizes symbiosis and
alliances. Birke and Parisi (1999) claimed that a Western humanism built on
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individualism and boundaries is threatened by sYmbiosis: "Becoming animal, in Deleuze
and Guattari's work, is to experience interchange; it is to question the ideals of humanism
and purity" (p. 67). They critique animal rights for seeking to extend boundaries instead
of questioning and challenging the existence of boundaries and identities as an othering
force.
The promotion of subject consciousness as an equalizing factor seems tenable so
long as hierarchies are not reintroduced into the system by assigning higher value to those
beings who humans determine most exemplify this connecting trait of being a conscious
subject, which is what complicates Elstein's (2003) model. This essentialist logic would
send society back to an oppressive system. A key question is whether it is possible for
people and most social animals to avoid creating pecking orders of some sort. Human
history seems to have proven otherwise; so the human tendency to evaluate, judge, rank,
and seek boundaries should be accounted for as a complicating factor in any ethical
system.
In conclusion, I see the value in embracing the deconstructive principles of
diversity, difference, and complexity, while still maintaining some ethical standards
based on universal principles, like avoiding unnecessary harm and valuing sentience, in
order to avoid total relativism. Although the constructivist approach to meaning does not
allow for belief in one universal truth, perhaps getting closer to any truth comes only
through embracing the complexity inherent in a blending of subjectivity and objectivity,
or, more specifically, nature and culture. This encourages social constructionists to admit
that natural tendencies and ecological principles have some merit and value, and,
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conversely, it encourages scientists to be open to the "humanity" of nature, while
encouraging scholars from all disciplines to expand their notion of the subject to include
animal life in general.
This lack ofborders, certainty, and stability makes humans uneasy and instigates
a need to create deceptive language that constructs tidy borders. Therefore,
problematizing the fragile borders of humanity and species through deconstruction of
speciesist language is a worthwhile goal of the animal rights movement. Hopefully it will
serve to lift the cloud of deception that constrains humanity and to prod us closer toward
a "surrender to the animal" (Derrida, 2002, p. 372) within ourselves.
The human/animal dualism explored in this section can be said to reside within
the broader culture/nature dualism in Western philosophy. It is therefore helpful to
dedicate the next section to exploring how environmental philosophy addresses the place
of humans in relation to nature, or all nonhuman life, and to what extent environmental
philosophies seek a less anthropocentric worldview, as animal rights philosophy does.
This brief overview of theories on nature will inform my upcoming attempt to situate
modern animal ethics within environmental ethics to examine its logical consistencies
and inconsistencies. This exploration will help determine the feasibility of incorporating
both environmental ethics and animal ethics in activist campaigns on behalf of other
animals, such as in vegetarian campaigns.
Western Philosophy and Non-Anthropocentric Values Related to Nature
The environmental movement incorporates a variety of ways to value nonhuman
life, with the ends of the environmentalist continuum often defined as "anthropocentric"
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on the conservative end and "biocentric/ecocentric" on the progressive end. Regarding
the debate between anthropocentric and ecocentric views, Cox (2006) stated, "perhaps no
other dilemma so sharply divides advocates in the U.S. environmental movement" (p.
276).
The most anthropocentric viewpoint is one of conservation, where nature is
viewed as a resource for human use (Van de Veer & Pierce, 2003). This originated in the
sciences and was promoted by Pinchot, a forestry scientist at the tum of the 20th century.
Additionally, some anthropocentric viewpoints value nature from a spiritual perspective.
According to this view, the need for wilderness preservation primarily depends on how
its beauty and "naturalness" make it a sacred place where humans can benefit from being
closer to God and reaching a sense of enlightenment not available in more urban, man-
made environments. This popular viewpoint historically falls under the umbrella of the
preservation movement, credited largely to John Muir, founder of the Sierra Club (Van
de Veer & Pierce, 2003).
An alternative viewpoint to anthropocentrism is ecocentrism, which suggests that
nature has intrinsic value that merits it for protection in its own best interest, regardless of
any separate instrumental value that humans may place on it. Aldo Leopold's land ethic,
deep ecology, and ecofeminism may best describe this less anthropocentric end of the
environmentalist spectrum (Van de Veer & Pierce, 2003).
Leopold (2003), the famous, mid-20th century ecologist, promoted the need for a
non-economic, holistic view of ecosystems. Leopold's "land ethic" stated that "a thing is
right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty ofthe biotic community.
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It is wrong when it tends otherwise" (p. 223). A basic principle ofthe land ethic is that it
"enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals"
(p. 216). Leopold's environmental ethic critiqued the conservationist viewpoint for
reinforcing human superiority over nature, which excused privileges without supporting
ethical obligations. Leopold did not support valuing the land based on "economic
motives" (p. 218) because not all of nature has economic value, so the resource
viewpoint's protection is limited to only certain parts of the whole (and sometimes it
excludes whole ecosystems in and ofthemselves).
Another more ecocentric perspective, deep ecology, provides an ethical
theoretical framework for acknowledging humans' obligations to the non-human world-
one that does not place humans at the pinnacle of moral relevance but recognizes the
equal moral status of all other life on earth (Devall & Session, 1985). Deep ecology
suggests a more holistic and less anthropocentric worldview is necessary to cure the
serious environmental problems facing our world. It considers biodiversity inherently
valuable and states "humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to
satisfy vital needs" (Devall & Session, 1985, p. 67). Deep ecology principles call for
humans to immediately moderate their "excessive" (p. 67) interference with the natural
world, reduce the human population, and change policies and lifestyles.
Another more ecocentric perspective, Ecological feminism, is defined by Warren
(2003) as a framework for "developing an environmental ethic which takes seriously
connections between the domination of women and the domination of nature" (p. 282).
Warren posited the logic of traditional feminism must include both the abolition of
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sexism and naturism, as both are oppressive frameworks characterized by a logic of
domination. Ecofeminism foregrounds the dichotomy of gender roles in society,
especially as they relate to the dualism of culture/nature: men being historically
associated more with human culture and rational beings and women being associated
more with nature and emotional/instinctual beings like NHAs (the "lower" beings).
Considering the current ecocentrism versus anthropocentrism debate, Eckersley
(1992) categorized all ranges on this spectrum. Eckersley pointed out the commonalities
both sides shared, saying they are both emancipatory at heart and critical of the same
types of enviromnentally destructive forces. Where Eckersley claims they vary most is in
their "ecophilosophical justifications" (p. 29) for their proposed alternatives. Eckersley's
scale of enviromnental perspectives consists of five ranges, from most anthropocentric to
most ecocentric, respectively; they are: resource conservation, human welfare ecology,
preservationism, animal liberation, and ecocentrism. When Grendstad and Wollebaek
(1998) empirically tested this spectrum to see where people's beliefs ranged, they found
that the most anthropocentric perspective, resource conservation, received the lowest
support, while human welfare ecology (just one ranking away) had the highest support.
The general public seemed to be fairly supportive of all of the middle category
perspectives and only failed to agree with the most anthropocentric and most ecocentric
"extremes."
While Marangudakis (2001) critiqued ecocentric activism (particularly Earth
First! direct action) as radical, unproductive and irrational, other studies confirm
Grendstad and Wollebaek's (1998) findings that ecocentric perspectives on nature are not
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as radically uncommon or irrational in eyes ofthe general public - especially not toward
wilderness protection (Manning, Valliere, & Minteer, 1999; Steel & Shindler, 1994). In
support of ecocentrism, a survey by Hunter and Rinner (2004) revealed that "individuals
with ecocentric perspectives place greater priority on species preservation relative to
those with anthropocentric perspectives, regardless of species knowledge" (p. 517.) This
suggests that a person's environmental perspective is more critical to detennining species
protection than a person's level of knowledge or awareness about species and ecological
issues. Hunter and Rinner (2004) claimed their survey results imply that education
campaigns to protect local species should expand to promote the bigger picture of
ecocentric ethics like ecological integrity and biological diversity and that people with
anthropocentric views are the key audience to target. This finding bolsters the argument
in this dissertation that animal rights campaigns should seek to change the public's
anthropocentric perspective on how they perceive and value other animals, addressing the
big picture of instrumentalism, rather than primarily seeking to raise factual awareness or
simply to change daily behaviors toward NHAs.
Environmental Ethics as it Relates to All Animals - Debates over
Individual versus Holistic Perspectives
Most environmental ethics, even more ecocentric ones such as deep ecology and
the land ethic, are built on holistic perspectives that prioritize the health of the ecosystem
or whole species more than the individuals that make up those groups. In contrast, most
philosophies supporting ethical treatment of nonhuman and human animals privilege
individual perspectives, such as rights. While deep ecology acknowledges drastic changes
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that humans must make to promote biodiversity, many other environmental philosophies
avoid inserting humans into the holistic perspective, as that would reduce humans down
to just another species and challenge the current system of individual human rights. This
section explores how environmental ethics literature has focused some attention on
NHAs and how it might further incorporate a concept of animal ethics.
Sagoff (1993) posited that animal liberation and environmental ethics are
incompatible, as environmentalism is not based on a concept of rights. Sagoff did not
challenge human rights but argued that if humans extended those individual rights out to
all animals then nature would be threatened by the fact that humans become obligated to
stop predation in the wild; however, no animal ethics theories make this assertion.
Rolston (1993) claimed humans should treat wild NHAs naturally rather than humanely,
but they should treat domesticated NHAs humanely. The rationale is that a natural
concept of ethics is indifferent to individual welfare and suffering and favors only the
ability to sustain life. These debates over whether or not to favor individual rights for
wild NHAs help explain the major policy conflicts animal activists have with many
environmentalists over hunting and killing non-native species (Varner, 1998).
However, some environmental ethics incorporate all animals in a more egalitarian
sense. Taylor (1993) took a more Schweitzerian approach to valuing nonhumans by
casting a broad net to include all wild plant and animal life. Taylor criticized the notion
of human superiority as a bias and asked humans to see themselves ecologically as
interdependent species with all others. Humans have a moral obligation to treat other
species as inherently valuable members of the biotic community. Taylor (1993)
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challenged a holistic environmental ethic by stating that humans, as a destructive species,
could not justify their own existence under a holistic perspective.
Excluding the Human Animalfrom Holistic Ethics
Some philosophers seek to retain a privilege for humans within a holistic ethic.
For example, Schmidtz (2002) did not believe in Taylor's (1993) idea of species
egalitarianism. Schmidtz (2002) claimed some species have additional virtues, beyond
just the telos all living beings share, that grant them higher moral standing. This
hierarchical view privileges humans as having the most virtues but acknowledges that
other sentient animals have interests that deserve some respect, while plants should be
valued more instrumentally.
To defend some individualistic human priorities, Callicott (1993) interpreted
Leopold's land ethic as including both holistic and individualistic principles, although
acknowledging the former is emphasized. Ecology conceptualized all life existing in a
circuit of energy that relies on predation, life, and death. Callicott (1993) admitted that a
holistic ethic is threatening to human rights, as it seeks to preserve, "the very inequalities
in nature whose social counterparts in human communities are condemned as bad and
would be eradicated by familiar social ethics" (p. 125). Callicott acknowledged that
Regan (2002) described the anti-human sentiments of holistic environmental ethics as
"environmental fascism" (p. 107). However, Callicott (1993) defended the land ethic by
claiming that it allowed humans to privilege their moral obligations to human
communities in which they were intimate (such as family and nation) while still retaining
an obligation to the biotic community.
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Additionally, like many other environmental philosophers, Callicott (1993)
suggested that humans should respect NHAs while still eating them, as the American
Indians did. However, this theory seems to defend the social status quo where humans
prioritize human interests over responsibilities to either the natural world or other
animals. Callicott implicitly granted the least priority toward NHAs, since they were not
perceived as a community of individuals to whom humans were directly obligated but
rather as a holistic part of the biotic community.
Biocentric Individualism and the Place ofHumans
Varner (1998) promoted a non-holistic environmental perspective by promoting
an idea of "biocentric individualism" that helped unify animal and environmental ethics
in some ways. By viewing all living organisms as members of the biotic community,
humans can grant them each interests that cannot be granted to wholes or groups.
Interests are granted to entities based both on their needs and on their ability to have
desires and goals, which only certain conscious individuals can have. Varner (1998)
compared nature with a business, where it is managed as a whole but for the benefit of
the individuals (stockholders and employee wealth).
Although Varner's (1998) ethic privileged conscious, individual animals over
individual plants or whole species, Varner admitted to an axiological anthropocentrism
that favors some human interests over other conscious animals' interests in times of
conflict. Varner does this on the basis that humans' interests contain larger goals than
nonhumans' do. This point does not seem biologically relevant, as often the pursuit of
human goals uses excess resources, so one can argue that Varner does not convincingly
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defend anthropocentrism here. Varner (1998) then pointed to strands of thought in both
Regan's and Singer's animal ethics that also privileged human interests and rights when
pushed in complex conflicts.
Varner (1998) attempted to show that the major, individualistic animal rights
philosophy of Singer may actually overlap with environmentalism, at least on a policy
level, by privileging holistic over individual value in some cases. This meant that
Singer's utilitarian ethic is "reasonable" enough to allow some therapeutic hunting, for
the benefit of the ecosystem, not sport, ifit reduces animal suffering overall. Varner
described Singer as a welfarist and Regan as a rightist because Regan is less willing to
allow individuals to be sacrificed for the benefit of the whole. By mainstreaming and
watering down Singer's and Regan's main arguments, Varner claimed to find
convergence with holistic environmental ethics, in some cases, and anthropocentrism in
others, presumably for the purpose of making animal ethics more amenable to
environmental philosophy.
Regan (2002) argued that an individualistic rights perspective is in keeping with
environmentalism if extended from animals to include plants. Regan stated that if humans
protect individuals in a biotic community, then the whole community benefits. One can
perceive of a group as morally valuable but one cannot assign rights to that group. Regan
highlighted environmental holism's paradox of wanting to value all life in holistic
categories while excluding the human species. These holistic views if applied to human
animals would lead to a "fascist" (Regan, 2002, p. 107) type governance that would
warrant the killing of any humans deemed ecologically unsustainable.
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Clearly, there is a need within environmental ethics to address Regan's (2002)
concern that a holistic ethical system would threaten human rights. Varner (1998) was
one of the few environmental philosophers who switched to an individual biocentric
ethic, while most others reconciled the conflict either by rationalizing humanity's status
as a superior being deserving of rights or by ignoring humanity as irrelevant to the
separate sphere of nature. It is hard not to notice that even environmental ethics, which is
largely based on ecological principles of species interdependence, still separates human
society's individual ethical system from nature's holistic ethical system, thereby
ironically reinforcing the nature/culture dualism. However, environmentalism does often
request that humans adopt a less invasive and destructive lifestyle even if it still grants
humans individual rights it denies all other life.
Failure ofEnvironmental Ethics to Address Domesticated Species
Environmental ethics also separates domesticated nonhuman species as being
under the purview of human ethics and reserves environmental ethics only for application
to wild nonhuman species. It therefore categorizes domesticated NHAs, such as farmed
animals, as unprotected entities who do not possess the inherent value that wild species
and humans do. This apathy toward domesticated nonhumans may be due to the fact that
many environmental philosophies do not ask for a transformed conception of humans in
relation to all other animals but rather ask for a transformed view of nature, where
humans should value the maintenance ofbiodiverse ecosystems. However, even this
biocentric view of nature as inherently valuable is often based on somewhat instrumental
values of human self-interest, since environmental preservation is often promoted as
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necessary to ensuring human survival (Freeman, 2005). Therefore, many environmental
ethics philosophies, even though some claim to be biocentric, remain more
anthropocentric, or humanist, than animal ethics.
But even if animal ethics challenges the human/animal dualism moreso than
environmental ethics does, it still reinforces the related culture/nature dualism in some
ways, but in a different sense than environmentalists. Animal ethics leaves the realm of
wilderness largely to its own governance and only interferes to protect nonhumans from
humans when the latter are exercising excessive violence or destruction (beyond basic
survival needs). It does not micromanage wilderness the way some environmental
perspectives do, and it does not seek to save free animals from the suffering they
naturally experience in nature, unless it is caused unnecessarily by humans. Animal ethics
does promote guidelines for the treatment of nonhumans where environmental ethics
does not - in human society. Here it seeks to grant these nonhumans the status of morally
relevant beings, not based on their value to an ecosystem, but based on their value as
conscious, sentient subjects of a life, similar to human beings.
Blending Individualism and Holism, Culture and Nature
It seems that neither animal nor environmental ethics can fully escape the
bifurcation of human society from nature in all ways, just as humans cannot fully practice
just individualism or just holism. Since humans are unwilling and unable to reinsert
themselves fully into a natural life as hunter/gatherers who would live more closely under
nature's holistic guidelines (in addition to living under some cultural guidelines enforced
in any social animal group), I posit that humans have to retain two separate but
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sometimes overlapping ethical systems - one for nature and one for human societies. For
animal ethics, that means practicing an individual ethic toward all animals in human
society and allowing wild nonhuman animals and nature their freedom from dominating
human interference (so that humans manage humans, not free nonhumans). For most
environmental ethics, that means practicing an individual ethic toward humans in human
society while asking humans to avoid domination of nature, and, perhaps ironically,
simultaneously managing nature according to a holistic ethic that allows for some
nonhuman individuals to be sacrificed for the benefit of the ecosystem (which could be
viewed as a form of domination).
Sociologists Jasper and Nelkin (1992) recognized this need to retain some
nature/culture divide by stating, "The animal rights movement might be more effective if
it embraced the environmentalist perspective on animals in the wild, and focused solely
on helping domestic ones" (p. 171). And Pollan's (2006) study of human food dilemmas
calls for a bifurcated ethical system, even if a larger advantage is given to humans:
A human morality based on rights makes for an awkward fit when applied to the
natural world. This should come as no surprise: Morality is an artifact of human
culture devised to help humans negotiate social relations. It's very good for that.
But just as we recognize that nature doesn't provide a very good guide for human
social conduct, isn't it anthropocentric of us to assume that our moral system
offers an adequate guide for what should happen in nature? Is the individual the
crucial moral entity in nature as we've decided it should be in human society? We
simply may require a different set of ethics to guide our dealings with the natural
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world, one as well-suited to the particular needs of plants and animals and habitats
(where sentience counts for very little) as rights seem to suit us and serve our
purposes today. (p. 325)
In conclusion, even in human societies, they blend individual and
communitylholistic ethical perspectives, albeit often privileging the former in Western
societies. So, it is not contradictory that humans do so in their outlook on how to treat
other species. While this blending of individual and holistic perspectives does not allow
for a neat or simple solution to ethical dilemmas, it does allow for some sense ofjustice,
mainly in avoiding exploitation of other animals and nature, most pertinent to the ethical
systems found in both human and nonhuman domains. While they are both anti-
instrumental, what may be lacking in both animal and environmental ethics is a less
humanist outlook where individual human rights are maintained while humans' animality
is embraced and the human/animal dualism more overtly challenged (Freeman, 2007b).
This less humanist outlook might increase our kinship with other animals and begin to
privilege nature as a moral and inherently valuable domain that is not entirely separate
from or "below" human society.
The next section explores how animal and environmental ethics have translated
into activism on behalf of nonhumans in the United States, including where animal
activism has overlapped with environmental activism historically. This animal activism
section will be followed by a section that returns to moral philosophy, narrowing the
discussion to the development of ethical perspectives on eating other animals.
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History ofActivism for Nonhuman Animals in the United States
This section examines the origins and development of the NHA protection
movement in the United States. To give a perspective on the rapid development of the
humane movement, between its origins in the mid 19th century and the tum of the 20th
century, about 700 animal protection organizations formed in United States, mainly
ASPCA chapters. And after Singer's 1975 book, Animal Liberation, the movement
experienced a growth spurt, and now it is estimated that 7,000 organizations exist with
over 10 million members (Beers, 2006, p. 3).
The Humane Movement Leading to Animal Rights
England pioneered the Western humane movement in the early 19th century with
Richard Martin's founding of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(SPCA), which was formed to enforce new anti-cruelty laws protecting farmed animals.
Beers (2006), a historian, credited the SPCA's formation to the social problems caused
by industrialization as well as inspiration from new philosophies on kinship related to the
abolition movement and Darwinian evolutionary theory. In the United States in the mid
to late 19th century, industrialization presented people with a conflict between their desire
to consume nature and to save it, as influenced by Thoreau's back to nature movement.
Henry Bergh created the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals (ASPCA) in 1866, and his first conviction was a butcher who had mistreated
farmed animals (Beers, 2006). Early ASPCA campaigns sought to improve the conditions
for working carriage horses and farmed animals in the slaughterhouse as well as to stop
hunting and animal experimentation. While some states did pass anti-cruelty laws earlier
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in the 19th century, the nation did not have a federal anti-cruelty statute unti11871 when it
passed the "twenty-eight hour law" to improve the welfare of farmed animals transported
by rail to slaughter. But protecting "livestock" drew less public support than protecting
companion animals, so animal shelter and rescue work started to dominate the humane
movement in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Post World War One (WWI) did see
other campaigns such as those against fur and circuses (Beers, 2006). The post World
War Two (WWII) years saw a growth in professional welfare organizations like the
Humane Society of the United States, Friends of Animals, and the Animal Welfare
Institute, who focused on changing institutions not just individuals (Jasper & Nelkin,
1992).
There were divisions within the animal protection movement, however. The
American Humane Association (AHA), formed in 1877 to unify the movement, ironically
caused a rift between radical and conservative activists in the late 19th century, as it took
a conservative welfare stance of working with industries like the meat industry (Beers,
2006). More militant activists left and formed their own rights groups, such as the
American Anti-Vivisection Association started by Caroline Earle White. By the post
WWII era, even other welfare groups, such as the Humane Society of the United States
(HSUS), campaigned for more stringent humane reforms in slaughterhouses, as the
HSUS considered the AHA's slaughterhouse monitoring to be too weak. Welfare
organizations sometimes used rights language but ultimately they took an instrumentalist
view that weighed human interests higher than the interests of other animals and did not
promote species equality. Welfarists and rightists argued over language in reform bills,
78
but the we1farists won and passed the Humane Slaughter Act in 1958 and the Laboratory
Animal Welfare Act in 1966 and 1970. The animal protection movement was largely
dominated by welfare groups until the mid 1970s (Beers, 2006).
In its origins, the animal protection movement borrowed activist strategies from
the abolitionist and women's rights movements, such as using moral suasion to expose
the reality of injustices (Beers, 2006). Since animal activists believed people were not
willing to give up their superior status over other animals, the early movement leaders
often used an anthropocentric approach and attached humane reform to human se1f-
interest. For example, the humane slaughter act was also touted as a public health reform.
Many organizations, especially the ASPCA under Bergh's leadership, attracted media
attention by staging protests and using shocking visual images of cruelty. Beers (2006)
claimed that newspapers covering the emerging movement in the late 19th century often
ridiculed activists, particularly Bergh, as sentimentalists, but the news ofthat century
eventually did show some moral outrage and sometimes compared human and NHA
slavery.
The modem day animal protection movement was inspired by Singer's (1990)
book Animal Liberation, which was originally published in 1975 (Jasper & Nelkin,
1992). In the 1970s, activist Henry Spira individually led animal rights campaigns, but by
the 1980's, national animal rights groups formed, such as People for the Ethical
Treatment ofAnimals, In Defense of Animals, the Animal Liberation Front, and the
Animal Legal Defense Fund, all of which are still active today. By the end of the 1980s,
there were several hundred animal rights groups and several thousand welfare groups,
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mainly local humane societies. Membership in national groups rose drastically in the
1980s - mainly from educated, city-dwelling, non-religious women who had companion
animals (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992).
The animal protection movement of the late 20th century drew from the ideologies
ofthe feminist and environmental movements to critique instrumentalism, the
institutionally-sanctioned exploitation of others as a means to an end (Jasper & Nelkin,
1992). The anti-instrumentalism of the New Left questioned capitalism's growth
imperative and its emphasis on the material instead of the moral. Rights rhetoric
burgeoned in many movements in the 1970s, including animal rights. Jasper and Nelkin
(1992) claimed the animal rights fundamentalists were more successful than welfarists at
attracting members and formulating issues because they used strong visuals and moral
language that was more dramatic and energizing. However, the authors critiqued the
fundamentalists' message as too polarizing due to a demonization of opponents as
enemIes.
The moral language of rights has radicalized the animal protection movement in a
matter ofa few decades (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992). Jasper and Nelkin explained:
Their leaders have linked philosophical arguments about the exploitation of
animals to prevailing social concerns: the mistrust of science and medicine, the
disaffection with big business and commodity culture, the disillusionment with
bureaucracy and expertise, and the resistance to domination so important in
feminist critiques. (p. 170)
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History ofAnimal Protection and Environmental Movement Alliances
Animal protection and environmentalism do overlap, particularly in the protection
of wild, or free, NHAs and their habitats. The main conflict in wildlife protection is over
hunting ofNHAs (Beers, 2006; Varner, 1998). Even if some naturists, such as Muir and
Seton, objected to unethical hunting practices, many naturists kept anti-hunting views to
themselves to avoid offending and losing the many hunting members in their
environmental groups. Early environmentalists often had more instrumental views of
conserving nature, which did not lead to many alliances with animal advocates. The first
significant alliance was a successful campaign at the tum of the 20th century to save birds
from extinction due to the ladies fashion trend of feathered hats (Beers, 2006).
Post WWII, the environmental movement had become less anthropocentric, but
biocentrism still did not fit ideologically with an animal protection movement built
largely on preventing suffering. However, Jasper and Nelkin (1992) claimed the
environmental movement's anti-capitalist, anti-instrumentalist ideology and its high-risk
strategies, such as those by Greenpeace, were influential to the emerging animal rights
movement. Beers (2006) believed that Carson, a popular environmental author, was able
to bridge the two movements in the mid to late 20th century, as Carson was influenced by
Schweitzer's broad reverence for life. The two movements did work together to pass two
significant wildlife protection measures - the Endangered Species Act (1969 and 1973)
and the Marine Mammal Protection Act (1972).
Hunting remains a point of contention, as most environmentalists still will not
alienate members by having anti-hunting or anti-fur campaigns (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992).
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Maurer (2002) and Varner (1998) suggested similar pragmatic motivations regarding the
environmental movement's current reticence to actively promote sustainable plant-based
diets or campaign against destructive factory farms, both out of fear of alienating
members and a desire to avoid having their identity conflated with animal rights, a less
popular ideology. Animal activists often consider themselves environmentalists, but the
reverse is less often true. Beers (2006) explained, "Humanitarians more easily conflated
biocentric concerns with issues of animal sentience; they could envision all animals and
one animal, perceiving the interests of both as an interrelated cause" (p. 195). Many
animal protection authors suggested greater alliances with the environmental movement
would be advantageous (Beers, 2006; Hall, 2006; Jasper & Nelkin, 1992; Maurer, 2002),
but to do so animal protection ideology would have to put greater emphasis on the
aspects that overlap with environmental ideology.
Beers (2006) suggested the ideological difference between environmentalism and
animal rights is also gender-based. The humane movement has a reputation of being run
by sentimentalists and females, which associates it with emotion. The environmental
movement has a reputation of being male-dominated and scientific, which associates it
with reason. This gives enviromnentalism the advantage of being on the dominant side of
the male/female and reason/emotion dualisms. Jasper and Nelkin (1992) described this as
environmentalism historically appealing to the brain and the humane movement
appealing to the heart. Although, the modem animal ethics philosophies of Regan (1983)
and Singer (1990) add a reasoned appeal for "masculine" notions of rights and justice that
welfare philosophies based on compassion do not possess.
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The final section of this chapter narrows the discussion of animal issues down to
the focus of this dissertation - animals used for human food. This section will explore the
historical development of Western thought on the ethics of eating other animals for food,
patiicularly pro-vegetarian perspectives, as they help inform the ARO food campaigns
studied in this dissertation. This section includes an exploration of the communication
challenges facing AROs due to the discomfort that the public and animal agribusiness
have with honestly and candidness in discussing these ethical issues and facing the reality
of how NHAs are raised. The section concludes with a brief overview of the status of
vegetarianism in the United States today.
Western Vegetarian Ethics Throughout the Ages
In opening their book Ethical Vegetarianism: from Pythagoras to Peter Singer,
editors Walters and Portmess (1999) situated the specific ethical dilemma of eating other
animals within the broader ethical debate of nature versus culture. The editors questioned
whether human's purpose was to amend nature or to follow it, how humans should view
predator and prey relationships and determine which one they are, and how humans
should reconcile the fact that some suffering and death is necessary to bring about a
renewal of life.
Throughout history, all pro-vegetarian writers have shown a concern for the
suffering that humans cause other animals, specifically suffering that is deemed
unnecessary (Walters & Portmess, 1999). Writers often asked humans to stop repressing
their pity and to bear witness to the horrors of the slaughterhouse. While writers from
previous eras focused more on questions of moral pmity and how to lead a good life,
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contemporary writers added to this a deconstruction of the human/animal dualism,
arguing that there is not a morally-relevant difference between all animals. I note the
authors' themes of ethicality are often based on avoiding unnecessary harm and showing
restraint from excess, which aligns with my earlier discussion of how humans' propensity
for excess requires a sophisticated ethical system.
Antiquity
Ancient writers often acknowledged a kinship between humans and other animals,
allowing nonhumans the capacities of reason and emotion that scientific thought of later
centuries would deny them (Walters & Portmess, 1999). Writers ofthis era often stated
how the killing of animals for food is unjust because it is unnecessary. They also worried
that human cruelty toward other animals desensitized people toward cruelty to humans.
Pythagoras (570-490 BeE) was perhaps the most famous vegetarian, and, in fact,
Western vegetarians up through the 18th century were often called Pythagoreans. His
motivation for vegetarianism was based on a belief in the transmigration of souls between
human and nonhuman animals. Ovid's writings on Pythagoras's teachings were quite
passionate, including terms such as bloodshed, flesh, evil, wicked, and greedy. The fact
that plant foods require no bloodshed makes them a "gentler nourishment" (in Walters &
Portmess, 1999, p. 22). Pythagoras argued that killing is only appropriate when necessary
for self-defense but not for food.
Plutarch (56-120) alluded to evolutionary kinship by recognizing that nature gave
all animals similar characteristics, and he said that the sentience and intelligence of other
animals deserved moral consideration (Walters & Portmess, 1999). Plutarch's description
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of cruel fanning methods that were practiced to improve the taste of the flesh suggests
that there has not been a time when fanning of animals was humane. He claimed flesh-
eating is unnatural to humans who must cook it to deceive the palate from the "taste of
gore" (in Walters & Portmess, 1999, p. 29). For Plutarch, vegetarianism equaled
humanitarianism and "social responsibility" because eating flesh "makes us spiritually
coarse and gross by reason of satiety and surfeit" (in Walters & Portmess, 1999, p. 30).
To emphasize his concern that our killing was excessive, Plutarch said we humans should
only eat flesh to satisfy hunger not luxury.
Porphyry (233-309) also claimed it is unjust to injure anyone for "luxury" (in
Walters & Portmess, 1999, p. 41) and not just subsistence, as justice is aligned with self-
control and abstinence. "Since justice consists in not injuring any thing, it must be
extended as far as to every animated nature" (in Walters & Portmess, 1999, p. 45). There
are several similarities between Porphyry's views and the views of Singer (1990)
millennia later in privileging sentience as a trait all animals possess that morally separates
animals from plants. Additionally, Porphyry believed that NHAs are rational beings and
noted the inconsistency that humans extended justice out to some humans who are not as
rational as some NHAs. The four reasons Porphyry gave for vegetarianism were (1)
animals are rational, (2) humans are inflicting needless suffering and death on NHAs, (3)
humans' craving for meat is based in pleasure not necessity, and (4) ill treatment of
NHAs encourages unjust treatment of humans (Walters & Portmess, 1999).
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From Ancient Times to the 19th Century
Walters and Portmess (1999) noted that Christianity's reign hindered
vegetarianism, as the Christian faith relied on the separation of humans and other
animals. There were few vegetarian writings between ancient times and the 18th century.
An exception was Leonardo DaVinci (1452-1519), a devout ethical vegetarian of the
Renaissance, who bravely refused meat at royal banquets (Berry, 1995). OfDaVinci's
few writings on the subject, he said, "I have from an early age abjured the use ofmeat,
and the time will come when men such as I will look upon the murder of animals as they
now look upon the murder of men" (in Wynne-Tyson, 1990, p. 103). Vegetarian writings
in the 18th century were often spawned in resistance to Cartesianism (Walters &
Portmess, 1999). For example, vegetarian Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733) believed
mere observation of animals' pain and suffering clearly refuted Descartes' logic. Other
writings of the 18th century, such as those by utilitarian David Hartley, often emphasized
the anthropocentric idea that flesh-eating does not lead to a virtuous character.
Nineteenth century authors were often anthropocentric, but they showed an
increasing concern for sentience by including vivid descriptions of slaughterhouse
violence (Walters & Portmess, 1999). Some writings have a tone ofpity for other animals
as weak victims on whom humans should bestow charity. Poet Alphonse De Lamartine
(1790-1869) described vegetarianism in feminine terms such as pure and gentle, as
vegetarianism represented having a soft or ideal heart. Physician William Alcott (1789-
1859) also mentioned femininity by arguing that women are sensitive and shun violence
and bloodshed, and it would benefit men's moral sensibilities to follow suit and not
86
suppress their natural tendencies against killing. Alcott believed the ethical argument is
even more persuasive than scientific arguments for vegetarianism. He also proposed a
sustainability argument, novel for the time, regarding the inefficiency of using land to
grow animals and not plants. But his argument was motivated by anthropocentrism more
so than environmentalism, as it claimed vegetarianism would allow more humans to
exist.
German composer and anti-vivisectionist Richard Wagner (1813-1883)
emphasized sentience in other animals and was highly critical and less sympathetic of
humans because they caused so much animal suffering (Walters & Portmess, 1999). He
said humans were addicted to pleasure but that joy should come only from refraining
from causing anyone intentional pain. Novelist Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910) emphasized
restraint through vegetarianism as a moral aspiration and first step to a virtuous life. Like
Alcott, Tolstoy believed humans naturally sympathized with other living beings, but it
was culture and blindness to custom that repressed those sympathies. Because meat-
eating is unnecessary, Tolstoy blamed humans' habit ofkilling on social excuses related
to religion, example, habit, and greed. Tolstoy acknowledged the cognitive dissonance of
many meat-eaters in avoiding the horrors ofthe slaughterhouse, "when what we do not
wish to see is what we wish to eat" (in Walters & Portmess, 1999, p. 104).
Pioneering physician Anna Kingsford (1846-1888) took a pacifist and
humanitarian approach to vegetarian advocacy (Walters & Portmess, 1999). She placed
the nobility of humans above other animals by saying we should ideally lead a gentle life
and not act like beasts of prey. She said humans should take pity on and show charity
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toward domesticated nonhumans. But she was also critical of humans by arguing that
eating meat makes them uncivilized, as humans sacrifice civility and peace for "comfort,
luxury, indulgence, and ease" (in Walters & Portmess, 1999, p. 108). Kingsford believed
vegetarianism should be the foundation of all peace and justice movements:
I always feel that such ofthese as are not abstainers from flesh-food have unstable
ground under their feet, and it is my great regret that, when helping them in their
good works, I cannot openly and publicly maintain what I so ardently believe -
that the Vegetarian movement is the bottom and basis of all other movements
towards Purity, Freedom, Justice, and Happiness. (in Walters & Portmess, 1999,
p. 108)
20th Century
Twentieth century pro-vegetarian writings expanded on all previous notions of
kinship, sympathy, and a virtuous character to include animal rights, environmentalism,
and feminism (Walters & Portmess, 1999). Perhaps the most ardent vegetarian and
animal rights spokesperson of the tum of the century was British teacher and social
reformer Henry Salt (1851-1939). In his Humanitarian League memoir Seventy Years
among Savages (1921), he challenged the notion of the English calling themselves
civilized while practicing needless violence toward nature and human and nonhuman
animals. Salt recognized that some animals and insects were killed in harvesting plant
crops, but he distinguished between this harm being a necessity and the raising of animals
for slaughter being unnecessary. Like Tolstoy and Kingsford, Salt spoke of vegetarianism
as foundational to a virtuous life (Walters & Portmess, 1999).
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While Salt believed in the health benefits of vegetarianism, offering the working
class populations as evidence, he argued that a humane motive should be the chief reason
to go vegetarian, "as the moral basis of vegetarianism is the one that sustains the rest" (in
Walters & Portmess, 1999, p. 124) and creates a lasting commitment. Mohandas Gandhi
(1869-1948) echoed Salt's assessment that vegetarianism should be motivated by
morality, both to increase personal satisfaction and sustained commitment and to improve
one's spiritual faculties:
I found that a selfish basis would not serve the purpose of taking a [man] higher
and higher along the paths of evolution. What was required was an altruistic
purpose. I found also that health was by no means the monopoly of vegetarians.
(in Walters & Portmess, 1999, p. 142)
Regan (1975), the contemporary animal ethicist, emphasized that humans should
specifically avoid killing animals, not just causing pain. Regan stated it did not matter if
humans killed a nonhuman on an idyllic farm, on a factory farm, or in the woods, it was
morally inconsistent to take away his/her life when one would not have taken the life of a
human. This view relied on Regan's belief that there is no morally relevant aspect of
humanity that separates them from other beings with a conscious interest in living. Since
killing is to be avoided, Regan (2003) contended that the "total abolition of commercial
animal agriculture" (p. 1) is a goal of the animal rights movement. Similarly, Singer
(1990) argued that animal agribusiness, whether free range or intensive, is a speciesist
practice because it controls and sacrifices the lives of farmed animals (major interests for
the nonhuman animals) to satisfy humans' taste for flesh, milk, and eggs (minor interests
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for the human animals). Considering the fact that humans can healthfully live on a plant-
based diet, a fact supported by the American Dietetic Association (ADA, 2003), Singer
(1990) asserted that humans should make it a "simple general principle to avoid killing
animals for food except when it is necessary for survival" (p. 229). Another philosopher,
S. Clark, also emphasized that since flesh-eating is largely unnecessary, it is morally
untenable. Clark argued that it is hypocritical for philosophers to claim they are against
unnecessary suffering, yet allow for it in diet, stating "those who still eat flesh when they
could do otherwise have no claim to be serious moralists" (in Walters & Portmess, 1999,
p.207).
Meat, masculinity, andpatriarchy. Adams (1990) provided an ecofeminist
perspective on promoting vegetarianism. Adams connected patriarchy with the unjust
domination of human women and nonhumans who are farmed and hunted. Adams (1990)
asserted, "women and animals are similarly positioned in a patriarchal world, as objects
rather than subjects" (p 168). Women and farmed animals both endure a "cycle of
objectification, fragmentation, and consumption" (p. 47). Farmed animals enter this cycle
by being enslaved, butchered, dismembered, and consumed. Their body parts are sold in
packages at the store quite fragmented and removed in appearance from the living,
feeling creatures they once were. Adams (1990) concluded that "eating animals acts as a
mirror and representation of patriarchal values. Meat-eating is the reinscription of male
power at every meal" (p. 187).
The sexist and speciesist connection between meat and masculinity has historical
roots. In the book Beyond Beef, Rifkin (1992) traced this connection between meat and
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masculinity back to ancient Egypt where the first universal religion was bull worship,
based on the bull God, Apis, who represented strength, virility, and a masculine passion
for war and subjugation. To mark the year's end, the Apis bull would be ritually
sacrificed and fed to the king so he could incorporate the bull's fierce strength and power.
More recently, in American culture, cowboys tamed the "Wild West" and turned it into a
vast cattle grazing area, forever associating red meat with this brave and tough category
of American men (Rifkin, 1992). Adams (1990) highlighted men's traditional role in
hunting animals and its perceived value in society, "Meat was a valuable economic
commodity; those who controlled this commodity achieved power" (p. 34). Adams
referenced several anthropologists, such as Leakey, Lewin, and Sanday, who found that
women's status was lower in societies where meat was important. When economies
relied on plant food, women held more status, and the society tended to be egalitarian
(Adams, 1990).
Naturalness arguments regarding predation and agriculture. Adams claimed
Western society maintains a social construction of humans as a natural predator and
obligate omnivore so the necessity of our flesh-eating habit is not questioned (in Walters
& Portmess, 1999). Under the omnivorous paradigm, vegetarianism is erroneously made
to seem a naYve and feminized position that is ignorant ofthe laws of nature and anatomy.
For example, Pollan (2006) accused vegetarian advocates of showing contempt for nature
and predation, ironically demonstrating vegetarians' discomfort with acknowledging
human's position as an animal. While it is true that many animal activists, along with
many other people operating under human ethical guidelines, are uncomfortable
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witnessing or partaking in the suffering and violence ofpredation, that does not
necessarily mean that they do not understand the need for predation in nature or that they
fail to embrace humans' animality in other ways. Humans can choose to define
themselves largely as herbivorous great apes. Mason (1993) cited anthropological
theories that proposed for the first 25,000 years ofHomo sapiens existence, prior to
hunting and agriculture, they were largely herbivorous, as is natural to great apes. As
Homo sapiens have migrated into ecosystems that do not provide adequate plant protein,
they have the ability to become more omnivorous if necessary for adaptation (Mason,
1993). So while human history reveals both periods of greater herbivorousness and of
greater omnivorousness, what is certainly unnatural is the vast consumption of animal
products that has come to symbolize the normal American diet of the last half century.
In opposition to Pollan's (2006) assertion that vegetarians fail to embrace their
animality, Wood (2004) argued that humans consume other animals to demonstrate
control over the animal within them. Humans may surmise that the external animals they
eat stand for the internal animal they must overcome. Wood (2004) contended that
humans use meat-eating to continually reassure themselves of their powerful position in
nature: "Might not the legitimacy of meat-eating rest, albeit precariously, not on our clear
superiority to 'the animal' but on our need to demonstrate this over and over again?" (p.
138). Similarly, Hall (2006) theorized that the root of humans' domination over other
animals lies in their insecurity over humans' history as a prey animal. Hall claimed
humans are ambivalent about letting go of their instrumental attitudes, even today,
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because these attitudes are historically linked to the self-preservation achieved in making
themselves the predator instead of the prey.
Most who claim meat-eating is natural for the human animal fail to address how
unnatural it is for any animal to breed and enslave others as a food source via agriculture.
This implies that the human practice of hunting wild animals, a practice approximately
20,000 years old (Mason, 1993), is more ethical under natural standards ofpredation than
is agriculture, the latter being a more cultural domain. While agriculture might be largely
unnatural to the animal kingdom, one could argue that it is part of a natural evolution for
humans in symbiotic alliance with certain other animals (Pollan, 2006). But even within
human history, domestication of other animals for agriculture is a newer practice for the
human species, originating approximately only 11,000 years ago (Mason, 1993). I
contend that agriculture is less indicative of natural evolutionary adaptation and more a
site of evolutionary role reversal, when the human species started to dominate and adapt
nature to fit its own needs. Agriculture and other dominating practices allow humans to
flourish but often in ecologically unsustainable ways (Singer & Mason, 2006).
Utilitarian arguments regarding reducing the most deaths and suffering. Even
plant-based agriculture causes NHAs to suffer and die by displacing wildlife and
frequently killing some field animals in harvesting. However, because foraging would not
sustain the human population at this point, plant-based agriculture is still largely required,
and because a vegan diet is more sustainable and efficient at feeding people, veganism
requires less land and kills fewer field animals than the current animal-laden diet (Singer
& Mason, 2006). Davis (2003), an animal scientist, argued that it would be more humane
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for humans to eat grass-fed cows than to eat only plants, as that beef diet would actually
cause the least NHAs to die. However, Matheny (2003) refuted the validity ofDavis's
findings based on a miscalculation Davis made by assuming an acre ofland could feed
the same amount of people, when a vegetarian diet could feed ten times as many.
Therefore, Matheny calculated that a vegan diet kills one fifth as many NHAs as a diet
based on grass-fed cows. Because a deontological ethic considers motivation in addition
to actions themselves, I argue that it is less of an ethical breach to inadvertently kill a
number of wild NHAs indirectly in necessary plant agriculture (although, ideally the goal
would be to develop harvesting practices that kill no one) than it is to continue to legislate
the intentional yet unnecessary breeding, captivity, and slaughtering of other animals
(such as cows fed on grass). Animal agriculture in any form facilitates an instrumental
worldview that supports the subjugation of other animals, reducing them to just a means
to an end.
Some authors (Pollan, 2006; Sagoff, 1993) made the utilitarian argument that
NHAs have a better life and a less painful death living on a free-range farm than living in
the wild. This argument is specious for a variety of reasons. First, it assumes that NHAs
would willingly trade their lives and their freedom for the short-lived "security" of a
captive existence prior to a guaranteed, premature slaughter by a human predator.
Second, it implies that farmers save each domesticated NHA from an unsafe life in the
wild, when the farmers actually create those NHA lives and, thus, are responsible for
additional deaths. Plus, one ofthe ways farmers protect their "livestock" from nonhuman
predators is to have the USDA Wildlife Services division kill tens ofthousands of wild
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predators annually (Mason & Singer, 2006). Third, it suggests that all animal activists
naively want these domesticated animals to be set free in the wild, where they are ill-
equipped (due to years of selective breeding for heavy meat, milk and egg production) to
adequately take care of themselves and escape predators. Animal rights scholars (Hall,
2006; Regan, 2003) admit that ideally humans would not subjugate any NHAs by
domesticating them into a life of forced captivity and dependence; however, these
scholars do not suggest that existing domesticated farmed animals simply be set free, as
that would be irresponsible and likely cause increased suffering. They simply suggest that
we humans discontinue breeding other animals for our own purposes.
Eating as subject to both natural and cultural ethical guidelines. While Rolston
(1993) defined eating animals as a natural event that is subject to the laws of nature, not a
cultural event subject to human ethics, I believe the variety ofperspectives on the issue,
as explored in this section, reveal eating is both natural and cultural. This reiterates my
earlier contention that the bifurcation of nature/culture is somewhat necessary in
determining ethical actions that affect both domains. I believe if the eating of others
becomes necessary for the survival ofa human in a certain place or situation, then flesh-
eating, especially through low-tech hunting, becomes more justifiable under the
guidelines of nature, as human ethics require that the moral agent be in a position to make
a choice from free will. Therefore, when one has a choice about what one can eat, eating
becomes more cultural and subject to human ethical systems, which makes the choice to
kill or exploit another animal for hislher body parts, in this common situation, morally
untenable.
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Because the ethicality of the human practice of raising and eating other animals
has been debated since Ancient times, it is perhaps not surprising that many meat-eaters
are uncomfortable discussing farmed animal welfare and animal rights. Animal
agribusiness capitalizes on this discomfort by communicating to the public using
ambiguous discourse that largely hide the problems with animal production and seeks to
increase its perceived ethicality, thereby reducing any consumer guilt.
The needfor deception in communicating about meat-eating. In order to sustain
the industrialized violence against nonhumans, such as in factory farming, Derrida (2002)
admitted it is necessary for humans to "organize on a global scale the forgetting or
misunderstanding ofthis violence" (p. 394). Animal agribusiness orchestrates this
forgetting with consumers' implicit permission. Both Pollan (2006) and Singer and
Mason (2006) discussed the difficulties they faced in trying to gain access to large animal
farms for purposes of research for their books. Singer & Mason (2006) noted that the
media are often denied access, particularly with cameras, as agribusiness is resistant to
allow any visual evidence of its practices to reach the public. Pollan (2006) observed,
"the meat industry understands that the more people know about what happens on the kill
floor, the less meat they're likely to eat" (p. 304) as the conditions are "nightmarish" (p.
318). In fact, Cheeke (2004), an agricultural professor, admitted that it is an ethical
situation for animal agriculture to purposely hide its industrial practices out of shame or
fear that consumers will go vegetarian if they were to see the poor welfare conditions.
This explains why many pro-vegetarian authors since the eighteenth century felt the need
to vividly describe the cruelties of the slaughterhouse in an attempt to raise the public's
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awareness of the cruelty behind closed doors. Pollan (2006) concluded that all industrial
agribusiness and its consumers participate in a "journey of forgetting that could hardly be
more costly, not only in terms ofthe animal's pain but in our pleasure too. But forgetting,
or not knowing the first place, is what the industrial food chain is all about" (p. 10).
Most animal products, especially meat, are packaged with little information about
the production conditions, facilitating no communication between farmer and consumer.
Pollan (2006) found it ironic that consumers purchase food, something so fundamental to
their health, based mainly on price. Pollan posited that ignorance and cheapness are
mutually reinforcing at keeping consumers apathetic to production issues and quality. But
Pollan noted a new trend in marketing animal products, such as cage-free or free-range,
that includes explanations of improved animal welfare and wholesomeness. Pollan (2006)
described the stories on the product packages as a new literary genre called "supermarket
pastoral" (p. 137). In the case of Petaluma's "Rosie, the organic free-range chicken,"
Pollan described the marketing as fraudulent because, during a visit, the author did not
find the chickens roaming free and could not locate the idyllic pasture pictured on the
label.
As Pollan (2006) and Singer and Mason (2006) noted, these new marketing
stories rarely represent authentic communication about actual farm conditions but rather
construct idealized visions of the kind of wholesomeness that consumers desire from
farming. It is just a newer tactic in the meat industry's history of using euphemisms to
disguise unappealing or harsh practices (Adams, 1990; Dunayer, 2001; Glenn, 2004). For
example, industry and government officials refer to animals using marketing or
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commodified terms, such as beefinstead of cow flesh, and grain-and roughage-
consuming units or inventory instead of animals (Glenn, 2004). Adams (1990) noted how
terminology describing meat objectifies NHAs and is purposely constructed via absent
referents that allow consumers to distance themselves from their accountability in killing
a living being. Describing the term meat, Adams stated, "something we do to animals has
become instead something that is a part of animals' nature, and we lose consideration of
our role entirely" (in Walters & Portmess, 1999, p. 251). Through analysis of advertising
and media images, Adams (2003) exposed the hegemonic nature of patriarchy as an
insidious force in American culture that allows inequality, like that toward farmed
animals, to virtually "disappear as a privilege and is experienced as 'desire,' as 'appetite,'
as 'pleasure'" (p. 171).
The public is complicit in the use of euphemisms to hide the unpleasantness of
farmed animal slaughter, as Westerners seem to require self-deception regarding their
unjust treatment of other animals in order to maintain their self-image as a civilized
society. Salt (1921) believed that euphemisms were an impediment to becoming a
nonviolent society:
The distinction between savagery and civilization is a matter of names ... to use
flattering titles as a veil for cruel practices gives permanence to evils that
otherwise would not be permitted. Our present self-satisfaction in what we are
pleased to call our civilization is a very serious obstacle to improvement. (p. 239)
This sentiment is echoed by Derrida's (2004) prediction that industrialized violence
against animals will have to change as it increasingly becomes a "spectacle" (p. 71),
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forcing humans to decide they cannot face the negative image this abuse creates of
themselves. Besides the lack of public awareness about modem farming, the largest
impediment to Derrida's prediction coming true is, perhaps, the continued restriction of
meat discourse to the realm of farmed animal welfare instead ofveganism and the rights
of animals not to be farmed and killed (Freeman, in press; Irvin, 2007).
American attitudes towardfarmed animals today. Americans are almost evenly
split in their concern for farmed animal welfare. A U.S. telephone poll (Zogby, 2003) of
more than 1,000 likely voters in 2003 revealed that 52% express concern about the
treatment of farm animals, when asked, while 45% are unconcerned. At the extreme ends
of these figures, 16% of those respondents said they are "very concerned," while a larger
number, 29%, are "not at all concerned." Yet, over 80% believe it is right to have, or .
there should be, laws to protect farmed animals from "cruelty and abuse" (p. 6).
When it comes to understanding farmed animal welfare laws, approximately two-
thirds of the population is unaware that farmed animals lack basic legal protection in the
United States, with over one third ofthose mistakenly believing that state and federal
anti-cruelty laws and the federal Animal Welfare Act ensure farmed animal welfare
(Zogby, 2003). This public misunderstanding about farmed animal protection may
account for the fact that over 70% of people polled believe farmed animals are "fairly
treated" (p. 6) in the United States. Attitudes did vary based on certain demographic
categories:
In general, throughout the survey, Democrats, women, singles, Easterners, and
those who are middle-aged and at middle income levels, are more likely to
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support welfare or protectionist legislation than Republicans, those under thirty,
rural respondents, Westerners, married people, those with higher incomes, and
men. (p. 5)
The last subsection of this chapter expands on current U.S. practices as it provides
a brief overview of the status of vegetarianism in the United States today.
Vegetarianism in the United States
In the book Vegetarianism: Movement or Moment? (2002), Maurer examined the
history of vegetarianism as a movement in the United States, claiming that vegetarianism
peaked in the mid-l800s and again in the 1960s and 1970s (Maurer, 2002). Ever since,
vegetarianism has held a small but steady contingency without growing significantly. In
spite of the animal rights and vegetarian movements, Americans' per capita consumption
of meat went up between the 1970s and the 1990s, with price and health being
determining factors in which type of animal is consumed in the largest quantities.
While approximately 7% ofthe American population self-identifies as vegetarian
on surveys, millions ofthese people do eat some meat, as so-called "semi-vegetarianism"
or "flexitarianism" is gaining popularity. The percent of the population who is actually
vegetarian, eating no animal flesh, is likely between 2 and 3%. About 1% of these people,
or approximately a million people, are vegan and eat no animal products whatsoever
(Maurer, 2002; Singer & Mason, 2006). The typical person attracted to vegetarianism is a
young, white, middle-class, atheist female (Maurer, 2002).
Maurer (2002) cited Visser, a cultural historian, who suggested that
"vegetarianism can be viewed as a modem response to dealing with the endless choices
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engendered by a consumer society that discourages the appearance of overconsumption"
(p. 138). But the main reasons people say they go vegetarian is for health and/or ethics,
with environmental sustainability being another popular motivation (Maurer, 2006).
People who go vegetarian for ethical reasons tend to be more committed to remaining
vegetarian. So, Maurer (2006) posited, "promoting concern for animals and the
environment is essential to the advancement ofthe vegetarian movement" (p. 45) because
health-motivated vegetarians may be tempted by the convenience of a meat-based diet
and new lower-fat meat items. Additionally, so-called "humane" or "happy" meats are
becoming more popular with consumers and former vegetarians, despite the fact that the
NHAs on these farms often still endure suffering and slaughter (Pollan, 2006; Singer &
Mason, 2006).
Summary and Conclusion
Summary
History ofWestern thought on other animals. Western society has come back to a
debate that is over 2,000 years old, the "original Greek appraisal ofthe worth of other
animals" (Cavalieri, 2006, p. 66). Society is moving beyond the limited arguments ofthe
post-Cartesian era regarding cruelty and pleas for more compassion and is challenging
the idea that NHAs should be enslaved. For the first time in history, using philosophical
means, "it is now possible to defend the idea that animal lives have value" (p. 66).
Poststructural and posthumanist philosophies regarding the false human/animal
dualism. The false human/animal binary must be deconstructed, as it is at the root of
Western philosophy's justification for its discrimination against NHAs. There is an
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inability to neatly define the human border that separates humans from all other animals,
at least not in a morally relevant way. Species is more about categorizing variety -
differences of degree not kind. Species categories are based more on biological or
physical traits, yet humans tend to use mental traits for determining who has moral
relevancy. For example Singer (1990) claimed that sentience was the true moral
distinguishing factor in human society, and Regan (2003) proposed the key factor was
being a conscious subject of a life. Most animal species possess sentience and
consciousness that warrant their being considered morally valuable individuals.
A major philosophical conflict in animal rights is that the very idea that humans
should treat nonhumans better and be "humane" may, ironically, be humanist; it may
privilege humans with a certain ethical status presumably not found in other animals or
nature. Human's ethical system may be highly complex when compared to that of other
animals, but this high level of sophistication appears to be necessary to restrain our
special propensity for excessive harm. I argue that the one trait that does seem to
distinguish the human species among most other animal species is our ability to do most
things (both "good" and "bad") to excess of what is natural or needed.
And nature is not necessarily immoral in comparison to culture, as nature has its
own principles that promote moderation and cooperation, especially among social
animals. Therefore, when AROs promote animal rights on ethical grounds, they should
take care not to insinuate that ethical principles are limited to the realm of humanity or
are "humane," as that might unintentionally reinforce the problematic human/animal
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dualism and related notions of human superiority that lead to discrimination against
NHAs.
Besides the notion of being "humane," humanism is arguably also apparent to
some degree in Singer's (1990) and Regan's (1983) theories that use a shared trait
between human and nonhuman animals, such as sentience and consciousness, as a reason
to include NHAs in our sphere of moral concern. However, before chastising animal
rights for implicitly promoting humanism, one must determine whether the activist's line
of argumentation is based more on the desire to build nonhumans up in the "noble"
likeness of humanity or based more on the desire to knock humans down off their self-
constructed moral pedestal, encouraging them to embrace, instead of shun, their innate
animality. The latter approach of asking humans to embrace their own animality and
begin to respect the body's wisdom, instead of always privileging human rationality, is
perhaps a more philosophically rigorous approach to promoting animal rights, but it is not
as pragmatic as the more humanist approach of proving NHA likeness to humans.
A philosophical problem with the tactic of emphasizing that NHAs share many
valued "human" traits is that it runs the risk of reducing other animals to lesser categories
of "sub-humans." While other species are different, they are by no means failed or lesser
versions of humans. Similar to the civil rights and environmental movement messages,
animal activists should ask people to respect diversity between groups and individuals.
But many animal activists may not want to or feel it is truthful to fully concede that
humans and other animals are so completely different. Therefore, I contend that the best
philosophical position upon which to base a message may be a blended one that embraces
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both the fundamental commonalities that provide kinship and the specific differences that
provide diversity.
While people may come to value NHAs and respect diversity, the concern is that
they will still prioritize fellow humans over other animal species if they do not see some
similarity that connects all animals together and gives them a reason to value other
species on the same level as they value their own species. As a base connecting trait, I
suggest that Regan's (2003) idea of being a conscious "subject of a life," may be the best
option; it combines principles of both sameness and difference. Problematizing the fragile
borders of humanity and species through deconstruction of speciesist language is a
worthwhile goal of the animal rights movement. Hopefully it will serve to lift the cloud
of deception that constrains humanity and to prod us closer toward a "surrender to the
animal" (Derrida, 2002, p. 372) within ourselves.
Environmental ethics as it relates to all animals: Debates over individual versus
holistic perspectives. Environmental ethics separates domesticated nonhuman species as
being under the purview of human ethics and reserves environmental ethics only for
application to wild nonhuman species. It therefore categorizes domesticated NHAs, such
as farmed animals, as unprotected entities who do not possess the inherent value that wild
species and humans do. This apathy toward domesticated nonhumans may be due to the
fact that many environmental philosophies do not ask for a transformed conception of
humans in relation to all other animals but rather ask for a transformed view of nature,
where humans should value the maintenance ofbiodiverse ecosystems. Therefore, many
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environmental ethics philosophies, even though some claim to be biocentric, remain more
anthropocentric, or humanist, than animal ethics.
But even if animal ethics challenges the human/animal dualism more so than
environmental ethics does, it still reinforces the related culture/nature dualism in some
ways, but in a different sense than environmentalists. Animal ethics leaves the realm of
wilderness largely to its own governance and only interferes to protect nonhumans from
humans when the latter are exercising excessive violence or destruction (beyond basic
survival needs). Animal ethics does promote guidelines for the treatment ofnonhumans
where environmental ethics does not - in human society. Here it seeks to grant these
nonhumans the status of morally relevant beings, not based on their value to an
ecosystem, but based on their value as conscious, sentient subjects of a life.
Therefore, humans may need to acknowledge some relevance in the
culture/natural dualism and retain two separate but sometimes overlapping ethical
systems - one for nature and one for human societies. For animal ethics, that means
practicing an individual ethic toward all animals in human society and allowing wild
NHAs and nature their freedom from dominating human interference. For most
environmental ethics, that means practicing an individual ethic toward humans in human
society while asking humans to avoid domination of nature, and, perhaps ironically,
simultaneously managing nature according to a holistic ethic that allows for some
nonhuman individuals to be sacrificed for the benefit of the ecosystem.
While both animal and environmental ethics are anti-instrumental, what may be
lacking in both is a less humanist outlook where individual human rights are maintained
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while humans' animality is embraced and the human/animal dualism is more overtly
challenged. This less humanist outlook might increase our kinship with other animals and
begin to privilege nature as a moral and inherently valuable domain that is not entirely
separate from or "below" human society.
History ofactivism for nonhuman animals in the United States. The U.S. animal
protection movement was founded in the mid 19th century and was largely dominated by
welfare groups until the mid 1970s (Beers, 2006). In its origins, the animal protection
movement borrowed activist strategies from the abolitionist and women's rights
movements, such as using moral suasion to expose the reality of injustices (Beers, 2006).
Since animal activists believed people were not willing to give up their superior status
over other animals, the early movement leaders often used an anthropocentric approach
and attached humane reform to human self-interest.
The animal protection movement of the late 20th century drew from the ideologies
of the feminist and environmental movements to critique instrumentalism (Jasper &
Nelkin, 1992). The anti-instrumentalism ofthe New Left questioned capitalism's growth
imperative and its emphasis on the material instead of the moral. Rights rhetoric
burgeoned in many movements in the 1970s, including animal rights. Jasper and Nelkin
(1992) claimed the animal rights fundamentalists were more successful than welfarists at
attracting members and formulating issues because they used strong visuals and moral
language that was more dramatic and energizing.
Many animal protection authors suggested greater alliances with the
environmental movement would be advantageous (Beers, 2006; Hall, 2006; Jasper &
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Nelkin, 1992; Maurer, 2002), but to do so animal protection ideology would have to put
greater emphasis on the aspects that overlap with environmental ideology. While the two
movements have worked together to pass significant wildlife protection measures in the
past, hunting and fur remains a point of contention (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992). The
environmental movement is also reticent to actively promote sustainable plant-based diets
or campaign against destructive factory farms, both out of fear of alienating members and
a desire to avoid having their identity conflated with animal rights, which is seen as a less
popular, less rational, and more "sentimentalist," ideology.
Western vegetarian ethics throughout the ages. Throughout history, all pro-
vegetarian writers have shown a concern for the suffering that humans cause other
animals, specifically suffering that is deemed unnecessary, such as food in many cases
(Walters & Portmess, 1999). Writers often asked humans to stop repressing their pity and
to bear witness to the horrors ofthe slaughterhouse. While writers from previous eras
focused more on questions of moral purity and how to lead a good life, contemporary
writers added to this a notion of animal rights and a need to deconstruct the
human/animal dualism, arguing that there is not a morally-relevant difference between all
animals. The authors' themes of ethicality are often based on avoiding unnecessary harm
and showing restraint from excess.
Regan's (2003) version of animal rights argued that killing is to be avoided, and
therefore, a goal of the animal rights movement is the "total abolition of commercial
animal agriculture" (p. 1). Similarly, Singer (1990) argued that animal agribusiness,
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whether free range or intensive, is a speciesist practice because it controls and sacrifices
the major interests of the NHAs to satisfy minor interests of the human animals.
Humanity's rationale for eating animals may lie in an unconscious fear and
contempt of wild animals. Wood (2004) argued that humans consume other animals to
demonstrate control over the animal they dislike in themselves. Humans may surmise that
the external animals they eat stand for the internal animal they must overcome. Similarly,
Hall (2006) theorized that the root of humans' domination over other animals lies in their
insecurity over humans' history as a prey animal, seeking to unnecessarily construct
themselves as a predator for fear that the alternative is to be prey.
Most who claim meat-eating is natural for the human animal, even though
anthropology reveals periods of greater herbivorousness and omnviorousness for humans,
fail to address how unnatural it is for any animal to breed and enslave others as a food
source via agriculture. This implies that the human practice of hunting wild animals, a
practice approximately 20,000 years old (Mason, 1993), is more ethical under natural
standards of predation than is agriculture, the latter being a more cultural domain. I
believe the variety of perspectives on the issue reveal eating is both natural and cultural.
This reiterates my earlier contention that the bifurcation of nature/culture is somewhat
necessary in determining ethical actions that affect both domains. Therefore, when one
has a choice about what one can eat, eating becomes more cultural than natural and is
therefore subject to human ethical systems; this makes the choice to kill or exploit
another animal for his/her body parts, in this everyday situation, morally untenable.
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Vegetarianism in the United States today. While approximately 7% ofthe
American population self-identifies as vegetarian on surveys, the percent ofthe
population who is actually vegetarian is likely between 2 and 3%. About 1% of these
people, or approximately a million people, are vegan (Maurer, 2002; Singer & Mason,
2006). The typical person attracted to vegetarianism is a young, white, middle-class,
atheist female (Maurer, 2002). The main reasons people say they go vegetarian is for
health and/or ethics, with environmental sustainability being another popular motivation
(Maurer, 2006).
People who go vegetarian for ethical reasons tend to be more committed to
remaining vegetarian (Maurer, 2006). Because health-motivated vegetarians may be
tempted by the convenience of a meat-based diet and new lower-fat meat items, Maurer
(2006) posited, "promoting concern for animals and the environment is essential to the
advancement of the vegetarian movement" (p. 45). This agrees with Salt's and Gandhi's
belief that vegetarianism should be promoted on the rationale of ethics more so than
health, based on both the deontological belief that the ethical rationale was more solid
and the utilitarian beliefthat it created greater long-term commitment to vegetarianism.
The needfor deception in communicating about meat-eating. Because the
ethicality of the human practice of raising and eating other animals has been debated
since Ancient times, it is perhaps not surprising that many meat-eaters are uncomfortable
discussing farmed animal welfare and animal rights. Animal agribusiness capitalizes on
this discomfort by communicating to the public using ambiguous discourse that largely
hide the problems with animal production and seeks to increase its perceived ethicality,
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thereby reducing any consumer guilt. Derrida (2004) predicted this industrialized
violence against animals will have to change as it increasingly becomes a "spectacle" (p.
71), forcing humans to decide they cannot face the negative image this abuse creates of
themselves.
Conclusion
This chapter helps to define and bolster the animal rights and vegetarian moral
philosophies that should serve as a basis for informing the messages ofAROs studied in
this dissertation. The next chapter focuses on communication theories that can guide
AROs in making communication decisions, and it includes deontological and utilitarian
framing debates among animal activists and scholars about how to construct campaign
messages designed specifically to protect the lives of farmed animals.
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CHAPTER III
COMMUNICATION THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview
In this chapter I focus on theory and scholarly literature related to communication,
particularly on behalf of social movements. I begin with a basic overview of the social
constructivist perspective on communication and meaning-making, including semiotics
and Foucauldian discourse to explain the signifying power oflanguage and why it is a
site of social struggle. Then, communication ethics are discussed, primarily drawing upon
public relations literature, including ethical challenges especially pertinent to radical
social movements. The rest of the chapter narrows to examine literature specific to social
movement communication; this includes the special challenges that social movement
organizations (SMOs) face in designing persuasive communication campaigns,
conveying counter-hegemonic ideas to the public, forming an identity, and attracting
productive media attention. While this dissertation is not specifically a rhetorical
analysis, I found it pertinent to include the strategic advice of select, contemporary
rhetoricians on social change, especially Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's (1969) theory
of argumentation related to values, as values are a key part of this dissertation.
Because this dissertation specifically examines framing by animal rights
organizations (AROs), a large section of this communication chapter is dedicated to
framing, frame resonance, and the frame alignment process, mainly drawing upon social
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movement theory in sociology. To help examine the framing debates within social
movements in deciding how radical and critical to be, examples are included of internal
framing debates within the American women's rights and abolitionist movements ofthe
19th century. This leads into a similar discussion ofthe current animal rights movement's
ideological framing debates over whether to promote rights or welfare. This debate then
narrows to explore animal activists' deliberations in food campaign frames over whether
to promote veganism exclusively or to also promote industry welfare reforms. The
chapter closes with an overview of two scholarly studies specific to the framing of
vegetarianism. Throughout this communication chapter, scholarship specific to animal
rights communication is provided when it exists and has not been covered in the
preceding chapter on animal issues.
Communication and the Social Construction ofReality
The importance of human communication is that it is essential to the very creation
and perception of reality for members of a society, and it is so elemental that it often
makes the cultural appear natural (Berger & Luckman, 1967). Emphasizing a similar
union between communication and culture, Carey (1989) described communication as a
process through which a shared culture is created, modified, and transformed. This
approach to communication is more humanistic than the once dominant transmission
model, which viewed communication as a mechanistic linear process of information
transmission between senders and receivers. In Carey's ritual view of communication, the
purpose of communication is to build community and unity rather than to control
information. Similarly, Hall (1997) conceived of communication as making and
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exchanging meaning. Hall believed meaning, at its most basic, is the result of societies
using their power to signify objects and concepts through language to determine what
they stand for and how they are supposed to be understood within a culture.
Communication is a cyclical process where ideological meaning is produced (encoded),
consumed (decoded), and then reproduced into social practice (transformed) (Hall, 1980).
This is not a neutral process, as Hall (1982) proposed that the dominant, elite culture use
the media as a hegemonic tool to manufacture consent by shaping and reinforcing
dominant ideologies so they seem like common sense. However, Hall (1980) believed
that while audience members may decode texts according to the dominant or preferred
reading of the producer, audiences are also active subjects who have some ability to resist
intended meanings, for example, with queer readings of heterosexual characters.
Hall's and Carey's definitions of communication argue that language is a social
construction and is therefore more unstable and malleable than it may appear. Saussure's
semiotics contributes heavily to this constructivist view that language is a system of signs
where meaning is arbitrarily assigned and is not natural or inherent; it is only made to
look natural through the cultural codes that attempt to fix signifiers to signifieds (Hall,
1997). Dominant beliefs are therefore anchored to the "natural" through tropes, such as
metaphors, which operate by channeling ways of thinking, almost imperceptibly, toward
one related, preferred concept and away from others (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Because
hegemony requires the consent of those who participate, it relies on the power of
naturalization to conceal subjectivity and make dominant, constructed meanings appear
as objective and fixed common sense notions (Hall, 1997).
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The semiotic view that meaning is often relational, malleable, and constructed
through difference, reveals the politics and values inherently constructed in language
(Hall, 1997). For example, in binaries, such as mind/body or culture/nature, meaning is
situated through opposition, according to hierarchical values that rely upon or even
exaggerate notions of difference (Chandler, 2002). Jakobson introduced the idea that in
each binary one term is marked and one is unmarked; the unmarked term, such as mind,
is more fundamental, naturalized, and prioritized while the marked term, such as body,
relates to it as secondary, lacking, or deviant (Chandler, 2002). Derrida's (1976) work on
deconstruction seeks to challenge the power inherent in prioritizing one binary term over
its supposed opposite by revealing the logical inconsistencies and instabilities of these
classic oppositions.
Foucault's notion of discourse adds to the theory that language itself is embedded
with naturalized power by showing how discourse, or a system of representation, has the
power to rule in or out ways of talking about a topic (Hall, 1997). Foucault (1990a)
conceived of discourse as the historically-influenced construction of knowledge (ideas,
images and concepts) that is used to organize thoughts and action on a topic in a certain
culture at a certain point in time. It operates via a complex system of social norms,
relations, and rules that are historically influenced. Discourse has the capacity to control
social practices and preserve institutional power through its management of what is
considered to be "truth" and knowledge in a society (Foucault, 1980). However, it is
more important to ask how something becomes true rather than what "is" true. For
Foucault (1980), truth is produced "only by virtue of multiple fonns of constraint" (p.
114
130). Power works through discourse to guide, condition, frame, and contain. Foucault
conceived of discourse as working like a grammar to determine the conditions for what
could be uttered but not dictating the exact utterances themselves (Hoy, 1981).
Because of its social influence, discourse "is the thing for which and by which
there is struggle. Discourse is the power which is to be seized" (Foucault, 1990b, p.
1155). This idea that there will always be a struggle over discourse, as it cannot be
permanently stabilized and fixed, allowed Foucault (2000) to be optimistic that change is
possible:
There is an optimism that consists in saying, "In any case, it couldn't be any
better." My optimism would consist rather in saying, "So many things can be
changed, being as fragile as they are, tied more to contingencies than to
necessities, more to what is arbitrary than to what is rationally established, more
to complex but transitory historical contingencies than to inevitable
anthropological constants ..." (p. 458).
As organizations struggle to change discourse, the inherent, and often hidden,
power in communication makes its strategic use an ethical issue. The following section
addresses ethical concerns, particularly for advocacy organizations who strategically
construct messages for persuasive purposes, such as the AROs I will be studying in this
dissertation.
Communication Ethics
Since the ancient Greeks first started theorizing on the topic of communication,
specifically rhetoric and the art of persuasion, concern over its ethicality has been a factor
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(Marsh, 2001). Aristotle believed that rhetoric should demonstrate truth, and he proposed
three kinds of proof by which the audience could judge the truthfulness of an argument:
ethos (credibility ofthe speaker), pathos (quality of appeal to audience emotions), and
logos (validity of the reasoning). These categories are still relevant today, as persuasive
communicators can choose to use reasoned arguments or emotional appeals or a
combination of both. Reasoned arguments are considered more ethical than emotional
appeals because the former involves more facts, may include a fair presentation of the
views of the opposing side, and invites the audience to logically evaluate the argument
(Bivins, 2004). However, although emotional appeals are more simplistic and may be
considered more manipulative, they are not inherently unethical, as long as the
communicator is not harming the audience and does not hide the fact that the message is
intentionally persuasive. These principles oftruth and avoidance of harm are perhaps the
two most fundamental and overarching values associated with ethical persuasion today
(Bivins, 2004).
Truth
When it comes to what constitutes truthfulness, Bivins (2004) highlighted the
need for persuasive messages to provide both factual accuracy and adequate context or
completeness to avoid being misleading. If the opponent's side is presented, it should be
stated fairly. However, advocacy communicators, being openly subjective, are permitted
to be selective in what facts they choose to reveal publicly under many circumstances,
except when it would be misleading and prevent the public from knowing something that
is necessary for informed decision-making (Fitzpatrick & Gauthier, 2001). Persuaders are
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not required to provide a full summation of all the facts on an issue to meet completeness
requirements, but they should seek to "genuinely inform" others instead of creating "false
impressions" (Martinson, 1996-1997, p. 44).
Another reflection of truth is the advocacy communicator's authenticity, which
relates to Aristotle's notion of ethos and credibility. Authentic communication is about
being true to oneself and to the audience (Baker & Martinson, 2001; Taylor, 1991). Baker
and Martinson (2001) related communication authenticity to virtue ethics, requiring the
communicator to be of good character and demonstrate personal virtue in both action and
motivation. Authenticity involves virtues such as: integrity, loyalty to stated causes and
institutions, and sincerity and genuineness. They said persuaders should sincerely believe
that the idea or product they are promoting has the positive attributes they are touting and
will be socially beneficial.
Avoiding Harm
Truthfulness also aids in the related ethical goal of avoiding harm. Steiner (1989)
suggested an ethic of care should inform persuasion in order to prevent harm to publics.
This is achieved by communicators showing respect for the dignity and integrity of the
audience members. Towards the goal of respect, many scholars place an emphasis on the
value of two-way communication (the symmetrical model) as a way to build a healthy
public dialogue and democratic community more so than does pure one-way advocacy
communication (asymmetrical model) (Grunig 2001; Wilkins & Christians, 2001).
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Activist Communication and Ethics
However, Holtzhausen (2000) argued that the two-way symmetrical
communication model is too narrowly defined as an organizational meta-narrative, and
does not fully take into account the broader socio-political context in which public
relations operates. Because public relations scholarship often ignores activist
organizations, Holtzhausen (2000) alleged that public relations theory largely exists to
support the maintenance of hegemonic power structures. Activists are often "the real
voices of democracy" (p. 100) and do not deserve for public relations scholars to portray
them as the enemies of social institutions. Holtzhausen noted the need to distinguish
activist groups from the nonprofit organizations that are frequently discussed in public
relations literature, as the latter are more closely aligned with dominant power structures,
such as the corporations who largely fund them.
For corporate public relations practitioners working in an agency, a major conflict
of interest that threatens ethical communications is their direct need to serve their client's
interests versus their indirect responsibilities to serve the public's interest (Fitzpatrick &
Gauthier, 2001). To counterbalance this client-bias and the corresponding utilitarian
profit-motive that accompanies commercial communications, many ethical theories
related to public relations favor duty-based or deontological ethics (which focus on right
means) instead of consequential/utilitarian ethics (which focus on right ends). However,
when the communicators are non-profit SMOs and are, in theory or intent, promoting the
greater good instead of their own self-interested ends, one might wonder if they are
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bound to the same obligation to favor deontological communication ethics over utilitarian
ethics.
While simply having altruistic goals does not justify using any means to achieve
them, one could make a case that the challenges SMOs face, such as marginalization,
lack of resources, and restricted choices, should factor more specifically into public
relations theories to provide more guidance for SMOs in a corporate-dominated media
environment (Bronstein, 2006; Freeman, 2007a). Public relations literature provides only
limited guidance to social movement practitioners, as it mainly advises corporate or
mainstream organization on how to deal with activist groups as a stakeholder rather than
coming from the SMa's perspective (Holtzhausen, 2000; Smith & Ferguson, 2001). On
the other hand, while Alinsky's Rules/or Radicals (1971) did address the real
communications challenges and balance of power issues faced by SMOs, many might
critique the author's brand of situational ethics as weighing too heavily on the utilitarian
end of the scale.
Even the Public Relations Society ofAmerica's (PRSA) member code of ethics
does not adequately address the special needs of in-house SMa communicators (PRSA
Ethics, 2000). While PRSA principles such as advocacy, honesty and disclosure of
information do apply to SMOs, other PRSA principles are only applicable to practitioners
who work in an agency serving multiple business clients. The conflict of interest between
serving the self-interests of a commercial client and the need to be socially responsible do
not apply as directly to SMa communicators. Therefore the ethical issues that do apply to
SMOs are more likely based on the ethicality of the communication act itself in not being
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too utilitarian rather than concern over SMOs being motivated to seek selfish ends
(Freeman, 2007a).
Persuasion and Propaganda
Advocacy communication is sometimes derided as manipulative "propaganda,"
particularly the communication materials of activist groups who are passionate about
their cause and may appear close-minded or one-sided. However, propaganda has some
distinctive, and largely negative, characteristics that distinguish it from mere persuasive
speech. Jowett and O'Donnell (1999) described propagandists as highly utilitarian in
putting their own interests above the audience's. They may purposely distort or
misrepresent information, sometimes even concealing the source of the message from the
audience. Propagandists often use language and emotion strategically to create a sense of
power, possibly with exaggeration and innuendo, and they may deify their cause while
demonizing or dehumanizing their opponents. Therefore, to be considered ethical,
advocacy communicators must avoid the kind of manipulative, misleading, and
reductionist message constructions that are characteristic of propaganda, such as: reliance
on authority figures; use ofunverifiable abstractions; belief in a fixed, polarized, black
and white world; reduction of complex issues into simplified cause and effect; use of
skewed time perspectives lacking continuity or flow; and emphasis on conflict over
cooperation (Black, 2001).
Guidelines for Ethical Persuasion
Several scholars have provided useful guidelines for evaluating the ethics of
persuasive communication. Baker and Martinson (2001) noticed there were overlapping
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aspects of all definitions of ethical persuasion, so they designed their TARES test as a
way to encapsulate all these common principles into one model. The five principles
represented in the TARES acronym are truthfulness of the message, authenticity of the
persuader, respect for the audience, equity/fairness of the appeal to the audience in
considering vulnerable publics, and social responsibility for the common good.
Sproule (1980) also provided a useful checklist for ethical communication,
focusing on deontological concepts like right motive and means, universal application,
and proper fit with social values. One caveat to the latter is that the conflicts that are most
likely to arise, specifically within campaigns of challenging movements, involve value
clashes and potential disconnects between the public's definition of the common good
and that ofthe SMO's. And it is difficult, in some cases, for an SMO in a challenging
movement to show respect for the values and beliefs of the public if it is attempting to
problematize and transform some ofthose values and beliefs (Freeman, 2007a). The next
section discusses challenges SMOs encounter, even beyond communication ethics, in
trying to use communication to construct and gain support for their version of the
common good.
Communication Challenges Facing Social Movements
Unlike more mainstream or institutional organizations, SMOs within challenging
movements struggle to transform a hegemonic view of reality in the dominant discourse.
Stewart, Smith, and Denton (2001) explained that SMOs need to convince the public that
not only is the commonly-accepted view of reality based on a faulty premise but the
situation deserves to be defined as a "problem" that warrants their immediate attention.
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The authors suggested that SMOs enable their target audiences to see that the problem is
indeed severe and not being solved by the authorities, proving it requires immediate
social intervention. To create presence for their issue in the minds of the public, SMOs
can use persuasive words, stories, gory pictures, and revelations of inconsistencies in
institutional practices. The audience must be made to feel that its assistance will indeed
result in a better future and that overcoming the status quo is not impossible (Stewart et
aI., 2001).
Additionally, Stewart et ai. (2001) defined five other persuasive functions of
social movements. First, SMOs must improve the self-perception ofmembers so that they
view their participation as morally important work ofwhich they can be proud. Second,
SMOs should legitimize their movement through co-active strategies that appeal to
society's common values while also engaging in confrontational strategies that decrease
the legitimacy and credibility of opponents. Third, SMOs should prescribe a course of
action for the public to redress problems. If factions within a movement each suggest
different solutions, it can send mixed or confusing messages to adherents. Fourth, SMOs
must mobilize members based on notions of shared identity and values, preferably using
nonviolent tactics that gamer public sympathy and support. Last, SMOs are challenged to
find ways to sustain the movement's momentum (Stewart et ai, 2001).
Maintaining Legitimacy
Cox (2006) acknowledged several key communication dilemmas pertinent to
many progressive social justice movements, radical environmentalism in particular. First,
society pressures SMOs to use socially acceptable language in order to be heard as
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credible and reasonable, but it is hard to appeal to values that are part of the very system
the SMOs are challenging, as discussed in the previous section on ethics. In deciding how
critical to be of the status quo, Gitlin (2003) noted that SMOs must walk a line between
being assimilated and "blunted" (p. 290) if they are too moderate and being marginalized
and trivialized ifthey are too critical. Cox (2006) explained that the dominant paradigm
of anthropocentric environmentalism claims the realm of common sense to gain
legitimacy and portrays more radical environmentalists as unreasonable people who are
outside of "symbolic legitimacy boundaries" (p. 61). In support of authentic
communication, all public relations practitioners who are facing a disconnect between the
public's beliefs and the organization's beliefs have the choice either to change the
organization's culture to align it with society's expectations or to change the public's
cultures to increase alignment with the organization (Heath, 1997).
Self-Interested versus Altruistic Appeals
Related to this debate over how critical SMO messages should be, SMOs must
also decide whether to base their appeals on the public's individual self-interest or on
altruism (Cox, 2006). This question is particularly relevant to movements that work on
behalf of other species. Evernden (1985) argued that altruistic, non-anthropocentric
appeals are necessary to win long-term support for the environment because appeals to
the public's self-interest are ultimately just unproductive short-term strategies that
reinforce a view of nature as a resource. But Cox (2006) distinguished between the
pragmatism and short-term focus of campaign rhetoric and the long-term goals of critical
rhetoric. The former often benefit from self-interested, reasonable appeals, while the
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latter are meant to more broadly challenge existing values to envision new worldviews.
While Cox mentioned the Deep Ecology Foundation, a lesser-known group, as promoting
critical rhetoric instead of more pragmatic or self-interested campaign rhetoric, generally
it is not clear by whom and how critical rhetorics are meant to circulate and become as
influential as pragmatic campaign rhetoric.
Individual SMa Tactics in Relation to the Movement
Cox (2006) also asked if a movement benefits by having some SMOs who are
more radical in tactics. Sociologists like McAdam (1996) and Tarrow (1998) argued that
radical groups produce a beneficial "radical flank effect" that gains attention and provides
incentives for institutions to bargain with moderates. But Cox (2006) acknowledged the
inconclusiveness of this theory by stating that others believe radical groups, such as the
Earth Liberation Front or the Black Panthers, ultimately hinder wide-spread support for a
movement by alienating people from wanting to associate with the movement as a whole
(Gupta, 2002). Either way, it appears that more moderate SMOs can only gain benefits
from more radical SMOs ifthe moderates publicly distinguish themselves from the
radicals (Gupta, 2002).
This seems to reinforce Heath's (1997) suggestions that issues managers should
strive both to differentiate their campaign from others by highlighting unique attributes
and positions and to create a strong organizational identity, or persona, that is truly
representative ofthe organization's characteristics. To increase shared understanding
with their publics, Heath (1997) suggested that organizations establish "zones of
meaning" (p. 192) through articulating facts, values and policies in issues campaigns. In
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order to create a shared understanding between all stakeholders, both members and
nonmembers, an organization should ensure that its internal and external communications
are in sync (Cheney & Christensen, 2001), which supports the ethical principle of
communicator authenticity (Baker & Martinson, 2001). However, Roper (2005) argued
that organizations may legitimately employ multiple identities to better connect with
different publics, but agreed that these identities should still be in sync with the
organization's mission and values.
Gaining News Media Access
Regardless of identity, SMOs face a challenge gaining media attention in which to
address the public in the first place, as a lack of financial resources often precludes much
use of paid advertising. When it comes to news framing of social issues, scholars have
demonstrated that the news tend to support dominant organizations and the status quo
while marginalizing or criticizing less powerful or minority groups, often focusing on
their protest actions more than the issues (Gitlin, 2003; Fishman, 1980; Ryan, 1991;
Tuchman, 1978). It is more challenging for less powerful groups to gain access to media
coverage than it is for mainstream, official sources with more resources, so activists often
have to escalate their protest activities to retain attention (Danielian, 1992; Gamson,
1988). Eley (1992) warned social movements that the "public sphere" in which they
operate cannot be optimistically defined as a civic forum for public consensus but,
instead, as a corporate-owned site of structured ideological negotiation.
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Public Relations Tactics ofAROs
In studying the public relations strategies of the United States' largest and most
media-savvy animal rights group, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA),
Simonson (2001) found that PETA successfully enacted a public relations switch in the
1990s from relying primarily on news-based social protest towards adopting a more pop-
cultural, celebrity-endorsed entertainment approach. Simonson contended that PETA' s
previous conflict-oriented approach often backfired in the news media: "they aim to be
noticeable; they hope to interfere with practices and systems of meaning, and in the
process of doing those things they strike some sensibilities as jarring or discordant"
(PA01). Simonson believed that the news media offer limited opportunities for successful
delivery of confrontational rhetoric for SMOs. As a result, PETA now prioritizes more
popular or comical approaches to reaching audiences through entertainment, even though
this tactic runs the risk of seeming sensational, trendy, trivial, or even offensive. Ingrid
Newkirk, PETA's founder and director, explained that PETA is forced to tum to more
sensational campaigns and be "stunt queens" (Younge, 2006, p. 12) to get any attention
for issues because the news media do not find everyday animal exploitation newsworthy.
When it comes to any media campaign on behalfof animal rights specifically,
Munro (1999) recognized that the animal rights movement faces the challenge of
redefining normal animal use as abuse: "animal movement activists seek to stigmatize
and mark as deviant what many people perceive as normal, legitimate, mainstream
activities ...The animal movement must transform the moral meanings associated with the
worst ofthese practices, redefining them as socially irresponsible" (p. 36). Munro (1999)
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agreed with Singer's (1990) contention that the animal rights movement's survival
depends on its ability to maintain the moral high-ground in campaigns. The opposition
knows this, since a common strategy of the counter-movements is to frame animal rights
activists as misanthropic (Munro, 1999). This tactic serves to call into question the
movement's morals, or at least their moral priorities, playing off of the public's deep-
seated beliefs in human superiority.
Perhaps the counter-movements do a better job at connecting with the public's
values than does the animal rights movement. Munro (1999) described a critique by
Goode (1992) stating that most animal rights campaigns fail because they "lack moral
capital, in that their arguments do not resonate with what most people believe and with
how most people behave" (Munro, 1999, p. 37). These concerns are legitimate because
the mainstream public's beliefs tend to coincide more with animal welfare viewpoints
that still allow the use of nonhuman animals (NHAs) rather than with rights viewpoints
that do not allow NHAs to be used as a resource. Wright (1990) expressed the mixed
feelings the average person has about animal use, "I still eat meat, wear a leather belt, and
support the use of animals in important scientific research. But not without a certain
amount of cognitive dissonance" (p. 20). It makes sense that by publicly exposing the
valid reasons for any cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) people experience over
using NHAs that the animal movement might begin to effect change.
The remainder of this chapter is used to discuss strategic communication
techniques especially applicable to SMOs in effecting change. I begin with some
127
strategies drawn from rhetorical theory, followed by a larger section examining SMO
framing in general, including current debates within ARO framing ofvegetarianism.
Strategies for Social Change Drawn from Rhetoric Literature
Another way of examining the persuasive nature of communication is through the
field ofrhetoric. Rhetoric can be widely defined as the study ofthe nature and function of
symbols in the human world and how they are used to construct our realities (Foss, Foss,
& Trapp, 1991). This broad definition overlaps with the social constructionist definitions
of communication I discussed in the first section (Carey, 1989; Foucault, 1990a, 1990b;
Hall 1997). However, while Foucault and Hall's work tended to foreground language's
inherent persuasiveness due to social inequality and power struggles, rhetoric, as I am
using it in this section, prioritizes explanations ofhow language can be used more
persuasively by the speaker for utilitarian purposes.
In The New Rhetoric Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) advanced a theory of
argumentation centering on the challenge of reasoning about values. They defined
argumentation as a process that seeks to resolve conflicts nonviolently by respecting the
public as free thinking citizens who can make decisions based on reason. They claimed
the goal of argument was to "create or increase the adherence of minds to the theses
presented for their assent" (p. 45). To be successful, arguments must begin from premises
upon which the author and audience agree.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) categorized premises into two types: real
and preferable. Real premises, such as those based on facts, truths, and
presumptions/probabilities, make it easier for the author to obtain more widespread
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acceptance. Preferable premises, such as those based on values, hierarchies and loci of
the preferable, are more subjective and often limited to appealing to only certain groups.
For preferable premises, the authors suggested the use of abstract values, such as rights
or peace, rather than concrete values for those communicators wanting to change the
status quo. Because abstract values are less specific, they appeal to more people; when an
abstract concept is applied to a specific person or situation it becomes more concrete and
agreement levels may decrease.
People often may agree on values in general, but rank them differently by
favoring some as superior. To help people rank these value hierarchies, the authors
suggest the speaker focus on a loci (ranking basis) of quality instead of quantity when the
goal is reforming the status quo. Quantity has normality or size on its side. Quality can
focus on the rightness or uniqueness of concepts or individuals, as that which is
threatened, irreparable, or priceless is deemed valuable (1969).
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) said that abstract ideas, such as rights and
justice, often need a sense of presence be created in order for the audience to experience
them. Communicators can create presence, attachment, and connection by stimulating the
audience's imagination and filling up their senses with the proposed idea. Film is useful
for creating presence, as is the use of narrative and myth because they help audiences get
to know individuals. Additionally, the communicator can use repetition and present tense
verbs. The authors recommended that communicators use the ambiguity and subjectivity
of language to their advantage by employing abstract notions that are open to
interpretation so a larger variety of audiences will agree with them. Communicators can
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also use ambiguity to extend a notion to relate to their cause. One way to render a notion
more obscure is to use metaphor or analogy. The authors suggested that communicators
make their notions flexible, adaptable, and progressive while making their opponents'
ideas seem rigid and outdated (1969).
This relates to McGee's (1980) notion of an ideograph, such as rights, being a
flexible yet positive cultural signifier due to its abstractness. McGee defined an ideograph
as:
an ordinary-language term found in political discourse. It is a high order abstraction
representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined
normative goal. It warrants the use ofpower, excuses behavior and beliefwhich
might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and
beliefs into channels easily recognizable by a community as acceptable and laudable.
(p. 15)
Often a movement bases its rhetoric on the past and appropriating a popular ideograph
(McGee, 1980). Therbom (1980) noted that new social norms are created by aligning
themselves with older norms. Confrontational rhetoric by itself does not transform a
society. The new ideas must be "situated in relation to elements of the prevailing
normative conceptions" (Therbom, 1980, p. 81). Burke (1984) acknowledged that to
debunk naturalized assumptions, one must introduce new principles and stretch them so
that they link with accepted old principles.
Black (2003) concluded that the animal rights and the anti-abortion movements
both employ the ideograph of rights in a diachronic or progressive fashion to include
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other animals and human fetuses. The movements aligned these rights with "powerful,
effective, nostalgic and sacred movements such as abolition, feminism, Black Power, Red
Power, gay pride, and others" (p. 315). Black suggested that the animal rights movement
must use rhetorical strategies that animate other animals to raise their status to persons
from the reductionist metonyms of objects or property.
The next section examines social movements specifically, drawing largely upon
sociological literature. It begins with an overview of social movement theory and its
development and narrows to discuss SMOs' strategic use of framing to achieve
communication goals, including a discussion of ARO frames at the end ofthe chapter.
Strategies for Social Movement Organizations
Many social movement theories have their roots in sociology, such as the Chicago
School, which historically focused on collective behavior studied from a rationalist
perspective - riots and panics, public opinion, fads, and revolutions (McAdam, McCarthy
& Zald, 1996). This rationalist perspective often viewed social movements as irrational,
emotional, and dysfunctional. By the 1970s, the study evolved to examine the structure
and processes of social movements more directly and respectfully based on political
opportunities and the capacity to mobilize resources. The cultural tum in the 1980s also
introduced non-structuralist elements such as framing, meaning-making, identity, and
emotions, which are influenced by academic areas such as semiotics, poststructuralism,
Gramscian hegemony, discourse, feminism, and postmodemism (McAdam et aI., 1996).
The three major strands of social movement theory today are: political opportunities
(addressing when and why), resource mobilization (addressing how/capacity), and
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framing (addressing identity and meaning-making). Each theory looks at different aspects
of social movements and often prioritizes different questions, so they can all be seen as
complementary to creating a holistic view of a social movement (McAdam et aI., 1996).
Political opportunity theory began in the 1970s, and it sought to determine under
what political conditions social movements emerged and prospered at a certain place and
time (McAdam et aI., 1996). It examines such factors as grievance level, institutional
access (such as having elite allies), rifts in government and elites, external resources,
lower levels of state capacity for repression, and high perceived cost of inaction.
Resource mobilization, a popular theory by the early 1980s, was influenced by elite
theory, the idea that social movements are best led by a vanguard of professional
activists. It sought to explain a movement's capacity for mobilization, which is reliant on
access to resources and their organizational structure. Framing is said to mediate between
political opportunity and resource mobilization (McAdam et aI., 1996).
Framing Overview
Theories on framing developed in the 1970s, and by the mid 1980s Goffman's
and Foucault's works and Gramsci's ideas on cultural consciousness and collective
identity had influenced social movement theory (McAdam et aI., 1996). A primary
development in framing theory was Goffman's (1974) conclusion that people use
expectations and schemas to make sense of all situations in life, looking for social cues to
know when and how to interpret an event or action. Goffman called these "schemata of
interpretations" (p. 21)frames, saying that humans must mentally frame their everyday
experiences to be able to cognitively comprehend and manage their reality and make
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decisions about appropriate actions. These frames serve to make things meaningful,
organize experiences, and guide actions.
Many communication scholars have applied Goffman's ideas on framing to
explain how communicators package their ideas through frames and how others respond
to these frames. For example, Entman (1993) acknowledged the power of framing to
identify problems and solutions: "to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality
and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment
recommendation" (p. 52). Gitlin (2003) described the importance of framing to meaning-
making by stating: "Frames are principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation
composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters" (p.
6). Lakoff (2004) noted the centrality of framing to enacting social change, as change
cannot occur without issues being strategically reframed: "Reframing is changing the
way the public sees the world. It is changing what counts as common sense. Because
language activates frames, new language is required for new frames. Thinking differently
requires speaking differently" (p. xv).
This association to common sense suggests that framing is related to a
Foucauldian notion of discourse, with discourse being a broader social process that helps
define the boundaries limiting the ways a topic can be sensibly thought about and acted
upon in a given society (Foucault, 1980, 1990a). Therefore, only certain frames would
make sense within a discourse on a given topic. This relates to Cox's (2006) concerns
that radical social movements are often constrained to use less critical discourse that stays
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within "symbolic legitimacy boundaries" of mainstream discourse, making it hard to
achieve ideological transfonnations ofthe status quo discourse. Foucault (2000)
suggested that discursive transfonnations rely on criticism of the status quo:
Criticism (and radical criticism) is utterly indispensable for any transfonnation.
For a transfonnation that would remain within the same mode of thought, a
transfonnation that would only be a certain way ofbetter adjusting the same
thought to the reality ofthings, would only be a superficial transfonnation. On the
other hand, as soon as people begin to have trouble thinking things the way they
have been thought, transfonnation becomes at the same time very urgent very
difficult, and entirely possible. (p. 457)
Framing is a component in this process of ideological transfonnation, but Oliver
and Jo1mston (2005) clarified that frames and ideology are not identical. They conceived
of frames as a reductionist presentation strategy which is infonned by ideology, or in
other words, a larger nonnative belief system. Frames can be perceived as a recruiting
tool for ideologies (Oliver & Johnston, 2005). Similar to discourse, ideologies serve as
both a constraint and a resource to the framing process, and the resulting frames help
scholars empirically observe ideology at work (Snow & Benford, 2005).
Framing serves as a method for social movements to package their ideologies and
participate in the signifying process of creating shared meanings. Seminal social
movement framing scholars include Gamson, who studied public opinion of social issues
according to how the public makes meaning, and Snow and Benford, who studied social
movement strategies and created a typology for the framing process (McAdam et al.,
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1996). Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford (1986) wrote a seminal work privileging
framing as a key element in soliciting participation in social movements, and since then
framing has become an increasingly popular topic in social movement research (Benford
& Snow, 2000).
Collective Action Frames by SMOs
Social movements create collective action frames with a specific purpose of
building support for a campaign and mobilizing people to act (Snow & Benford, 1988).
Gamson (1992) defined the three components of collective action frames as: (1) injustice
(a problem exists and it is important), (2) agency (assurance that we can fix it if we work
together), and (3) identity (side with us). However, Benford & Snow (2000) found fault
with Gamson's claim that injustice is a necessary component of all collective action
frames, even though it is common. They (Snow & Benford, 1988) more generally defined
the three core tasks of framing as: (1) diagnostic (define the problem and possibly
attribute blame), (2) prognostic (define solutions), and (3) motivational (encourage
collective action).
The practice of selecting what Snow & Benford (1988) referred to as the
diagnostic, or problem, component ofthe collective action frame can be contentious
within a movement; disagreements may occur not only in defining the problem for the
public but also in assigning blame, as causality for problems is often multi-faceted and
complex. An SMO's diagnostic and prognostic frames should align, as the definition of
the problem constrains the range of pertinent solutions (Benford, 1987). The prognostic,
or solution, component of collective action frames is often influenced by external factors
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that may create a need for the SMO to counter-frame remedies offered by one's
opponents and rationalize recommendations (Benford, 1987). Additionally, factions
within a social movement may reveal themselves in the different prognoses offered by
different SMOs, such as the abolitionist versus litigator factions identified within the U.S.
anti-death penalty movement that debated whether to work toward a federal ban or work
on a case-by-case basis to save individual lives of current death row inmates (Haines,
1996).
The motivational component of collective action frames must construct a
compelling motive that serves as an inspiration to engage in collective action toward the
proposed solution (Benford & Snow, 2000). To gamer this support, motivational frames
often rely upon an appeal to shared values, demonstrating alignment between the goals of
the SMO and those of the target audience.
Frame Alignment Process
In their seminal work, Snow et aI. (1986) suggested that an SMO must
strategically create alignment between its interpretive frames and those of potential
adherents -linking an individual's beliefs and values with the goals and ideology of the
SMO. The authors identified four types of frame alignment processes, which are
discussed below: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame
transformation.
First, frame bridging is the "linkage oftwo or more ideologically congruent but
structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem" (Snow et aI.,
1986, p. 467). This allows the SMO to engage "unmobilized sentiment pools" (p. 467),
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whether they be individuals or other social movements, who are likely to be sympathetic
to the issue. This alignment process seems to emphasize the SMO's use of media vehicles
as a structural bridge to reach and organize previously unmobilized individuals who share
similar interests in redressing a problem.
Second, frame amplification is the clarification of an interpretive frame, by
tapping into existing values or beliefs in society, so that the frame bears on a particular
issue and people see the connection. All movements utilize frame amplification, but it is
particularly useful to movements whose values contradict society's core values and are in
need of greater support (Berbrier, 1998). Frame amplification involves amplifying both
values and beliefs (Snow et aI., 1986). Values refer to guiding behaviors or states of
existence that society deems worthy of protection and promotion (Rokeach, 1973). As
values exist in a hierarchy that varies by individual, SMOs must elevate a presumed value
to create salience for it in the mind of the viewer and demonstrate its direct relevance to
the issue at hand (Snow et. aI., 1986). Beliefs describe relationships and are "ideational
elements that cognitively support or impede action in pursuit of desired values" (p. 470).
Frame amplification must address the following core beliefs affecting desire to
participate in collective action, such as people's need to believe the problem is serious,
certain parties are to blame, change can happen if they act collectively, and their
assistance is necessary and socially acceptable (Snow et aI. 1986).
Third, frame extension is produced by extending the boundaries of an SMO's
framework to show it includes other issues and concerns that are important to a group of
potential adherents (Snow et aI., 1986). This is useful for creating coalitions with other
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social justice groups. To be ethical, an SMO needs to be sincere and avoid using frame
extension to merely gain additional resources. Another caution is that extending the
issues for which an SMO advocates can backfire by diluting the specificity of its original
cause and resulting in increased disputes among core supporters.
The last alignment process, frame transformation, consists of creating new
meanings and values often by changing old meanings (Snow et al., 1986). Oliver and
Johnston (2005) claimed that frame transformation is actually ideological transformation.
Frame transformation is particularly necessary when the values promoted by an SMO do
not resonate or may even appear antithetical to conventional lifestyles (Snow et al.,
1986). New values must be planted in society and erroneous beliefs reframed, such as a
change in the way a domain of life is framed so that what previously seemed acceptable
is reframed as unjust or problematic. This can sometimes be done under a broad or global
interpretive frame transformation, such as a meta-narrative ofpeace, which reframes
many domains of life under a new universe of discourse (Snow et al., 1986). Benford and
Snow (2000) noted that frame transformation has not been adequately studied by
scholars.
Various Frame Characteristics, such as Resonance
Characteristics of frames can vary between SMOs within the same movement.
Benford and Snow (2000) noted four main characteristic of frame variances: problem
identification and direction/locus of attribution; flexibility and rigidity, inclusivity and
exclusivity; variation in interpretive scope and influence; and resonance. The more
inclusive and flexible a frame is, the greater the opportunity it has to evolve into a master
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frame. Master frames, such as rights, injustice, hegemony, and democracy, are the
broadest in interpretive scope and can be used across different movements.
Another variable characteristic between framing approaches is the extent to which
a frame resonates with its intended public. Benford and Snow (2000) claimed frame
resonance is dependent on both credibility (of the speaker and message) and salience
(with the values prioritized by the individual and society). A frame is more credible, and
hence more persuasive, if its message is congruent with the stated beliefs and actions of
the SMO. For example, SMOs should avoid such contradictions as preaching
nonviolence and compassion and then acting or speaking in an aggressive, rude, or
violent manner, as was demonstrated by the radical fringe of the anti-abortion movement
(Johnson, 1997). The other resonance factor is salience, which can likely be increased if
the values and beliefs that a frame espouses are also central in the targeted individual's
hierarchy of values and beliefs (Rokeach, 1973). To be salient and resonant, frames must
be commensurate with and relate to the target's personal experiences by not seeming too
abstract or distant from his or her everyday life (Benford & Snow, 2000). Additionally,
frames are constrained by the need to be culturally resonant and fit within a society's
overall myths, narratives, ideologies, and identity. For example, McAdam (1996) credited
successes of the Southern Christian Leadership Coalition in the civil rights movement to
the accessibility and resonance of framing around accepted principles of Christianity and
democracy as well as the congruence between the protesters' nonviolent resistance tactics
and their frames of morality and justice.
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Johnston and Noakes (2005) summarized Gamson and Snow's work on frame
resonance to explain how to increase resonance from the perspective of the source,
message, and receiver. The source must be perceived as credible, and it helps ifhe or she
is charismatic. The message must be logically consistent, timely/relevant, and amplified
and compatible with the culture. Also, the receivers must be able to bridge ideologies and
extend or transform the frame to fit their existing attitudes and morals.
Tactics to Address SMa Framing Challenges
Tarrow (1998) proposed three major framing challenges facing SMOs. First,
SMOs must decide whether to use familiar frames or new ones. Inherited and familiar
frames are more resonant but may lead to passivity, but if frames are too new and
unfamiliar then it may lead to inaction. Most successful groups use inherited frames but
link them to action. Second, similar to the notion of resonance, SMOs must try to get the
public to share their frame. In this effort, it helps ifthe SMO builds upon common values,
not divisive ones. Third, SMOs must determine how to build unity through identity
without being too narrow or elitist.
Polletta (2006) argued for the importance of storytelling and narrative to SMOs.
Because storytelling is associated with emotion it works better in the cultural arena rather
than in the arena ofpolitics or finance. Similar to Perelman and Obrechts-Tyteca's (1969)
suggestion that ambiguity is useful at appealing to larger audiences, Polletta (2006) noted
that a dramatic story's openness to interpretation helps it galvanize unity between
different groups to act collectively on a cause because they can each use the story in
different ways with their constituents. Polletta (2006) also suggested that stories have a
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better chance of resonating if they come from the cultural stock and seem familiar, such
as linking one's movement to past freedom fighters and heroes.
Similarly, Za1d (1996) stated that the strategic frames of one group are often built
off of other master-frames of another group because we share a cultural identity. One's
culture determines what an injustice is and what tactics are acceptable remedies. Yet
there are cultural contradictions where the society accepts some injustices while
denouncing other related injustices (ex: preaching democracy but accepting racial
discrimination). Controversies often center on definitions of relations between rights and
responsibilities or self-reliance and mutuality.
Lakoff (2004) advised communicators who were engaged in reframing issues to
avoid using the opponent's language and frames when trying to negate them, as that only
serves to inadvertently reinforce the opponent's way of seeing the world. An
organization's language and frames should fit and emphasize its own worldview and
values. In support of authentic communication, Lakoff concluded that U.S. conservative
political groups were generally better at framing than progressive groups because
conservatives "say what they idealistically believe" (p. 20) while progressives take the
utilitarian approach of relying on polls to decide how radical or moderate to be. Lakoff
suggested that advocacy organizations avoid talking primarily in terms of policy, facts, or
negations and, instead, talk in terms of a clear set of simple values that accurately reflect
what the organization stands for and express its "moral vision" (p. 74).
SMa framing tactics for reaching the news media. SMOs are challenged when
using the news media to communicate frames, as the news media tend to use episodic or
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event-oriented frames more so than thematic or ideological ones. Therefore, Klandermans
& Gosling (1996) suggested that SMOs can only rely on the media (who prefer
adversarial frames) to tell the public there is a conflict and who the major players are so
people can take sides, but the SMO has to fmd other channels through which to educate
the public on the logic of the issue itself. Gamson and Meyer (1996) claimed that the
news media are more useful at communicating a social movement's diagnostic or
prognostic frame components as opposed to its motivational components.
Ryan (1991) advised activist groups on how framing could be used to add drama
to a campaign in order to increase newsworthiness and compete in a challenging media
environment where they are at a disadvantage. She suggested SMOs use a values appeal
to create resonance by framing themselves as a positive group trying to right moral
wrongs in a conflict. Similar to Polletta's (2006) advisement to use narrative, Ryan
(1991) stated that SMOs need to weave facts into a story with mythic plots and characters
and culturally acceptable social goals, such as freedom, rights, and compassion. Iftheir
opponents muddle the issue by picking a similar frame and attempting to assimilate them,
then Ryan suggested that SMOs switch to a change-oriented frame based on the idea of
moral progress.
To better understand the communication challenges faced by key rights
movements in creating moral progress in the United States, I discuss internal framing
debates within the early women's rights and civil rights movements over the extent to
which their messages should criticize or challenge the status quo discriminatory ideology
in pursuit oflegal goals. This relates to the previous discussion of how SMOs struggle to
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create resonance and alignment for their frames with the public on issues over which they
may disagree. And movement leaders often disagree over these tactical framing decisions
that appear to involve compromising ideological integrity for public acceptance and
tangible results (Cox, 2006; Gitlin, 2003).
Ideological Framing Debates in Historical Us. Social Movements
Framing is a competitive process where leaders in challenging movements
struggle externally with counter-movements and authorities to define frames, but there
are also internal framing struggles over tactics and goals (Zald, 1996). This section's
framing debates, from the early stages of human rights movements in the United States,
serve as useful framing examples to this dissertation as they bear some relevance to
today's animal rights movement framing struggles, since animal rights is also in a fairly
early stage of development and seems radical for the time. In this section, I specifically
explore some of the framing debates within the women's rights and abolitionist
movements of the 19th century.
Framing ofwomen's rights. In the book Man Cannot Speakfor Her, Campbell
(1989) claimed that women of the early 19th century began to acknowledge their own
need for rights as they were denied the right to be spokespersons and leaders of any
significance in the other social reform movements which they pioneered. Women then
turned that collective action towards themselves and founded their own societies,
convening the first women's rights convention in 1848. The convention's Declaration of
Sentiments, which was heavily ridiculed by the male dominated press, based its
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manifesto on extension of natural rights to women. This reaffirmed American values of
democracy and justice and promoted reform not revolution.
Campbell (1989) identified two major contradictory framing choices made by
women suffragists, one was more ideologically pure and the other more politically
expedient. The former frame was the more "radical" or oppositional argument drawn
from the women's rights convention that women deserved rights based on the equality
guaranteed to citizens per the U.S. constitution (natural individual rights). The other
frame, political expediency, was a more pragmatic and moderate approach asking for the
vote on the basis that it would be socially beneficial if women could spread their innate
moral virtues to the public sphere and better facilitate their caretaking roles as wives and
mothers. The latter approach was considered more feminine, as it was selfless and
altruistic, and its message played off of stereotypes of female purity. The former
approach of asking for equal rights for oneself seemed more masculine and self-centered.
The women's rights movement did experience factioning over sending these mixed
messages that confused the identity of women's suffrage in the eyes of the public.
Campbell (1989) explained that movements must balance contradictory internal
and external pressures to maintain buy-in of current members while still attracting new
members to the cause. The paradox is that if you maintain ideological purity to advance a
new worldview, you increase your internal unity through radical identity, and the conflict
is then oriented externally toward the public. But if you use politically expedient
ideologies that are less threatening to the status quo, it creates more external unity with
the public but more disagreements and factions internally within the movement.
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Campbell (1989) claimed that the more moderate and feminine suffrage appeals
"exemplify the seductive strategies that the oppressed are constrained to use when they
lack the legal, political, and economic power to effect change" (p. 96).
While Lucy Mott, Henry Blackwell, and Frances Willard used this more moderate
and expedient approach, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony were both what
Campbell (1989) called "ideological purists" for using a natural rights argument. When
speaking to legislators, Stanton and Anthony were somewhat aggressive and used legal
and democratic arguments. They pointed out contradictions in the American legal system,
such as women being denied the right to be tried by a jury of their peers and women
being taxed without being able to vote. Taxation without representation was a powerful
argument that resonated with democratic struggles in American history.
Additionally, Anthony and Stanton connected women's rights with other classic
struggles that resonated with most men at the time: the American Revolution, the civil
war, and the protestant revolution. Similarly, they used the analogy of comparing
American men to tyrants such as kings, feudal barons, and popes - all very un-American
traits that made democratic American men appear hypocritical. Later Stanton chose an
indirect attack by focusing on the victim and comparing women to slaves instead of
attacking the men as victimizers (Campbell, 1989).
In general, women did not "fit" as public spokespeople for a cause because the
world of public debate was competitive and based on reason. If women were good at that,
then they were equal to men in intellect, which was threatening to the dominant beliefs of
male's superior mental capacities. Therefore, women had to balance being rational with
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being feminine, so they often used a less authoritarian and more participatory style of
communication. Many female rhetoricians used the following for proof and authority:
biblical references, personal experience and narrative, vivid metaphors, and the power of
presence.
Frances Willard embodied this paradox of feminine feminism, as she was strong
yet attractive and fashionable. She used a moderate or "social feminist" approach ofthe
temperance movement where she kept gender roles distinct but argued for society's need
for female morality and talents in the public sphere. She and her group were much more
accepted and popular than Stanton's group. She addressed audiences as if they were
superior and she wanted their approval. She made women's rights seem less threatening
to men by trying to convince them that women needed male protection so women could
do their caretaking jobs better and more safely (Campbell, 1989).
Rev. Dr. Anna Howard Shaw, a prolific paid lecturer at the turn ofthe 20th
century, also tailored her speeches to male audiences, except she used humor when
pointing out contradictions in male arguments to reveal their absurdity (Campbell, 1989).
She helped men laugh at their fears, and her sense of humor made her seem more sensible
and likeable. Like Stanton and Anthony, Shaw used a natural rights approach based on
democratic principles. She argued that it is more important to uphold democratic
principles than to buckle to the opponent's trivial fear-based concerns of "what ifs." She
seemed to be both ideologically pure yet tailor her argument to appeal to men's interests
and concerns in a less threatening and expedient way through humor (Campbell, 1989).
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Framing ofthe abolitionist movement. In the book Forerunners ofBlack Power:
The Rhetoric ofAbolition, Bormann (1971) identified two main rhetorical styles of
abolitionist speakers in the mid 19th century, both influenced by Puritan preaching
heritage: agitation (used by William Lloyd Garrison, Wendell Phillips, and Frederick
Douglass) and conversion (used by Theodore Weld). While agitation and conversion are
similar, respectively, to Campbell's (1989) dichotomized rhetorical styles of ideological
purity and political expediency in the women's rights movement, Bormann's
abolitionist's agitation style seems more radical and aggressive, in content and delivery,
than the women's rights version, as the agitator rhetoric was more revolutionary than
reformist in its critique ofthe United States.
Bormann (1971) analyzed these two rhetorical styles according to the two major
challenges facing social movement leaders. First, leaders must mobilize people to their
cause by showing them what is wrong and how they can fix it, similar to the diagnosis
and prognosis frames of Snow & Benford (1988) or Gamson's (1992) injustice and
agency frames. To do so, the movement must historically situate its cause into the
cultural narrative while creating its identity and vision (Bormann, 1971). For example, it
may be asking to go back to a better time or it may envision itself as part of an ongoing
progression toward a better society. Second, similar to Gamson's (1992) identity frame,
Bormann (1971) said the movement must create a group identity to gain commitment
from members by making itself meaningful to members' lives.
When it came to abolitionists mobilizing people and situating the movement in
the culture, both agitators and conversionists used testimony and evidence from
147
Southerners and former enslaved people to shock the public with the brutal facts of life
under slavery (Bormann, 1971). Both types of rhetoric viewed slavery as a sin, but
conversionists used biblical rhetoric more. Agitators focused on means, principles, and
morals. They were openly critical of institutions and anyone supporting slavery, calling
Americans hypocrites. They historically situated themselves outside of American
experience as new revolutionaries because they believed society was corrupted by racism.
On the other hand, conversionists focused more on ends, as the goal was to be persuasive.
They appealed to people's noble interests for the American dream and principles of
freedom. They saw their movement as the better part of the American dream - of
guaranteeing the natural rights of man. The conversionist approach was effective, and
many new anti-slavery societies started because of it (Bormann, 1971).
In addressing Bormann's (1971) second reform challenge of creating group unity,
identity, and commitment, both agitators and conversionists sought to make the
abolitionist movement a major force in their members' lives by labeling it as a moral
duty. They both claimed it was a righteous cause sanctioned by God and was worth
sacrificing and suffering for. Agitators were more stringent in their demand that slavery
be outlawed immediately and full political rights be granted to all men. They did not
water down the message to make it more appealing and felt disruption was necessary
because it got attention and headlines. Conversionists, however, were more moderate at
first and said abolition could happen gradually and black men should not be granted full
voting rights immediately. But conversionists eventually came around to the full rights
position, which Bormann argued was the rhetorically stronger position. Bormann
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described the conversionists as being more successful than agitators at reducing internal
fighting and at converting more people and appealing to outsiders.
In the civil rights movement a century later, Dr. Martin Luther King's rhetoric is
more similar to conversionists with its promotion of democratic American values
(Bormann, 1971). But it was firm like the agitators about the immediate need for equal
rights. King's rhetorical style was evangelical and drew much support from churches.
Contrastingly, the Black Power movement was more agitation-oriented and attacked
cherished American values and social structures as inherently racist.
In conclusion, it seems like the preferred framing approach is a mix of the two
styles. SMO communicators should promote strong moral values and be uncompromising
on rights like the agitators and ideological purists. But they should make sure to situate
themselves as reformers within American cultural values, and possibly use a softer sell,
to be more appealing and make progress like the conversionists and political expedients.
Just as Campbell (1989) and Bormann (1971) distinguished between more and less
critical, or ideological, framing approaches in historical rights campaigns, in the next
section I examine similar framing debates in the modem day animal rights movement
regarding whether to prioritize rights versus welfare, or, alternatively, abolition versus
reform.
Ideological Framing Debates in the Animal Rights Movement
Legal scholars Francione (1996) and Hall (2006a) suggested that animal rights
activists should more authentically align their rights ideology with their activist
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strategies. Both authors drew a distinction between animal welfare and animal rights
ideologies and favored the latter.
Distinctions between animal rights and animal welfare. Francione (1996) said
animal rights is about justice and the abolition of animal exploitation and not allowing
other animals to be treated as a means to human ends. A rights philosophy demands the
"incremental eradication ofthe property status of animals" (p. 4) to raise them to the level
of "personhood" (p. 6). Francione claimed:
The rights advocate makes one thing very clear: that animal rights is a position of
the outsider who ultimately seeks a paradigm shift in the way that law and social
policy regard the status of animals, as well as in the human/animal relationship.
(p.2l9)
Hall (2006a) defined animal rights as a deontological ethic granting nonhumans the right
to privacy and freedom from human intrusion. It is an argument against use and
domination in favor of freedom.
Conversely, Francione (1996) and Hall (2006a) defined animal welfare as a
mainstream philosophy that merely regulates animal exploitation and the suffering of the
NHAs we control. Francione (1996) stated that animal welfare has the following
characteristics (a) it recognizes animal sentience but believes NHAs are not as worthy of
moral respect as humans, (b) it recognizes the property status ofNHAs while wanting to
limit the rights ofproperty owners, and (c) it accepts trading away the interests ofNHAs
in favor of human interests only if the latter are deemed significant and necessary.
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Framing around animal rights not animal welfare. Francione (1996) claimed that
the modem day animal rights movement is largely a hybrid of both rights and welfare.
Hall (2006a) also noted that few animal protection organizations actually promote rights;
humane groups clearly promote welfare, and, ironically, even many radical direct action
groups ultimately focus on welfare and suffering. Francione (1996) explained that many
AROs operate on the belief that they must use a welfare platform to get to the eventual
goal of rights. Francione argued that a welfare approach is "structurally defective" (p. 4)
at accomplishing an abolitionist rights agenda. It is "counterproductive on both
theoretical and practical levels," (p. 5) as a social movement must align its ideology,
goals, and strategy for logical consistency. Francione (1996) and Finsen and Finsen
(1994) admitted that a largely welfarist animal protection movement has raised awareness
of animal suffering over time, but it has not achieved the goal of decreasing the number
of animals who are exploited.
Both Hall (2006a) and Francione (1996) critiqued utilitarian philosophies of
animal ethics, like Singer's, as well as utilitarian activist strategies that fail to align the
message and tactic with the kind of end world they seek. The animal rights movement
fails to connect theory and practice in favor of pragmatism. Hall and Francione used
metaphors such as treadmills and chasing one's tail to describe the futility of welfare
reforms that seek to chip away at the myriad ways NHAs suffer within an exploitative
system. Any such victories are shallow, as they merely mitigate a few of the endless array
of symptoms but do not get significantly closer to eliminating the root cause - an
instrumental view ofNHAs as property.
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In support ofBaker & Martinson's (2001) authenticity principle in
communication ethics, a .rights message from a rights organization is honest
communication that authentically represents the group's goals without hiding aspects that
might be unpopular and less mainstream. Francione (1996) stated:
Although many animal rights organizations claim to embrace the complete
abolition of animal exploitation as a long-term goal, they often couch this
message in more "conservative" terms in order to make their message more
acceptable to the public. The problem with this approach is that it allows animal
exploiters to respond that animal advocates are not honest or that they have some
"secret," agenda, which is arguably harmful to the overall credibility of the
movement. (p. 117)
Regarding a willingness to be candid, Hall (2006a) provided the example that most
advocacy groups promote so-called "humane" farms instead of asking supporters to go
vegetarian. Hall lamented that more advocacy groups did not "cultivate a public demand
for peaceable, animal-free farming unabashedly" (p. 99) because it is defeatist and timid
to give up on replacing exploitative systems and settle only for demanding improvements
to the system. Hall likened this easy-sell approach to following a corporate marketing
model that adjusts to fit the status quo and treats citizens like consumers by offering them
a bevy of appealing choices. Hall argued that these expedient tactics just end up
distorting the issue.
An additional advantage ofmaintaining an ideologically-based frame is that it
enables the ARO to control the discourse by defining the problem around the root cause
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of exploitation and enslavement instead of allowing the issue to be limited to animal
husbandry/welfare or human self-interest. Regarding the weakness of using the latter
frame, Francione (1996) explained:
These arguments shift the moral focus from issues ofjustice for a disempowered
group to the self-interest of the empowered group and open the debate to various
empirical considerations, such as how dangerous meat eating really is or whether
vivisection is really "scientific fraud" (p. 118)
Regarding the weakness of a welfare frame, Francione argued that limiting the frame to
welfare fits with a mainstream industry perspective, allowing industries to claim they are
in agreement or compliance with humane treatment. This may inadvertently benefit
animal exploitation industries, whose strategy has been to alienate the animal rights
activists by labeling them as misanthropic and militant in favor of co-opting the more
conservative welfare groups and humane messages. So using a rights campaign that
questions the legitimacy and existence of those industries has the advantage that it cannot
be co-opted by them.
Framing around incremental abolition goals. Francione (1996) understood the
pragmatic need for activists to feel effective and not campaign in vain for rights or seek
violent revolution, so he acknowledged that rights, not just welfare, can be gained in
stages of incremental abolition. But Francione cautioned that AROs should ensure their
campaigns for incremental change are actually based on rights not welfare principles. He
provided the following examples of rights campaigns: asking people to go vegan or to
boycott companies who test on animals, ending the use of certain animals in certain kinds
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of exploitation, protesting or exercising civil disobedience against an exploitative
industry, or banning certain hunting or experimentation practices or devices. While
Francione mentioned that a rights agenda could include banning cruel farming practices
like battery cages or dehorning, he cited a caveat by Robert Gamer (1993) who argued
that this could just lead to public support for less cruel animal farming, a concern that is
partially mitigated by including a vegan message in the campaign.
Francione (1996) also cautioned against relying too heavily on regulatory reforms
of industry, as welfare campaigns for humane farming do. The industries have the law on
their side as they are owners of animal property, so until animals are not considered
property, Francione said it is futile to request significant legal change when "the legal
system structurally limits the scope of reform to what is dictated by the instrumentalist
position" (p. 171).
Blending animal rights with environmentalism. Hall (2006a) provided framing
advice by recommending animal rights campaigns represent NHAs with dignity instead
of perpetuating a stewardship narrative where NHAs are represented as weak victims
who need human heroes to care for them. The popular use of imagery that emphasizes
NHA cuteness can diminish human respect for them as fellow adults. Hall's definition of
animal rights partially overlaps with environmentalism as it envisions more free
nonhumans and less captive ones for humans to save. Humans must not focus on creating
a world where they and other animals avoid all suffering and risk, as that is part of nature.
Hall suggested the animal rights movement shift its focus to protecting free nonhumans
and their habitat instead of campaigning for more space for captive animals, which just
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further displaces wilderness. Hall proposed that animal ethics be put within the umbrella
of ecology not humanitarianism. To do so successfully, environmental ethics must be
encouraged to embrace an ethic that respects all individual animals, not just humans.
The next section narrows the debate,..over AROs using animal rights versus animal
welfare frames to apply it to the framing of farmed animal issues and vegetarianism
specifically.
ARO Food Framing Debates
For at least a decade, most major animal rights organizations, and even some
animal welfare groups like the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), have made
farmed animals a primary focus, as farmed animals comprise the vast majority ofNHAs
killed in the United States and the numbers of animals killed for food increases each year
(FARM death toll, 2007). Instead of primarily promoting veganism, the recent trend for
some animal protection organizations is to encourage humane farming reforms, as has
been successful in Europe. In some cases, the animal protection organizations promote
less inhumane farm products, such as cage-free eggs, in addition to vegetarianism. This
shift toward farmed animal welfare reforms has sparked debate within the animal rights
movement over effectiveness, authenticity, and integrity in movement strategy. In this
section, I will include arguments for both farming reform and veganism.
In favor ofhumane reform frames. Those activists who argue in favor of working
with the meat industry to institute higher animal welfare standards often use utilitarian
arguments about it being more effective at both eventually promoting veganism and
currently reducing the amount of suffering billions of animals endure. Advocates for
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welfare refonn argue that to insist only on veganism, when it is adopted at such a slow
rate, is tantamount to the movement activists turning their backs on the billions of
animals who currently suffer.
Singer (2006) has become more of an incrementalist since the reasonable
arguments for veganism presented in Animal Liberation in 1975 have failed to make
veganism mainstream. Singer argued that raising awareness about the lack of fanned
animal welfare in the United States will serve to raise public consciousness that minor
improvements are still not enough. Park (2006), of the HSUS, took a pragmatic approach
by arguing that welfare strategies attract more media attention to educate the public about
poor fanning conditions. Both Park and Singer cited England as an example of a country
that has strong fanned animal welfare laws and a higher rate of vegetarianism. However,
their arguments fail to prove that the fonner resulted in the latter, as it could be the other
way around.
Park (2006) also suggested the utilitarian motive that fanning refonns would
drive up prices which would reduce consumption of animal products. It is probably true
that cost-conscious consumers might eat fewer of these pricey domestic products ifless
cruel methods were outlawed in the United States, but this does not take into account that
cheap, factory fanned animal products would likely still be readily available and popular
due to free trade imports. Due to globalization, it seems the best way to ensure supply
decreases is to decrease demand for any animal products.
Pann Sanctuary Director G. Bauston (2006) argued that the movement should not
dichotomize welfare versus rights as both can be accomplished by asking the public to
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view farmed animals as sentient beings instead of commodities. Similarly, Singer and
Friedrich (2006), the latter being from PETA, contended that the philosophical argument
for granting animals freedom from cages also "logically demands that we cease to exploit
them for our own ends" (p. 12). While Francione (1996) argued that rights and welfare
are separate philosophies, the author believed that certain incremental strategies, such as
with farming, could be in keeping with animal rights. However, Francione admitted that
it is problematic with farming to maintain a distinction between encouraging industry
reform and implicitly promoting the resulting animal products.
Infavor ofvegan frames. Many activists do not believe Bauston's and Singer and
Friedrich's (2006) contention that animal agribusiness reform is philosophically
consistent with animal rights (Dunayer, 2006; Hall, 2006b; Lama, 2006; Mark, 2006;
Torres, 2006). These activists emphasized that the purpose of animal rights is to promote
life, freedom, and respect though the abolition of speciesist practices such as
industrialized animal slaughter. They do not believe any implicit or explicit promotion of
"happy meat" aligns with that life-affirming goal. Mark (2006) encouraged rights
activists to fulfill their unique purpose in global animal discourse by asking activists, "If
we are not going to give the hard message for what the animals need, who is?" (p. 25).
Some activists emphasized that working with animal agribusiness weakens the
movement's integrity and credibility. Former cattle rancher turned activist H. Lyman
(2006) maintained that if the meat industry is wrong and AROs team up with them, then
the AROs are wrong too. Documentarian J. LaVeck (2006b) claimed that financial
incentives encourage both industry and animal rights organizations to negotiate the "price
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of public concern for animal suffering" (p. 21), as both groups end up growing and
getting the resources they need. To dissuade AROs from helping animal agribusiness
profit, LaVeck suggested:
We don't need to be a part of dreaming up the details ofthe industry's new and
improved systems of exploitation, and we certainly don't need to put our good
names and our movement's credibility behind the questionable products that
result. (p. 23)
Many activists expressed concern that by promoting farmed animal reforms they
were sending conflicted and mixed messages that weakened their position by revealing an
identity crisis. Sociologist Bob Torres (2006) argued that it shows conflict, weakness, and
defeatism to promote a kinder version of speciesism. Torres stated that welfare is untrue
to animal rights ideology and turns activists into advocates for exploitation. LaVeck
(2006b) agreed that animal rights messages need to be clear, strong, truthful, and morally
consistent. If AROs negotiate with industry, it sends a complicit message that eating meat
is a necessary evil, and all that activists and the public can realistically do is try to
mitigate suffering. LaVeck claimed that through welfare reform, activists are introducing
"moral ambiguity into situations where the boundaries between right and wrong must
never be allowed to blur" (LaVeck, 2006b, p. 23).
While Singer (2006) does believe activists should reform industry, in the
philosopher's book with Mason (2006), they declare that from a consumer perspective
veganism is superior because it provides ethical clarity, making it easier to make food
choices and stick with them; conscientious meat-eaters will always be plagued with the
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ethical dilemmas of determining both how humane is humane enough and whether or not
the farms from which they buy are truly acting as humanely as they claim. If Singer and
Mason's argument is turned around on the animal rights movement, it seems to imply
activists should prioritize vegan campaigns, as they lack the ethical ambiguity dilemmas
of promoting so-called "humane" farms.
The authenticity and power of ARO communication is also compromised when
AROs sanction agribusiness's appropriation ofprincipled terms that guide the animal
movement, such as "compassion" and "humane," thereby lowering the threshold for what
these terms mean in society. These terms represent something positive to the public, but
in reality the movement has allowed them to misleadingly represent something less
positive - a softer version of killing and approved amounts of suffering (LaVeck, 2006a).
Ethical communication issues with humane reform frames. Lama (2006)
indirectly addressed communication ethics by noting that humane reformers think they
are tricking the trade into eventual abolition when in reality the trick is on them, as the
industry uses the activists as economic leverage to sell so-called "happy meat." This
echoes Francione's (1996) concern that when animal rights activist campaigns claim to
be reasonably reforming agribusiness to better fit mainstream animal welfare standards,
the public may be mislead about the activists' more "radical" abolitionist agenda of
moving them toward veganism. The industry can then point out this breach in
communication ethics to undermine the credibility of activist groups.
Controlling the discourse by defining the problem around rights. All questions,
strategies, and solutions stem from how the problem is defined. LaVeck (2006a) and
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Dunayer (2006) suggested that animal rights activists retain control of the discourse by
defining the problem as exploitation and slavery not husbandry and cruelty. A husbandry
frame is too narrow, excluding both the larger issue of the NHA's right not to be
exploited and humans' lack of need for their exploitation in the first place. This echoes
Hall's (2006a) and Francione's (1996) suggestions that animal rights campaigns be brave
enough to maintain a rights ideology, since being outside the mainstream is essential to
transforming the status quo. Activists create framing challenges the more their campaigns
focus on reforming, instead of transforming, the mainstream use of NHAs for food,
because a vegan solution then remains more radical in the eyes of the public. LaVeck
(2006a) argued that when some animal groups work with industry on welfare reforms it
can set back the whole animal rights movement from a framing standpoint:
The focus of public dialogue irrevocably shifts from the questionable morality of
using and killing animals, to an elaborate, endless wrangle over how the deed will
be done - conditions, treatment, standards and regulation. In this new framework,
public calls by animal advocates for the boycott of all animal products, for
nonparticipation in exploitation, have no place. Such talk is now an
embarrassment for the participating animal groups, and a joke for the meat
industry people. Such talk is now relegated to the realm of "radicalism." (p. 20)
Vegan frames and the connection with environmentalism. In considering whether
to prioritize humane farming reforms or veganism, LaVeck (2006b) reminded activists
that any animal products, even ones that are cage-free, are less sustainable and contribute
to greater environmental devastation. Unlike farming reform campaigns, campaigns
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supporting veganism have the added benefit of being able to emphasize sustainability,
which benefits all animals, including humans and wild, or free, NHAs. Conversely,
welfare campaigns are limited to focusing on a reduction of suffering for captive
nonhumans and fail to relate to environmental issues.
Similarly, Hall (2006b) reminded animal rights activists to see the big picture of
how their work connected with other social causes, such as environmentalism, in seeking
to transform humans' dominionistic attitude toward others and nature. "We're seeing the
biggest set of extinctions and the most ominous climate indicators in modern history,"
Hall claimed. ''Negotiating with industries is fiddling as Rome burns. We should be very
busy learning a different way to think about other animals and the earth" (p. 25). Hall's
(2006a) belief that animal rights is about letting NHAs live free from human interference
requires that animal activists work toward ensuring a healthy environment with habitat
for all animals. Hall advocated that AROs promote veganism to work toward this mutual
goal of animal rights and environmentalism. Regarding the animal rights goal of
veganism, I use the following section to explore Americans' attitudes about
vegetarianism and meat-reduction as well as two scholarly studies examining framing of
vegetarian messages.
Framing ofVegetarianism
American consumer attitudes about vegetarianism and meat-reduction. To frame
vegetarian messages effectively, it helps to understand public opinion and motivations
regarding meat-eating. A 2007 study by the Humane Research Council (HRC) found that,
while total vegetarianism remains a marginal diet in the United States, 13% of Americans
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consider themselves semi-vegetarians and over a quarter of the population says they are
actively reducing their meat consumption. This latter group, comprised largely of women
and older consumers, is primarily motivated to reduce meat consumption based on self-
interest, such as health, rather than on animal or environmental protection. While
consumers view vegetarian foods, such as fruits, vegetables, and whole grains, as healthy,
they also generally believe that some animal products, such as dairy, chicken, and fish,
are also healthy.
Vegetarian advocates are challenged by survey findings that reveal 80% of
Americans do not intend to ever fully eliminate meat from their diet, based on concerns
that it may be unhealthy to do so and their overall preference for the taste of meat.
However, almost a quarter of the population is interested in reducing their meat
consumption by half. Therefore, the HRC study (2007) suggested that it would be more
effective for vegetarian advocates to promote meat reduction, rather than vegetarianism:
For an adult audience, meat reduction is clearly more acceptable than complete
veg*ism, and there is strong evidence that this approach to veg*n advocacy would
persuade more people. Moreover, there is evidence that those who start to reduce
their meat consumption become more open to both further reduction and possible
elimination of meat from their diet. (p. 7)
Consumers interested in meat reduction and vegetarianism have concerns about its
potential inconvenience and cost, so advocates should provide consumers with practical
infonnation on how to overcome these barriers (HRC, 2007).
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When presenting rationale to the public, pro-vegetarian organizations should
avoid mass advocacy campaigns in favor of more targeted approaches (HRC, 2007).
Consumers often need to hear a variety of reasons for going vegetarian, and it is likely
most effective to lead with a health argument followed by a concern for animal suffering.
While the health rationale, in particular, and the environmental rationale, to some degree,
are more useful at encouraging people to reduce meat consumption, the animal suffering
rationale is most effective at motivating people to eliminate meat. Therefore, the HRC
(2007) concluded that it may be most strategic for different advocacy organizations to use
different appeals, such as some concentrating on meat-reduction for health reasons and
others on vegetarianism for animal protection reasons.
Communication tactics ofus. vegetarian advocates. Maurer (2002) studied
vegetarianism as a movement promoted by not only animal protection organizations but
also vegetarian societies, which is broader than my dissertation's specific focus on animal
rights organizations. According to Maurer, vegetarian ideology "provides both a critique
of meat-eating and a vision of a vegetarian world" (p. 2). The vegetarian movement's
ideology is based on three core tenets that vegetarianism supports (1) human health, (2)
compassion for NHAs, and (3) environmental sustainability (Maurer, 2002, p. 71). Most
vegetarian activists also believe that promoting a gradual dietary transition leads to more
permanent vegetarianism for a convert than does encouraging immediate dietary changes.
While advocacy organizations tend to agree on the merits of all these tenets, they
sometimes disagree on how to present them to the public. For example, their advocacy
materials may choose to promote one benefit over others, or they may shy away from the
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word "vegan" as it is less familiar and may seem extreme to the general public. Some
even opt to replace the familiar but culturally-loaded term "vegetarian" with the more
benign and clinical term "plant-based diet" (Maurer, 2002).
Similar to Cox's (2006) discussion of choosing self-interested versus altruistic
appeals, the main framing debate within vegetarian advocacy is whether to promote
altruistic ethical benefits or whether to promote individual, human health benefits
(Maurer, 2002). Maurer found that, for wider appeal, vegetarian campaigns often chose to
emphasize health. Yet Maurer cautioned that this dietary focus can lead to a loss of
integrity over the meaning of the term "vegetarian," as the public may mistake it for
meaning someone who does not eat unhealthy red meat or one who eats very little animal
flesh.
Conversely, a campaign that promotes a strong vegetarian identity based on
ethical principles, for other animals or the environment, can be inspirational at creating a
stronger commitment than a more vague and mainstream appeal to a healthy plant-based
diet, but it attracts fewer people (Maurer, 2002). Yet, if vegetarianism becomes just
another healthy lifestyle choice for consumers, it loses its ideological edge; vegetarianism
should be seen as a "public moral good" (p. 126) ifit is to become more ideological and
foster greater commitment. Maurer explained:
Many vegetarian leaders seek to move health-motivated, self-interested
"exemplary" vegetarians to a more ethical focus that centers on caring more about
other humans and animals. This deepening of motivation they see as being key to
sparking a greater interest in vegetarian advocacy. (p. 121)
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Additionally, there is the issue that the message should be authentic to the
organization's beliefs. Maurer (2002) mentioned the conflict that vegetarian leaders face
when communicating an ethical message internally to dedicated members to retain
commitment while using a more individualistic message externally, for utilitarian
purposes, to gently attract a wider range of new members. Based on this dilemma,
Maurer claimed, "vegetarian advocates must walk a fine line, balancing practicality and
moral consistency" (p. 128). She cited activist Jim Mason's description that vegetarian
advocacy must avoid seeming fanatical and purist on one end and hypocritical on the
other.
Maurer (2002) concluded by suggesting that the vegetarian movement will not
significantly increase the number of vegetarians unless it proves that meat is either
dangerous to one's health or is immoral. Since meat consumed in small quantities is not
extremely dangerous, it seems that the ethical argument is the most compelling option.
So, perhaps it is advantageous that a significant portion ofthe vegetarian movement is
comprised of animal rights organizations whose campaigns tend to promote more ethical
urgency and inspiration than do the campaigns of solely vegetarian organizations. Maurer
suggested that the vegetarian movement build even closer ties to animal and
environmental movements to increase its influence and resources and perhaps transcend
its marginal presence.
Public resonance ofPETA 's vegetarianframes. While Maurer (2002) studied
vegetarianism as a broad movement, Mika (2006) conducted a more specific study
examining the efficacy and resonance of PETA's vegetarian print messages by
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conducting focus groups with non-vegetarian college students. Mika (2006) found that
PETA faced a common social movement paradox in having to choose between being
inoffensive, but going unnoticed, or being offensive and confrontational, but gaining
more attention. For example, PETA was successful at getting the attention of research
participants via shocking frames, such as "The Holocaust on Your Plate" or "Jesus was a
Vegetarian," but those frames were considered offensive; but frames considered less
offensive, such as "meat's no treat for those you eat" or "vegetarianism is nonviolence,"
tended to generate little attention with participants.
Mika (2006) concluded that none of the variety of PETA's vegetarian print
messages or their corresponding frame alignment processes were particularly successful
at resonating with focus group members, with the possible exception of frames that
invoked an absent referent (Adams, 1990) to foreground the living being behind the body
parts. However, since PETA used a human woman's body, separated into pieces ofmeat,
to generate the absent referent, it was perceived as offensive by some feminists.
Mika categorized PETA's appeals to patriotism, religion, and sex as examples of
the frame extension aligmnent process (Snow et al., 1986). Mika found that participants
considered the patriotism appeals to be shallow; the religious appeals to be preachy,
factually inaccurate, and offensive; and the sex appeals to be attractive but not
convincing.
Regarding more controversial frames like claiming "meat is murder," comparing
factory farming to Nazi concentration camps, and showing the "lamb of God" being
slaughtered, Mika's (2006) participants suggested that an organization that relies on
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shocking messages seems less credible, less believable and less reasonable, and they
compared PETA to the radical anti-abortion movement. Mika suggested that shocking
frames, which were the only ones categorized as examples of a frame transformation
alignment process (Snow et al. 1986), may work better with the public ifthe object of
moral outrage is constructed to be the animal agribusiness industry and not meat-eaters
themselves because participants resented the implication that they were the culprit. So
Mika (2006) concluded that while moral shocks might possibly work for other animal
rights campaigns besides those condemning meat-eating, use of moral shocks was
probably less effective at inducing people to go vegetarian, specifically, since that
required people to sit in judgment of themselves and confront the potential immorality of
their own ingrained lifestyles; it's presumably more effective for AROs to ask people to
condemn the cruel actions of others, such as a seal-clubber or animal researchers (Jasper
& Nelkin, 1992).
In general, participants wanted more reasoned, factual appeals, like toward health,
rather than symbolic or shocking appeals (Mika, 2006); however, I noted a caveat that the
sample text was largely limited to simplistic messages, such as billboards and stickers,
instead of more contextualized pieces like brochures, web pages, or films. Yet while
Mika's focus group participants were not convinced by shocking visuals and "condensing
symbols" (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992, p. 398), these tactics do appear to resonate with a
minority of the public, as they have worked as a useful recruiting tool for the animal
rights movement, even more so than social networks (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992). And
Gamson (1992) noted that injustice frames often do not work upon a single exposure, but
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they can be a first step toward a viewer's eventual transformation with repetition and
more reflection over time. To conclude, Mika (2006) suggested a utilitarian tactic that
AROs should target certain messages toward certain audiences with whom the frame is
likely to be more resonant rather than using a broad-based approach that will appeal to
some and offend others.
Summary and Conclusion
As participants in a challenging movement, AROs participate in the struggle over
discourse via their strategic use of framing to package their non-speciesist ideologies in
ways that resonate with a largely speciesist American public. AROs are faced with the
challenge ofredefining accepted practices, like meat-eating and animal farming, into
socially unacceptable practices. In redefining the status quo as problematic, AROs must
decide how to balance the risks and benefits involved with either being too critical and
oppositional or too moderate. They also must decide whether to base their appeals on
altruism and ethics, which match their own altruistic motivations and ethical beliefs, or
on human self-interest, which can potentially gain wider acceptance~
Promoting altruistic rights or justice appeals that more openly critique the status
quo of animal farming and meat-eating is a deontological communication approach for
AROs. Conversely, promoting appeals to human self-interest, such as the healthfulness of
vegan diets, or messages that fit within dominant animal welfare discourse, is a more
utilitarian communication approach. These deontological and utilitarian choices are
widely debated within the modem day animal rights movement. Lessons from 19th
century human rights framing debates suggest that appeals should retain ideological
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integrity by strongly promoting and demanding rights while also increasing expedience
by being culturally resonant and non-threatening. This fits with the advice of many
animal rights activists who want their messages to reflect their beliefs on animal rights by
problematizing exploitation instead of husbandry and supporting veganism instead of
humane farming reform.
Because animal rights is a moral issue, ARO communication strategies and
message content should retain the moral high ground and avoid being misanthropic,
untruthful, or harmful. In the persuasive process, AROs need to avoid being
propagandists by constructing ethical messages that are largely based on deontological
concerns of the message being accurate, contextualized, authentic to their own beliefs,
identified by source, and respectful and fair to the audience, society, and even opponents.
Rhetorical theory suggests that because AROs challenge the status quo, they
should appeal to abstract values and use ambiguity to create wider appeal. Because AROs
are marginalized, it is useful to emphasize values that prioritize quality, such as rightness
or uniqueness, over quantity. AROs can create a sense of presence and connection for
these abstract values by utilizing compelling visuals or mythic narratives to introduce
individuals. For greater acceptance, new ideas should connect with culturally-accepted
and historically-situated ideas and narratives, such as how AROs expand the democratic
notion of human rights to extend to nonhuman animals, so the latter are seen as persons
not property.
Framing theory, particularly from sociological literature, provides much guidance
for AROs in constructing collective action frames that define problems and culprits;
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demonstrate the problem's severity and urgency; suggest logical, realistic solutions that
will work; and encourage participation based on shared identity and values. ARO frames
must align their own ideologies and values with those of the audience through frame
alignment processes such as bridging to reach sympathetic, unmobilized adherents;
amplifying important beliefs and values to demonstrate their relevance to the issue at
hand; extending the issue's relevance out to other related social issues; and transforming
people's views on the issue so they see it in a new light.
To increase the resonance of frames, AROs should seek credibility by using
arguments that are authentic to their beliefs, truthful, and logically consistent. To be
resonant, frames should also create salience by appealing to key, culturally-accepted
values and connecting them to the audience member's personal everyday life.
Additionally, AROs should promote a clear set of simple values, more so than facts, that
accurately reflects what it stands for and promotes its moral vision of a primarily vegan
human society that does not domesticate and exploit fellow animals.
In conclusion, this communication chapter provides theories that help inform
research questions in order to identify the problem, solution, and motivational
components of collective action frames used by major AROs in their food-related
campaigns to protect farmed animals. I examine the values AROs promote and determine
which ofthese supports altruism instead of human self-interest. I also categorize ARO
framing choices into the four frame alignment processes of Snow et al. (1986) and
suggest ways that AROs could increase alignment and resonance with the public while
still retaining authenticity with animal rights ideology in pursuit of frame transformation.
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Additionally, I explore whether ARO leaders make communication strategy
decisions primarily based on a deontological or utilitarian basis, and then I determine
what implications those framing choices have for the animal rights movement. I support
Baker & Martinson's (2001) idea of speaker authenticity and Lakoff's (2004), Hall's
(2006a, 2006b), LaVeck's (2006a, 2006b), and Francione's (1996) idea ofusing frames
that reflect one's ideology and values. Therefore, in this dissertation I will assess to what
extent ARO food frames are informed by animal rights ideology and how they could
better reflect these non-speciesist principles in ways that could resonate with the
mainstream public.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
Overview
In this dissertation I study how ideology infonns activist discourse, specifically
the framing of values and ideology in food campaigns of U.S. animal rights organizations
(AROs). I take both a descriptive and prescriptive, or nonnative, approach to exploring
this topic, using critical and cultural studies theories to infonn textual analysis (Hall,
1997) and interviewing methods (Denzin, 1997; Patton, 2002). The descriptive portion
explores representation via a textual analysis of how food advocacy materials frame the
issue in tenns of problems, solutions, and values alignment, all of which is considered in
relation to animal rights ideology and the organization's mission. This analysis of
representation in the text is complemented by an exploration of the production side of
activist framing via phone interviews with organization leaders to detennine why they
construct issues and values the way they do and how it relates to animal rights ideology.
Interviews with ARO leaders detennine in what ways communication decisions are made
based on deontological principles versus more utilitarian principles.
The nonnative component of this dissertation promotes the idea that a social
movement ideology, meaning its basic guiding philosophy and worldview, should infonn
its discourse for integrity, or authenticity, in communication. Toward this end, I am
interested in both animal ethics and communication ethics. The ideal activist frame must
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make sense logically and ethically so it is both strategic and truthful to the social
movement ideology. For animal rights ideology, specifically, this would be supportive of
AROs constructing non-speciesist frames for purposes of frame transformation that help
to deconstruct the human/animal dualism that is at the root of animal exploitation. What
are the implications if animal rights organizations choose to be more utilitarian in seeking
expedient frames that promote the kind of behavioral dietary changes that may lead to
decreased animal exploitation of some farmed animals but without necessarily fostering a
transformation to non-speciesist values that support rights or liberation for all nonhuman
animals (NHAs)?
Research Questions
The first six questions comprise the descriptive portion, rather than the
prescriptive portion, of the analysis. The first three questions are based on Snow &
Benford's (1988) three components of collective action frames: (1) diagnosis of problems
and also culprits, if applicable; (2) prognosis, or solutions; and (3) motivation. In this
dissertation, I identify the first two aspects of ARO frames in terms of what problems and
solutions they define and also assess the values they promote to indicate the motivational
framing component.
1. Is the diagnosis component of collective action frames identifiable, and, if so,
what problems are defined by AROs and who, if anyone, is blamed?
2. Is the prognosis component of collective action frames identifiable, and, if so,
what solutions are defined by AROs?
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3. To which values are AROs appealing? How are AROs creating any alignment
between their values and those of the public?
For research question three, I am especially interested in identifying values related to
NHAs and considering how these values resonate with American culture and contribute
to frame alignment processes, such as bridging, amplification, extension, and
transformation (Snow et al., 1986).
The fourth research question is inspired by Cox's (2006) dilemma for the
environmental movement regarding whether radical advocacy organizations should
promote altruistic values versus appealing to human self-interest.
4. How and to what extent do frames appeal either to self-interest or to altruism and
social responsibility (toward humans and/or nonhumans)?
Research question five is broad enough to allow for exploration of the feedback I
receive from the interviews with ARO leaders discovering how they make
communication choices and why. I am particularly interested in whether they are more
influenced by deontological principles that encourage them to convey what is most true,
significant, or authentic or by utilitarian principles that encourage them to convey
whatever will work the best to produce the desired beneficial effect. This relates back to
research question four's categorization ofvalues into altruistic appeals, which are likely
to be more deontological, and human self interest appeals, which are likely to be more
utilitarian.
5. How do organization leaders explain their framing choices, particularly in terms
of ethics and ideology?
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Research question six examines a central interest of this dissertation, the extent to
which AROs' messages have deontological integrity in being informed by and/or
supportive of the animal rights ideology and missions that guide them, instead ofbeing
informed by more mainstream ideologies, such as animal welfare. By animal rights
ideology, I mean the basic challenge to speciesism that embraces the idea that humans
should not exploit other animals or solely value them instrumentally (Francione, 1996;
Regan, 2003; Singer, 1990).
6. Are each organization's frames congruent or incongruent with (or representative
or unrepresentative of) its organizational mission and animal rights ideology
(versus animal welfare ideology)?
The last question comprises the normative, or prescriptive, component of the
analysis that interprets the ARO advocacy choices in terms of their implications for the
animal rights movement and makes recommendations for how frames could better align
with animal rights ideology for increased communication integrity.
7. Overall, what are the possible implications of ARO framing choices in terms of
communication ethics and animal ethics? What frames are considered the most
supportive of animal rights ideology and/or are examples of frame
transformation?
Under Analysis
This section describes the criteria for determining what and who should be studied
to best answer the research questions above. It includes profiles of the AROs and
descriptions ofthese AROs' advocacy materials selected for analysis.
---------------- -
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Criteria for Inclusion
This study is designed to ascertain how organizations with more "radical"
ideologies, as opposed to more mainstream ideologies, are challenged to frame and
present their values and ideas, some of which may be new to society, and enact frame
transformations (Snow et al. 1986). Animal rights organizations are used in this study as
an example of a social movement organization with a more radical ideology, seeking
fundamental change to the speciesist status quo, especially the accepted practice of
animal farming and meat-eating. While similar to AROs in some respects, vegetarian
societies and animal welfare organizations were not included in this study, as they are
often more moderate, so, on the whole, they do not face the same framing challenges that
AROs do.
To be considered an ARO, one's mission must be defined as focusing on ending
NHA exploitation and use by humans, such as for food, entertainment, research, and
sport, under the belief that NHAs are inherently valuable beings, not resources. This does
not preclude AROs being supportive of some animal welfare initiatives, such as
decreasing the suffering of domesticated animals, in some cases. In contrast, the mission
of an animal welfare organization is defined by a focus on improving the well-being of
and decreasing the suffering ofNHAs, particularly ones who are domesticated or used by
humans. It does not necessarily challenge the right to use these NHAs for human benefit
or challenge notions of human superiority or the human/animal dualism. A catchphrase
expressing this difference is that animal rights promotes empty cages while animal
welfare promotes cleaner cages. Relating this to the food issue, animal rights would
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promote veganism and an end to animal agriculture while animal welfare would refonn
animal agriculture to be less cruel.
The ideological differences between animal rights and animal welfare makes the
two less comparable and precludes the use of welfare groups in this study, as one cannot
expect an animal welfare group, such as the Humane Society of the United States
(HSUS), to promote an animal rights frame. Vegetarian societies are also not included in
this study, although they are somewhat applicable as food advocacy groups, because their
missions are not specifically non-anthropocentric nor are they dedicated to animal
advocacy or to prioritizing animal ethics as the main rationale upon which to promote
vegetarianism. They can choose to emphasize more mainstream or self-interested
rationale, such as health, and not be untrue to their guiding ideology or mission.
To be comparable and relevant, the animal rights organizations (AROs) selected
for this study had to fit the following criteria: (1) have an animal rights mission in
contrast to a more moderate welfare mission, (2) have a significant focus on ending
exploitation ofNHAs for humanfood, such as with campaigns promoting veganism not
just fanned animal industry refonn, (3) have campaigns that provide a variety of print
and electronic advocacy pieces aimed at the public, and (4) be headquartered within the
United States with at least a national presence instead of a local presence (regardless of
the organization's size).
The limitation of this study to the United States is both for the sake of
convenience, as this is the country in which I reside and the national movement in which
I participate, and for relevance, as the United States has a high level of activity and
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influence worldwide. For example, the world's largest ARO, People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals, was founded and is headquartered in the United States.
Additionally, America often exports its factory farming methods as well as its diet heavy
in animal proteins worldwide, which means any changes to American food production or
nutrition can have global consequences for farmed animals, human health, and the
environment (Nierenberg, 2003; Pollan, 2007; Schlosser, 2001; and Singer & Mason,
2006).
The following five organizations, listed alphabetically, most fully met the criteria
for inclusion in this study:
1. Compassion Over Killing (COK)
2. Farm Animal Rights Movement (FARM)
3. Farm Sanctuary (FS)
4. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA)
5. Yegan Outreach (YO)
While it could be argued that a few more organizations might also have met the criteria, it
was useful to keep this study limited to a manageable number ofthe most applicable and
relevant organizations so that the interviews and deep analysis ofthe many advocacy
materials could be completed in a timely manner.
Description ofOrganizations Included in this Study
Compassion Over Killing (COK). The first ARO is Compassion Over Killing
(COK), a smaller group located in Washington, D.C. with six paid, full-time staff. It was
founded in 1995 as a high school group but has since expanded to include a nationwide
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focus. It has approximately 17,000 supporters and sends out an estimated quarter million
materials a year (Erica Meier, personal communication, November, 14,2007). Its mission
statement says, "working to end animal abuse, COK focuses on cruelty to animals in
agriculture and promotes vegetarian eating as a way to build a kinder world for all of us,
both human and nonhuman" (COK Home Page, n.d.). In 2005, COK won VegNews
magazine's award for the "Organization Most Deserving of Your Year-End Donation," as
COK is quite efficient with its relatively small budget of under $500,000 (COK
Financial, 2006). COK has led some successful campaigns exposing factory farming
cruelty, particularly in the egg industry. Due to its success, its original founders were
recruited to the HSDS's farmed animal welfare department several years ago, and COK is
now under the leadership of Erica Meier.
Farm Sanctuary (FS). The second ARO is Farm Sanctuary (FS). Its mission, up
until 2008, was, "to expose and stop cruel practices of the 'food animal' industry through
research and investigations, legal and legislative actions, public awareness projects, youth
education, and direct rescue and refuge efforts," (FS Financial, 2006). In early 2008, the
same time period that the analysis for this dissertation was performed, FS underwent a
communications and image update, which included a new design for its Web site, a new
logo, and a revised mission. The new mission is:
Farm Sanctuary works to end cruelty to farm animals and promotes
compassionate living through rescue, education and advocacy. We envision a
world where the violence that animal agriculture inflicts upon people, animals and
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the environment has ended, and where instead we exercise values of compassion.
(FS Home Page, 2008)
FS was founded in 1986 after co-founders Gene and Lorri Bauston rescued a
sheep, Hilda, off of a "deadpile" at an auction and nursed her back to health in their
apartment (About FS, 2008). FS has since grown into the largest farmed animal rescue
organization in the nation, with more than 100,000 members, 7,000 visitors to its main
Web site, 75 paid staff, and revenues of over $5 million (FS Financial, 2006). It operates
sanctuaries in Watkins Glen, NY (headquarters) and Orland, CA, as safe havens for
thousands of rescued farmed animals. The co-founders divorced several years ago, and
the organization remains under the leadership of Gene, who has since changed his sir
name back to Baur. FS was a co-sponsor with the HSUS on the first ever ballot initiatives
for farmed animals that outlawed pig gestation crates in Florida and Arizona. Veal crates
were also banned in Arizona, and FS is now working on a similar initiative in California
that also includes a ban on caging hens (FS Ballot Initiatives, 2007).
Farm Animal Rights Movement (FARM). The third ARO is the Farm Animal
Rights Movement (FARM), which is located in Bethesda, Maryland and is run by
founder and President, Alex Hershaft. It claims to be the oldest animal rights group
dedicated to farmed animal issues, as it grew out of the Vegetarian Information Service in
the late 1970s and changed its name to the Farm Animal Reform Movement (FARM) in
1981 (About FARM, n.d.). During the interview for this dissertation, Alex Hershaft
explained that the name that FARM had used for more than 25 years had recently been
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revised to Farm Animal Rights Movement to better reflect its strategy of promoting
veganism instead of industry reform.
FARM defines itself as a "public-interest organization advocating plant-based
(vegan) diets to save animals, protect the environment, and improve health" (About
FARM, n.d.). FARM describes its strategies to enact dietary and agricultural reforms in
the following way, "while we occasionally engage in andlor encourage civil disobedience
at slaughterhouses and similar attention-getting devices, the majority of our efforts are
grassroots educational campaigns, massive media blitzes, and participation in
government decision-making processes" (About FARM, n.d.). It has seven paid staff and
annual revenues of over $400,000 (FARM Financial, 2006). Throughout its existence,
FARM has organized many annual national animal rights conferences, and it promotes a
variety of ongoing campaigns, such as: The Great American Meatout, Meatout Mondays,
World Farm Animals Day, Choice School Lunch, Gentle Thanksgiving, Veggies for
Ecology, Well-Fed World (Global Hunger Solutions), Bite Global Warming, and the
Equal Justice Alliance (fighting the federal Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act).
People for the Ethical Treatment ofAnimals (PETA). The fourth ARO is People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA). Even though PETA addresses a wide range
of animal issues, in addition to vegetarianism, it has been included in this study because it
is the largest animal rights group in the world and one of the most well-known. PETA
was founded by Alex Pacheco and Ingrid Newkirk 25 years ago in Washington, DC, after
the founders conducted an undercover investigation of a primate research lab, resulting in
the first ever conviction of an animal researcher for cruelty (About PETA History, n.d.).
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Now headquartered in Norfolk, VA, and run by founder Ingrid Newkirk, PETA has
expanded to include international offices and boasts more than 1.8 million members and
supporters (About PETA, n.d.).
PETA says it is "dedicated to establishing and defending the rights of all animals.
PETA operates under the simple principle that animals are not ours to eat, wear,
experiment on, or use for entertainment," which is how the group defines animal rights in
basic terms (About PETA History, n.d.). Its official mission statement describes it as an
animal rights organization and states:
PETA focuses its attention on the four areas in which the largest numbers of
animals suffer the most intensely for the longest periods of time: on factory farms,
in laboratories, in the clothing trade, and in the entertainment industry... PETA
works through public education, cruelty investigations, research, animal rescue,
legislation, special events, celebrity involvement, and protest campaigns. (About
PETA, n.d.)
PETA gets more media attention than most animal protection groups; its staff
members were interviewed by the media over 2,700 times in 2005 and had over 1,000
opinion pieces published in print media. In the fiscal year ending July, 31, 2005, PETA
had revenues of over $31 million, employed more than 150 full-time paid staff, sent
action alerts to more than one million email subscribers, had more than 37 million people
visit its Web sites, and filled over 650,000 requests for vegetarian starter kits (About
PETA Financial Report, 2005). Notably, the demand for vegetarian starter kits in 2005
increased four-fold from the previous year (About PETA Financial Report, 2005).
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Additionally, PETA's Web site, GoVeg.com, received a VegNews magazine Veg Webby
Award for "Best Vegetarian Resource" (About PETA Financial Report, 2006).
Vegan Outreach (VO). The fifth ARO, Vegan Outreach (Va), is a small and
highly focused group run by founders Matt Ball and Jack Norris, the latter a registered
dietician. It was formerly located in Pittsburgh, PA but is now primarily operated from
Tucson, AZ. It began as Animal Liberation Action in 1993 before evolving several years
later into Vegan Outreach, based on distributing a brochure of the same name (Va
History, 2007). va describes itself as "promoting a vegan lifestyle," and "working to
expose and end cruelty to animals through the widespread distribution of our illustrated
booklets, Why Vegan, Even IjYou Like Meat, and Try Vegetarian," which are distributed
by other animal advocacy organizations and volunteers, such as students (About va,
n.d.). More than five million hard copies have been distributed world-wide, the vast
majority in North America, with translations in four languages besides English (Va
History, 2007). A major va campaign is its "Adopt a College" program that has resulted
in the distribution of over 1.5 million booklets on more than 800 college campuses
between 2003 and 2007 (Va Adopt a College, 2007). Over a decade after its founding, it
operates with just three paid staff members, and it posted annual revenues ofjust over
$400,000 for the 2005-2006 fiscal year (Va Financial, 2007).
Advocacy Materials under Investigation
I analyzed electronic and print advocacy materials that are directly related to
farmed animal or food animal issues and directed at the public, including the
organization's members. I did not include materials solely aimed at the media,
183
goverrunent, industry, or institutions in general. I prioritized messages designed for direct
communication with individual members ofthe public, as these messages can be more
candid and are less likely to be tempered by a concern of having to meet newsworthiness
criteria or be filtered through an independent third party before reaching the public.
Klandermans & Gosling (1996) suggested that SMOs use non-media channels to educate
the public on the logic of issues because the news media tend to emphasize the conflict
over the issue itself. The bulk of each ARO's materials and Web pages are geared toward
the public.
The definition of "food" advocacy includes vegetarian or vegan materials
advocating a plant-based diet, but it also more broadly includes any material addressing
the human practice of farming NHAs or hunting/fishing them to use for food. As the
purpose of this study is primarily to examine how AROs construct and frame values
related to other animals, I excluded vegetarian recipes and cooking tips from analysis but
not the discussions of vegetarianism itself. I analyzed both electronic and print advocacy
materials that the AROs were currently using, which I gathered in January 2008. What
could not be viewed over the Web was sent to me by the AROs. To help offset any costs
involved in printing and shipping these materials, I sent each ARO a $20 donation.
Electronic advocacy materials. Electronic materials included Web pages and self-
produced video footage (including television advertisements and animal cruelty footage)
relating to food issues. While most AROs run multiple Web sites related to food
campaigns, for manageability, I solely concentrated on the main or home Web site for
cok.net (COK), farmusa.org (FARM), farmsanctuary.org (FS), and veganoutreach.org
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(VO). Since PETA was the only ARO included in this study that addresses a broad range
of animal rights issues in addition to food, I concluded that PETA's goveg.com Web site,
which is dedicated to food issues, was more pertinent to this dissertation than was its
home page ofpeta.org. Whenever information on an ARO's home Web page linked to a
related Web site, such as fishinghurts.com, eggindustry.com, or vegforlife.org, I analyzed
the information on that related Web site's home page but did not analyze that whole Web
site to avoid the amount of text becoming overwhelming.
Other electronic advocacy materials studied included film and video footage. This
was especially pertinent to COK, FS, and PETA who document animal farming and
fishing practices in undercover and overt filming situations and provide copies of this for
the public. For COK, I analyzed its 45 Days: The Life and Death ofa Broiler Chicken
DVD. For FS, I analyzed its Life Behind Bars DVD on intensive confinement, narrated
by actress Mary Tyler Moore, and its Factory Farming Compilation DVD, which
included Eggribusiness, Making ofa Turkey, The Downside ofLivestock Marketing, and
Humane Slaughter? I also included documentaries posted on FS's online video gallery
covering two investigations into the Canadian foie gras industry and a dairy industry
investigation titled, Behind the Milk Mustache. PETA has many videos online, but I
chose to concentrate on its two most popular: (1) Meet Your Meat, a documentary ofthe
life and death of cows, pigs, and birds on factory farms, narrated by actor Alec Baldwin,
and (2) Chew on This, a DVD that succinctly promotes 30 reasons to go vegetarian. I also
analyzed online investigative footage that applied to PETA's current cruelty campaigns
against kosher slaughter, Tyson chicken farms, and Kentucky Fried Chicken.
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Additionally, when AROs posted PSAs or television advertisements on their Web sites, I
included those as well, such as COK's seven television spots, which primarily ran on
MTV, FS's twelve television PSAs and three radio PSAs, and PETA's "Happy Orgasm
Day" electronic vegetarian greeting card for valentines day.
Print advocacy materials. Print materials included food-related advocacy for mass
distribution, such as vegetarian starter guides, booklets and pamphlets, print
advertisements, and collateral pieces, including stickers, clothing, buttons, and posters.
A key advocacy piece for all AROs is some version of a vegetarian starter guide,
as that is often the lengthiest, full-color publication they distribute. Many are 24 pages.
There is COK's Vegetarian Starter Guide, FS's Guide to Veg Living, PETA's Vegetarian
Starter Kit, and Peta2's (teen/youth division) teen starter guide What They Never Told
You .... I did not analyze a vegetarian starter guide from FARM, as it only distributes
guides produced by others, such as FS's guide. I analyzed VO's three primary booklets,
Why Vegan?, Even ifYou Like Meat, and Try Vegetarian, which have some resemblance
to vegetarian starter guides, but these l6-page booklets concentrate more on animal
cruelty issues and vegetarian rationales instead of recipes and food tips. The latter
practical diet and nutrition tips serve as the primary information in VO's Guide to
Cruelty-Free Eating, which was not analyzed in this study.
VO did not have any other print publications I analyzed, and COK only had a
pork leaflet and an egg industry leaflet. FARM's print materials were mainly double-
sided, full-color postcards focused on specific campaigns. I analyzed eight of FARM's
postcards: three for the Great American Meatout, one for Meatout Mondays, one for
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Well-Fed World, one for Bite Global Warming, and two for the general promotion of
vegetarian starter kits.
Being the largest organization in this study, FS and PETA had the most print
publications, so I had to exclude some. From FS I chose: How we Treat the Meat we Eat
brochure, You can Help Stop Factory Farming brochure, Farm Animals Have Feelings
Too leaflet, Factory Farming: Destroying the Environment brochure, Choose Vegfor Life
brochure, 20 Reasons to Go Vegfor Life leaflet, a series offive "Say No" leaflets aimed
at specific factory farming practices, and three print advertisements. I did not include FS
print pieces that were related just to the sanctuary, aimed at kids, or focused only on
certain campaigns. To keep the text size manageable, I also did not analyze a series often
older brochures that tell "The Truth About ... " a variety of animal products.
From PETA, I chose: Chop Chop environmental leaflet, People are Saying
celebrity leaflet, Think before You Eat black celebrity leaflet, The Truth about Chickens
brochure, Foie Gras: Cruel to Ducks and Geese leaflet, What's Wrong with Eating
Turkeys? leaflet, What's Wrong with Dairy? leaflet, Being Boiled Hurts lobster leaflet,
Fishing Hurts anti-angling leaflet, and the Take a Closer Look at Fish brochure. I
excluded PETA print publications aimed at children and teens or ones targeted to certain
campaigns, such as KFC.
Collateral pieces, while seemingly trivial, often convey a core, simplified message
indicating an ARO's most fundamental and prioritized beliefs. COK had two shirts, a
tryveg.com bumper sticker, and a "See her as more than a meal" poster. FARM had five
shirts, three bumper stickers, three buttons, six posters, and an "Animal Rights Now!"
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rubber bracelet. FS had eleven shirts, nine bumper stickers, and three sets of smaller
stickers. PETA had nine small stickers, five bumper stickers, five shirts, two buttons,
three posters, and a vegetarian tabling display containing four posters. VO had one
"Boycott cruelty, go vegan" bumper sticker, one "Choose compassion, try vegetarian"
bumper sticker, and one "Vegan Outreach, choose compassion" shirt.
While a textual analysis of current materials can only provide a snapshot ofthe
organization's framing approach at one point in time, the interviews with organization
leaders will provide some historical context for framing strategies over time. The
following section explains the methodology for analyzing the advocacy text and
interview data.
Cultural Studies Methods
In the circuit of culture, as defined by British cultural studies scholars such as
Stuart Hall, the meaning of a cultural phenomenon is most thoroughly explained through
analysis of its many combined influences and their interaction (DuGay, Hall, MacKay, &
Negus, 1991). These influences, or cultural processes, include "how it is represented,
what social identities are associated with it, how it is produced and consumed, and what
mechanisms regulate its distribution and use" (p. 59). To explain animal rights discourse
on the issue of food, I examined several cultural processes, namely its representation in
mediated communication texts and its production by AROs.
Production and representation are closely aligned processes, as producers encode
meanings in their texts. "This concern for the culture of production takes us back once
again to questions of representation and identity, but also forward to questions of
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consumption" (DuGay et aI., 1991, p. 60). While this dissertation does not directly study
the audience and its consumption, some aspects of social identity and consumption are
revealed through interviews with organization leaders about their interactions with
audiences and how the public influences ARO framing choices. The two methods of
textual analysis and interviewing complement each other, as textual analysis reveals what
meaning was constructed and the interviews help reveal why meaning was constructed in
that way.
Textual Analysis
I used the qualitative method oftextual analysis to examine overall patterns and
meanings constructed in print and electronic ARO advocacy communication on food.
Textual analysis is a useful tool due to its open-ended nature and ability to allow the
researcher to delve more deeply into issues and meanings than do quantitative methods.
My qualitative analysis process followed Hall's (1975) description oftextual analysis,
which includes a three-step process: (1) a long preliminary soak in the text - initial
readings and light note-taking of all text (including visuals) that allows one to focus on
issues while still seeing the big picture, (2) a close reading of the text - getting more
focused and taking detailed notes to start identifying strategies and themes that can be
used to structure the paper, and (3) interpretation of the text - explaining what and how
meanings were constructed through those themes across categories and what realities
were represented (p. 15).
Hall's (1997) book on representation provided additional guidance on how to use
post-structuralist concepts of semiotics and Foucauldian discourse to examine meanings
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in texts. Visuals and written text were analyzed in context with one another to better
interpret implied meanings. During analysis, I analyzed how AROs were using emphasis,
metaphor and analogy, repetition, word choice, catch phrases, color, symbols, photo
images, illustrations, placement and proximity, space, mood and tone, emotion, facts,
values, narrative, contrast, voice, activity and passivity, music, characters and subjects,
species, names, identification, authority figures and experts, celebrities, historical or
cultural reference, eye contact, expression, camera angles, lighting, attractiveness and
appeal, disgust, omission, and the natural versus the industrial. I assessed in what position
AROs wanted the presumed human subject to be and what they wanted him/her to
expenence.
Although the research questions emphasize human values and ideology, this does
not mean that I focused only on text messages and images of humans only. I also
analyzed discussions and visuals of farming or fishing practices and descriptions ofNHA
qualities and experiences. These persuasive messages are embedded with values, not only
in indicating how humans treat NHAs and identifying traits humans might appreciate in
fellow beings, but also how human audiences will presumably respond to these messages.
I wanted to ascertain to which preferred conclusions ARO frames were leading viewers
and to which values or emotions the AROs appeared to be appealing? For example,
photos of pigs stuck in gestation crates, chickens shackled upside down in a
slaughterhouse, or calves being separated from their mothers are likely meant to elicit
sympathy and outrage due to an aversion to suffering and cruelty, while photos of
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animals enjoying the sun outdoors, being petted by people, or nursing their young are
likely meant to elicit feelings of identification, peace, pleasure, and/or companionship.
In ARO texts, there were some anthropocentric values constructed that related
most directly only to humans, such as the promotion ofthe human health benefits of
veganism. While these are only indirectly related to research questions about animal
rights ideology, they are especially applicable to the research question categorizing self-
interested versus altruistic values. But not all altruistic values are necessarily non-
anthropocentric. For example, the promotion of veganism as aiding more equitable food
distribution to mitigate world hunger is both anthropocentric and altruistic. It emphasizes
human interests but not at the expense of other animals, so it relates to the question about
altruism but not the questions about animal rights ideology.
Even though this is not a quantitative content analysis, it was sometimes useful to
note the prominence and general proportion of space and emphasis AROs dedicated to
discussing certain frames, such as how much they emphasized anthropocentric aspects of
food in relation to focusing on NHAs or which frames were given more attention. While
emphasis was not able to be calculated in a precise percentage, it was expressed in larger
proportions, such as "approximately one third" or "roughly half." Prominence is relevant
to note, as a heavier emphasis by AROs on self-interested values, for example, might
indicate a form of speciesism by implying the public is and prefers to remain
anthropocentric. This would relate to research questions by possibly indicating that the
AROs are less willing to significantly engage in frame transformation and direct
promotion of animal rights ideology.
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Interviews
To gain a contextualized perspective on the production of advocacy materials, I
conducted in-depth phone interviews with the executive directors or presidents at each
ARO. This applied to research question five, ascertaining how ethics and ideology playa
role in ARO framing strategy. While it would have been beneficial to conduct an
ethnography at each ARO and interview multiple staff members involved in constructing
messages, this was a time and cost-prohibitive option as the AROs are located in five
different cities across the United States and the textual analysis portion ofthe dissertation
is also time-consuming. Therefore, in selecting just one person of the same position to
interview at each ARO, I believed the executive director was likely to be the most
influential and knowledgeable spokesperson regarding the ARO's framing decision-
making process and rationale. I contacted each participant by email in December 2007 to
explain the project and assess their willingness to be interviewed. I then asked them each
to sign a consent form approved by the Institutional Review Board's guidelines for
protection of human subjects. Each participant consented to having hislher real name
used and having the interviews recorded for transcription.
The five ARO leaders I interviewed by phone in January 2008 were: Erica Meier
(COK), Alex Hershaft (FARM), Gene Baur (FS), Bruce Friedrich (PETA), and Matt Ball
(VO). It is particularly beneficial that Alex, Gene, and Matt are founders of their
organizations and have intimate knowledge of its history. An exception was made
regarding who was interviewed at PETA because its founder and President, Ingrid
Newkirk, was out ofthe country and unavailable to be interviewed in January 2008. As
--------------
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PETA's Vice President ofIntemational Grassroots Campaigns, Bruce was a fitting
replacement. He has worked at PETA for over a decade, heading up many food
campaigns and serving as a primary media spokesperson.
My interviewing methods were influenced by Denzin's (1997) descriptions of
interpretive ethnography, of which interviewing is a central part. Denzin advocates for a
feminist, communitarian, publicly responsible analysis with an ethical basis in the
feminist notion of care, privileging emotion and political transformation instead of more
patriarchal notions of duties and reason. This method envisions a more humble role for
the researcher who must be open to examining herself as a mutual subject of study.
To give status to my research subjects, I treated them with respect and
appreciation and attempted to provide some reciprocity or benefit to them for
participating. While reciprocity does not include monetary compensation for their time, I
believe my research participants enjoyed having an opportunity to share their expertise on
animal advocacy and talk to a scholar who is interested in both examining and assisting
their work. There are broader, social benefits as well, as this dissertation promotes a
mutual goal, shared by the participants and me, of advancing protection for NHAs. While
there are no major personal risks involved to the participants, the consent form did advise
that when discussing their organization's communication strategies, they should choose
to be as candid or as discreet as they deem appropriate to protecting their organization's
privacy.
The phone interviews were structured informally. However, I followed a standard
interview schedule as a useful guide to ensure all the major points pertinent to the
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dissertation were consistently addressed. An informal structure utilizing many open-
ended questions enabled interviewees to reject or transform my imposed assumptions to
answer the questions in ways that fit their conception of the topic. In this way, I afforded
the interviewees more agency to avoid conforming to my way ofthinking or being
limited by my framing of the issue (Patton, 2002).
The interview schedule of questions, listed in full in the appendix, asked them
such questions as: What is your animal rights/liberation philosophy and how does that
influence your message strategy, if at all? Explain the history of your food campaign
message strategy and why you have chosen your current approach? What is the main
problem as you define it in your food messages? Do you promote dietary changes based
more on the audience member's self-interested or altruistic motives, and how does that
choice affect their view of animals? What values do you assume the audience member
already possesses, and what values do you try to promote? What is your visual strategy,
and how would you like the audience to view other animals in relation to themselves? Do
you believe your campaign messages are influenced more by your theories on animal
rights or your theories of what works best to get people to switch their diet? I also often
asked about their views on humane farming reforms or free-range farming, if it was not
mentioned in their answers.
Besides providing context for the textual analysis, the participant input from these
interviews applied to my normative assessments of the implications of framing choices
and what types of frames may be optimal. Adding their real world experience and
professional judgment to the analysis helped ground my conclusions so that I took into
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consideration the expert opinions of professional activists and the challenges AROs face
in the real world.
A challenge in interviewing ARO leaders who are used to being media
spokespersons is to avoid receiving polished, well-rehearsed answers intended primarily
to improve the reputation of their organizations or to educate the public about basic
animal issues. At the beginning of each interview, I distinguished my role as a scholar
from that of a reporter, and I encouraged them to feel free to provide more detailed,
candid, and critical feedback than they might in a media interview. Whenever I believed
their initial answers were too shallow or reserved, I gently probed for further depth to the
extent that they were willing to share. To increase their ability to respond candidly and
thoughtfully to my questions during the phone interview, the interviewees called me from
a private space, such as in an office with a closed door. The interviews lasted
approximately one hour, with Bruce's (PETA) being the shortest, at 40 minutes, and
Matt's (VO) being the longest, at 80 minutes.
Description ofOverall Analysis Process for Both Methods
I conducted and transcribed the phone interviews in January while I was
simultaneously gathering and initially reviewing advocacy materials gathered for the
textual analysis. Once I had briefly reviewed all of the ARO text to assess its basic
breadth and contents, I was able to select the specific elements and pieces that I believed
were most pertinent to include in this text sample in order to best answer the research
questions. Then I gave all the selected print and electronic materials a closer read while
taking hand-written notes based on topics in the research questions, such as problems,
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solutions, values, and animal rights ideology. The note-taking on the Web sites was
especially laborious due to the wealth of infonnation and many layered pages and links
they contained. I admit that spending so much time experiencing hours of video footage
and hundreds of photos of animal suffering in factory farms and slaughterhouses took an
emotional toll and made me sympathize with the ARO employees who deal with these
issues, images, and animal victims on a daily basis.
In February I categorized all ofthis handwritten data into a notebook with tabs
separating each ARO's text notes from the ARO's leader interview transcripts. Then I
read through all the notes from each ARO's text and interviews, taking more notes in red
ink and highlighting themes. Based on this third read, I typed up a separate observation
report for each ARO related to themes from the research questions. Then I took the
observations in those reports to begin to classify the main answers to my seven research
questions, merging all the infonnation across AROs for the first time. I referred back to
the detailed notes in the notebook to extract the many specific examples used as evidence
to back up my findings.
The next chapter (Chapter Five: Findings) contains the descriptive answers to the
first six research questions with many examples drawn from the text and interviews based
on the process described above. Then, in the final chapter ofthis dissertation (Chapter
Six: Discussion and Conclusion), I further analyze and interpret those findings, along
with answering research question seven, to explain the relevance ofthese findings to
animal rights movement communication strategy and communication theory.
------------------------
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CHAPTER V
FINDINGS
This section addresses the six research questions that comprise the descriptive
component of the dissertation depicting the framing choices of the five animal rights
organizations (AROs) studied: Compassion Over Killing (COK), Farm Animal Rights
Movement (FARM), Farm Sanctuary (FS), People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
(PETA), and Vegan Outreach (VO). Based on the analysis of ARO food advocacy texts
and my interviews with the ARO leaders, I explain and categorize what messages and
frames the five AROs communicated (especially related to ethics and values), how they
communicated this, and why. While I do reflect on some of the possible implications of
the advocacy messages in this chapter, it is in the upcoming conclusion chapter where
most of my communication prescriptions appear, along with an explanation of the
relationship between these findings and academic literature and theory on communication
and animal ethics.
The research questions covered in this chapter include (in this order): AROs'
problem frames, solution frames, promotion of values, categorization of self-interested
versus altruistic values (both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric), the influence of
ethics and ideology in ARO communication choices, and the congruence between ARO
messages, their mission, and animal rights ideology. Each section cites numerous
pertinent examples of written and visual messages used by the five AROs I examined and
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also intersperses relevant commentary from the ARO leader interviews to provide further
context.
Research Question One (RQ1): Is the Diagnosis Component o/Collective Action
Frames Identifiable, and, ifso, What Problems Are Defined by AROs and
Who, ifAnyone, is Blamed?
I identified four "problem" frames which I discuss in relative order of frequency
and prominence: (1) the suffering of animals due to cruelty, (2) the commodification of
animals as objects, (3) the harmfulness of animal agribusiness and animal products to
humans and the environment, and (4) the needless killing and death of animals for food
products. I follow this with a discussion of who the AROs blamed for these problems,
which mainly targeted animal agribusiness for causing the cruelty and destruction and
hiding it from consumers. Because consumers were largely kept ignorant, AROs only
occasionally suggested consumers were culpable.
(RQ1) Problem Frame 1: Cruelty and Suffering
By far the most prominent problem frame presented by AROs is the cruelty and
suffering of farmed animals (mainly in factory farms and slaughterhouses but also in
free-range farming, commercial fishing, and aquaculture). When I asked ARO leaders to
identify the main problem, everyone said it was the cruelty and inherent animal suffering
that comes with it, with a caveat that FARM only uses this cruelty frame in its few
animal-specific campaigns. Some leaders phrased it differently, such as PETA's Bruce
Friedrich occasionally saying "abuse" and FARM's Alex Hershaft calling it "brutality"
instead of ever using the word "cruelty." FS's Gene Baur specified that the problem was
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the public's lack of awareness of how they are supporting cruelty, which will be
discussed in the section on blame. But in the interview, Gene did use versions of the
words "cruel" 26 times and "suffer" 12 times. Erica Meier from COK used versions of
the words "cruel" less, only nine times, but said "suffer" 23 times. Matt Ball from va
used those words in the interview more often than any other leader, saying versions of
"cruel" 27 times and "suffer" 33 times. ARO texts are full of visual and verbal
descriptions of animals' extreme mental and physical suffering in confinement and the
painful transport and slaughtering process. In the rest of this section, I provide examples
from each ARO text of this emphasis on cruelty and suffering.
The covers ofva's two most popular booklets both problematize farm animal
cruelty, with Why Vegan? saying "boycott cruelty" but showing images of happy
animals, while Even ijYou Like Meat (EIYLM) says both "cruelty" and "suffering" and
shows images of unhappy animals in intensive confinement. Inside both va booklets are
numerous photos and descriptions from factory farms and slaughterhouses with titles
such as "Industrialized Cruelty: Factory Farming" and "Oppose the Cruelties of Factory
Farming." The Web address listed on the back ofthe EIYLM booklet reads
"opposecruelty.org." Even va's softer Try Vegetarian booklet says "reduce suffering"
on the front and labels its interior farm animal sections "Oppose Cruelty" and "Spare the
Animals." va's Web home page makes it clear that its goal is to "decrease suffering."
PETA's Meet Your Meat video introduces factory farming as "humanity's cruelest
invention." Some of its stickers and leaflets emphasize pain for sea creatures, such as
"Being boiled hurts!" (for lobster) and "Fishing hurts!" as well as a corresponding Web
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site titled fishinghurts.com. Other examples from PETA include: the back of a turkey
leaflet titled "a recipe for misery," a teen vegetarian booklet section on factory farms
saying they are "hell," a foie gras leaflet titled "cruel to ducks and geese," and a major
section on goveg.com labeled "cruelty to animals."
FARM has a shirt that says "Stop human and animal suffering," collateral pieces
that say "Fight factory farming!" and a veal poster that says "Help us stop his agony."
The tagline for FARM's World Farm Animal Day is "lest we forget their suffering."
Similarly, FS has several collateral pieces that read "Stop factory farming!" and a bumper
sticker that says "Boycott veal: cruelty in the crate." Its brochure How We Treat the
Animals We Eat often uses the words "inhumane," "misery," "painful," and "suffer."
FS's number one reason to go vegetarian, according to a leaflet of20 reasons, is because
"'food animals' are not protected from inhumane treatment."
COK mirrors FS's concern over lack oflegal protection by saying "no cruelty
toward 'food animals' on farms, no matter how horrific, is prohibited by any U.S. federal
law," which is a bold quote in its section on animals in the Vegetarian Starter Guide. At
the end of the guide, viewers are asked if they want to "support cruelty and misery,"
which is a common call-to-action from COK, using words such as "cruelty" and
"suffering." Additionally, the cover ofCOK's egg brochure says "100% cruelty," and its
pig leaflet has the title, "Pork: Another Cruel Meat." COK's Web site also features three
reports specifically on animal suffering (in the egg, broiler, and turkey industries).
All the AROs tend to focus on the worst cruelties in factory farming, specifically
the extreme intensive confinement of battery cages (egg-laying hens), gestation crates
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(pigs used for breeding), and veal crates (male calves used for meat), where the animals
can hardly move and the pictures are particularly pitiful, showing bars, excrement, chains
(for the calves) and inflamed raw skin on hens whose feathers have rubbed off. To
specifically expose these three practices, FS has a "Say No To" leaflet series as well as a
video narrated by celebrity vegetarian Mary Tyler Moore titled "Life Behind Bars." COK
uses images of these three caging practices in all of its seven television spots and has
several campaigns dedicated specifically to the egg industry, and FARM has some
"boycott veal" collateral pieces. Foie gras (enlarged duck or goose liver) is another
notoriously cruel practice that is particularly targeted by FS and PETA with brochures
and videos showing the emotionally and physically painful force-feeding by pipes and the
resulting wounds and premature death it causes. Most communication pieces also discuss
the unpleasant conditions of other types of animals, even animals who are caged less
intensively but are still crowded, such as cows on feedlots, pigs in pens, "poultry" birds
in warehouses, and, occasionally, fish in aquaculture. Only FS addresses lesser eaten
meats like those of sheep and duck.
Immobility is frequently shown, not just animals stuck in small cages but images
ofbirds painfully impaled by wire through the wing or neck or stuck underneath battery
cages. Lame and injured birds are shown unable to get to food and water, with the
explanation that their legs often cripple under their excessive weight. Mammals called
"downers," who can't walk due to injury or illness, languish in pain at stockyards or are
dragged by chains to slaughter.
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Almost every factory farming discussion includes a description of the many
painful standard procedures and "manipulations" that are performed without anesthesia,
usually on baby animals. These include debeaking, branding, castration, dehorning, toe
clipping, ear and tail docking, and teeth clipping. Videos allow the viewer to hear the
animals squealing or crying to indicate pain.
AROs cite the high mortality rates on the farm or in transport as evidence of the
animals' poor living conditions and lack of individual medical care. Dead animals are
shown rotting in among the living. Videos from FS and PETA reveal workers beating to
death animals who are sick or considered runts, particularly in the pork, foie gras, and
turkey industries. Useless baby birds, especially males in the egg industry or females in
the foie gras industry, are shown by the thousands suffocating slowly in trash bags inside
dumpsters. And it is common for any section on slaughterhouses to assure viewers
(sometimes with visual evidence) that many ofthe animals, particularly the birds, are
fully conscious when having their throats slit, sometimes up to the point of experiencing
scalding tanks and dismemberment. VO cites a slaughterhouse worker describing how
cows often die "piece by piece."
(RQI) Problem Frame 2: Commodification ofAnimals into Economic Objects
Most AROs, particularly FS, have messages that problematize the fact that
agriculture treats farmed animals like economic units, or objects, instead of sentient
beings who are individual subjects. For example, FS's "Sentient Beings" campaign,
headed by Mary Tyler Moore, has a leaflet that states, "animals used for food in the
United State are commonly treated like unfeeling 'tools of production,' rather than as
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living, feeling animals." Similarly, FS's Veg for Life brochure says farm animals are
treated like "mere production units." The group's farmed animal treatment brochure also
uses the term "tools of production" and "commodities." It explains that "when they are
no longer profitable, they are literally thrown away," providing examples of how it was
deemed legal both to throw "spent hens" into wood chippers and to discard male chicks
in the garbage "like manure" (the latter term was used by an egg industry lawyer in
court). FS's turkey video says turkeys are treated like "production units" and are seen as
"commodities," explaining why the many dying turkeys do not receive adequate vet care,
as it is not cost effective. FS's Eggribusiness video describes the economic imperative of
the industry which considers hens "production units," and displays a "callous attitude that
allows sentient beings to be commodified" and permits suffering and death to be
"acceptable economic losses on agribusiness balance sheets."
To emphasize the commodity status of farmed animals, FS's video on downed
(non-ambulatory) animals is a powerful example of how much suffering will be accepted
by the industry to maintain some economic value from the meat on dying or lame
animals, as men prod the farmed animals to walk or drag them by chains into the
slaughterhouse. The video narrator explains that calves may sell for "as little as one
dollar but can be left to suffer for days" for that dollar. The video ends with a judgment
stating "the fact that stockyards insist on getting every last dollar out of these sick
animals in intolerable." A FS dairy industry video explains how "calfjockeys" round up
day old "frail calves, some on the verge of death" to make a "quick buck," and shows
men dragging calves by ears or legs and wheeling them off in a wheelbarrow. PETA's
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Vegetarian Starter Kit devotes a whole page to a story of a downed cow at a stockyard
who was left suffering all day because the staff veterinarians would not euthanize her
because it would damage the "value ofthe meat." She was eventually shot by a butcher
and "her body was purchased for $307.50."
FS and YO especially like to quote agribusiness industry representatives who
explain that they see farm animals as profitable objects or machines. A popular pork
industry quote (used in FS's sentient beings leaflet, some FS videos, and YO's booklets)
advises farmers to "Forget the pig is an animal. Treat him just like a machine in a
factory." YO's Why Vegan? booklet cites another popular quote from a hog farmer who
concluded that "crowding pigs pays" to explain why mortality rates on crowded transport
trucks were acceptable. A similar sentiment about mortality in the egg industry was
explained by an animal ethics professor, Bernard Rollin, (in YO's Why Vegan booklet
and FS videos), saying "chickens are cheap, cages are expensive."
To visually express the impersonal business ofmass producing animals as food,
ARO communication pieces often show factory farmed animals en masse, especially long
shots of warehouses that reveal a sea of animals all looking repetitious and relatively
similar. Sometimes, videos show animals, particularly birds, being dumped down ramps
or onto conveyers like produce. Other times, closer shots reveal that each animal has a
number above hislher crate (for pigs and calves) or a numbered tag on hislher back or ear
(for cows), indicating that he/she is nothing more than a number who will soon be
replaced. FS has an online profile of a cow, named Maxine, who escaped slaughter in
Queens, and the text calls the barcode sticker on her back "insulting." FS removed it to
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transition her from "food animal to beloved resident." Similarly, va's Why Vegan?
booklet titles its factory farming section "The Transformation of Animals into Food" to
emphasize that life is reduced to an object. This dissertation's later section on values, in
response to the third research question (RQ3), addresses how AROs negate the validity of
this objectification by highlighting farmed animals' status as sentient subjects.
(RQl) Problem Frame 3: Harmfulness ofAnimal Products and Farming to People and
the Environment
A common approach in the marketing of vegetarianism is to use what va's Matt
Ball called, in our interview, the "three-prong" approach of problematizing the animal
food industry to three main entities: farm animals, human health, and the environment.
All of the AROs, except va, still use this approach. In the interview, Matt at va said he
believes the factory farming cruelty angle is the strongest message and most apt to get
some people to change their eating habits, so va has shifted the bulk of its focus onto the
cruelty frame, while it still does mention how to eat a healthy vegan diet and occasionally
mentions environmental benefits (mostly on its Web site). In regard to problem framing,
this means that the four other AROs devote some resources to informing the public that
animal products are unhealthy for humans and that animal agribusiness is unsustainable
for the environment. For example, each of their vegetarian guides and Web pages contain
separate sections on health and the environment.
Human health messages from AROs tend to be about how a pure vegetarian diet
can be healthy in general and often healthier than a standard meat-based diet, especially
in preventing major diseases and obesity. They often cite the American Dietetic
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Association's positive position on vegetarian diets. However, this is more of a solution
frame than a problem health frame, but a distinction is that AROs do not just attempt to
say that plant-based diets are as healthy as animal-based diets, they often attempt to
problematize animal-based diets as less healthy. For example, while their health
information is mostly positive, COK's Vegetarian Starter Guide and FS's Guide to Veg
Living both say animal products are the "main source of saturated fat and the only source
of cholesterol" for most Americans. FS links excess protein intake with a variety of
common diseases as well as revealing "links between animal food consumption and many
forms of cancer." Both COK and FS's guides also list the antibiotic-resistant bacteria
strains that are found in animal products, and FS's 20 Reasons To Go Vegetarian leaflet
and its Guide to Veg Living also warn against "harmful pathogens like Salmonella and E.
coli" as well as warning that Mad Cow Disease and Avian Influenza are "sickening and
killing" people. PETA's Vegetarian Starter Kit particularly condemns fish and chicken
as "hazardous" due to toxins like mercury and arsenic.
COK's vegetarian guide contains a section on how dairy is unnatural for adult
mammals, saying "our bodies treat cows' milk like an invader" and citing a Harvard
study linking high dairy consumption to osteoporosis. FS's vegetarian guide also debates
the bone-building myth of dairy by saying "studies suggest a connection between
osteoporosis and diets that are rich in animal protein" due to calcium being leached out of
the bones. PETA's vegetarian kit has similar information in a "What's Wrong with
Milk?" section.
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PETA is the only group that mentions sexual performance as a problem for meat-
eaters. On its Web site, PETA cites a scientific study claiming that meat leads to
impotence. PETA also takes a more positive approach to sexual enhancement claims by
saying that a vegetarian diet helps one to be thinner and more energetic, which is seen as
sexier than being overweight and sluggish. This positive association with vegetarianism
and sex is endorsed through its annual "sexiest vegetarian" contests, one for celebrities
and one for "vegetarians next door." PETA's Vegetarian Starter Kit has a page on weight
loss written by a medical doctor who states that while it is possible for someone to be a
fat vegan, vegetarian diets are the "only diets that work for long-term weight loss" and
that "meat-eaters have three times the obesity rate of vegetarians and nine times the
obesity rate of vegans."
Less frequently, human health and well-being issues linked to animal agriculture
are framed to include world hunger, farm worker rights, and rural communities. These
sections are not as popular and tend not to appear in printed material or videos but rather
as small sections within Web sites. Only PETA, FS, and FARM address some ofthese
health issues. For example, in the "Why Vegetarian?" section of goveg.com, PETA has
separate links to "world hunger," "worker rights," and "factory farming: poisoning
communities." PETA's world hunger section explains that much ofthe world's food,
even from developing countries, is used as farm animal feed for Western diets: "instead
of feeding the world's hungry, we take their grains and land to feed our addiction to meat,
eggs, and milk." PETA's worker rights section discusses many ways the working class is
exploited by agribusiness who provides dirty and dangerous work for low wages. PETA's
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communities section claims contamination from factory farms is "destroying the
heartland" and making people in the surrounding areas sick, as agribusiness is "choosing
profits over people." FS has an "economy" issues link within its factory farming Web
section that contains similar information on how corporate agribusiness releases
hazardous pollution in rural communities and fails to bring these communities many
economic benefits.
Uniquely, FARM has an entire campaign dedicated to world hunger policy
reform, called "Well-Fed World." It promotes "plant-based diets" (the term used in place
of "vegetarianism"), particularly culturally-specific staple-rich foods, among other social
programs, as keys to reversing starvation rates as the worldwide consumption of
unsustainable animal products and factory farming increases.
Regarding the environment, PETA, FS, and FARM have separate print pieces, as
well as online links, specifically dedicated to framing animal agribusiness as
environmentally destructive, commonly featuring photos of pipes spewing manure into
cesspools next to factory farms. PETA's Chop Chop leaflet claims one can't be a "meat-
eating environmentalist" and visually equates a pork "chop" to trees being "chopped,"
providing details on meat's association with global warming, pollution, excessive
resource use, and damage to oceanic life. PETA's environmental link on goveg.com
provides more details on all these issues and emphasizes how wasteful and destructive a
meat-based diet is. It uses the analogy that for a meat-based meal, one is cutting down
parts of the rainforest and dumping out water and food. Eating meat is also equated to
driving a hummer instead of treading lightly on the earth.
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FS's "Veg for Life" series of three print pieces all mention environmental
degradation, using verbs such as eroded, ruined, contaminated, compromised,
mismanaged, and ransacked. In fact, the leaflet states the number two reason (out of20)
to go vegetarian is because "much of our water and fossil fuel supply is squandered for
livestock rearing." FS has a gray brochure titled "Factory Farming: Destroying the
Environment," emphasizing water and air pollution and the waste ofland, water, and fuel
resources. It features photos of cesspools, chemical plants, drugs, and a fish kill. FS' s
online link to environmental issues, in its factory farming section, lists similar issues plus
a section titled "Fish" that is all about the unsustainability of commercial fishing and
aquaculture.
FARM emphasizes global warming as the main environmental problem of a meat-
based diet, labeling its campaign "Bite Global Warming" and its Web site
coolyourdiet.com. The campaign logo consists of an earth with a thin burning ring around
it. FARM builds its campaign around a 2006 report of the United Nation's Food and
Agriculture Organization that lists "animal agriculture" as an even bigger "culprit" to
greenhouse gas emissions worldwide than the transportation industry (a fact cited in
many other ARO messages). In addition to greenhouse gas emissions, FARM discusses
the standard issues of pollution and inefficient use of land, food, and water resources.
(RQl) Problem Frame 4: The Killing and Taking o/Life/or Food Items
This frame is less frequent, as it is overshadowed by a more common emphasis on
the suffering involved in the life and death of farmed animals, which is distinct from
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making their loss of life the problem. This section outlines examples of when killing and
death were problematized for their own sake.
PETA's Chew on This DVD lists reasons why people should go vegetarian. Some
include: "because no living creature wants to see her family slaughtered," "because no
animal deserves to die for your taste buds," "because they don't want to die," and
"because commerce is no excuse for murder." PETA often emphasizes in its calls-to-
action how "vegetarians save more than 100 lives each year," which indirectly refers to
the fact that meat-eating kills more than 100 animals a year. PETA's teen booklet twice
mentions that animal deaths are premature by stating that animals are killed while young
and that even animals on free-range farms "all have their lives violently cut short." A
musician is also quoted saying "Why should somebody have to die if I need a snack?"
and one page is titled "Bottom Line: Meat is Murder." "Meat is Murder" is a retro slogan
of the animal right movement that implies eating meat is tantamount to a criminal killing,
but this slogan is not used much anymore and was rarely used by PETA and never used
by other AROs.
FARM has a World Farm Animals Day (WFAD) campaign whose purpose is to
"expose, mourn, and memorialize the innocent, feeling animals in factory farms and
slaughterhouses," and it shows visuals of humans protesting and nonhumans being
slaughtered. The concept ofmourning over the dead is highlighted by FARM's use of
death toll statistics that are presented for each species. The term "death toll" is
reminiscent of how America honors lives lost in any tragedy, like soldiers in war,
ensuring that each life counts. In one instance, FARM's WFAD text emphasized the fact
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that these deaths are unnecessary, saying "pointless suffering and death," which fits with
a vegetarian solution that is sometimes mentioned, such as in the campaign's slogan
"Saving billions - one bite at a time." Necessity was mentioned again in several of
FARM's Meatout campaign postcards, saying that each vegetarian "saves up to 2,000
animals" from deaths that are "unnecessary." But, in other instances, the WFAD site
shifts back to a focus on suffering, and not death, by saying farm animals should be
"treated humanely." And in all of FARM's animal-oriented materials, and in most other
ARO materials, the problem of cruelty is still emphasized because the deaths mourned
are typically limited to animals specifically from "factory farms" rather than from
agriculture in general.
COK and VO typically emphasize cruelty, but COK occasionally will use the
phrase "saving animals," which implies farmed animals should be saved from death. And
VO's Try Vegetarian pamphlet asks people to "Spare the Animal," which more directly
implies people are sparing animal lives rather than sparing animal suffering, especially as
photos ofliving animals are juxtaposed with their resulting meat product. The necessity
of animal deaths is overtly challenged once in VO's two most popular booklets by using
an animal scientist quote questioning our "right to take the lives of other sentient
organisms, particularly when we are not forced to do so by hunger or dietary need, but
rather do so for the somewhat frivolous reason that we like the taste of meat." Similarly,
COK's video on the broiler industry says chickens are killed just to satisfy "our taste for
meat, eggs, and dairy," which implies their deaths are a luxury not a necessity. COK's
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section on "Frequently Asked Questions" explains that humans do not need to eat other
animals to survive.
Similarly, FS's section on "Frequently Asked Questions" states people have the
"choice" not to kill, as meat isn't necessary for them like it is for some other animals, and
it ensures us that eggs and dairy do indeed cause death to hens and cows. In its "Veg for
Life" leaflet, FS also ranks animal death as the 19th reason (of 20) to go vegetarian,
saying "nearly 10 billion farm animals needlessly die every year to fuel the food
industry." FS also has a recent advertisement and t-shirt that uses the phrase "End the
slaughter. There are lives on the line," to emphasize that killing should cease.
Conversely, FS's use of the word "life" implies the opposite of death, as in its "Veg for
Life" campaign and in stickers that display the animals saying they want to live and their
life depends on you. FS campaign materials to protect turkeys, in particular, often say
"Save a turkey. Don't eat one." Somewhat similar to FARM's idea ofmouming the dead,
FS has a tribute section on its Web site that memorializes residents of its sanctuaries who
have died (of natural causes) with individual stories that signify that each individual's life
mattered.
(RQl) Blame Aspects ofProblem Frames: Agribusiness First, Consumers Second
I begin this section by discussion agricultural blame frames followed by consumer
blame frames. AROs identified the most blatant culprit of all problems to be "factory
farms," or the "agribusiness industry," as this industry perpetuates the cruelty, killing,
pollution, and destruction and keeps it hidden from the public. To a lesser extent, the
government and legal system is mentioned for failing to protect farmed animals, but only
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a few ofthe AROs, particularly FS, propose that laws should be changed or that laws are
part of the solution. Therefore, it seems the purpose ofAROs mentioning farmed
animals' lack oflegal protection is primarily to make consumers feel more responsible
for animal protection. Consequently, consumers of animal products are a secondary party
who shares some blame, but AROs typically do not directly accuse the public of
wrongdoing, as it is assumed that consumers do not know the extent of the cruelty nor do
they know that animal products are unnecessary for their health.
While ARO messages sometimes blame "animal agriculture" as a whole or may
specifically mention "free-range" farms as responsible for cruelty, the majority of
messages verbally and visually blame "factory farms and slaughterhouses." Those very
terms are inherently condemning and negative, much more so than the industry's own
terms of "farms," "confined animal feeding operations," or "processing plants."
Collateral materials from FARM and FS specifically tell people to fight or stop "factory
farming," which is a distinctly different message than "end animal farming" would be.
Factory farming of land and sea creatures is also frequently specified as the main
culprit in environmental damage, specifically in terms of causing pollution. For example,
the title ofFS's environmental brochure specifically blames "Factory Farming" and
shows water pollution. Many times, however, meat production in general, whether via
small or large animal farms, is framed as unsustainable, or less efficient, in comparison to
plant-based agriculture. For example, FARM's global warming card highlights that "meat
production causes more greenhouse gases than automobiles," and COK's Vegetarian
Starter Guide says "raising animals for food is one of the leading causes of pollution and
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resource depletion today." However, visuals tend to show large confinement operations
rather than small farms.
If cruelty and suffering is the main problem, agribusiness is portrayed as
responsible because it is greedy, callous, or just using common business sense to compete
in a global market for cheap food; it cuts comers at the expense of farmed animals in
order to increase profits. Explanations of the economic rationale behind the industry's
mistreatment of animals is typically explained by AROs only if the communication piece
has enough space, such as in videos, booklets, or online. AROs suggest that, despite the
public impression to the contrary, profit-motives dictate worse animal husbandry not
better, particularly in a global mass market. VO's Why Vegan? booklet begins its factory
farming section by saying, "the competition to produce inexpensive meat, eggs, and dairy
products has led animal agribusiness to treat animals as objects and commodities," and its
home page has a paragraph that claims the industry is in a "race to the bottom for the
lowest price at any cost." COK's three animal suffering reports all include the phrase
"profits have taken priority over animal welfare."
To further rationalize for skeptical consumers why agribusiness causes and allows
rampant animal suffering, AROs explain that poor treatment may be necessary to produce
the product efficiently or improve taste. For example, AROs typically explain that ducks
will suffer over-feeding via pipes to engorge their livers for expensive foie gras, egg
laying hens will be "force-molted" to shock their bodies into another laying cycle, and
"veal" calves will be made anemic and kept from moving so that their meat will be tender
and pale. The dairy industry separates calves from their mothers after just minutes or
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days so that more of their mother's milk can be sold for human consumption.
Additionally, factory farmed animals raised for meat are bred to be unnaturally heavy
and, therefore, more profitable. PETA's Vegetarian Starter Kit explains that chickens are
"bred to grow so large so fast that many become crippled under their own weight or
suffer organ failure," and pigs and turkeys also face similar pain due to obesity.
AROs explain that the industry typically denies individual medical care to farmed
animals because it is not cost effective, so sick animals are left to die, and painful medical
procedures like castration, debeaking, or tail docking go without anesthesia. Additionally,
most AROs try to explain that these procedures are not necessary for the animal's health
but are done only to modify the animal to fit the "frustrating" factory conditions. For
example, VO's EIYLM booklet introduces debeaking by explaining, "to reduce losses
from birds pecking each other, farmers cut a third to a half of the beaks off." It also cites
Pollan, a food author, explaining that pigs' tails are docked to render their resulting stump
"more sensitive" so they "mount a struggle" to avoid being bitten due to overcrowded
conditions. Regarding tail-docking, COK's Vegetarian Starter Guide laments that "the
industry'S response is not to make conditions less inhumane."
And when animals get to the slaughterhouse, many are allowed to experience pain
and suffering because "speed guides the slaughtering process not humane treatment," as
claimed in a FS brochure and its video on turkey slaughter. In an earlier part of this RQl
section, where I detail how commodification of animals is part of the problem, ARO text
examples are provided explaining how mortality from overcrowded and poor conditions
is less costly than providing the animals with more space and how downed animals are
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left to suffer and are dragged to slaughter rather than being euthanized so their meat can
still be sold.
AROs usually mention at some point in any cruelty discussion that this
mistreatment is legal, as federal or state laws do not protect animals on farms, with only
minimal federal protection in transport and slaughter. AROs frequently suggest that u.s.
cruelty laws are inconsistently applied so that they do not protect animals on farms the
way they protect the animals in people's homes. For example, COK's Vegetarian Starter
Guide highlights this sentence: "the animals who we eat are treated so abusively in this
country that similar treatment of dogs or cats would be grounds for animal cruelty
charges in alISO states." PETA's goveg.com has a unique section titled "Government
Negligence" that claims government is "beholden" to industry and is "bought and sold"
so that what little regulation exists is inadequate. While the government is part of the
problem, it is often not the solution, with some FS campaigns being the exception. Most
AROs' call-to-action is for consumers to boycott animal products as this is considered
more effective than working with an untrustworthy industry and government regulatory
agencies on welfare reforms.
The untrustworthiness of animal agribusiness is an occasional theme, with COK
emphasizing it the most. COK's Web site lists a campaign victory against the United Egg
Producers' "Animal Care Certified" logo because the FTC suggested the logo be
discontinued as it agreed with COK that the logo was "misleading" consumers about
animal welfare. Several COK television spots from a few years ago use the slogan "Don't
swallow the lie," as the COK visuals and text expose viewers to the realities of factory
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fanning juxtaposed with the myth of old MacDonald's fann. A narrator says, "meat, egg
and dairy industries want us to think the animals raised for food have good lives. Does
this look like a good life to you?" One ad depicts what it might be like for a consumer to
actually be served a "side oftruth." It shows a consumer at a fast-food drive through who
is horrified to hear over the speaker how the animals were raised to make her bacon, egg,
and cheese sandwich.
To provide further examples of the theme of agribusiness untrustworthiness, a FS
television PSA features Persia White warning consumers, "Don't believe what meat, egg
and dairy industries are feeding you," and FS's How we Treat the Animals we Eat
brochure says, "Misleading packaging and marketing deceives consumers, leading them
to believe fann animals experience an idyllic life." Similarly, PETA's Vegetarian Starter
Kit claims factory fanns spend millions "trying to obscure reality with images of animals
who are living peacefully in an idyllic barnyard," and its teen veg booklet is titled "What
they never told you ... " And PETA's goveg.com will sometimes use phrases such as,
"What industry doesn't want you to know is ... "
VO's home page asks people to try to visit a fann to find out 'just how far
agribusiness with go to hide the truth from you." The same paragraph also says,
"Through slick marketing, the industry seeks to manipulate you into ignoring reality -
they exist only to make as much profit from killing as many animals as possible." VO
booklets quote an animal science textbook where the author asks if the industry should be
"reluctant to let people know what really goes on, because we're not really proud of it
and concerned that it might tum them to vegetarianism?"
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While not all ARO messages overtly accuse the industry of hiding cruelty, the
AROs tend to use terms such as "expose," "reality," and "truth" to insinuate that they are
revealing to the public something that industry hides. For example, FS, PETA, and COK
often use "undercover" video to get images. The main feature on PETA's goveg.com in
February 2008 was "Shocking kosher slaughter investigation." VO booklets use titles
such as "If Slaughterhouses had Glass Walls ..." and "Stories from behind the Walls" to
indicate secrecy.
Because industry hides these abuses from consumers, AROs usually do not blame
meat-eating consumers directly and typically use language that insinuates that consumers
are caring people who are innocently ignorant ofthe realities of factory farm cruelty. For
example, VO's EIYLM booklet says, "Hidden from public view, the cruelty that occurs
on factory farms is easy to ignore," and its Why Vegan? booklet begins by saying, "Many
people believe that animals raised for food must be treated well because sick or dead
animals would be of no use to agribusiness. This is not true." When all the AROs suggest
consumers eat vegetarian food and provide them with recipes and options, it is implicit
that since consumers now know the truth, they should no longer be willing to financially
support animal agribusiness. While AROs reserve negative and accusing messages for the
industry, instead of consumers, even the AROs' many positive messages about
consumers' compassion and healthy vegetarian food options suggest, by default, that
consumers are guilty. These messages indirectly blame newly educated consumers for
supporting animal cruelty if they continue to buy animal food products under these
circumstances.
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While most ARO messages appeal to the compassion of consumers and try to
involve them in the solution, a few ARO messages are more directly accusing of meat-
eating consumers as responsible parties in the problems of animal cruelty and
environmental destruction. For example, FS's Humane Slaughter? video from the 1990s
concludes with the sentence, "By eating chickens and turkeys, consumers directly
subsidize this abuse." And FS' s video The Making ofa Turkey cuts from factory farming
photos to video of consumers shopping in the meat aisle of the grocery store. The narrator
says because consumers are eating turkey year-round and prefer to eat turkey breasts,
farmers respond by altering the size and shape ofthe birds to fit consumer demands.
In addition, a FARM poster shows a cow slaughter illustration and reads "It's a
filthy business. They couldn't do it without you," and its Meatout Mondays online
campaign tells consumers they now have a choice whether to boycott cruelty or to tum a
"blind eye." One ofCOK's television spots says, "When we buy meat, eggs, or dairy we
support this cruelty" and shows factory farming images. YO's Why Vegan? brochure uses
quotes from PhDs to accuse consumers of an ethical breach. One is an animal scientist
who asks if, as a society, we should "know better," and the other is a quote from Dr. Carl
Sagan and Dr. Ann Druyan who accuse people of "pretending animals do not feel pain"
and drawing an unfair distinction between nonhuman and human animals for the purpose
of being able to use them "without any disquieting tinges of guilt or regret."
PETA's Meet Your Meat video shows the link between the dairy and veal
industries and says, "If you're consuming milk, you're supporting the veal industry" and
informs viewers that "cows give milk for their offspring - not for human beings."
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Similarly, PETA's Chew on This DVD shows raw chicken wing meat and tells viewers
"this is not what wings are for," indicating that wings belong to birds for flying not to
humans for eating. The DVD also includes several other direct statements on why people
should go vegetarian such as: "might doesn't make right," "it's violence you can stop,"
"no animal deserves to die for your taste buds," and "it takes a small person to beat a
defenseless animal and an even smaller person to eat one."
While most ARO messages about the environment take a positive approach to
asserting the "power" consumers have to save the earth, the most accusing environmental
messages for consumers come from PETA. Its Chop Chop leaflet boldly asserts, "Think
you can be a meat-eating environmentalist? Think again!" and ends with the statement,
"There's no excuse for eating meat." PETA's online environmental section explains
problems and says, "Meat-eaters are responsible for production of 100% of this waste.
Go vegetarian and you'll be responsible for none of it." It also uses an analogy of
someone cutting down parts of the rainforest and dumping water and food down the drain
for one meal and states, "that is what you are doing if you eat animals."
Research Question Two (RQ2): Is the Prognosis Component o/Collective Action
Frames Identifiable, and, ifso, What Solutions Are Defined by AROs?
The most popular solution AROs propose is for consumers to eat fewer or no
animal products, but FS also promotes humane farming reforms via government and
PETA promotes some humane reforms by industry and retailers. I discuss these three
solution frames in this section.
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(RQ2) Solution Frame 1: Consumers Going Vegetarian or Reducing Consumption of
Animal Products
The most common solution by far proposed by all AROs to redress problems with
animal agriculture is for consumers to stop supporting it and go vegetarian. The word
"vegetarian" or "vegan" is often used in most call-to-action sections of print or electronic
materials, in many collateral materials, and as titles in prominent links on home pages
(except for FS's main Web page, as vegetarian messages are more prominent in its
separate vegforlife.org Web site). All the AROs offer free, full-color, lengthy vegetarian
starter guides, with FARM distributing the guide printed by FS. For collateral, every
ARO has at least one t-shirt that says "vegan," except for COK who uses the word
"vegetarian," and the Web addresses that AROs advertise on collateral and print
materials often suggest vegetarianism, such as Meatout.org, Veganoutreach.org,
Goveg.com, Vegforlife.org, Vegkit.org, and Tryveg.com. Messages at the end of most
print materials promote vegetarianism through listing veg Web sites with such calls-to-
action as: (COK) "Choose veg foods," (FARM) "Kick the meat habit" and "Get a free
veg starter kit," (FS and PETA) "Go vegetarian" or "Choose vegetarian," and (VO)
"Choose to act with compassion by boycotting animal agriculture." Additionally, phrases
such as "meatless meals," "meat-free," "humane choices," "compassionate choices," and
"crue1ty-free foods" are common.
Every ARO uses the term "vegetarian" more often than "vegan," as in all the
"vegetarian" starter guides. Yet, the AROs' ultimate goal seems to be for people to adopt
a "vegan" or "pure vegetarian" diet containing no animal products because all the recipes
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and product suggestions are vegan, even if they are not so labeled. "Vegetarian" is a more
familiar word than "vegan" and is likely less threatening because it implies consumers
need not make as much of a radical dietary change (Maurer, 2002). The ARO that uses
the word "vegan" most prominently is va, as that is in its name and is the title of its Why
Vegan? booklet. However, with the increased popularity of its EIYLM booklet and
alternate Web URLs that avoid the word "vegan," the group seems to be moving away
from frequent use ofthat word. In more scientific arguments, such as with environmental
or world hunger issues, FS and FARM favor the term "plant-based" over "vegetarian,"
presumably as it has less political and social identity connotations.
Much ofthe time, AROs, especially COK and PETA, are consistent and clear in
their solution for consumers to "go veg" and give up all animal products, and no group
ever suggests that people switch to so-called "humane" animal products. But FS, va, and
sometimes FARM occasionally suggest less sweeping dietary changes or ask that
consumers simply reduce the amount of animal foods they eat. By virtue of its "Meatout
Mondays" campaign title, FARM suggests that people should be eating vegetarian at
least one day a week. However, the campaign materials tend not to suggest limits and
instead just promote vegetarian eating in general, using the word "vegetarian" frequently.
Like FS, FARM also has a few "fight factory farming" or "boycott veal" collateral
messages that may imply that traditionally-farmed animal products are acceptable.
FARM's World Farm Animal Day campaign has "vegetarian" mentioned in some places
online but other times it alludes to "humane" treatment and farming, so the solution for
consumers is left ambiguous. In a few of FARM's postcards it suggests "reducing" meat,
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but that is always accompanied with the option of eliminating meat or going veg too. But
FARM overtly promotes only consumer solutions, not industry changes, as one of its
vegetarian postcards explains that "attempts to improve the treatment of animals have not
worked."
Besides its "Veg for Life" campaign materials, FS's messages may not
specifically suggest a vegetarian solution when focusing on factory farming and
stockyard cruelty. In some cases, FS suggests legal reforms to ban a particularly cruel
practice, such as intense confinement systems and downed animal abuses. But it may
accompany this solution with an additional request that consumers avoid factory farmed
products in general or avoid buying that particular factory farm food item, such as:
"never buy foie gras," "please don't buy veal," "don't eat pork from farms that use
gestation crates," and "don't eat eggs from battery cage hens." This implies that it might
be acceptable to eat these animal products, or any others, if they come from animals who
are raised in better conditions. FS's emphasis on promoting "compassionate" choices, as
with its slogan "A compassionate world starts with you," sometimes leaves the consumer
with the option of determining which food items may qualify as compassionate.
VO's Even IjYou Like Meat (EIYLM) booklet takes the approach that consumers
should consider reducing their consumption of animal products, in particular the "eggs
and the meat ofbirds and pigs," as those animals suffer the most on factory farms. The
cover suggests people "cut meat consumption in half," and it continues inside by telling
readers that, "opposing factory farming isn't all or nothing" and they should "eat less
meat to help prevent farm animal suffering." In this way, it avoids using the word
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"vegetarian" or suggesting readers completely boycott all animal products, opting instead
to ask the individual reader to just "do what you can." The primary time VO uses the
word "vegan" in the EIYLM booklet is to encourage the reader to "choose an approach
you can sustain. A brief stint as a vegan is not as effective as years of eating less meat
and eggs." While this seems to suggest veganism is too extreme, all the recommended
food shown is always vegan.
In the interview, Matt Ball ofVO explained that this pragmatic, flexible dietary
message receives a better reception from the average person leafleted who does not have
plans to give up meat, and therefore, does not want to accept a pamphlet whose main goal
is vegetarianism or veganism. The ENLM booklet has become VO's main
communication piece for leafleting over the last few years, with Why Vegan?, its classic
leafleting booklet, being deemed a better choice to give to people who haye already
expressed some interest in animal issues or vegetarianism.
While not all the ARO messages are strict in promoting full vegetarianism, none
of the AROs ever encourage consumers to switch to "free-range" or so-called "humane"
meat, eggs, or dairy. But by default, some consumers may perceive free-range products
as the obvious solution when the ARO has framed the problem as mainly one of factory
farm cruelty. This perception is especially logical ifthe ARO does not specifically
condemn or discredit free-range farming in that particular communication piece or if
vegetarianism is not specifically mentioned as the preferred solution, as is the case in
some ofFS's factory farming materials.
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To steer consumers away from any animal products, all the vegetarian starter
guides (from COK, FS, and PETA), as well as YO's main booklets, and all the Web sites
for these AROs, have small sections dispelling the myth that "free-range" farming is free
of cruelty or suffering. These sections highlight the fact that there are no regulated
standards for free-range labels, so consumers may be misled, and AROs mention that
these farm animals still experience painful mutilations, uncomfortable transport, and
slaughter, even ifthe animals might have more space while they are growing. In the
slaughterhouse section ofYO's Why Vegan? booklet, it mentions that all animals, even
ones from free-range farms, are slaughtered, informing or reminding the reader that
eating any animal product contributes to the killing of those animals.
FS and FARM both have unique sections that mention that consumers can also
reduce animal suffering by choosing "compassionate clothing." FARM did use the word
"vegan" sometimes while FS did not discuss it in terms of "vegan" fashion and simply
called it "cruelty-free clothing." Either way, it is part of the principles of a vegan lifestyle
to avoid wearing animal products like wool, down, or leather, as veganism is supposed to
be a near total boycott of animal exploitation. FS's section in its vegetarian guide focuses
on wool, down, and leather while FARM's online section also includes silk and fur, as
did FS's separate booklet titled "Guide to Compassionate Living: Directory of Animal-
Free Products." PETA promotes vegan clothing on its main Web page and in separate
campaigns but not on goveg.com or specifically in food communication materials. COK
and YO concentrate solely on food issues.
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(RQ2) Solution Frame 2: Government Instituting Farmed Animal Welfare Reform Laws
Some FS campaigns demand legal humane fanning refonn, making federal and
state governments blameworthy for allowing cruelty. In FS's video Life Behind Bars,
spokesperson Mary Tyler Moore proclaims that gestation crates, battery cages, and veal
crates "are inherently cruel and should be banned in the United States as they are in other
countries." Other AROs also mention that these confinement systems are outlawed in
other countries. FS's "Say No" factory fanning series also calls for these practices to be
banned, including foie gras. FS' s Web page explains that it has worked with the Humane
Society of the United States on referenda in three states to institute state-wide bans on
crates for calves and pigs and is now adding battery cages. FS also asks for federal
legislation to protect downed animals at slaughterhouses so the law would require their
euthanasia and forbid their meat from being sold. Additionally, FS' s "Sentient Beings"
campaign seeks improved legal subject status for fanned animals, as has been passed in
Europe, to get them "basic legal protections in the United States."
COK has chosen to request legal refonn only in required welfare labeling of
marketing materials for egg cartons so that marketers cannot make false animal welfare
claims and customers can be infonned if eggs come from caged birds. In 2007, COK
successfully got the FTC to ask the United Egg Producers (UEP) to stop using its
misleading "Animal Care Certified" logo, and the UEP now uses a more ambiguous logo
that says "United Egg Producer Certified."
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(RQ2) Solution Frame 3: Corporations Instituting Voluntary Farmed Animal Welfare
Reforms
PETA has some humane refonn campaigns, although they are voluntary industry
refonns instead of the government regulation that FS requested. PETA has employed a
long-standing campaign, Kentucky Fried Cruelty, against fast-food giant KFC to demand
improved welfare standards of its chicken suppliers. Additionally, based on undercover
footage of slaughterhouse employees abusing chickens on the kill floor, PETA has a
"Tyson Tortures" Web site, and asks that the poultry company, Tyson, fire those abusive
employees and institute a killing method based on gas rather than knives. The gassing
method is supposedly more humane, partly because it "eliminates worker contact with
live animals." In February 2008, PETA culminated a successful campaign getting the
large Safeway grocery store chain to institute some improved animal welfare standards
for its suppliers. This "Shameway" campaign specifically asked for less reliance on both
eggs from battery-caged hens and meat from pigs in gestation crates. PETA's newest
campaign in 2008, featured prominently on goveg.com, is to promote increased welfare
standards in kosher slaughter in South America and asks people to sign a petition
"urging leaders of the Orthodox Union and the Israeli Rabbinate to mandate the use of
modem restraining pens and prohibit the'shackling and hoisting' method.
Research Question Three (RQ3): To Which Values Are AROs Appealing? How Are
AROs Creating Any Alignment between Their Values and Those ofthe Public?
When asked about values in the interview, most ARO leaders said they were not
changing values as much as promoting values that the public already holds, namely
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compassion and an aversion to animal cruelty. They did say that they had to appeal to
people's desire for moral consistency by asking people to "extend" the values of
compassion they felt toward dogs and cats out to sentient animals on farms. This may
involve changing people's attitudes about farm animals (and fish, in PETA's case) so that
people recognize these beings are equally as feeling as dogs and cats, essentially seeing
them as a subject not object. In this section, I discuss AROs' prominent appeals to the
values of compassion for nonhuman animals (NHAs), appreciation for their sentience,
and moral consistency. Additionally, I discuss other values to which AROs appealed,
such as: desire to improve the world and make a difference, choice, pleasurable and
convenient food, belonging, life, concern for fellow human beings, honesty, American
populism, naturalness, freedom, and American pride.
Additionally, based on the problem frames I described in the RQl section of this
chapter, all AROs believe many people value their own health and environmental
responsibility. This is evident because all AROs have separate sections addressing, to
different extents, the health and environmental benefits of plant-based diets. Because this
dissertation focuses on NHA issues and values related to humans' relationship with other
animals, in answering this third research question (RQ3), I focus more broadly on those
values and the values to which AROs alluded most when communicating about NHAs.
Therefore, I do not directly discuss human health and sustainability values in this values
section, as these are less relevant to this dissertation. The exception to this is an
exploration of values related to the desire for food to be pleasurable and convenient, as
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that has not yet been discussed in this chapter and tangentially relates to other values I
address in this section.
(RQ3) Value 1: Compassion and Caringfor NHA Suffering and Aversion to Cruelty
If cruelty and suffering is the main problem frame, and a consumer boycott is the
main solution AROs propose, then it makes sense that ARO messages assume consumers
are compassionate and caring toward NHAs. Sometimes they overtly declare this
assumption. For example, FS 's new slogan is "A compassionate world starts with you."
And PETA's Meet Your Meat video ends with celebrity vegetarian Alec Baldwin telling
viewers to think about the cruelty they have seen, to choose "compassion," and to go
vegetarian as "millions of compassionate people" have decided to do. Continuing the
compassionate theme, PETA's Yeg101 online link states that "compassionate people
everywhere are adopting a vegetarian diet."
YO's Why Vegan? booklet declares that making humane and compassionate
choices is essential to the status of being human; it says " ... we can choose to act with
compassion by boycotting animal agriculture. Making humane choices is the ultimate
affirmation of our humanity." COK's Vegetarian Starter Guide creates a good versus bad
dichotomy under the title "Choosing Compassion Over Killing" by asking, "Do we want
to support kindness and mercy, or do we want to support cruelty and misery?" It tells the
reader that, by choosing vegetarian foods, "we can take a stand for compassionate
living." COK's vegetarian eating brochure describes the millions ofvegetarians as
"thoughtful people."
229
FARM literature describes those who participate in the Great American Meatout
as "caring" people who are "troubled" by pollution and suffering. "Caring" is also the
adjective FARM uses to describe people who save a turkey at Thanksgiving, and one of
its Meatout postcards includes the value of care in the headline, "Because you care about
animals ... " Similarly, FARM also mentions several times that people who speak out for
farm animals on World Farm Animal Day are "people of conscience."
(RQ3) Value 2: Respectfor the Sentience and Individuality ofOther Animal Subjects
Built into the assumption that someone is compassionate toward NHAs is the idea
that the person respects the other animals' ability to feel and does not want them to
suffer. The concept of sentience, as I use it here, involves not only experiencing pain, but
also experiencing emotions, thought, or consciousness. This relates to the earlier
discussion, in RQl, of how ARO messages build a problem frame around agribusiness's
practice of treating farmed animals like objects not subjects. So, for that problem frame to
work, AROs must appeal to people's values toward the well-being of fellow, individual,
sentient subjects and ensure people include farmed animals in that group. AROs typically
do not use the word "sentience," rather they tend to say "feel" or "suffer" instead. All
AROs are careful to use gendered or personal pronouns like "he," "she," or "I" when
referring to farmed animals instead of following the common American practice of
referring to each individual farmed animal as "it."
In interviews, the AROs' leaders said they believe the American public already
values the sentience and individuality of certain familiar animals, in particular cats and
dogs. Therefore, every ARO includes frequent messages to ensure the public that farmed
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animals are also sentient, often comparing their capabilities to those of cats and dogs or
sometimes to other animals, including humans. An example of a pet comparison is
FARM's vegetarian postcard, which states, "Animals raised for food are just as
intelligent, lovable, and sensitive as the animals we call pets." An example of a human
comparison is PETA's teen vegetarian booklet, which declares, "Animals are like us" and
proceeds to describe farmed animals doing what would normally seem like "human"
activities, such as pigs playing video games, hens talking to each other, turkeys playing
ball, cows babysitting, and fish gardening.
FS's "Sentient Beings" campaign seeks elevated legal status for U.S. farmed
animals, to be classified as sentient beings as they are in Europe. The leaflet for the
campaign is titled "Farm animals have feelings too," and says these animals are "sentient
beings - capable of awareness, feeling, and suffering" who "deserve to be treated with
respect." This is contrasted with pictures of farmed animals in extreme confinement and
quotes from industry that compares them to machines and manure.
To visually contrast the objectification of animals on factory farms, all AROs use
pictures of comfortable animals, presumably rescued and in a sanctuary, often featuring
individual subjects looking directly at the reader, or to a lesser extent hanging out, of
their own choice, with friends of their same species. Booklets, like several vegetarian
starter guides, describe the personalities of each rescued land animal and display their
portraits and individual names, such as Truffles or Kari (pigs); Norman, Phoebe, and
Travolta (cows); Emery, Marmalade, and Jane (chickens); and Ashley (turkey). The
descriptions reveal individual personality traits, such as friendliness, talkativeness,
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playfulness, and preferences for certain foods such as apples or green grapes. FS profiles
individuals most frequently, as FS is the only ARO who actively rescues and provides
sanctuary for land-based farmed animals, but COK and VO both include profiles on
rescued, named animals in their main booklets too.
In the interview with Gene Baur from FS, he said they try to use pictures that
reveal the animal's personality. In FS's Guide to Veg Living, one such photo shows a
goose, Bing, happily spreading his wings in a pond and honking with gusto, and another
photo shows a piglet, Rudy, standing proudly and defiantly in the grass with the low
camera angle putting the viewer in the position of having to look up at him so that he
appears larger than life. There are also quite a few examples from every ARO that use
photos of farmed animals getting their faces close up to the camera as if to indicate their
curiosity and friendliness.
PETA has an "Amazing Animals" section on its home page for the goveg.com
site and in its Vegetarian Starter Kit providing information on the natural abilities of each
farmed animal species: chickens, pigs, fish, cows, turkeys, ducks, and geese. The photos
that accompany this information are all close-ups of contented animals outdoors. The
information pages often cite scientists explaining the capabilities of each animal species
in relation to intelligence, emotions, social skills, and communication, which also
indicate that these are traits that the public values. Here are examples of PETA's opening
sentence descriptions for each species:
Chickens are inquisitive, interesting animals who are thought to be as intelligent
as cats, dogs, and even some primates; Pigs are curious and insightful animals
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thought to have intelligence beyond that of an average 3-year-old human child;
Fish are smart, sensitive animals with their own unique personalities; Cows are
intelligent, loyal animals who enjoy solving problems; Turkeys are social, playful
birds who enjoy the company of others; Geese are very loyal to their families and
very protective of their partners and offspring.
PETA dedicates more space to fish than does any other ARO, and it is the only
group that talks about fish sentience in terms of intelligence and personality. It has a
fishinghurts.com Web site, brochures, and collateral materials dedicated to sea animals.
The other AROs who mention fish, particularly COK, FS, and VO, to a minor degree,
often talk about them only in terms of an environmental issue. COK does talk about fish
sentience in terms oftheir ability to feel pain but not in terms of personality. Erica Meier
of COK admitted that her group wishes it had more resources so it could address sea
animals as PETA does. According to Matt Ball, VO has purposely taken fish out of its
main booklets because most people do not identify with cruelty issues regarding fish and
identify more with land animals, particularly mammals. In general, mammals such as
cows and pigs seem to be the most popular animals for all AROs to display, with
chickens being the next most popular. Leaders at COK and VO both admit that they try to
emphasize birds because of utilitarian concerns over birds being the animal species who
suffers in the greatest numbers.
Some messages remind consumers, specifically, not agribusiness, that farm
animals are more than food objects. For example, a COK print advertisement displays a
cow's face reflected in a woman's eye and asks teen girls to, "See her as more than a
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meal." FS has a new print ad featuring a close-up photo ofthe face of young pig named
Truffles who challenges the viewer to, "Look me in the eyes and tell me I'm tasty." FS
also has a sticker showing an illustration of a chicken stating, "I am not your breakfast,
lunch or dinner." Similarly, PETA has several collateral materials with an illustration of a
chick declaring, "I am not a nugget" and telling viewers that pigs and fish are "friends not
food." When it comes to pigs, PETA reminds viewers that they have an assumed
attachment to one pig as an individual subject - Babe, from the movie ofthe same name
- using a poster that shows a piglet and reads, "Please don't eat Babe for breakfast." And
the very title of PETA's popular video, Meet Your Meat, juxtaposes the idea that
consumers can see farmed animals both as individual subjects while alive and as objects
after death.
Because Americans have shown a penchant for being friends with certain species
of animals, friendship toward farmed animals is sometimes used as a value by FARM,
FS, and PETA. FARM has a button and t-shirt that declares, "I don't eat my friends" and
shows an illustration of a man surrounded by farmed animals and a cat. FS has stickers
that show a pig saying, "I want to be your friend, not your food," and, similarly, PETA
has stickers declaring that pigs and fish are "friends not food." In most cases, these
stickers appear to be aimed at children, as the stickers mainly use cartoon versions of
pigs, and PETA includes its kid-specific Web site, petakids.com. On FS' s Web site, it
sometimes refers to both its nonhuman sanctuary residents and human visitors as
"friends," and shows pictures of people petting the farmed animals. According to Matt
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Ball, VO likes to use some photos of people posing with farmed animals in ways that
would seem reminiscent of how people interact with their companion animals.
(RQ3) Value 3: Integrity, Including Moral Consistency and Pride in One's Morality
ARO leaders admit that, in order to encourage people to "extend" their
compassionate values from one NHA group to another, AROs often appeal to people's
desire for moral consistency and personal integrity. Moral consistency and integrity is
defined here as one's actions accurately reflecting one's values and applying those values
uniformly and fairly in all situations. In this case, the AROs use the logic of moral
consistency as such: if people already care about the welfare of cats and dogs and do not
want to see them harmed, and if farmed animals are equally sentient beings, then AROs
imply that it would make sense that compassionate people would not want to see farmed
animals harmed either. To show consensus for farmed animal welfare values, the
vegetarian guides for FS and PETA both use survey data to prove that the majority of
Americans are in favor oflega1 protection of farmed animals and against their intensive
confinement. But a consensus clearly does not exist in favor of saving farmed animals
from death and consumption, although there is consensus in America that people should
not eat dogs and cats, so that is where AROs often point out moral inconsistencies in
American attitudes.
Messages by FS, FARM, PETA, and COK use questions as a tool to provoke
viewers to rationally justify why they eat certain species and pet others, implying it is a
morally random decision who gets killed. A COK t-shirt shows a photo of a dog looking
up at viewers while seated on a dinner plate with a knife and fork on either side of him.
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The headline asks, "Why not? You eat other animals, don't you? Go vegetarian."
Similarly, a FARM vegetarian postcard shows a picture of a cat and a piglet nose to nose
with the question, "Which do you pet? Which do you eat? Why?" And PETA's online
section on chickens has a photo illustration of a chicken with a cat's face and the
question, "If your cat tasted like chicken, would you eat her? Why not?"
FS uses this questioning technique the most. It has a t-shirt and other collateral
materials with drawings of a happy dog and cat and an anxious cow and pig with the
question, "If you love animals called pets, why do you eat animals called dinner?" The
intentional use of the word "called" implies that humans treat NHAs according to the
arbitrary or socially constructed ways humans choose to define them, more so than how it
has to be or naturally "is." The same phrasing and question is used by vegetarian actor
Corey Feldman in a PSA for FS showing him petting a turkey and telling viewers that
farmed animals have the same "emotions, personalities and intelligence" of the cats and
dogs that are part of American families. Another FS television spot dramatizes the
comparison by juxtaposing a category of animals called "friend," represented by a dog,
cat, and horse, with a category of animals called "food," represented by a pig, hen, and
calf. It then asks, "Why? Go veg."
YO also appeals to moral consistency, as its booklets openly talk about the need
for people to widen their "circle of compassion" toward other animals to include farmed
animals, as they do dogs and cats. YO's Even ijYou Like Meat (EILYM) booklet asks,
"Are dogs and cats really so different from chickens, turkeys, pigs, and cows that one
group deserves legal protection from cruelty, while the other deserves virtually no
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protection at all?" and shows a girl holding a dog while fanned animal faces are featured
in a circle around her. It concludes with a mainstream welfare appeal by saying that most
people are "appalled" by farm animal cruelty, not because they believe in "animal
rights," but because they "believe animals feel pain and that morally decent human
beings should try to prevent pain whenever possible." In this way, the appeal is not
asking for a change in values, since it assumes people are generally supportive ofNHA
welfare, but rather it asks for a more equal application of this NHA welfare value.
In a similar appeal, FS specifically uses the word "all" in places to emphasize
how every animal species, including fanned animals, should be included in one's circle
of compassion. A FS sticker shows a calf and encourages us to, "extend compassion to
ALL beings," and a t-shirt shows a piglet and reads, "All babies need love." In many of its
factory fanning messages, FS's call-to-action says, "Like all animals, fann animals feel
pain and deserve protection from cruelty."
FS, along with COK and PETA, infonn the public that America's animal cruelty
laws are inconsistently applied between fanned animals and companion animals. Several
FS print materials simply say that fanned animals are excluded from most state anti-
cruelty laws and from the federal Animal Welfare Act. COK's vegetarian guide says,
"the animals who we eat are treated so abusively in this country that similar treatment of
dogs or cats would be grounds for animal cruelty charges in all 50 states," and PETA's
vegetarian guide claims that billions of animals are killed by the meat industry "in ways
that would horrify any compassionate person and that would be illegal if cats or dogs
were the victims."
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To help create empathy for fish, PETA often uses moral comparisons to how
humans would not perform the same cruel acts to dogs and cats that we do to fish. For
example, brochures say we humans wouldn't "stab our cat or dog through the mouth" in a
fishing analogy, and "none of us would drop a live cat or dog into boiling water. Why
should it be any different for lobsters?" And to compare the act of eating fish to eating
dogs, PETA often cites a quote from aquatic expert Dr. Sylvia Earle saying, "I wouldn't
deliberately eat a grouper any more than 1'd eat a cocker spaniel," based on their
personalities. Also, PETA's fish brochure states, "if you wouldn't eat your dog, you
shouldn't eat fish."
In the ''Widening the Circle" section of the Why Vegan? booklet, VO takes a
different approach and bases its appeal on humanity's moral progress, putting the focus
on how humans value their morality rather than putting the focus on how humans value
the feelings of other animals. It includes a quote from author Milan Kundera who accuses
humanity of a "fundamental debacle" in failing "humanity's true moral test," which
consists of "its attitude towards those who are at its mercy: animals." This relates to a
quote several pages later in which the booklet text declares that, "making humane choices
is the ultimate affirmation of our humanity."
Morality is based on notions of right and wrong. While overt use of the words
"right" and "wrong" do not appear much in any ARO messages, PETA does use them in
several places. PETA's Chew on This DVD and television spot ends with the declaration,
"you know this is wrong" when showing factory farm cruelty. PETA has a poster series
and some leaflets with headlines that state, "What is wrong with... " meat, eggs, or dairy.
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On the poster, the solution is to "Join the Vegetarian Revolution," which is an unusual
phrasing in the call-to-action that implies a moral uprising is warranted and is occurring.
This moral uprising appears to be led by celebrities, so it is characterized as fun and
trendy more than militant.
One of the few instances the moral word "right" is used is in the beginning of
PETA's Vegetarian Starter Kit when it says vegetarianism is a way to "eat right" for
health, animals, and the planet. Another time is in PETA's Chew on This DVD when it
says, "might does not make right," a phrase also used by COK once in its vegetarian
guide. The PETA DVD utilizes other moral language to promote vegetarianism by also
saying there's "no excuse for murder," as these animals do not want or deserve to die,
and that this "isn't fair." Yet fairness and justice are values to which AROs rarely directly
appeal.
Any ofthe frames discussed in RQl that blame consumers for the problem of
cruelty and destruction seem to be appealing to people's desire to achieve consonance
between their actions and their values. Those accusing frames assume people will feel
guilty about behaving inconsistently with their beliefs and, therefore, be willing to change
their eating habits so they can feel satisfied with their moral integrity. PETA uses a quote
from actress Natalie Portman to explain her moral reasons for being a strict vegetarian: "I
just really, really love animals and I act on my values ... I am really against cruelty [to]
animals." Similarly, a position paper on "Humane Meats" posted on FS's Web page says
that people who are "sincere" in their concern for animals will stop eating animals,
implying that, even ifthese people still eat so-called "free-range" meats, they are being
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insincere to their animal welfare values. The position paper goes on to suggest that
veganism is a path to a "deeper level of compassion," which emphasizes its use as a tool
for moral development.
(RQ3) Value 4: Desire to Improve the World and Make a Difference
ARO messages indicate that people must want to improve the world and make a
difference with their lives, as that may be a source of pride and even a sign ofpersonal
growth. COK's vegetarian eating brochure encourages readers to "Make a difference.
Start today!" and the back of its vegetarian starter guide states in bold, "Every time we sit
down to eat, we can make the world a better place." Similarly, YO's EIYLM booklet tells
readers, "Every time you choose compassion, you're making a difference." In agreement,
FARM's global warming online section declares, "You can make a difference at every
meal." PETA's online "pledge to be veg" appeals to people who want to make things
"better" and do the right thing, by having them agree, "I want to eat better, feel better and
stop supporting cruelty."
To emphasize personal empowennent, FARM uses the slogan, "Stop global
warming one bite at a time" to describes the "power" of our food choices and how they
"matter." Similarly, FS has a radio PSA for Earthday that says listeners have the "power"
to protect the earth "every time we eat" and the "power is on your plate." COK's veg
starter guide and veg eating brochure agree people's diet matters to others, saying, "Our
everyday food choices have far-reaching impacts that can't be ignored." The starter guide
includes environmental impacts by stating that when people avoid animal products, they
"take positive steps to protect our planet for ourselves and our loved ones." YO's Why
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Vegan? booklet also emphasizes impact by saying, "over the course of a lifetime, one
person's food choices affect hundreds of animals."
Note that in many of these slogans there is a time element that emphasizes the
ease with which a person can make a difference through vegetarianism everyday because
it allows him or her to improve the world "at every meal" or "one bite at a time." Eating
is a mundane and convenient form of activism for those who do not necessarily want to
dedicate time to being a traditional activist or do not have the money to donate to causes.
Further indicating the importance of a switch to vegetarianism, AROs often claim
that vegetarianism is the "best" or "most important" thing a person can do to solve
problems. For example, FS's "Veg for Life" brochure says, "eliminating ALL animal
foods from our diets is the single most important step we can take to be kinder to animals,
ourselves and the Earth." PETA often cites vegetarian musician Sir Paul McCartney
telling readers, "If anyone wants to save the planet, all they have to do is just stop eating
meat. That's the single most important thing you can do." FARM claims, "our best option
to end these atrocities is to stop subsidizing them."
Making a difference is also connected with feeling good about oneself. FS's final
reason (out of 20 in a leaflet) to go vegetarian is that the reader will, "feel good because
you make the world better," and this is mentioned again in FS's "Frequently Asked
Questions" section ofthe Guide to Veg Living by stating that vegetarians enjoy better
"mental health and feel good knowing they are working toward improved health and
well-being for themselves, animals and the environment." Regarding mental health,
COK's starter guide's page on transitioning to a vegetarian diet is like a life coach's
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personal growth plan telling new vegetarians that they have "made it!" and should give
themselves a "pat on the back!" when they have successfully been a near-vegetarian for a
month. In several places, it tells the readers to be patient and not to be hard on themselves
if they cannot go vegetarian overnight, reminding them that, "for every animal-friendly
choice you make, you're having a positive influence." Similarly, FS's veg guide page on
transitioning one's diet seems to indicate that vegetarianism is worth the effort by telling
readers to, "give yourself a break" if every move is not perfect, encouraging readers that
"every step you take to reduce suffering, exploitation and injustice is always a step in the
right direction."
(RQ3) Value 5: Choice
In this section, I isolate the notion of choice to mean that AROs emphasize how
vegetarianism is not only voluntary but also the preferred or fitting choice for
conscientious consumers. For example, COK's materials repeatedly use the word
"choice," such as in asking consumers to "choose vegetarian." Its Vegetarian Starter
Guide highlights "choice" in its ending call-to-action for the animal and environmental
sections, titling them, respectively, "choosing compassion over killing" and "choosing
sustainability." Erica Meier ofCOK explained that COK titled its Web page
"tryveg.com," purposely using the verb "try" to emphasize choice. Almost similar to
what a reporter might say ofhislher goal, Erica stated COK's goal is to, "provide people
with the facts so they can make a decision on what they want to support." COK believes
it is particularly necessary for them to provide facts about animal agribusiness practices
because the industry often misleads consumers. Erica stated:
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People in our country, they want a variety of choice. It's really the goal behind the
industry - the freedom of choice. And it's actually a good tool to use against them
because if they want consumers to have the choice, then they need to provide
them with information that is more in line with the truth. And so we are providing
them with that information, so that they can make that choice.
PETA's videos also emphasize the importance of our food choices, such as when
the narrator in Meat Your Meat says, "Every time we eat we make a choice. Choose
vegetarian," and the Tyson slaughterhouse video says, "We have a choice. We can
choose cruelty to animals or we can choose compassion. Please go vegetarian." Even the
use of the word "please" is a way of emphasizing that consumers have the power to
choose and no force is involved. In rare cases, it is the farmed animals who plead with
viewers to choose vegetarian, such as in a few of PETA's collateral materials where the
farmed animals say, "please don't eat us."
COK urges consumers to use their buying choices to help farmed animals by
emphasizing that the animals do not have a choice to help themselves. COK's egg
brochure and its pork leaflet both say the animals, "don't have a choice - but you do."
Similarly, COK has a television spot called "Choices" that asks, "Would you choose to
live like this?" as it shows crated animals. Then it declares, "We have a choice. They
don't." Also, In COK's "frequently asked questions" section, in response to the common
argument that other animals eat each other so we should eat animals too, COK provides
that distinction that humans have the "choice" not to eat animals, as it is not necessary for
human survival.
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Choice can also be about highlighting a lack of restrictions. FS's, FARM's, and
VO's suggestions that consumers eat less meat (discussed in RQ2), instead of always
recommending veganism, is another way to emphasize to consumers that it is their choice
to what extent they wish to change their diet. And goveg.com's "Veg1 01" section boldly
declares that vegetarians eat, "whatever we want," which is an unusually liberating
phrasing that implies the choice to eat vegetarian foods is voluntary and does not feel
restricting. When viewing each ARO's messages as a whole, over all their text, it is clear
that the ARO believes the best choice consumers could make would be to eliminate all
animal products.
(RQ3) Value 6: Pleasurable and Convenient Food
Every ARO highlights the positive aspects of vegan foods, recognizing that taste,
convenience, accessibility, and variety are very important to food consumers. For
example, the ease ofthe diet is often emphasized, especially by PETA, by stating many
accessible options exist now for vegetarians. PETA's Vegetarian Starter Kit explains,
"Restaurant options for vegetarian diners keep getting better and better," and "you can
now find veggie burgers and other mock meats and soy milk in pretty much every
supermarket nationwide, including Wal-Mart." Further emphasizing ease, it says, "It's
easy to live and let live, and this guide will show you how," and "Now it's easier than
ever to go vegetarian," shown in conjunction with a display of cookbooks. Goveg.com's
"Veg1 01" section declares that vegetarian-friendly menus are "sprouting up everywhere,"
making it "easier" than ever. PETA's teen veg guide discusses grocery, dining, and
cooking options and declares, "It's easy to be vegan." To emphasize variety of choice,
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PETA writes, "There is a world of other options" as the title for its page on cruelty-free
food substitutes.
Equally optimistic, COK's Vegetarian Starter Guide says, "Just 15 years ago,
finding cruelty-free versions of our favorite foods was like a game of scavenger hunt. But
today, virtually every major grocery story sells animal-free foods." One of the guide's
page titles is called "Simple and Delicious: Vegetarian Dining" and another is called
"The Easy Way to Transition to Vegetarian Eating." And COK's vegetarian eating
brochure contains a section called "It's as easy as 1-2-3." The other AROs agree. FS's
Guide to Veg Living says in several places, "Fortunately, transitioning to a plant-based
diet has never been easier," and VO's EIYLM booklet tells readers, "exploring a meatless
diet is simple."
To create a positive connotation with vegetarian foods, AROs often accompany
these food messages with cheerful, bright colors such as green, yellow, and blue and
include many photos of colorful, fresh produce, hearty cooked dishes, and vegan name
brand products found in grocery stores. All AROs highlight the satisfying taste of
vegetarian foods by using words such as "tasty" and "delicious," with VO's messages
being the most understated. The recipe section of COK's starter guide is labeled,
"Recipes for Vegetarian Delights" and assures readers, "Eating vegetarian foods doesn't
mean giving up the tastes you love." And PETA2's teen booklet labels its recipes,
"Tantalize Your Taste Buds."
FARM is also very optimistic in promoting vegetarian foods and tells readers
considering signing up for its Meatless Mondays campaign to, "Have fun. Remember,
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going veg isn't about restricting your diet - it's about discovering new possibilities and
experiencing fresh, exciting flavors." In fact, in the interview, Alex Hershaft from FARM
said the main message FARM promotes, because he has found consumers care the most
about it, is "availability, taste, cost, and ease of preparation ofthe meat and dairy
alternatives." So FARM sees itself as a marketer of vegetarian foods, trying to appeal to
consumers based on the main self-interested reasons consumers choose to eat any food.
(RQ3) Value 7: Belonging (Especially to the Right Crowd) or Desire/or Popularity
All AROs emphasize the growing popularity of vegetarianism, presumably so it
does not seem like a fringe lifestyle or odd dietary choice. People do not want to be
alone, so, by emphasizing popularity, AROs provide assurance that vegetarianism as a
lifestyle and an ideal is validated by others. In actuality, some leaders admit in interviews
that the percentage of vegetarians has not risen substantially over recent decades, but it is
popular with certain demographics, such as women and youth. However, even if
vegetarianism is not growing rapidly, the sale of vegetarian foods is.
va's Why Vegan? cites a poll estimating there are two and a half million vegan
adults in the United States. FS's Guide to Veg Living begins by assuring readers there are
a wide variety of people who eat vegetarian, saying, "From former cattle ranchers to
Hollywood celebrities, more and more people from every corner of America are
recognizing that vegetarianism is good ..." and "After years on the fringe, meat-, egg-,
and dairy-free fare has earned a well-deserved place in the American food culture. To
join with the millions of Americans who have already embraced vegetarianism, read on."
The third page is dedicated to proving vegetarians are in "good company," as the "best
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people" have gone vegetarian for ethical reasons. The page shows a variety of celebrities
as well as listing moral leaders from history explaining their ethical dietary choices.
PETA's Vegetarian Starter Kit is the only starter guide that features people on the
front, in this case, celebrities. Inside, celebrity pictures and quotations are used to
demonstrate that vegetarians are morally progressive as well as healthy, attractive, and
popular. Several ofPETA's leaflets also use celebrity appeals and attempt to show
diversity in race, gender, and age. PETA's teen vegetarian booklet contains the headline,
"Everyone's doing it" on a page showing attractive, young celebrities. Goveg.com
contains a "Famous Vegetarians" link on the home page that takes viewers to a page with
Alicia Silverstone's picture and the headline, "Vegetarian Stars are Powered by Tofu."
This gives the viewer access to headshots and quotes of dozens of current vegetarian
celebrities. To further emphasize that beautiful people go vegetarian, PETA's goveg.com
also hosts annual "sexiest vegetarian" contests for celebs and non-celebs.
(RQ3) Value 8: Life
The ARO frames that problematize the killing and death ofNHAs, as discussed in
RQl, implicitly help to conversely express the value oflife. Sometimes, "life" is directly
mentioned, such as when FARM uses the word in its slogan for the Great American
Meatout, with the term "Choose Life." Also, FARM's "Gentle Thanksgiving" campaign
uses the word "life" several times, saying that killing innocent animals, "betrays the life-
affirming spirit" ofthe holiday and asking viewers to, "celebrate life." FS's turkey
messages also contain references to saving their lives. As previously discussed, FARM
and other AROs also talk about how vegetarians save so many number of animal lives.
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To promote saving life, COK uses the term "saving" prominently in its vegetarian starter
guide, titling its main sections, "saving ourselves," "saving animals," and "saving the
earth."
FS's vegetarian materials now all fall under the "Veg for Life" name and logo.
One can interpret the word "life" in this context to mean that a healthy vegetarian diet
saves the lives of farmed animals and/or one's own life. Life could also connote time,
suggesting people should eat vegetarian for the rest of their lives. FS's main vegetarian
guide titles the recipe section, "Recipes for Life," as does PETA's Vegetarian Starter Kit.
Also, FS sells a t-shirt that has a quote by Buddha which reads, "All being tremble before
violence. All fear death. All love life." In a more direct life-saving appeal to consumers,
FS has several stickers showing cows and chickens with a statement reading, "She wants
to live and her life depends on YOU!" The gendered and personal pronouns also indicate
the animals' status as subjects rather than objects; another sticker says "he" and another is
in first person coming from a cow's perspective, saying, "I want to live."
(RQ3) Value 9: Naturalness
Naturalness is a value often related to food, as in natural foods being healthier
than artificial foods. And while I share a few examples of that health connotation from
the ARO texts in this section, I largely highlight how AROs suggest that what is natural
for animals and what is more natural or traditional for agriculture is preferred to what is
artificial or industrialized, such as the genetic modification of animals and large-scale,
intensive confinement agriculture.
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As previously discussed in this chapter, AROs often show photos of farmed
animals in a contented state outdoors in the sun, contrasted with many images of them
behind bars, often in the dark of a warehouse, looking unkempt while crowded with all
others on factory farms. The images, both still and film, of factory farms and
slaughterhouses often display much mechanization, metal, and concrete. These images
sometimes show animals dying in garbage cans and dumpsters. The feel is cold, dark,
gray, dirty, and industrial. This unnatural environment is juxtaposed against the
cleanliness and brightness of portraits of contented animals who have been rescued and
are surrounded by the natural elements of sun, grass, sky, hay, wooden fences, and ponds.
To a lesser degree, some species, particularly fish but sometimes wild turkeys, are shown
in the wild.
To label factory farm images as unnatural or untraditional farming practices, YO
booklets use a headline that reads, "not your childhood image," and both PETA and COK
use messages aimed at youth that state, this is not "Old MacDonald's" farm. These tactics
imply that viewers expect or want farmed animals to live a life outdoors or in a clean
bam - a life that is closer to what would be considered "natural" for them, either natural
for their species in the wild or natural for old-fashioned animal husbandry.
AROs, with the exception of FARM, often directly refer to practices, conditions,
and the animals' bodies being unnatural in modem animal agriculture. For example, in a
brochure, FS says its number 10 reason to go vegetarian is because, "Farm animals are
usually prevented from engaging in instinctual behavior and live a fraction of their
natural lives." YO's booklets cite food author Michael Pollan saying of a battery-caged
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hen that, "every natural instinct of this animal is thwarted ... " These unnatural and
frustrating factory conditions are contrasted with the descriptions of how these species
would behave in nature, as explained by several FS, COK, and PETA messages.
Many messages describe the unnatural weight that the industry demands of
animals raised for meat and the artificial way the weight is obtained. In VO booklets,
writer Michael Pollan explains that piglets are weaned earlier than they would be "in
nature" because "they gain weight faster on their hormone and antibiotic-fortified feed"
than on mother's milk. And FS's video on the turkey industry explains how fanners alter
the shape of the birds to meet consumer demands for turkey breasts. The video explains
that this "anatomical manipulation" has made the males so large that it is impossible for
turkeys to "mount and reproduce naturally," so they must be "artificially inseminated."
With a similar focus on weight, COK's Vegetarian Starter Guide explains how chickens
and turkeys "grow so abnormally fast due to selective breeding and growth-promoting
antibiotics" that they suffer lameness and organ failure. PETA's vegetarian guide
describes this too and shows a photo of a crippled chicken on her back.
Many of these ARO quotes indicate the unnatural diet and medications that
agribusiness uses to fatten animals. For example, PETA's starter kit uses the phrase
"dosed with a steady stream of drugs" in several places when describing chickens raised
for meat. And COK's starter guide tells readers that "beef' cattle are "fattened on an
unnatural diet of grains and 'fillers' (including sawdust and chicken manure)." It also
says that factory farmers, "artificially inseminate dairy cows every year and keep them
pumped full of steroids and other hormones" to yield higher milk yields. FS's veg guide
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names the dairy honnone as Bovine Growth Honnone and explains that because of it,
cows today "produce ten times more milk than they would in nature." FS also mentions
here that dairy cows are killed at the young age of four or five when they could live to be
20 years or more. This premature death is something that PETA has also mentioned for
many fanned animal species, which could be considered an emphasis on how animals do
not get to live out their "natural" lifespan when fanned.
The food itself can be construed as unnatural for humans to consume, particularly
in the case of dairy. For example, COK's Vegetarian Starter Guide contains a section
titled, "Is milk natural?" and shows an illustration of human children sucking on a cow's
udder to visually answer that question with a "no." It explains how each species' milk is
"intended" for its own species and that humans are the only species who drinks the milk
of other species. Similarly, PETA's starter kit also says, "no species naturally drinks milk
beyond the age of weaning." PETA's Meet Your Meat video also emphasizes how the
cow naturally gives milk for her baby not for humans. Most AROs do not argue that meat
is unnatural for humans to eat, with the exception ofPETA once addressing it in the
health section of goveg.com, under the title, "Is eating meat natural?" It argues that,
among other physiological reasons, humans are not as naturally equipped as carnivorous
animals to kill and eat raw animal flesh with their bare hands.
Additionally, all the environmental messages about how animal agribusiness
heavily pollutes the land, air, and water seem to be based on the belief that nature is clean
but can be contaminated and become toxic or ruined by humans. Environmental
messages by AROs suggest that animal agribusiness is not in sync with nature. FS's
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factory farming brochure cover cites the Worldwatch Institute saying, "overgrown and
resource intensive, anilJlal, agriculture is out of alignment with the Earth's ecosystems."
To further indicate the artificial, the brochure shows photos of medication as well as
fumes coming from an agricultural chemical plant. Related to this, FS's, COK's, and
PETA's vegetarian guides all mention contamination in the resulting animal products
humans eat, saying how animal products are a health risk because they contain unnatural
ingredients like pesticides, drugs, and other chemicals.
(RQ3) Value 10: Honesty
All the examples provide in the RQ1 section explaining problem frames that
blame agribusiness for misleading consumers indicate that consumers appreciate being
told the truth. COK is the ARO who emphasizes the honesty aspect the most with its
campaign for truth in product labeling and its television spots, such as the one about
consumers being served a rare "side of truth" at a fast food restaurant.
In an interesting twist on honesty, PETA's Chew on This DVD accuses adult
consumers of being dishonest to children about food when the narrator says, "you
shouldn't have to lie to your kids" about where their food comes from. This assumes that
adults believe that the reality of farm animal suffering and death would upset kids and
possibly keep them from eating meat.
One could even interpret the AROs' frequent use of referenced citations and
photos as a way to emphasize that the AROs themselves are telling readers the truth about
the conditions of factory farming and the environmental and health risks associated with
animal products. Since it is clear that these advocacy materials are partisan, AROs often
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cite outside experts, especially with doctorates, to prove the truth of statements in favor
of vegetarianism or agricultural practices. VO is the most meticulous in its use of other
experts and inclusion of detailed citations within the document. But all the vegetarian
starter guides cite outside scientific sources, particularly in the sections on environment
and human health, but also to prove claims of the sentience or capabilities of other
animals.
(RQ3) Value 11: Concern/or Fellow Human Beings
Anthropocentric altruism is particularly emphasized by FARM, PETA, and FS
who all have campaigns that either fight human hunger, worker exploitation, or the
polluting and health contamination of rural neighborhoods (as was discussed in more
detail in the problem frames ofRQl). These frames assume people care about the health
and well-being of other humans, especially innocent humans who are underprivileged and
are suffering starvation, mistreatment from their agribusiness employer, or health
problems due to having to live near or work in factory farms and slaughterhouses. For
example, PETA's online messages declare that "profits are put before people" by
government and factory farmers, so readers who are "compassionate" toward people are
encouraged to go vegan to, "stop these exploitative industries and promote a world of
compassion." But, in general, ARO collateral materials and popular pieces like vegetarian
starter guides, while not misanthropic, tend not to emphasize compassion for humans.
One exception is FARM's t-shirt that says, "Stop human and animal suffering. Go
vegan!" And FARM is also the only ARO who has a campaign dedicated to human
equity issues with its "Well-Fed World" hunger campaign.
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(RQ3) Value 12: American Populism and the Accountability and Responsibility ofBig
Business and Government
This broad category overlaps with the last three values of naturalness, honesty,
and concern for human well-being, as ARO messages capitalize on an assumed public
mistrust for the exploitative and irresponsible tendencies of big business and, in some
cases, government. This idea of American populism suggests that AROs assume people
want big business and the political elite to be held accountable in cases where they take
advantage ofthe little guy and the innocent. For example, all AROs critique modem
agricultural practices specifically on the basis that it is contemptible as "factory farming,"
"corporate agribusiness," or an "exploitative industry," in contrast with the bucolic values
that consumers may have for wholesome traditional or family farming, considered a
responsible business of everyday hard-working people. Hence, the blame portion of ARO
problem frames, as discussed in RQl, tend to center on agribusiness more than
agriculture. AROs generally do not insinuate that small or "family farms" are nearly as
problematic, and in fact, never mention these types of farms in the problem frames.
Factory farming, in particular, is largely to blame for why cruelty is standard, food is not
wholesome, the earth is polluted, workers are exploited, and consumers are misled.
PETA and FS appeal to these populist values the most, as they both have online
sections discussing the exploitation of workers and the contamination of rural
communities by animal agribusiness. The implication is that industry is greedy and
callous, while the public values the elite showing justice, respect, responsibility, and
decency toward the common man. Yet the jobs agribusiness provides are described as
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dangerous, dirty, and low-paying. PETA cites workers who explain how their bosses
cheat them out of wages and worker's compensation for injuries and how they have little
job security so they cannot complain. To highlight objectification, PETA quotes a farm
worker saying he felt he was "disposable" and treated like a "machine," and a contract
chicken farmer said she was "treated like a dog" by the industry. To further emphasize
worker mistreatment, PETA shows pictures of working class people protesting and
striking and describes industry as anti-union. In this section, PETA also occasionally uses
trigger words for exploitation like "serfs," "slaves," and "child labor."
This is contrasted with wholesome "community" values of rural America, or the
"heartland," where people simply expect basic, fair treatment from employers and a safe,
healthy environment for their families and community. FS's section on the economic
issues of factory farming laments the loss of family farms saying, "small farms help to
create close-knit communities and thriving local economies." PETA has an online section
describing the health problems faced in rural neighborhoods, which is titled, "Factory
Farms: Destroying the Heartland."
PETA's sections on the polluting of rural communities and the negligence of
government might also appeal to politically conservative values, especially those that
mistrust the federal government. Because most AROs propose a consumer solution
instead of a government solution, this could be construed as valuing the notion of
personal responsibility, consumer choice, and free market capitalism. For example,
PETA's page on government negligence shows a photo ofthe Capitol Building in
Washington, DC, specifically emphasizing thefederal government and its agencies, such
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as the USDA and EPA, and not implicating local governments. And while corporations
are blamed for ruining communities and making people sick, the solution is not for
government to regulate industry as much as it is for individual consumers to boycott these
irresponsible animal agribusinesses. Regulation is portrayed as a joke because money has
corrupted the process, so individuals must take it upon themselves to right the wrong
through responsible consumer choices.
(RQ3) Value 13: Freedom
While AROs frequently highlight consumer freedom of choice (as in value
number 5, choice, previously discussed), the value of freedom I refer to here is directed at
the way humans feel about themselves and every animal having freedom over their own
life and body. PETA's Chew on This DVD says people should go vegetarian "because
everyone wants to be free," meaning NHAs also want to be free. Yet, besides this
example, the word "freedom" is not directly used much by AROs, but the value is
implied. AROs' consistent emphasis on extreme confinement and immobility of animals
in factory farms implies that AROs believe Americans will find high levels of restriction
to be unsettling or unfair.
COK's pork leaflet emphasizes confinement with photos of pigs stuck in gestation
crates and an analogy of how readers might feel similarly frustrated and uncomfortable
being "stuck" in a car in traffic for years. It says pigs are, "unable to move freely" and
"can't even walk or turn around." They are in a pregnancy "cycle" going only between
gestation and farrowing crates. The word "cycle" is used by many AROs when describing
breeding sows and dairy cows, as they are stuck in a cycle of re-impregnation so that they
---------
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continually produce maximum profits for agribusiness. This use of the word "cycle"
connotes a treadmill where one is trapped in motion going nowhere.
Freedom is associated with wide open spaces, as in the American West, which
may be why FS emphasizes space on its new home page in 2008, which is much less
cluttered than its previous home page. FS has added much white space, a large picture of
rescued animals outdoors enjoying the sun, and a strip of grass across the bottom. It no
longer includes photos of factory farmed animals on its home page. Blue sky, sun, and
grass are often represented in all ARO pictures of "happy" animals (who are presumably
rescued from farming) to emphasize their relative freedom in contrast to the darkness,
filth, and discomfort of captivity on factory farms.
Besides wild-caught fish, it would be complicated for AROs to claim that animals
commonly used for food should be "free," as animals raised in captivity are domesticated
and cannot survive in the wild. But FS sometimes uses the word "free" when describing
how rescued animals in its sanctuary are free from pain and free to roam outdoors and
enjoy life. Yet, farmed animals on the few small farms that are truly "free-range" might
have similar space to those at Farm Sanctuary, but photos of these few "free-range"
animals on farms are not used in ARO literature, as they would likely fail to promote the
same level of contempt for captivity and agriculture as do the pictures showing animals in
intense confinement on factory farms. However, viewers of ARO materials may not
know for certain that the contented animals shown in pictures are not just from "better"
farms, which may lead readers to immediately think of freedom in terms of any farm that
does not use cages and allows animals outdoor access.
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(RQ3) Value 14: American Pride
In a few cases, American pride is directly referenced through the use of patriotic
symbols, such as a PETA bumper sticker that displays the American flag and states,
"Proud to be a Vegetarian American." And FARM's Great American Meatout campaign
specifically mentions America and uses red, white, and blue colors. One of its posters has
Uncle Sam, portrayed by a cow, pointing at the audience, reminiscent ofthe famous war
recruitment poster, saying "I want you to stop eating animals." The text emphasizes
loyalty by stating viewers should join the meatout, "for your honor, for your family, for
your country, and for your planet."
Sometimes the AROs give an indirect nod to American pride by suggesting the
humane policies ofthe United States government lag behind those of other, usually
European, countries. For example, COK's Vegetarian Starter Guide explains, "While
many other countries are banning the battery cage system because of its inherent cruelty,
egg producers in the United States still cram hens into small, wired cages." This strategy
of comparing humane laws internationally is used most frequently by FS because it has
some of the only campaigns calling for federal legal reform of industry. For example,
FS's Eggribusiness video explains that European nations have already outlawed battery
cages, so the U.S. lags behind. The narrator says, "It's time for birds to be protected from
abuse in America too." And in FS's Life Behind Bars video, spokesperson Mary Tyler
Moore informs viewers that legal protection for farmed animals in the United States is
"grossly inadequate." She states gestation crates, battery cages, and veal crates should be
banned in the U.S. as they have been in Europe. The call-to-action is that, as a "civilized
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nation," America has an "ethical obligation" to prevent their suffering. The video also
cites U.S. Senator Byrd critiquing factory farming as "barbaric" and saying a "civilized
nation" must be more "humane" toward life.
Related to America's notion of itself as a civilized society is FARM's use of
caveman analogies in two cases, implying that ifpeople are still eating or wearing
animals in the 21 st century, they are uncivilized and undeveloped. While this could
suggest that people simply have more options in modem times, it also capitalizes on
Americans' views of themselves as citizens of one of the most highly-developed,
advanced, and civilized nations. Perhaps ironically, it could suggest that Americans no
longer behave like the animals that were their primitive ancestors. Similarly, FS appeals
to America's pride with a t-shirt bearing Gandhi's quote, "The greatness of a nation and
its moral progress can be judged by the way its animals are treated."
Research Question Four (RQ4): How and to What Extent Do Frames Appeal either
to Self-Interest or to Altruism and Social Responsibility (toward Humans
and/or Nonhumans)?
With this question I primarily seek to ascertain how ARO messages mayor may
not emphasize a concern for NHAs, instead of only humans, as the AROs' primary
purpose is the protection ofNHAs. I refer to these values as "NHA-centric" to
differentiate them from values that are geared primarily toward humans, which I refer to
as "anthropocentric." Similarly, I also wish to identify the prominence that ARO
messages place on values of altruism or social responsibility toward others, human and
nonhuman, as social movements are primarily moral movements that promote a
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heightened awareness of the value ofjustice toward others. The opposite side of the coin
to altruistic values is a focus on one's own self-interest, realizing that self-interest and
altruism are not always mutually exclusive categories, as will be explained at the end of
the section. When discussing human self-interest in relation to vegetarianism, the focus is
usually on improving human health (such as nutrition, disease-prevention, and weight-
loss), avoiding environmental risks to health, and enjoying vegetarian food.
All AROs do put an emphasis on promoting an altruistic concern for farmed
animals (whether it be their welfare or their rights), primarily through dedicating much
space to the topic and using farmed animal photos throughout messages. Relative to each
ARO in this study, VO and COK put the largest proportion of emphasis on NHA issues,
while FARM may be said to put the least. VO and COK are the smallest groups in the
study, so they admit their limited resources are directed toward educating the public
about farm animal cruelty rather than nutrition or environmental issues. Alex Hershaft of
FARM admitted that his organization spends most of its time promoting vegetarian foods
(based on human self-interest values). Yet, FARM's materials emphasize farmed animals
more than Alex indicated. FS and PETA, being the groups with the largest resources in
this study, have the largest quantity of communications and array of materials. Therefore,
they have the space to branch out into more anthropocentric issues, yet they both,
especially FS, still spend the majority oftheir space and efforts promoting NHA-centric
values rather than anthropocentric values. For example, all their videos and the vast
majority of brochures focused on farmed animal cruelty and not human health, food, or
the environment.
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(RQ4) Each ARO's Emphasis on NHA Altruism versus Human Self-Interest
While all AROs promote vegetarianism as a solution to proposed problems with
meat and agribusiness, an important question of this dissertation asks on what values
basis is this vegetarianism promoted? I primarily used all the vegetarian starter guides (of
which I include YO's three main booklets) and "Why Yegetarian?" sections of ARO
Web sites as pertinent sites for assessing the emphasis AROs place on self-interested
versus altruistic values. In this section, I discuss each ARO in relative order of its
emphasis on NHA altruism over human self-interest.
Vegan Outreach's (VO) emphasis on NHA altruism versus human self-interest.
YO's three booklets, especially Why Vegan? and Even ijYou Like Meat (ENLM) over
Try Vegetarian, are dedicated to farmed animal cruelty and compassionate messages.
Each booklet cover features photos of farmed animals only and uses the word "suffering"
or "cruelty," which conveys that respect for NHA welfare is the main reason to give up
eating meat. And YO's Web site also has chickens across its header who remain for most
pages. Approximately 13 of 16 pages in Why Vegan? and ENLM are focused on NHA
altruism, with the self-interested health and food-oriented pages toward the back. The Try
Vegetarian booklet takes a more self-interested approach, relatively speaking, by starting
out talking about health, with only halfthe pages dedicated to NHA altruism. However,
photos of farmed animals feature prominently on almost all its pages. YO does have a
health section on its Web site and a separate Guide to Cruelty-Free Eating that is
dedicated more to health and practical food preparation issues than its three main
booklets.
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Compassion Over Killing's (COK) emphasis on NHA altruism versus human sel.f
interest. With compassion built into its name, perhaps it is fitting that all of COK's
campaigns, video footage, print pieces, and television spots are dedicated to the altruistic
purpose of exposing the public to the harsh realities of factory farm cruelty. Its Web site
features photos of farmed animals on the header of all pages. COK's veg eating brochure
has a piglet on the cover and starts with NHA-centric reasons to go vegetarian and then
proceeds to health and environmental reasons.
COK's Vegetarian Starter Guide dedicates just over a quarter of its pages to
farmed animals, with the six-page animal section coming after the three-page health
section, followed by a two-page environmental section. The guide has photos of farmed
animals on its cover along with fruits and vegetables. Over a third ofthe booklet's pages
simply help people make the transition to vegetarianism with recipes and shopping tips
(which is technically self-interested, but I perceive it to be more value-neutral than the
health section, as preparation and access to food is more of a practical concern rather than
a rationale).
Erica Meier said COK privileges the issue of farmed animal suffering but also felt
it was necessary for COK to provide people with the "tools" they need to go vegetarian
and maintain that lifestyle, hence all the pages dedicated toward food procurement and
recipes. Also in this latter effort, COK has launched a series of city-specific vegetarian
Web sites, providing tips on eating vegetarian in major cities such as Washington, DC
and Portland, OR.
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Farm Sanctuary's (FS) emphasis on NHA altruism versus human self-interest. FS
is heavily focused on farmed animals, as it is the only ARO that actively rescues and
provides homes for them. FS's Web page showcases a huge photo of sanctuary residents
across the top and also portrays at least one photo of a farmed animal on each page. All
ofFS's campaigns, advertisements, videos, and the vast majority of its print pieces and
collateral materials are dedicated to farmed animals.
FS has a leaflet called 20 Reasons to Go Veg for Life which is evenly divided
between animal, environment, and health reasons; but the animal reasons do get some
premier placement as the first and last reasons listed, and the majority of photos include
NHAs. Of all the reasons listed, approximately half could be considered altruistic,
including all the NHA-oriented reasons and many environmental reasons. FS also has a
lengthy Guide to Veg Living, one quarter of which is dedicated to NHA altruism, with
cows featured prominently on the cover as the only photo. Pictures of named farmed
animals (such as Rudy and Charlotte), sometimes shown with human companions, appear
throughout the guide. The guide opens with a page of well-known people talking about
their moral reasons for going vegetarian. This is followed by four pages on health before
a three-page section on farmed animals, followed by a two-page environmental section,
which includes a "ransacked oceans" paragraph on sea animals. Similar to COK's and
PETA's vegetarian guides, one third is dedicated to practical information such as recipes,
food, and tips on making the transition.
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People for the Ethical Treatment ofAnimal's (PETA) emphasis on NHA altruism
versus human selfinterest. PETA uses the words "ethics" and "animals" in its name, so it
is appropriate that it should focus heavily on NHA altruism. While that is largely the
case, PETA probably appeals to human self-interest slightly more often than most AROs
in this study do, with the possible exception ofFARM. Anthropocentrism is evidenced, in
part, by PETA's greater use of celebrities and photos ofhumans, along with its greater
emphasis on the value of attractiveness (including sex appeal and weight-loss). These
generally fall into the self-interested values category of "belonging" (discussed in RQ3).
PETA's Vegetarian Starter Kit resembles that ofCOK and FS, with a similar
proportion ofpages dedicated toward NHA altruism in the center (approximately one
quarter), another quarter dedicated to human health, and virtually the rest (almost half)
covering food issues like recipes and tips on transitioning. The difference is that
environmentalism is reduced to half a page, and more emphasis is put on human health
(like athleticism and weight-loss). Also, the cover page of the starter kit features photos
of celebrities and food but never features an image of a NHA. A farmed animal does not
appear in the kit until page five, while the first few pages feature nineteen photos of
celebrities. However, the majority of quotes by those celebrities deal with altruistic
values toward NHAs.
In PETA's "Top 10 reasons to go vegetarian in 2008," listed on goveg.com, over
halfthe reasons are self-interested (with "slim down" being the first) and only one third
of the reasons mention NHAs. But, PETA's popular Chew on This DVD lists thirty
reasons to go vegetarian, and nearly two-thirds focus on farmed animal altruism,
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especially in the last half ofthe video. In the middle of the video, only two reasons focus
on the environment and two on anthropocentric altruism. A quarter ofthe reasons are
self-interested (health), and they hold a prominent place, dominating the first third of the
video. However, the visuals overwhelmingly emphasize farmed animals, as opposed to
humans, throughout. The last NHA-centric reason viewers are left to ponder is heavily
moralistic - "because you know this is wrong."
Overall, PETA's numerous food collateral materials and print pieces are almost
solely dedicated to farmed animal altruism, even though PETA still follows its trend of
featuring celebrities heavily in print. And its extensive goveg.com site lists "cruelty to
animals" and "amazing animals" as the first and second link under the "Why
Vegetarian?" section. Only the health link is wholly self-interested, while links on the
environment, world hunger, worker rights, communities, and government negligence are
largely altruistic (even if more anthropocentric).
Farm Animal Rights Movement's (FARM) emphasis on NHA altruism versus
human self-interest. FARM is campaign-oriented rather than just having an overall "go
veg" theme. Ofthe campaigns I analyzed, three are heavily altruistic (Bite Global
Warming, Gentle Thanksgiving, and World Farm Animal Day) with a fourth (Well-Fed
World) emphasizing anthropocentric altruism. Two are primarily self-interested (The
Great American Meatout and Meatout Mondays). But in talking to Alex of FARM, he
seems to emphasize those Meatout campaigns as being most important, as he thinks
people are most influenced by self-interest. Yet, in FARM's Meatout messages, even
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though they privilege self-interest (health and general food preferences), they do always
mention farmed animals and environmental issues, to a lesser degree, at the end.
The "Why Vegetarian" section of FARM's Web site lists issues in order of their
perceived interest to the public. The list goes from most anthropocentric and self
interested (health), to anthropocentric altruism (world hunger), to altruism mixed with
self-interest (environment), to NHA altruism (farmed animals). The introduction includes
a statement that reflects FARM's mixed emphasis on self-interest and altruism,
"Although most people are motivated by health concerns, it is important to realize that
dietary choices have much broader implications for planetary surviva1." In the
introduction, it blames animal agriculture for its role in causing the "biggest problems
facing America and the rest of our planet," namely "disease, hunger, environmental
devastation, and death."
(RQ4) Environmental Messages, both Altruistic and Self-Interested
Each ARO includes messages dedicated to environmental values, with VO using
this appeal the least. Environmental values are considered both self-interested and
altruistic because ofhuman's ecological interdependence with the natural world for
surviva1. The question is: which is emphasized more in environmental messages of
AROs, human self-interest or altruism? For example, when messages focus on the well-
being of nonhuman species, such as wild animals and rainforest or ocean ecosystems, this
is more altruistic. But when messages focus on domestic pollution and its human health
risks, these are more self-interested. While it is an inexact science to separate these mixed
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messages into two distinct categories, my overall assessment is that ARO environmental
messages are both self-interested and altruistic but might lean more toward altruism.
PETA's environmental messages imply altruism when they suggest people should
not eat animal products because it causes so much waste, inefficiency, and pollution. For
example, the Chop Chop leaflet focuses as much on inefficiency/waste as it does on
pollution and includes a section on the destruction of ocean life and deforestation. Also,
the "what you can do" section online has this altruistic message, among others:
"Switching to a vegetarian diet reduces your 'ecological footprint,' allowing you to tread
lightly on the planet and be compassionate to its inhabitants." However, PETA's teen
booklet appeals more to self-interest by placing a visual emphasis on risk, featuring toxic
icons, a polluted stream, and a barren landscape. It also shows a gas pump, which
signifies expense and security in today's political climate.
Almost all of FARM's print materials briefly mention environmental protection.
Plus, FARM has a dedicated environmental campaign built around global warming that
also addresses all aspects of environmental devastation. The campaign includes a poster,
t-shirt, postcard, and online section. All feature the earth logo, which humbles humans
and emphasizes their mutual status with all other living beings on the same planet. While
these materials contain self-interested messages, particularly around pollution issues and
the effects of global warming, they do mention the protection of ecosystems and wildlife.
For example, the poster says meat production "kills more wildlife than all other activities
combined." The online, "What You Can Do," section includes the altruistic statement
that viewers should go veg for "the Earth and ALL its inhabitants."
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FS's environmental messages are altruistic but include self-interested values
slightly more often than other AROs, mainly because it includes some of the local worker
and community health risks within the environmental section (which is anthropocentric
altruism). Toward anthropocentric values, FS's environmental brochure emphasizes
pollution, mentioning "tainting drinking water" and the "health threats" and "respiratory
problems" of air pollution, particularly for those people living near factory farms. It
further emphasizes human health risks by showing pictures ofmedicine and a chemical
plant in conjunction with a paragraph on "toxic drug residues" in meat. However, it
includes a comment on how these chemicals also put wildlife populations at risk, and it
discusses "dead zones" next to a photo of a wild fish kill. The paragraph on "leaking
lagoons" explains how cesspool leaks often sicken both humans and "native animals and
plants."
FS's environmental section of its vegetarian guide emphasizes the urgency of the
need for dietary change based on the largely self-interested reason that otherwise "the
valuable resources on which our lives depend will continue to be eroded, depleted and
polluted beyond repair," but most ofthe messages following this highlight risks to both
human and nonhuman populations. And toward NHA altruism, the "ruin on the range"
paragraph includes threats to endangered species and the killing of "wild animals" by the
government to protect ranching interests. The paragraph on "ransacked oceans" also
emphasizes aquatic species extinction, killing of "bycatch" animals (privileging the
deaths of mammals and birds), and aquaculture damage to aquatic ecosystems.
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COK's vegetarian guide's environmental section is evenly split between self-
interest (pollution and toxins) and altruism (efficiency and ocean biodiversity). Toward
self-interest, it says the air and water we use are polluted and ends by saying humans
should protect the planet "for ourselves and our loved ones." In favor of altruism, the
section is titled "Saving the Earth" and shows a c1earcut forest, a bee on a flower, and a
photo of a man trying to free a giant tuna caught in a driftnet. Additionally, in the
paragraph on fishing, it explains, "local ecosystems are destroyed, devastating animals
and plants."
(RQ4) Anthropocentric Altruism
I discussed appeals to anthropocentric altruism in RQ3, in the sections covering
the values of "concern for fellow human beings" and "American populism." To
summarize, of all AROs, PETA puts the most emphasis on altruism toward other humans
in its extensive goveg.com site that discusses rural communities, workers, and human
hunger. But these issues are not highlighted elsewhere, such as in PETA's print pieces.
FS has a small section on rural communities in the factory farming section of its Web
page and occasionally mentions hunger and worker issues in other materials. FARM is
the only ARO to dedicate a whole campaign to human hunger, but it does not have a
domestic focus on rural communities or worker issues. When considering all ARO
messages as a whole, anthropocentric altruism is dwarfed in comparison to the emphasis
on NHA altruism and even, to a lesser degree, anthropocentric self-interest.
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(RQ4) Mental Health and Morality: How Self-Interest Overlaps with Altruism
The idea of altruism is not always devoid of self-interest, as was mentioned by
several ARO leaders in the interviews. For example, Matt Ball ofVO called the choice
between self-interested and altruistic appeals a "false choice" because, by appealing to
people's ethics, you are appealing to people's own self-interest. He said being vegetarian
adds to people. It's not about "I've given up meat. I've given up cheese. I've
given up eggs, and I suffer through the day because I don't have these things." It's
really something that can be a very positive thing for an individual. It can really
add to the meaning of their life - to their ethical satisfaction - to their fulfillment
as a person.
In basic terms, doing good makes one feel good about oneself, and AROs often
mention this mental benefit to the public in conjunction with moral messages about how
their vegetarianism prevents animal cruelty or environmental devastation. I discussed the
ARO emphasis on the mental benefits of ethical vegetarian choices in the RQ3 section
under the values of "making a difference" and experiencing "moral integrity." In contrast
an emphasis on going vegetarian for health reasons, as opposed to moral reasons, does
not present as much opportunity to involve altruism and is essentially based on self-
interested values.
Research Question Five (RQ5): How Do Organization Leaders Explain Their Framing
Choices, Particularly in Terms ofEthics and Ideology?
This section's information came from interviews with each of the five ARO
leaders: Erica Meier ofCOK, Alex Hershaft of FARM, Gene Baur ofFS, Bruce Friedrich
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of PETA, and Matt Ball ofVO. They are all referred to by first name followed by the
ARO abbreviation in parenthesis. Their responses are often categorized into two
communication ethics approaches of deontological and utilitarian. Deontological is
defined as means-oriented, and these communication choices are based more on animal
rights ideology/philosophy, with messages assessed according to truthfulness,
representativeness, importance, and/or sincerity with animal rights ideology. Utilitarian is
defined as ends-oriented, and these communication choices are based more on what will
presumably work most effectively to create the desired end result of helping NHAs the
most. These two decision-making styles do not always contradict each other, as
sometimes the most effective (utilitarian) message is also the most ideologically authentic
(deontological). In this analysis, it is challenging to separate animal ethics from
communication ethics, as they are not mutually exclusive categories and both include
deontological and utilitarian aspects. The intention for RQ5 is to privilege communication
ethical choices regarding how to present animal issues to the public.
Findings reveal that, overall, most AROs use a blend of deontological and
utilitarian communication approaches, especially in their choice to privilege NHA
concerns over human concerns, but they often lean more toward utilitarianism,
particularly in their choice to privilege animal welfare over animal rights, as the former is
more widely appealing. This section first discusses leader motivations for choosing
NHA-centric appeals versus anthropocentric appeals. Then, their decision-making
rationales within the NHA-centric appeals are discussed, such as which NHA species
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they privilege, how visuals are chosen, and whether or not they choose to emphasize
animal welfare or animal rights.
It is interesting to note that many of the ARO leaders interviewed made voluntary
references to Peter Singer, Tom Regan, utilitarianism, deontology, and pragmatism
without my prompting or including those specific terms in my questions. This speaks to
the appreciation and/or understanding that these ARO leaders have for animal ethics and
ideology, even though they may choose to campaign for animals based on different
means.
(RQ5) Motivations for AROs in Choosing Whether to Appeal to Concerns for NHA
Altruism or Human Se{flnterest
YO and FARM are admittedly the most utilitarian in communication choices,
even though they use different messages in pursuit of the same end result of encouraging
people to go vegan or reduce their consumption of animal products. Matt (YO) believes
that many people, especially youth on college campuses, care about animal suffering, so
YO emphasizes an animal cruelty message with this target group because he believes this
message is "strong" and powerful enough to inspire some readers to actually change their
diets. Matt thinks a self-interested health or environmental message may initially create
more "agreement" about the need to change or greater willingness to "consider" the
message, but it is ultimately not "strong" or compelling enough to spark such a
significant change for most people. He explained a distinction in YO's communication
goals, "We don't want people to listen. We want people to change."
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To disprove the myth that self-interested appeals are more effective, Matt (YO)
cited other health statistics, such as the obesity epidemic or smoking, to prove that people
will continue to consume or do unhealthy things even when they know it may harm them.
He also feels the public will not believe an animal protection group's claims that all
animal flesh is unhealthy over the medical community's claims that chicken and fish are
generally okay to eat. In addition, Matt stated, "a plurality of people who are vegan cite
ethical reasons, animal issues, for being vegan," and they tend to be more committed to
the diet, while many people who claim to be "vegetarian," but still eat some chicken and
fish, cite health as their main motivation. Therefore, YO chooses to primarily appeal to
altruism toward NHAs instead of human health. This is done for utilitarian reasons but is
also deontological for an ARO, making it both pragmatic and authentic.
Of all ARO leaders, Alex (FARM) had the most utilitarian viewpoint, as well as
being the most pessimistic in terms of his beliefs about what motivates people and how
they feel about other animals. He believes that most Americans think of other animals as
"resources," with the exception of cats and dogs in many cases. Therefore, Alex thinks
concern for animals is less influential at getting most Americans to change their diets
than higher priority reasons such as the "availability, taste, cost, and ease of preparation
ofmeat and dairy alternatives," concern for their own health, and concern for the
environment (listed in order of how he perceives their influence). Notice that his list of
perceived motivating factors goes from most self-interested at the top to most altruistic at
the bottom. He says FARM emphasizes self-interested reasons such as the "attractiveness
of vegan foods" over more altruistic reasons because appeals to self-interest are more
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likely to work when asking consumers to make a change as "fundamental as what they
consume three times a day." Alex clarified, however, that ifhe is simply asking for a
donation, an altruistic appeal on behalf of other animals may work better, but in
requesting that consumers make a larger "sacrifice," such as "changing life-long habits,"
he does not think altruism is a strong enough appeal.
No other ARO leader said hislher group used primarily self-interested appeals, as
the rest prioritized animal cruelty messages, which is more of a deontological
communication approach than FARM's, considering the main function and concern of all
these AROs is NHA protection. Gene (FS) did admit he thought the health argument was
probably the most convincing at getting people to go vegetarian. Yet, despite this belief,
FS still uses concern for farmed animals, not health, as its main message because he says
FS is trying to appeal to people's "hearts." Therefore, FS's communication decisions are
more deontological than utilitarian in this aspect. Even though the end result in both the
content of FS and YO is similar in their emphasis on NHAs, FS' s choice is more
influenced by deontological or ideological concerns than is YO's.
(RQ5) Motivations/or ARO Choices in Emphasizing Animal Welfare or Animal Rights
and Other Decisions within NHA-Centric Messages
Choosing to emphasize animal welfare or animal rights. Despite FS's
deontological motivations, as mentioned in the last section, Gene (FS) claimed that FS
"marries" ideology and utility in its overall message strategy (essentially blending
deontological and utilitarian approaches). For example, within the spectrum of animal
altruism appeals, FS, like most AROs, is more utilitarian in its communication decision to
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reach people "where they are;" Gene (FS) believes most people already care about animal
welfare, so he does not seek to move them to animal rights but rather asks them to simply
"evolve" to expand their welfare concerns out from companion animals to farmed
animals. This aspect of the communication decision is utilitarian in that it is easier and
probably more immediately effective not to challenge people's basic beliefs about
animals to a great extent, so one get better results in acceptance of one's message.
In their altruistic appeals, I would describe every ARO as utilitarian in this same
respect of choosing not to challenge people's basic speciesist worldviews and simply to
appeal to people's existing, mainstream animal welfare concerns about animal suffering
and cruelty, as it is perceived as an easier or more obvious route to gaining acceptance for
one's message than is an appeal to animal rights. Gene (FS) said, "I don't think there's a
conflict, really, between the values that we're promoting and the values that most people
hold," which he described as "humane" and "compassionate." He said, "We hope to tap
into that sentiment and encourage people to act in ways that are consistent with their
values, and most people want to see themselves as compassionate." Similarly, Bruce
explained PETA's choice to tap into the public's existing desire not to cause cruelty to
animals:
Everybody I've encountered in my speaking with people about animal issues is
opposed to cruelty, so it's really just a matter of helping them to understand that
their own food choices, if they are eating meat, are out of integrity or out of
compliance with their basic values.
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Most ARO leaders use the word "evolve" or "extend" to suggest that the main change in
attitude that needed to happen was for Americans to transfer their existing animal welfare
concerns about companion animals over to animals who are used for food.
While ARO leaders do think that most Americans believe farmed animals (except
for fish) feel pain and do have some basic emotions, leaders think that most people
simply have not considered farmed animals as sentient individuals in the same way they
consider dogs and cats sentient; this is largely because the American public is not
typically asked to think about it, as farmed animals and factory farming are purposely
kept out of sight and out of mind. Therefore, these AROs make it their job to get the
public to "open their eyes" (a popular phrase used in the interviews) and consider farmed
animals and the role consumers play in animal suffering. Gene (FS) said, "We want
people to question the status quo - to question if what we are doing to animals is
appropriate." He said FS is challenged to "encourage people to be somewhat
introspective," and "that's a hard thing to do because people have to do that on their own
and we want to provide the, sort of, the nudge that gets people looking internally and
looking honestly at their own behavior."
To accomplish this, most AROs, with the exception of FARM to some degree, use
a two-pronged message strategy designed to both (1) raise public awareness about farmed
animals as sentient beings in comparison to other familiar nonhumans like dogs and cats,
and (2) inform people that these animals used for food are suffering greatly, especially in
factory farms. Gene (FS) explained:
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In order to protect something or somebody, it is very helpful to know and
understand that something or somebody. A big part ofFS's message is that these
are living, feeling beings and they suffer just like your cats or your dogs might
suffer. So we try to make it relevant for people that way. That they are currently
being abused in mass and it's just, just, just ... wrong.
Choosing visuals ofNHAs. FS, COK, PETA, and VO follow this strategy of
persuading people of farmed animals' sentience and individuality and simultaneously
informing them how much these animals suffer in agriculture. Often leaders say this is
accomplished with a combination of two types of visuals (l) showing happy photos of
contented animals displaying their "personality" (per Gene) and just being "who they
are" (per Erica), and (2) showing sad or graphic photos of animals suffering in factory
farms. For the former "non-abuse" visuals, Erica (COK), Gene (FS), and Bruce (PETA)
all said that they chose photos that allowed viewers to look into the faces, and particularly
the eyes, ofthe farmed animal. Gene (FS) said, "animals' eyes, like humans' eyes, can
often times say a lot, and looking into the eyes can provide a real connection." In an
attempt to create a connection in viewers' minds between the similar sentience of farmed
animals and companion animals, Matt explained that VO likes to use photos that show
people interacting with or petting farm animals, so "people can see pictures of people in a
way that looks like a person with their cat or a person with their dog, but it's with an
animal that they are generally used to eating."
When choosing factory farm photos, Gene said he wants the photos to "touch
people viscerally" and "to, I don't want to say shock but, to expose the realities of factory
277
fanning." Bruce (PETA) said he wants those factory fann photos to create "empathy."
Erica said COK uses confinement photos more than slaughter photos because she thinks
the public can better "relate" to being confined than they can to being slaughtered. She
hopes these confinement images might facilitate people "putting themselves in that
situation or seeing their dog or cat" in a crate. Matt said YO makes utilitarian decisions
about using factory fann photos that are "powerful" enough to be affecting without being
so "gory" that people will avoid reading the booklet:
We don't want to pick the goriest pictures to give people more of an excuse to
write it off as propaganda, but we don't want to tone down our message so much
that even the people that say "I can't look at that" will look at it because it takes
away too much of the power of the message - the reality of what goes on in
factory fanns. Weare trying to be somewhere in the middle that will influence the
most number of people.
Matt said this idea of settling "in the middle" of the visual spectrum is done for the
utilitarian purpose of creating "the most change per dollar spent in an hour spent
leafleting."
While all AROs believe they are showing the public the "reality" and "truth" of
what goes on in factory fanns, Bruce (PETA), Alex (FARM), and Matt (YO) specifically
mentioned visual honesty in the interview. Bruce said PETA's images are "a
representative sample of the abuses that are standard." Alex said FARM used, "whatever
works. I mean as long as it doesn't distort the truth. We focus on whatever we feel would
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catch us more attention." So, FARM's utilitarian visual strategy is tempered by the
deontological concern of truthfulness. Matt emphasized truth more than drama for YO:
We're trying to use pictures that honestly represent what goes on in factory farms
... We don't want to go for gore for gore's sake. We want to have pictures that are
defensible in terms that this is the reality of what goes on - this is standard
practice - and not have people think that it is sensationalized propaganda.
Choosing which NHA species to emphasize. Ethical choices are also reflected in
the decision of which species to highlight. For example, most AROs avoid talking about
fish as sentient beings, although they usually address sea animals to some extent, such as
making fishing and aquaculture an environmental issue. AROs choose the latter approach
for utilitarian reasons, as there is not mainstream public acceptance that fish even feel
pain, much less have personalities. PETA is the only group who is willing to tackle this
challenge in actively promoting fish sentience, including personalities, making PETA the
most deontological ARO on this issue. Yet, all AROs believe fish are sentient and are
killed for food in greater numbers than land animals, so from a deontological
communication standpoint fish should be prioritized. Erica (COK) laments that her small
group does not have the resources to emphasize fish as much as they would like and
admires PETA's efforts. And while I did not ask Gene (FS) specifically about fish, I
believe FS has the partial excuse that they do not rescue aquatic animals, so fish are not
their priority.
Matt admitted that YO makes an intentional compromise on the fish issue because
even though YO's goal is to reduce animal suffering as much as possible, Matt thinks
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people will dismiss YO's message entirely ifthey see an animal welfare appeal toward
fish, as that requires a larger attitude or values change than most people are willing to
make. So, YO now largely avoids fish messages for utilitarian communication reasons
because it may compromise its success at getting people to stop eating land animals. And
in keeping with its utilitarian communication and animal ethics goals, YO has begun to
prioritize the welfare of factory farmed birds and pigs, as Matt believes they suffer in the
greatest proportion and numbers of all land animals. Therefore, YO's materials feature
many photos ofbirds and pigs and ask people especially not to eat eggs or the meat of
birds and pigs.
Matt explained that the decision to emphasize birds is still a compromise in
possible effectiveness because the public tends to relate most with mammals, such as
cows and pigs, so it is harder to get public acceptance ofwelfare messages aimed at birds
(but he says birds still rank higher than fish). He explained that because birds make up
the vast majority ofland animals killed (in part because they are smaller than mammals),
YO does not want to emphasize mammals just to gain greater reader acceptance and risk
increasing the trend ofpeople giving up red meat and switching to poultry. Erica (COK)
has made this same observation and also prioritizes birds for this reason.
In some ways, the focus on birds can be considered deontological and the
marginalization offish can be seen as utilitarian. AROs sacrifice some wider public
acceptance of their message in favor of attempting to save the largest number of animals
from suffering (birds). This is a balancing act, and risk, that COK and YO are willing to
take on behalfofbirds (due to their vast suffering), but are less willing to take on behalf
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of fish (despite their equally vast or greater suffering) because of utilitarian concems that
the risk would not pay off with fish. However, COK does include a few fish messages,
so it is not as concerned as VO that mentioning fish will tum people off the whole idea of
ethical vegetarianism. In utilitarian fashion, Alex said FARM more frequently uses
pictures of pigs and cows than birds.
Choosing whether to compare human and nonhuman animals. All ofthe ARO
leaders believe there is a similarity between humans and other animals, as they agree we
are all animals, but when every ARO leader was asked whether promoting similarity
between humans and other animals was part of their strategy, only Bruce (PETA) and
Gene (FS) said it was. Bruce (PETA) said, "For the same reason you wouldn't eat a
human being, you shouldn't be eating a dog or a cat or a pig or a fish." Gene (FS) said,
"Inherent to our message and to our mission is the recognition that the other animals have
feelings and value and interest in their own right." Alex said FARM only "tangentially"
promotes similarity between humans and nonhumans in messages conveying that we all
have the right to have our basic needs met, and "the most fundamental need is the need to
live." Because promoting similarity between humans and nonhumans challenges the
accepted human/animal dualism and seeks greater changes in attitudes from the public, it
can be seen as a deontological approach. None ofthe AROs actively promote or privilege
a similarity between humans and other animals in the advocacy materials I study in this
dissertation.
Choosing whether to include welfare reform messages. Bruce (PETA) and Gene
(FS) explained why they include a "reform" message (reforming industry or laws), and
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Erica (COK) and Alex (FARM) explained why they did not. Erica (COK) expressed
concern that consumers want to "justify eating meat" by choosing free-range products or
generally assuming the animals on all farms are relatively "happy." To explain the
industry's role in facilitating this "misunderstanding" so that consumers think animals are
treated humanely, Erica said:
It's something that the industry is recognizing as extremely lucrative, so a lot of
the messages that the industry are starting to use like the happy cow campaign and
in the egg industry the animal care certified and Oscar Meyer has kids singing
songs about how great it is to be a hotdog. I think that the industry is recognizing
that more people in our society are seeing the truth about factory farming, so they
are trying to appeal to their emotional side as well by saying "oh it's okay. These
animals are all happy." And a lot of people are buying into that.
Alex (FARM) agreed, and he thinks reforms by AROs are counterproductive from
a utilitarian standpoint because they might work to ease this consumer guilt so people can
continue eating animals:
When they advocate bigger cages and an occasional ray of sunshine for these
animals as they continue being raised for food, they are providing the medicine,
the band-aid, the aspirin that the socially conscious consumers are desperate for in
order to keep perpetuating the problem of eating animals.
Alex (FARM) also expressed a deontological take on this issue, more unusual for him,
that AROs should be sincere and consistent in promoting their belief that animals should
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not be used for food. He believes reforms are "counterproductive" coming from animal
rights groups because it:
Gives the impression that we approve of the use of animals - exploitation of
animals - for food as long as they are treated a little less reprehensibly. We feel
that welfare reforms is something that the animal exploiting industry should be
introducing to try and entice the consumer, the socially conscious consumers, to
consume them.
Gene (FS) agreed that ARO messages should make it clear that industry reforms
do not make industry "good" and that reforms are not better than veganism, but he still
argues that a mix of welfare (legal reform) and rights (veganism) messages can work at
the level of strategy, even ifhe admitted they are somewhat contradictory at a
philosophical level. He said that, philosophically, FS is an animal rights organization, but
"from a broader strategic standpoint and broader messaging standpoint the movement
exists more on a continuum. Not one block of rights people and one block of welfare
people." Pragmatically, he thinks, "Welfare folks often times gravitate towards and
evolve toward rights folks and a rights position over time," so FS's legal reform
messages are a "practical near-term approach," while FS's vegan messages work on a
"broader societal cultural shift that has to happen that goes beyond laws."
Gene (FS) sees humane farming reforms pragmatically as "incremental abolition,"
as "steps in the right direction" meant "to abolish certain cruelties in a hope that we
eventually create the humane vegan world we dream of." In reform messages, FS
capitalizes on popular welfare sentiments, arguing that factory farming practices are
283
"cruel" and "outside the bounds of acceptable conduct in a society that values
compassion." To explain FS's approach to both welfare and rights messages, he said:
The welfare reforms are often times seen as soft within the animal movement.
When it comes to welfare stuff our messaging is hard. Ban the crates. Ban this.
Ban that. But when it comes to the rights, which within our movement has tended
to be more strident, we put a little soft edge on that and encourage people to adopt
a vegan lifestyle. So that is kind of how we have taken those two aspects of our
movement to try to kind of marry them.
Bruce (PETA) uses both utilitarian and deontological logic to explain why it
makes sense for AROs to promote "less abusive production,"
Both from a pure animal rights, Tom Regan, perspective, if you say, "How would
I want to be treated if I were that animal?" obviously you want to have the worst
abuses eliminated. And then, of course, from a utilitarian standpoint, it seems to
move us further toward a world that we are envisioning to treat animals not as
badly.
To explain why his last point is utilitarian, Bruce argued that there are higher rates of
vegetarianism in countries where "there's more consciousness and more 'humane'
production," as humane laws help raise people's awareness about farm animal suffering,
so more people might then withdraw their support. He stated, "We do have to get to a
point where people say, 'Yes, chickens shouldn't be caged. Yes, pigs shouldn't be
crammed into crates' in order for more people to make a choice not to eat animal corpses
at all." However, previous comments from him and other leaders suggest Americans
284
already believe intensive confinement is cruel and, therefore, wrong. So, one could argue
that getting rid ofthe worst cruelties will not change consumer attitudes or behaviors,
which is perhaps why he claims that regardless of consumer attitudes, legal reforms are
better for the NHAs who exist in agriculture. This latter point is deontological, but his
former point is utilitarian in arguing that humane laws help raise the issue of farmed
animal cruelty for public scrutiny and that increased awareness and exposure may lead to
increased vegetarianism.
SimplifYing animal rights ideology. Overall, AROs, especially COK, FS, and
PETA, often simplifY their deeper animal ethics philosophies to create communication
strategies based on more shallow or popular ethical sentiments. Therefore, a relationship
exists between theory and strategy, but it is just partial or more at a surface level. Recall
Gene's (FS) earlier comments about how he thinks messages do not have to be either
animal rights or animal welfare and they exist on a "continuum." Despite being a rights
organization, FS' s messages tend to avoid using the word rights in favor of the word
compassion because the latter represents a convergence between animal rights and
welfare:
The word "compassion," I think, is very important in the animal movement and
we need to, in my view, it is a strong word and it embodies what our movement
should be about. And it's not divisive within our movement like rights versus
welfare has become.
Similarly, Bruce explained that PETA prefers to focus on promoting compassion and to
"stay out ofthe more academic utilitarian versus deontological versus whatever you want
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to call Gary Francione's ethic discussion." While Bruce thinks all animal rights groups
agree with the basic premise of PETA's mission that "animals are not ours" to use as
resources, the focus ofthe ARO's work and messages should be on the "issues"
themselves to end that use of animals. He said, "PETA tries very hard to focus on 'brass
tacks' issues rather than to get mired in any sort of philosophical disputes." This fits with
his belief that the public also agrees that much of the animal cruelty, in practice, is
wrong. In favor of utilitarianism, Bruce said PETA will work with any group who is
"trying to make the world a kinder place" even if they do not share the same ethical
philosophies in all aspects.
COK also simplifies philosophy in its messages by making the whole popular idea
of being compassionate toward NHAs "simple" for the public to practice toward farmed
animals, in particular, as its messages highlight the ease of ethical vegetarianism. Erica
said COK's goal is "to encourage people to simply stop eating animals" and to "make the
idea of not eating animals a mainstream issue - to bring it to the forefront, make it a
household term, make it accessible to people, make them realize how easy it is to simply
stop eating animals." In order to help make it mainstream, she said COK has gravitated
toward providing more practical guidance on how to be vegetarian and not just ethical
rationale on why. "We are now trying to offer the general public a pragmatic view of how
they can take steps to help animals," Erica said. "We try and offer tools, not just
providing them with reasons why they should be vegetarian or vegan."
Separating animal rights ideology from strategic communication. Rather than
simplifying philosophy, some AROs separate their ethical philosophies, to some extent,
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from their communication strategies to focus on whatever works best. The latter is
especially true for FARM's and YO's utilitarian strategies. Alex explained that FARM's
motives differ from its strategies: "Well, our message strategy is always determined by
our audience ... But our motives are to - those of bringing justice and fairness to the rest
ofthe animal kingdom that we have been exploiting so ruthlessly." He admitted that the
two are separate with the statement, "If we appeal to their self-centered interests by
talking about the desirability of vegan foods, it has nothing to do with their view of
animals." I also see this as an admission of the limitation of this food-oriented strategy in
helping animal rights overall. Even though Alex (FARM) believes the value of animal
rights movement is that it improves us humans so that we are "more sensitive to the
suffering of others," he still does not advocate dedicating much time to emphasizing an
empathetic message or trying to promote animal rights because that requires more
resources than his group has. He explained, "We feel that that's too difficult an issue for a
small organization to tackle. So we really don't try to change American values visa vi
animals."
Alex (FARM) also clarified that even with its one campaign that emphasizes
altruism toward NHAs, World Farm Animals Day (WFAD), it is more informative about
welfare issues than it is transformative about rights. Alex said it only affects "their views
of the treatment of animals. It's not their views of animals themselves." He even
dismissed the strategic value ofWFAD by saying, "We don't feel that World Farm
Animals Day really does as much to advance our goals as some of our other campaigns,
but we just do it out of a sense of obligation." This latter statement clarifies that WFAD is
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deontologically motivated, but the fact that he perceives it as less effective reflects his
overall utilitarian priorities.
Another utilitarian, Matt (VO), explained that the differing animal ethics
philosophies of he and his co-founder, Jack, do not have to be perfectly in sync in all
aspects, as VO focuses on where they "converge" with each other and with the views of
the public - on the issue of suffering. This is similar to Gene's (FS) and Bruce's (PETA)
comments on public consensus that cruelty and suffering is wrong. Matt (VO) explained:
We don't have to come to an agreement of what animal rights or animal liberation
is between us because the bottom line is that there is so much suffering that it
doesn't really matter if you're a deontologist or a utilitarian.
Matt said VO does not present information to the public "in terms of animal rights" nor is
it "based on philosophy." "We're not trying to have people agree with Tom Regan or
Peter Singer," he explained. "We're trying to reduce the amount of suffering as much as
possible." In support of his utilitarian emphasis, his message is "based on what we've
found over the years that has been effective at creating the most amount of change in
people's habits." Essentially, VO does not feel it needs to persuade people about ethics
but rather just provide them with consumer "information" about factory farming that will
likely offend the moral beliefs they already hold, as most people have an "inherent
rejection of cruelty." He explained, "Our message is more a matter ofpresenting
information - the reality of factory farms - to people so that they can see these things and
make an informed choice. "
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Research Question Six (RQ6): Are Each Organization's Frames Congruent or
Incongruent with (or Representative or Unrepresentative oj) its Organizational
Mission and Animal Rights Ideology (versus Animal Welfare Ideology)?
In this section, I discuss each ARO (in alphabetical order) in tenns ofmission and
ideology. First, each ARO's mission statement is deconstructed to elucidate its meaning
and implications, particularly in relation to expressing ethical philosophies about other
animals, and that is compared to the meanings elucidated in its advocacy messages. The
implications of those ARO advocacy messages are then discussed in tenns of how much
they relate to and support an animal rights philosophy in opposition to an animal welfare
philosophy, as outlined in the animal theory chapter. The notion of "animal rights" used
here is broad enough to include deontological and utilitarian animal ethics, as made
popular by Regan and Singer, and includes as key components: the deconstruction of the
human/animal dualism, a non-instrumental view of other animals, and non-speciesist
values.
Compassion Over Killing (COK)
Mission: "Working to end animal abuse, COK focuses on cruelty to animals
in agriculture and promotes vegetarian eating as a way to build a kinder world for
all of us, both human and nonhuman."
COK's use ofthe verb "end" in it its mission denotes a strong conviction to
animal protection without compromising for a mere "reduction" in abuse, which fits with
COK's stance to promote veganism and not industry refonn. Animal cruelty is mentioned
as the focus in the mission, and cruelty is often a tenn that is the focus ofCOK's
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messages. The use of the broader term "animal agriculture" instead of the more specific
term "factory farming," indicates a more sweeping inclusion of all farmed animals, even
those on so-called "free-range" farms. This fits with COK's animal rights stance against
promoting free-range animal products, but it is somewhat less representative of the terms
used in its messages, which more often specify factory farms.
The mission says COK promotes "vegetarian eating," which is true in a broad
sense of the word or according to a "pure vegetarian" connotation, but it would be more
accurate to use the specific term "vegan." All COK's food promotion is vegan, but it
tends to purposely use the broader and more mainstream term "vegetarian," presumably
because it is more appealing and familiar to the public than the word "vegan." The
mission's phrase, "kinder world," defines COK's vision or goal and makes vegetarianism
the solution and path to that goal. This fits with COK's messages, which often emphasize
notions of "compassion" and "kindness."
The mission's specification that kindness should be for "all of us, both human and
nonhuman," implies a commonality between all animals and includes a place for
nonhumans in the circle of compassion. The term "nonhuman" is in accordance with
animal rights, but an opportunity was missed by not using the word "nonhuman animal,"
to clarify that humans are also animals, which would have further unified humans with
other fellow animals. However, this verbiage is reflective of COK's terminology in its
messages. While it never openly perpetuates the human/animal dualism by using
problematic phrases like "people and animals," it also never openly acknowledges
humans' status as an animal. For example, when COK refers to animals, it often specifies
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which type with specifics like "fann animals" or "companion animals" but never a
"human animal." When messages do not specify and simply say "animal abuse," the
audience is supposed to assume that they mean nonhuman animals, which perpetuates the
mainstream idea that "animal" never includes humans. And while the mission uses the
tenn "nonhuman," the text rarely does.
COK messages also tend to highlight the similar status of companion animals and
fann animals much more often than they highlight the similar status between human
animals and farm animals as fellow sentient beings. This tends to be more indicative of
an animal welfare approach that does not challenge the human/animal dualism but,
instead, simply tries to break down divisions between categories ofNHAs who are valued
differently. But it is useful that COK builds the status ofNHAs as individual subjects
with personalities and desires. While COK does occasionally include fish in its cruelty
section and mentions their sentience in tenns of pain, it would be more supportive of
animal rights to include references to fish individuality and build a subject status for
them, as it does for land animals, as it would challenge the mainstream marginalization of
fish sentience. In support of animal rights, COK messages, like all AROs, are careful to
use gendered pronouns and avoid the objectifying tenninology of "it" when describing a
NHA.
COK focuses much attention on NHAs and the cruelty they endure on factory
fanns as well as to the promotion of a vegan diet, which is sincere to its mission and to
animal protection in general. While COK's vegan messages support animal rights goals,
because its rationale is largely specific to the worst cruelties on factory fanns, its
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messages are more supportive of animal welfare beliefs. It misses an opportunity to
emphasize a rights rationale that no animals should be used or kept in captivity as a food
resource, regardless of how much or little suffering is involved or how secretive or
candid the farm industry is about its practices. Additionally, while COK's name mentions
"killing," its emphasis on cruel treatment implicitly makes husbandry the problem more
so than killing.
Farm Animal Rights Movement (FARM)
Mission: FARM is a "public-interest organization advocating plant-based
(vegan) diets to save animals, protect the environment, and improve health."
To begin with the terms "public-interest" and "advocating" admits advocacy but
immediately puts the emphasis on advocating on behalf of a human public. While this
does reflect FARM's message emphasis on human health and food preferences, it does
not reflect its animal rights motivation. Conversely, the order of the listed rationale for
veganism does reflect FARM's animal rights motivation by listing "save animals" first,
but it does not reflect its messages that usually list NHA issues last and human issues
first.
The mission statement is clear that FARM's goal is to promote "plant-based
(vegan) diets," which is specific and accurate. It is interesting that FARM uses the more
clinical and less political term "plant-based," but then combines it with the more political
and "extreme" term "vegan." Both terms are used in FARM's literature, but "vegetarian"
and "meatless" are used more frequently.
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It is interesting that FARM recently changed its name from "Farm Animal
Welfare Movement," which it had for decades, to "Farm Animal Rights Movement." The
new name is an accurate reflection ofFARM's animal rights philosophy and its stance of
promoting vegetarianism instead of industry reform. However, the decision to more
openly espouse animal rights in its name seems contrary to the increasing move away
from an emphasis on animal rights or ethical messages to more benign and
noncontroversial messages about the attractiveness ofplant-based foods. I argue that
FARM's flexible messages, such as Meatless Mondays, that sometimes fail to suggest a
complete boycott of animal products in favor of simply eating less meat, are a type of
"reform" message aimed at consumers to partially reform their diet. A more dedicated
animal rights message would call for a total boycott of animal products, even if it
acknowledged the practical need for a gradual transition period.
In support of animal rights, FARM has collateral materials that show a man
exclaiming, "I don't eat my friends," as he surrounds himself with farmed animals. This
helps the public see other animals as fellow individuals with personalities. Otherwise,
FARM does not typically personalize nonhuman individuals or highlight capabilities of
each species as all the other AROs did. But it does follow the popular ARO pattern of
promoting the similarities between farmed animal and companion animal sentience to ask
for moral consistency in avoiding eating any NHA, while it did not often compare NHA
sentience to that ofhumans. But FARM does avoid objectifying NHAs with the pronoun
"it" and sometimes includes fish, not only in its environmental sections, but also in its
animal cruelty sections, which implies sea animals should be considered on par with
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other animals in welfare concerns. FARM's animal death toll statistics carry a disclaimer,
saying the lives of marine creatures go "uncounted" by the industry. But photos of fish
are scarce, and FARM materials do not discuss their sentience directly.
FARM's World Farm Animals Day (WFAD) campaign contains both rights and
welfare messages, as it implies some "people of conscience" are going vegetarian, while
others are just demanding humane treatment. The WFAD emphasis is specifically on
factory farm cruelty, in most instances, yet it does also emphasize death with its
memorialization rhetoric and death toll statistics. Also, it mentions that these deaths are
"unnecessary," which helps to more strongly condemn them. Additionally, FARM often
comments in other places how many "lives" a person can save ifhe/she goes vegetarian
or avoids eating turkey at thanksgiving. FARM was also the only ARO to use a peace and
nonviolence message, with its "Choose Peace - Choose Veg" card featuring Gandhi. This
emphasized nonviolence towards humans first and then nonhumans second.
There was only one place where FARM's message overtly perpetuated the
human/animal dualism: its WFAD t-shirt says, "Stop human and animal suffering. Go
vegan!" This is ironic, as the message intends to unify humans and nonhumans based on
their common sentience and mutual benefits gained from a vegan society, however, the
language states humans are not animals. While FARM does not typically overtly exclude
humans from the animal category, it is similar to COK in its casual use of the word
"animal" in other places, such as "save animals" or "protect animals" or "land animals,"
indicating the common use of the word "animal" to imply only nonhumans.
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Overall, FARM's messages are not cohesive, since they are separated into many
different campaigns and seem to communicate some contradictory or mixed messages.
For example, they occasionally espouse a more strident animal rights view and a meat
boycott but, more often, focus on human self-interested values unrelated to NHA issues
and allow a more "flexitarian" eating approach. Yet, FARM is the onIy ARO that has a
collateral piece that said "animal rights," as it did on its cause awareness bracelet. FARM
mentioned NHA issues more often than would be expected, based on Alex's insistence
that it prioritizes human self-interest values over altruism toward other animals.
Farm Sanctuary (FS)
Mission: "FS works to end cruelty to farm animals and promotes
compassionate living through rescue, education, and advocacy." Additionally, FS's
vision statement is: "FS envisions a world where the violence that animal
agriculture inflicts upon people, animals, and the environment has ended, and
where instead we exercise values of compassion."
This mission has some similarities with COK's in its use of the strong verb "end"
to solve the problem of "cruelty" to all "farm animals." Compassion is promoted as the
solution in the mission and vision. However, the phrase "compassionate living" is
ambiguous, from a dietary standpoint, since vegetarianism goes unmentioned in both
statements. Instead, the mission mentions, "rescue, education and advocacy," which is
representative of its main actions but not specific to what the public should be doing.
FS's newly designed Web site in 2008 is also more vague about vegetarianism than it
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used to be, and a viewer has to search a while before running across the tenn "veg,"
which does not appear on the home page, whereas it does on all other ARO sites.
FS's vision statement defines the problem as "violence" from "animal
agriculture." "Violence" is a strong word with negative connotations, in support of a
moral position against killing, but the word "violence" rarely appears in FS messages, as
the word "cruelty," from the mission statement, is more commonly used. It is useful,
from an animal rights standpoint, that the mission and vision do not limit themselves to
critiquing violence from factory fanns only, even though most of the messages directed at
the public do emphasize factory fanning over just "animal agriculture." It is
representative ofFS's three-prong approach to framing issues that the vision mentions
ending violence toward "people, animals, and the environment," although it would be
more representative ifNHAs were mentioned first because FS nonnally puts them first,
although, sometimes, human health is privileged. It is problematic that the vision
statement separates "people" and "animals," perpetuating the human/animal dualism in a
prominent statement that appears on the home page. Overall, the mission and vision seem
designed to appeal to mainstream American values and play it safe by avoiding any
trigger words that might indicate FS's animal rights stance.
FS places a lot of emphasis on fanned animals and their sentience. Because FS
rescues fanned animals, it is well-equipped to communicate the personality and
individuality of fanned animals, using gendered pronouns (and gendered names) instead
ofthe objectifying "it." FS helps the public see these animals as it sees them - as
companions and fellow sentient beings. Like most AROs, FS especially highlights the
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similarity between the sentience and capabilities of farmed animals and dogs and cats,
much more so than the similarity between human and nonhuman animals. FS will use
vague terminology such as "like all animals ..." but it never openly espouses the belief
that humans are animals.
Perhaps because FS does not rescue aquatic animals, such as fish, they are rarely
mentioned in its advocacy materials. When they are, it is in the context of environmental
issues, which does not highlight their sentience or individuality. And, even then, the text
privileges the lives of sea animals who are more popular with the public, such as turtles,
sea birds, and marine mammals. This does not ask people to change their view or values
related to fish, specifically.
As with all AROs studied, FS's materials emphasize cruelty at factory farms and
slaughterhouses. FS also emphasizes downed animal abuse at stockyards. While other
AROs problematize cruelty as a rationale for the public to become vegetarian, FS also
uses a cruelty frame to promote legal reforms of industry, such as banning gestation
crates, veal crates, battery cages, foie gras, and the use ofdowned animals in food.
Banning the worst industry practices is a more logical and direct solution to confinement
and cruelty than are consumer boycotts. However, humane reforms are generally
regarded as an animal welfare campaign rather than animal rights. Sometimes, FS's
factory farming messages are separate from its vegetarian messages, which might lead
viewers, in these cases, to assume they should switch to free-range or so-called "humane"
animal products. Or, it might lead viewers to believe that they do not need to make any
dietary or consumer changes, as the industry can solve the problem. While FS's online
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position papers on humane meats and welfare reforms explain its animal rights and pro-
vegan stance, its more widely-distributed literature is not usually that explicit.
In discussing agricultural practice, FS often uses critical verbs, such as
"exploited" and "used," which imply an animal rights critique against using other animals
as a resource. Toward this end, FS emphasizes how agribusiness puts economic interests
over animal welfare to clarify the industry's "commodification" of subjects into objects.
Also, in support of animal rights, it does place some emphasis on promoting life over
death rather than just problematizing suffering only, as explained in the RQl section on
"killing and taking of life for food items." However, in one of its older slaughter videos,
the narrator says, "there's no excuse for killing animals this way," instead of saying more
specifically, "there's no excuse for killing animals." There are a few places where FS
specifically mentions that killing animals is unnecessary, such as in its new
advertisement, "End the slaughter; there are lives on the line," which is a moral
condemnation of killing that goes beyond husbandry and welfare issues.
People for the Ethical Treatment ofAnimals (PETA)
Mission: PETA is "dedicated to establishing and defending the rights of all
animals. PETA operates under the simple principle that animals are not ours to eat,
wear, experiment on, or use for human amusement or for any other purpose."
PETA is the only ARO in this study who deals with animal rights issues beyond
agriculture, as is clear from this mission statement. PETA's mission lists the problem of
eating animals first, which is representative of PETA's emphasis on the topic.
Technically, PETA's actual mission statement simply explains the issues and activist
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tactics it uses, but Bruce Friedrich suggested this principles statement included above is
what it typically "presents" as its mission.
In this statement, PETA openly describes itself as an animal rights organization,
which most AROs do not do, or at least not as candidly. However, it rarely mentions
"animal rights" in its food messages, but it does use moral language, such as "wrong,"
more than other groups. PETA's mission is its philosophical principle. Its anti-
instrumental view that "animals are not ours to eat" or "use for any other purpose" is
directly in accordance with an animal rights ideology that does not view other animals as
property. PETA does not have to use the word "vegetarian" here, as it is clearly implied.
PETA does not often mention the terms "resources" or "property" in its messages, as it
tends to focus on "cruelty" instead. But, like FS, it will use critical verbs such as "used
for," "exploited for," and "killed for" to condemn the agricultural practices of animal use,
exploitation, and killing.
Some of PETA's messages about cows used for dairy and hens used for eggs
include stronger anti-instrumental language than it typically uses when describing the
factory farming of other species. Possessive pronouns are used to signify that the animals
own "their" milk and eggs or "their" calves, chicks, or mothers, along with the
implication that consumers are stealing from them. Consider this statement: "Male calves
are tom away from their mothers within hours of birth so that the milk that nature
intended for them can be used by people instead." And, in an unusual ecofeminist-
inspired statement, PETA says female animals are, "manipulated for their reproductive
functions."
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PETA is the only group to use the critical word "murder" in a few of its messages,
as it is an overt condemnation and criminalization ofthe practice of killing. In further
support of an animal rights position, PETA sometimes mentions "life" and lives "saved"
by vegetarianism (see the RQl section on the problem frame of "killing and taking of life
for food items"). However, Bruce described PETA's main message as having always
been, "eating meat supports cruelty to animals." Because Bruce believes people already
oppose cruelty, this message is more in line with a welfare position than a rights position
that emphasizes death or killing.
Often in conjunction with a cruelty message, PETA highlights the sentience and
subject status of farmed animals, especially in its collateral materials and "Amazing
Animals" section on the Web. PETA includes aquatic animals in these sections and does
more to promote a change in attitudes about fish than any other ARO by far. While many
AROs choose to promote sentience by introducing readers to one rescued individual,
PETA more often describes the overall capabilities and attributes of the species. This has
the advantage of giving nonhumans the implied respect of a "wild life" species and does
not risk belittling their dignity with a "cute" description similar to that of a pet. But it has
the disadvantage of not being able to explain individual personality traits and create a
stronger connection between the reader and the NHA. Additionally, this approach relies
on heavy use of scientific studies to "prove" animal sentience, which, ironically, tacitly
supports animal research, a practice opposed by PETA and animal rights ideology.
Like every ARO, PETA often compares farmed animals to dogs and cats, which
does not challenge the human/animal dualism. But it also compares farmed animals to
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humans more than most AROs do, which highlights their similar sentience but may not
admit humans are animals. Perhaps surprisingly, only this one statement openly admits
humans are animals: "Like humans and all animals, cows ..." On a few occasions, PETA
actually contradicts this, perpetuating the human/animal dualism with statements such as
"animals are like us," "people and animals," and "meat doesn't just hurt animals; it hurts
people too." And like many AROs, PETA sometimes uses the word "animals" in a way
that implies the standard use of the word to exclude humans but might not mean this.
This often happens when listing the three standard reasons why someone should go
vegetarian, such as "for yourself, animals, and the planet" or "for your health, for
animals, and for the Earth," It does not state "you" are not an animal, but it implies
animals are in a wholly different category, which does not openly challenge the
human!animal dualism as much as the phrase "other animals" would.
Vegan Outreach (VO)
Mission: VO is "dedicated to reducing animal suffering by promoting
informed, ethical eating," and "VO is working to expose and end cruelty to animals
through the widespread distribution of our illustrated booklets, Why Vegan, Even If
You Like Meat, and Compassionate Choices, along with our follow-up Guide to
Cruelty-Free Eating."
va is the only ARO to use "vegan" in its name, and up until 2008, it used to be
part of the mission statement. Recently it changed part of the mission from "promoting a
vegan lifestyle," which implies animal rights, to the more open phrasing "reducing
animal suffering by promoting informed, ethical eating," which implies animal welfare.
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va used to promote the word "vegan" and that strict diet more actively in its literature
before the Even ifYou Like Meat (EIYLM) booklet became more popular than its Why
Vegan? booklet. The fact that the mission problematizes animal cruelty is highly
reflective of va's messages. The verb "expose" expresses va's contention that the meat
industry hides the cruelty from the public, while the verb "end" expresses an optimism
and strength that could imply a vegan solution. However, va's messages have softened
to promote "reduction" at least as much as boycotting or ending support of cruelty. For
example, I analyzed va's old booklet, Try Vegetarian, for this dissertation, but va
recently updated it with the new title, Compassionate Choices, that does not openly state
vegetarianism.
The word "outreach" in va's name is highly reflective of va's methods of
simply reaching out to as many people directly as it can with its limited budget. This
focused strategy is reflected in its mission through the phrase, "widespread distribution of
our illustrated booklets." The public is then solely charged and empowered with solving
the problem of cruelty by reducing or eliminating use of animal products. In keeping with
va's open mistrust of animal agribusiness and its more covert animal rights motivations,
it does not ask industry to reform, as some consumers might expect based on a cruelty
argument. Some consumers may then seek the more obvious personal solution that they
should simply support less cruel farms, such as "free-range," but va includes a small
section explaining that animals still suffer on "free-range" farms too. While there is a
slaughterhouse section in most of the booklets, in general, suffering is emphasized as the
problem more than the killing or use of farmed animals, so the messages lean more
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toward animal welfare. Even the statement in Why Vegan? that, "veganism is best viewed
as a tool for reducing suffering," implies veganism is primarily motivated by an animal
welfare philosophy not rights.
In fact, va's messages do not ask anyone to support animal rights, and they admit
in EIYLM that most people are concerned about factory farming because "morally
decent" humans should "prevent pain" (a welfare perspective) not because these moral
humans believe in "animal rights." While this is likely a truthful reflection of public
sentiment, it does not ask people to evolve toward an animal rights viewpoint and can be
interpreted as marginalizing it. But while va's text does not promote rights, it does
highlight some citations by others who more actively support rights or bring up ethical
issues in general, so moral concepts toward other animals are prominent.
va helps the public recognize the sentience of farmed animals, and like COK, it
highlights birds more than most AROs. It includes a profile of a rescued bird in the main
two booklets. va sometimes compares farmed animals to dogs and cats to highlight their
similar sentience for the purpose of getting people to widen "the circle of compassion" to
include farmed animals too. However, fish are not included in any booklet but do appear
in an online section as a subset ofthe transport and stockyards section. va mentions fish
the least of all AROs, as Matt admitted he thinks its inclusion might cause people to
disregard the whole booklet, which fails to challenge the mainstream marginalization of
fish nor highlight them as sentient beings.
va's comparisons of farmed animals to humans are rarer than comparisons to
other mammals and birds. These comparisons fail to imply that humans are animals,
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except in the case of a quote by Carl Sagan that actively challenges the human/animal
dualism. But the VO text never uses false phrases such as "people and animals." In
several places, VO uses the humanist phrase, "making humane choices is the ultimate
affirmation of our humanity." While this supports altruism, it is problematic because it
implies that humans are the only ones who make ethical choices, reinforcing a
mainstream belief in human moral superiority. But overall, VO is similar to COK in
keeping the emphasis on the suffering of factory farmed animals and humans' ethical
consumer choices related to their mistreatment.
Summary
The six research questions addressed in this chapter describe the results of the
textual analysis of ARO advocacy materials as well as the interviews with ARO leaders
about the motivations and strategy behind their advocacy decisions. Findings for RQl
revealed that AROs framed the problems with animal agribusiness and animal products
as: cruelty to farmed animals, commodification of farmed animals into economic units,
harm to humans and the environment, and the unnecessary killing and death of animals.
The problem frames typically blamed animal agribusiness, especially factory farms,
rather than directly blaming consumers. For RQ2, solution frames almost always
suggested that consumers should switch to eating a total or largely plant-based diet, but
FS and PETA also had solutions for humane reforms to industry.
In response to RQ3 on values, the study revealed that AROs made prominent
appeals to the values of compassion for nonhuman animals (NHAs), appreciation for
their sentience, and desire for moral integrity and consistency. Other values included:
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desire to improve the world and make a difference, choice, pleasurable and convenient
food, belonging, life, concern for fellow human beings, honesty, American populism,
naturalness, freedom, and American pride.
For RQ4, values were categorized into altruistic versus self-interested. AROs
often did promote altruistic values, particularly toward NHAs more so than toward
humans, in keeping with their missions. But PETA, FARM, and FS also had messages
promoting anthropocentric altruism, such as fighting world hunger, farm worker
exploitation, and the polluting of rural communities. VO and COK were the AROs that
placed the most emphasis on altruism toward NHAs, while FARM did so the least,
instead, often using appeals to human self-interest, such as health and food preferences.
Environmental arguments from the AROs included a mix of appeals to human self-
interest and altruism. AROs sometimes combined human self-interest and altruism by
highlighting the mental benefits consumers can gain from practicing moral consistency
through helping animals and the planet by eating vegan.
RQ5 dealt with unearthing ARO leader motivations in how and why they
construct advocacy messages as they do. In general, AROs leaders explained that they
use a blend of deontological and utilitarian communication approaches, especially in their
choice to privilege NHA concerns over human concerns, as many ARO leaders think
NHA frames are both ideologically significant and pragmatically compelling. Matt (VO)
and Alex (FARM) were the most utilitarian, even though the former uses a NHA-centric
appeal and the latter a human self-interest appeal.
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When making decisions about how to construct NHA-centric messages, most
ARO leaders often leant more toward utilitarianism, particularly in their choice to
privilege animal welfare over animal rights, since the former is more widely appealing.
Bruce (PETA) and Gene (FS) explained their, largely utilitarian, choice to promote
humane farming reform, which was deontologically opposed by others, such as Alex
(FARM). Every ARO, except PETA, made the utilitarian decision to marginalize fish,
assuming the public is less sympathetic to fish. But COK and VO made the deontological
choice to privilege birds over more popular land animals, such as pigs and cows, because
birds suffer in vastly greater numbers. Overall, COK, FS, and PETA often simplified
animal rights ideology into a "shallower" package that creates greater public consensus
around notions of compassion or welfare instead of rights. VO and FARM tended to
separate animal rights ideology and motivations from their communication strategy
decisions, using a utilitarian philosophy of framing messages based on what works best to
achieve animal protection goals.
For RQ6, each ARO's messages were discussed in terms oftheir congruence with
animal rights ideology and the ARO's mission. While there were always ways in which
ARO messages supported animal rights, especially in showing respect for farmed
animals' subject status and promoting veganism, messages were often conservative, such
as avoiding direct mention of animal rights or an overt challenge to the dominant
human/animal dualism.
The next chapter provides a discussion on the implications of these findings for
communication theory and the animal rights movement. A normative component is added
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that includes recommendations for how AROs could increase the ideological integrity of
their food advocacy frames so that they more directly support animal rights ideology and
promote frame transformation.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Introduction
Whereas the previous findings chapter comprised the descriptive portion of the
dissertation analysis, this discussion chapter provides the prescriptive or normative
portion. Here I discuss conclusions and implications concerning the AROs' existing
framing choices in terms of communication theories and animal ethics. I then discuss
what general frames and communication strategies I conclude would be the most
supportive of animal rights ideology, particularly in support of frame transformation.
This chapter ends with sections on the study's contribution to communication theory and
praxis as well as its limitations.
To summarize my perspective on the frame alignment process, much of which
was explained in the introduction and communication theory chapters, the ideal frames
for AROs to use would be ones that are truthful as well as congruent with an animal
rights ideology (deontological), first and foremost, as well as being effective at meeting
animal rights goals (utilitarian). The former deontological concerns are primary to the
thesis that animal rights organization messages should be informed by animal rights
ideology. What is true or authentic to a social movement's ideology should be expressed
as such, in most cases, for integrity and honesty in communication (Baker & Martinson,
2001; Francione, 2006; Hall, 2006a, 2006b; Lakoff, 2004; LaVeck, 2006a, 2006b).
308
As AROs are part of a challenging movement that seeks a fundamental
transformation in worldviews and behaviors, I advocate for some ARO frames to fit
Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford's (1986) frame transformation alignment process,
in support of Foucault's (2000) notion of critical transformation and Lakoffs (2004) idea
of reframing issues for social change. To do this, the ARO frames must ask the American
public for the kind of major change in speciesist worldview that is necessary to promote
all animal rights issues in the long-term while still finding a way to resonate with the
public. This chapter explains how, and to what extent, AROs did or could construct less
speciesist frames that resonate on some level with a largely speciesist American public.
Implications ofARO Framing Choices in this Study
Snow & Benford (1988) categorized components of collective action frames into
diagnosis (problems and culprits, if applicable), prognosis (solutions), and motivation.
Similarly, for RQ1 and RQ2 in this dissertation, I identified the first two aspects of ARO
collective action frames in terms of what problems and solutions they defined. In RQ3, I
assessed the values AROs promoted to loosely indicate the motivational component of
collective action frames. This section begins with a discussion of the implications of the
problem and solution frames constructed by AROs, followed by a discussion ofthe
implications of the values to which they appealed.
RQl and RQ2: Problem and Solution Frames
In RQ1, I identified the main problem frames AROs used as: (1) suffering of
animals due to cruelty, (2) commodification of animals as economic units, (3)
harmfulness of animal agribusiness to humans and the environment, and (4) the needless
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killing and death of animals for human food. The blame component was overwhelmingly
aimed at animal agribusiness, particularly factory farms, and, secondarily, consumer
demand for animal products. In RQ2, I found that to solve all of these problems, AROs
overwhelmingly relied on consumers to become vegetarian or reduce consumption of
animal products. In some instances, FS and PETA also promoted agribusiness "humane"
reforms, whether legal or voluntary, as the solution to the main problem frames of
suffering and commodification.
Industry reform solutions and its fit with vegan solutions. This industry reform
frame makes sense as a logical solution to decreasing the suffering, cruelty, and
commodification ofNHAs since AROs primarily blamed it on factory farms. This
strategy fits with Benford's (1987) theory that problem and solution frames must
logically align, but it does not perfectly align with animal rights ideology, as ARO
solutions promoting welfare reforms still allow industry to exploit animals but do so in a
way that causes them less suffering. As an example, FS was the only ARO who talked
about the need for factory farming "humane" reforms and did not always also mention
vegetarianism. While this frame makes sense logically, it does not fully align itself with
an animal rights ideology.
In the animal ethics chapter I discussed the nuances of the animal rights
movement debate over whether or not AROs should promote agribusiness welfare
reforms. Some activists and scholars made a utilitarian argument that welfare reforms are
a short-term solution to reducing suffering that works in small steps toward the long-term
solution of veganism (Park, 2006; Singer, 2006; Singer & Friedrich, 2006). Even
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Francione (1996) considered banning some factory farming practices to be aligned with
incremental abolition but admitted this tactic is more muddled and problematic than the
tactic of promoting veganism. However, I think FS's campaign to ban foie gras may fit
Francione's incremental abolition ideal because it is not a welfare improvement but a ban
on an entire product and category of farming. Other scholars and activists made a
deontological argument that "improving" an exploitative industry it is out of sync with
animal rights ideology, adding the utilitarian argument that these reforms undermine
vegan objectives by assuaging consumer guilt and possibly helping agribusiness become
more profitable by appealing to increasingly conscientious consumers (Dunayer, 2006;
Francione, 1996; Hall, 2006b; Lama, 2006; LaVeck, 2006a and 2006b; Lyman, 2006;
Mark, 2006; Torres, 2006).
The latter ideological and practical concerns over AROs promoting reform
solutions fit with the thesis ofthis dissertation that favors authentically representing
ideology. Similar to LaVeck (2006b), I argue that the industry reform solution frame
muddles and weakens the corresponding vegan solution frame aimed at consumers by
suggesting that industry can solve the problem instead of insisting industry is the
problem. Additionally, the emphasis on the animal cruelty and suffering frame by AROs
often highlighted the worst or most abusive aspects of factory farming practices. By
doing so, it implicitly made less painful or mundane practices of farming animals, such as
captivity and use, seem less problematic or even unproblematic by comparison.
Therefore, it is illogical that the direct and main solution to the problem of factory farm
cruelty and commodification is a lifelong boycott by consumers, as that problem implies,
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instead, that agriculture should switch to less inhumane practices. Usually, a boycott is a
market-based tactic that is used to leverage economic support against a corporation in
favor of demanded improvements. To view veganism as a boycott and market solution to
factory farm cruelty, specifically, implies that once the industry makes the demanded
welfare improvements, consumers will then resume their financial support of that
industry.
While AROs did not suggest the latter idea that consumers use veganism as
leverage to meet welfare demands, I suggest there is a natural connection between
boycotts and reforms which fails to make veganism the logical solution for the problem
of poor animal welfare in agribusiness. The logical solution to a problem frame of poor
animal welfare is for consumers to financially support less inhumane animal farms, but
the main problem-solution relationship that was set up in the majority of ARO frames is
end suffering/cruelty via veganism. However, the AROs often tried to more logically
align the problem of cruelty and commodification with the solution ofveganism by
explaining that the industry will not stop its cruel practices because it is untrustworthy,
greedy, and uncaring, and, additionally, it cannot stop its cruel practices because its profit
motive dictates poor animal welfare in order to remain viable in a global market. When
AROs included this economic argument against reform in their messages, veganism,
rather than eating "humane" animal products, became the more logical solution to the
problem of animal suffering.
However, a vegan solution to cruelty does not make as much sense if it is
proposed along with an industry humane reform solution, as they inherently contradict
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each other and require more complex explanations to work together. Yet PETA and FS
did sometimes demand industry improvements (welfare solution) along with asking
consumers to go vegetarian (rights solution). This combination of rights and welfare
solutions might make more sense if the AROs had explained that the two are unrelated
by clarifying that veganism is the most ethical solution to the problem and industry
reforms are a separate solution aimed at mitigating some of the worst farmed animal
suffering endured while society at large is transitioning from an animal-based to a plant-
based diet or because less conscientious consumers wi11likely continue to demand animal
products. However, this explanation was not clarified in PETA's or FS's messages.
The commodification problem frame and a vegan solution. Rather than the
problem frame of cruelty/suffering, the animal commodification problem frame used by
AROs could fit more logically with a vegan solution and animal rights ideology as long
as objectification is emphasized in a broad sense more so than just emphasizing its
resulting suffering, as then more types of animal agriculture can be implicated, not just
factory farms. However, in many cases, the AROs referenced standard factory farming
practices to indicate how the mass production of animals commodifies them and profits
take priority over welfare, which could implicitly exclude critiquing a small, more
"traditional" form of animal husbandry. I draw this conclusion because even when AROs
argued against "free-range" farming, they often did so based on the argument that most of
these farms were not truly "free-range," so that still implies that a true "free-range" farm,
albeit rarer these days, would not be objectifying.
313
These commodification frames do become more inclusive of problematizing all
animal agriculture, not just factory farms, when the AROs emphasized the subject status
and individuality of each farmed animal, especially when they compared farmed animal
individuality to human, dog, or cat individuality. This approach was closer to critiquing
all use of farmed animals as inherently objectifying, since American society does not
allow farming of subjects, such as humans, dogs, or cats. Therefore, I conclude that ARO
positive frames that emphasized farmed animal individuality and subject status are more
in alignment with animal rights ideology than the negative frames that problematized
factory farming practices primarily on the basis of being cruel or commodifying.
The problem frame ofkilling and a solutionframe ofveganism. I think the AROs'
lesser-used problem frame of "killing and taking of life for human food" is the problem
frame that best aligns with animal rights ideology as well as a vegan solution. It relates to
the former paragraph's discussion in favor of ARO frames that constructed farmed
animals' subject status as being equal to dogs, cats, or even humans, all of whom are not
allowed to be killed for food in the United States. Adding a necessity angle could bolster
this frame, as it makes logical sense that if Americans do not need to eat animal products
to survive, then they cannot morally justify the killing of fellow animal subjects. Some
AROs did occasionally mention this necessity angle, or implied it by emphasizing the
healthfulness of a vegan diet, but I think necessity should be emphasized as central to
determining when the idea oftaking anyone's life becomes immoral and when meat does
indeed become "murder," as PETA declared. This necessity angle is supported by Hall's
(2006a) contention that animal rights should not demonize predation overall, as predation
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is unavoidable for carnivorous species, which will be discussed in more detail later in this
chapter.
The problemframe ofharm to humans and the environment. Another problem
frame used by AROs argued that animal products were harmful to people and the
environment, which is a form of frame extension (Snow et aI, 1986) in applying one
problem to other seemingly unrelated issues such a public health and the environment.
While self-interested arguments about human health risks (whether it be from eating
animal products or from living in an environment polluted by agribusiness) are a
legitimate concern that should be mentioned (HRC, 2007), I contend that this frame
should not be emphasized by AROs as the main concern, and it usually was not, as it is
not as directly related to the animal rights ideology that serves as the AROs' primary
motivation. Only FARM generally put human health issues above NHA issues, and
PETA and FS could only occasionally be accused of doing this in certain communication
pIeces.
Within this harm frame, environmental harm has greater potential than human
harm to fit an animal rights ideology, especially if wild NHAs and their habitats are
emphasized as deserving protection (LaVeck, 2006b). I found that all AROs included
wild species, especially oceanic life, in their environmental sections in addition to
mentioning risks to humans. However, I think there is a missed opportunity to emphasize
the inherent value ofNHA life in these frames to more overtly connect the notion of
animal rights to protecting "wild" animals, not just domesticated animals, from human
exploitation or unhealthy interference (Hall, 2006b). From a deontological
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communication standpoint, this allows the moral frames supporting veganism to directly
support other animal rights issues, or animal rights in a broader sense, and not just the
single issue of animal farming.
Problem frames and their relation to the value ofmoral integrity. One issue that I
did not list as an explicit "problem" frame was that of consumer moral integrity being
challenged by the practice ofmeat-eating, particularly factory-farmed products. However,
I did identify moral integrity as a prominent value AROs promoted, and moral integrity
was central to the motivational messages that urged consumers to go vegetarian. The fact
that AROs suggested farming practices were out of sync with the public's general
concern for animal welfare indirectly makes moral inconsistency a problem for meat-
eating consumers and necessitates their involvement in the solution so they can obtain
consonance. Attaching the moral integrity value to problem frames against animal
agribusiness was one way that AROs made the vegan solution seem personally relevant
to meat-eating audience members who might be experiencing guilt. This does not suggest
that the use of the moral integrity value fully aligns a cruelty problem frame, specifically,
with a vegan solution, as conscientious consumers can still alleviate guilt on the suffering
issue by choosing animal products from farms they deem to fit their standards of
"humane."
If AROs framed consumer guilt or moral inconsistency as the problem, it would
indicate that how we humans feel about what we do to other animals is more important
than the ethicality ofwhat we actually do to them. Therefore, I contend that a guilt
problem frame would imply that animal farming and meat consumption are not a problem
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so long as the consumer has no ethical qualms about supporting it. Therefore, it is more
prudent to highlight moral integrity as one of our motivational values rather than making
a lack of integrity the problem. After all, consumer guilt is the problem from the
perspective of animal agribusiness, but the exploitation ofthe animals is the problem
from the perspective ofAROs, and the two should not be conflated (LaVeck, 2006b).
This is an example of the importance of values in ARO framing choices, as discussed in
the next section.
RQ3: Values
For RQ3, I examined how ARO food advocacy messages position the human
subject in terms of what values humans are said to possess or should possess that might
motivate them to concur with the AROs' proposed solutions. The main values AROs
promoted, in addition to health and environmental stewardship, were: compassion for
other animals, respect for animal sentience and individuality, personal integrity and moral
consistency, desire to improve the world and make a difference, choice, pleasurable and
convenient food, belonging, life, concern for fellow human beings, honesty, American
populism, naturalness, freedom, and American pride. In keeping with suggested social
movement organization (SMO) framing and rhetorical strategy (Benford & Snow, 2000;
Burke, 1984; Therborn, 1980; Zald, 1996), these values generally fit within American
cultural norms, which should enhance their resonance. ARO leaders understood this, as
they stated they were promoting values that the public already possessed, namely
compassion for animals and an aversion to cruelty. The only time ARO leaders felt they
were trying to "change" people's values toward other animals was through suggesting
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that people "extend" their animal welfare values out from dogs and cats to farmed
animals.
I particularly wanted to ascertain if and to what extent AROs promoted values
that were representative of animal rights ideology, not just welfare. While I think the
values that AROs promoted do not usually conflict with or contradict animal rights
values, only certain values actually promoted an animal rights viewpoint. And these
values only did so when AROs specifically framed them in ways that created this
connection. ARO values that were either informed by or promoted an animal rights
ideology, to some extent, were: compassion, respect for sentience and individuality,
moral integrity and consistency, honesty, life, freedom, naturalness, belonging, and desire
to make a difference. In the following sections, I discuss how each value was or could be
related to animal rights.
Value: Compassion. While the notion of compassion resonates with popular
sentiment because it connotes concern for the welfare of other animals, the AROs
optimistically implied, but did not overtly state, that people's compassion for animal
welfare will extend to an animal rights perspective that animals should not be exploited
or killed. For example, according to ARO frames, the problem that incites compassion is
viewing factory farm cruelty (a welfare frame), but AROs then associated this
compassion with leading people to a vegan solution (rights frame) and not with switching
to less inhumane animal products. So, by this association, AROs applied a deeper or
stricter meaning to the concept of compassion and implied that to be truly compassionate
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is to avoid killing or exploiting any animals, including fish, for food. This is an example
of frame amplification (Snow et aI, 1986).
The value that is more directly related to the principle prohibiting farmed animal
killing and exploitation is justice instead of compassion. While compassion is a necessary
first step or component ofjustice, as it creates an initial concern and caring for other
sentient beings, it is not as fundamental or direct as justice is at implying that these
animals have a right not to be owned as a resource. ARO appeals to compassion tended to
be more restricted to the notion of avoiding suffering and cruelty. So, they condemned
certain poor husbandry practices more than they condemned the entire practice or concept
of animal farming.
Value: Respect for sentience and individuality ofother animals. Appeals to
compassion generally did not ask the audience to think of farmed animals much
differently, as these appeals relied on audience members already viewing farmed animals
as sentient beings who are capable of feeling pain. So these compassion appeals implied
that people respect farmed animal sentience, at least related to pain and suffering, through
the AROs' prominent use of the cruelty problem frame. But the value of respect for
sentience can be framed to be more transformational in favor of animal rights if the
frames convince people that farmed animals not only feel pain but are individuals who
have emotions, consciousness, and unique personalities. Then a person's respect for
farmed animal sentience might presumably deepen into seeing them as individuals who
have the same right not to be eaten as do other individuals, such as humans or dogs,
based on the fact that Americans generally view the latter as individual subjects not
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objects. AROs, particularly FS, PETA, and COK, often did promote the idea that farmed
animals were unique, thinking, feeling, individuals, but PETA was the only ARO who
included fish in this category and encouraged people's respect for individuality to apply
to sea animals, which can be categorized as a frame transformation alignment process
(Snow et al., 1986). Even more transformational, in terms of animal rights, is the idea that
other animals' subject status is similar to that of humans, as we are all animals. Most
AROs did not openly state this human analogy, with PETA perhaps using it more than
other AROs.
Value: Moral integrity and consistency. Directly related to valuing farmed
animals as fellow "subjects of a life" (Regan, 2004, p. 185), is the desire to value one's
own moral integrity by respecting the rights ofthese fellow subjects in a consistent
manner. AROs' frequent use of dog and cat comparisons with farmed animals makes
logical and moral sense as a way to encourage people to question the irrationality of the
status quo's unjustified categorization of some animals into subjects and some into
objects. Statements such as PETA's "If you wouldn't eat your dog, you shouldn't eat
fish," are an important first step in getting people to acknowledge that they avoid eating
certain animals for moral reasons, so they should also consider the moral inconsistency
oftheir eating any animal. The latter is an example of frame bridging (Snow et al., 1986)
through attempting to extend animal welfare concepts, including the idea of abstaining
from killing, out from one nonhuman to another.
But the use of the moral consistency value has limitations similar to the value of
respect for sentience and individuality if all the comparisons are restricted to being
320
between farmed animals and other domesticated nonhuman animals, since this tends to
draw mainly upon a desire for consistent application or expansion of current animal
welfare values only. AROs are not taking the opportunity to promote animal rights values
that would challenge the human/animal dualism and compare the subject status of farmed
animals to that of human animals.
Part of an appeal to the value ofmoral consistency could be to ask people to
consistently apply some of their values ofjustice and rights, as typically directed mainly
at humans, to nonhuman animals, namely domesticated animals we have tended to use
for food. These human rights and justice values include the right not to be exploited or
enslaved and the right not to be killed, if one is not guilty of any violent crime. As
women and people of color have a history of being discriminated against on the basis of
their association with lowly nonhuman animals (Adams, 1990; Speigel, 1997), AROs
could more frequently draw upon ideas ofmoral progress and human social justice
analogies, abstracting them where appropriate to fit NHAs, as do Regan (2003), Singer
(1990), Francione (1996), and Hall (2006a).
I believe the process of expanding the idea of basic human rights and applying it
to the treatment of other animals is an example of frame transformation (Snow et ai.,
1986). But ARO messages in this study rarely drew upon transformational human rights
analogies, instead frequently relying more on frame bridging by asking for protection for
farmed animals similar to what America provides for dogs and cats. As I explained in
Chapter Two, to clarify the boundaries ofthis analogy, animal rights specifically asks for
human rights values to apply to NHAs only to the point of preventing domestication,
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exploitation, and unnecessary killing ofNHAs by humans, based on our Western
culture's ethical principles. But it does not dictate that humans interfere with the natural
predation cycle followed between groups of wild NHAs, according to their society's
culture or ecological principles found in nature.
When one considers how a moral integrity frame toward human rights would not
tend to highlight the value of consumer choice but rather civic obligation to uphold
rights, I believe that, similarly, the value of showing moral consistency in extending
rights to fellow animal subjects should be complemented with an "ethical obligation"
value more so than the "choice" value that AROs tended to emphasize. While ethical
veganism is a choice, as it is not illegal to eat farmed animals, it is better aligned
philosophically with a justice frame than it is with a consumer choice frame, as the latter
may make veganism another trendy lifestyle choice instead of an ethical obligation
(Maurer, 2002).
Value: Honesty. A subset of moral integrity is an appeal to honesty. AROs use
this but largely in terms of appealing to consumers' desire for honesty from agricultural
marketing concerning the reality of its animal welfare and environmental practices. But
within a moral integrity frame, appeals to the honesty of consumers should interrogate
their acknowledgement oftheir own role in agribusiness problems. All ARO problem
frames that blamed the consumer (as discussed in RQ1) implied consumers need to take
an honest look at the "reality" of factory farming cruelty and environmental destruction
which agribusiness hides from them.
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PETA also used an isolated, but useful, honesty frame telling parents they should
not have to lie to their kids about where their food comes from. This implied that adult
Americans are ashamed of the killing of animals for food and know it would emotionally
upset children, so they remain complicit in hiding the violence they financially and tacitly
support. An honesty frame could state that one should willingly, openly, and frequently
confront the agricultural practices and consequences behind one's food choices to ensure
they are in accordance with one's own values in order to maintain moral integrity and
model that value for one's children.
Value: Life. Every ARO, with the exception ofVO, alluded to valuing life. I
believe life to be a central component of animal rights, as in other animals having the
right not to have their lives taken by humans, except in self-defense. The right ofall
animals to their own life is more central to animal rights ideology than is the right to be
treated well in captivity, so I believe AROs should more frequently appeal to people's
value for protecting and maintaining life over death, instead of primarily appealing to
compassion for suffering. Additionally, times when AROs portrayed farmed animals
requesting and desiring that we save their lives, such as in some FS stickers, also
complemented the previous value of respecting their sentience and ability to experience
emotions and consciousness. The idea is that humans should value the life of anyone else
who has the ability to value his or her own life too. This allows AROs to draw
comparisons that can break down the false human/animal dichotomy by showing how all
animals, human and nonhuman, value their own lives. FS used this approach on at-shirt
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featuring Buddha's quote, "All beings tremble before violence. All fear death. All love
life."
Value: Freedom. Besides FS saying its sanctuary residents enjoyed freedom and
PETA once saying "everyone wants to be free," the value of freedom was implied more
than it was explicitly mentioned; AROs conversely emphasized and problematized the
confinement, crowding, immobilization, lack of space, and lack of outdoor access on
factory farms. AROs contrasted this immobility with visuals showing the relative
freedom of rescued farmed animals outdoors in a sanctuary setting reminiscent of a small
family farm and with the few images of "food" animal species in the wild, especially fish.
One of the problems discussed in the findings chapter was that these visuals set up an
implied definition of freedom that does not mean freedom from domestication and
farming but simply freedom from indoor, intensive confinement. This tacitly supports
small, less inhumane, free-range farming rather than supporting the idea that NHAs
should own their own bodies and be free to control their own lives. Some AROs, such as
PETA, got closest to this latter frame through occasionally discussing the rights of dairy
cows and egg-laying hens to own their own offspring, milk, and eggs.
Related to freedom is the notion of control over one's body and choices. This was
emphasized by some of COK's messages that stated humans have a choice but these
farmed animals do not, implying that the farmed animals are stuck in a bad situation
through no fault of their own but humans have the freedom to choose whether or not to
free them from this bad situation. This frame could be more explicitly tied to freedom and
related notions of choice and opportunity if it explained that while wild animals often
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have the opportunity to escape being eaten by predators,jarmed animals are given no
such opportunity to avoid becoming prey, in this case to a human predator. Then the
frame emphasizing the lack of freedom and forced captivity can link up with natural
principles of freedom and "survival of the fittest" (Darwin, 1859) as well as American
cultural principles supporting justice, fairness, and opportunity.
I argue appeals to the value of American pride should align with notions of
freedom rather than the AROs' tendency to appeal to American pride based on a
somewhat humanist and elitist idea of America's advanced civilization and "humanity."
Freedom and liberty are positive principles that are heavily associated with the rhetoric of
America. America's Declaration of Independence proclaims everyone's rights to "life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness," the national anthem declares America to be "the
land of the free," and the pledge of allegiance claims America provides "liberty and
justice to all." Therefore, ARO messages aimed at Americans could cite freedom
terminology more explicitly to align the animal rights movement with accepted
democratic principles that resonate with the American public and are commonly part of
rights movements (Bormann, 1971; Campbell, 1989). This frame amplifies or transforms
the idea of having the right to freedom so it applies to other animals in order that they
may seek their own versions oflife, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, free from
exploitation. While this freedom frame is more logically applied to "wild" or free NHAs
who are commercially caught for food, particularly fish, it could also be used to
emphasize the animal rights principle that it is not in anyone's best interest to be
domesticated and kept in captivity.
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Freedom is a complicated frame in the case of farmed animals who have been
selectively bred in captivity and are no longer equipped to survive in the wild. Frames
could explain the vision that NHAs should have basic freedom over the right to their life
and to own their own body, milk, eggs, and offspring, as all wild animals do. But this
freedom frame would then need to clarify that the animal rights movement generally does
not intend that all farmed animals should be set free into the woods, but, rather, the
movement seeks an end to their intentional breeding and use by humans (Singer, 1990). It
should be admitted that this would likely result in the eventual extinction of most highly-
domesticated farmed animal breeds who no longer have a place in the ecosystem and are
more adapted to rapidly and painfully growing unnaturally fat than they are to living in a
natural environment.
Value: Naturalness. Freedom also ties into the value of naturalness, as other
animals in nature do not farm other species in captivity as a food resource. So while ARO
frames generally appealed to naturalness by framingfactory farming and slaughterhouse
practices as "unnatural" in comparison to traditional animal farming, AROs could extend
a naturalness frame out to communicate that anyfarming of other animals for food is
itself unnatural when viewed in relation to common forms of predation in nature.
However, this frame is complicated by the fact that humans have practiced animal
agriculture for thousands of years (Mason, 1997), so a counterargument may be that
farming has become naturalized for our species and those domesticated NHA species, as
well as the fact that plant agriculture is largely unnatural too (Pollan, 2006). Therefore, I
suggest appeals to animal agriculture's unnaturalness are best done within a meta-frame
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of freedom or justice. This also acknowledges that an action's "naturalness" may
contribute to its ethicality, as I argued in Chapter Two. I clarified that ethics are a blend
of both natural and cultural principles. Therefore, the justice and freedom frames provide
the cultural values which are complemented by the "natural" value of avoiding unnatural
predation.
In addition, ARO appeals to the naturalness of a plant-based diet for human
nutrition were associated with the value of health. At some point in any vegetarian
argument, AROs must use a health frame to validate the diet, although these
anthropocentric appeals should not be more prominent than NHA-centered appeals. A
health argument is useful to demonstrate that predation is unnecessary to human survival
in cases where a variety ofplant-based proteins are available. Proofthat animal products
are unnecessary to human health in America is integral to supporting the frame that
problematizes the killing of animals for human food.
For honesty in communication, AROs should take care not to make health or
naturalness claims that go beyond what can be well-substantiated, and those references
should be clearly cited. It was not the goal of this dissertation to assess the accuracy of
claims made by AROs, but I did discover in the interviews with ARO leaders that no one
took an extreme utilitarian position of stating they would intentionally misrepresent the
facts to achieve animal rights goals. Erica (COK) said COK is not a nutrition
organization and prefers to refer people to other sources if they want more health
information, which seems like an honest way for an ARO to approach the topic.
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YO's co-founder and President Jack Norris actually is a registered dietician. With
its Guide to Cruelty-Free Eating, YO is perhaps the most careful and conservative ARO
in addressing the health topic and explaining any issues, not glossing over potentially
negative information. Because of industrialized agriculture, Americans do not obtain their
food as their ancestors did in the wild, so there are a few potential issues of nutrient
deficiency with a modem, solely plant-based diet, such as vitamin B-12, of which
potential vegans should be made aware (Mason, 1997; Melina, Davis & Harrison, 1995).
These issues can be overcome with supplementation and planning (ADA, 2003; Melina,
Davis & Harrison, 1995), but they should be openly addressed along with explanations of
why these modem issues exist, so the naturalness frame is still supported. To foster
honest communication, if AROs are going to point out any potential risks with modem
animal-based products or diets, they should be willing to point out any potential risks
with a modem, solely plant-based diet.
Providing basic, accurate nutrition details to aspiring vegans, or pointing them to
reliable health sources, is part of a commitment to communication ethics that builds
credibility for animal rights and shows a related concern for the human animal. In fact
Bruce (PETA) stated that PETA cares about humans too as fellow animals, so he did not
think there was any conflict with an ARO focusing on human health, implying it was a
deontological choice more than a utilitarian one. But other AROs tended to admit a more
utilitarian motivation in using the health frame for largely strategic reasons, as people
were naturally motivated, at least in part, by self-interest. Additionally, Erica's (COK)
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emphasis on providing tools that could keep people healthy and happy on a long-term
vegan diet is another way that the health or naturalness frame can be utilitarian.
Value: Belonging. When AROs such as PETA and FS show the diversity of
people who are going vegetarian and let the public know there are millions of people
choosing this diet, it provides validation that this is not just a subculture of alternative
youth or hippies. This practice of emphasizing diversity fits with Tarrow's (1998)
framing challenge to avoid creating a narrow or elitist identity when attempting to build
unity and attract people to the movement. Through PETA's use of celebrities, and FS also
using moral leaders in its vegetarian guide, these AROs built a concept of unity or
identity based on people holding similar values and acting with integrity rather than on
age, race, gender, or style. However, while there was diversity, photos still favored
attractive, younger, white people. I found that FS, especially, and PETA to an extent, did
a good job in emphasizing the moral reasoning behind the celebrities' and leaders'
choices to be vegetarian so that the focus was put on animal ethics as the unifying
rationale. FS's use of the theme that you are in "good company" highlights belonging to
or emulating a group of people who have ethical principles, rather than just a group of
people who are well-known or physically attractive.
PETA appealed to the value ofbelonging more than any other ARO since it often
featured current celebrities and other "sexy" people, but the focus was sometimes more
on health or attractiveness rather than ethical rationales. To maintain focus on the NHAs
and to avoid making vegetarianism look like a Hollywood fad, it is important to include
leaders from throughout various stages ofhistory and different cultures to ground ethical
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vegetarianism in a long history of moral thought, in keeping with communication scholar
recommendations to make historical connections between ideas (Ryan, 1991; Therborn,
1980). While most of these historical leaders were men, this can serve the utilitarian
purpose of helping a male audience recognize that vegetarianism does not have to be seen
as an effeminate dietary choice (Adams, 1990). Additionally, I think AROs should
feature stories from former animal farmers and hunters to help provide further diversity
in terms of masculine and rural perspectives and to dispel any ideas that vegetarianism is
just an urban alternative subculture (Maurer, 2002).
Value: Desire to make a difference. The previous theme of identifying and
emulating leaders in practicing ethical vegetarianism is related to the idea that through
vegetarianism you as an individual can also make a difference and do something
important. AROs did not draw that exact parallel between the reader being as important
to social causes as Gandhi or the Dalai Lama, but they sometimes did say that
vegetarianism was the "most important" step a person could take everyday to solve a
variety of problems caused by animal agribusiness. To provide the motivational aspect of
framing, ARO's emphasized the "power" every person has to "make a difference" by
saving animal lives, stopping global warming, and protecting the planet. These altruistic
messages empower the average American to be an activist at every meal, without any
more effort than simply eating plant-based foods. This turns the mundane private act of
eating, done most!y for pleasure and sustenance, into ~ public act of more social, moral,
and political significance.
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In support of both deontological and utilitarian communication perspectives,
framing veganism as a vehicle for personal growth helps to emphasize the moral and
altruistic rationales for veganism and create a stronger identity and commitment than
messages that emphasize self-interest (Maurer, 2002). Yet, being proud of oneself and
feeling consequential is also in one's own self-interest. While veganism is based on the
beliefthat the lives of other animals matter, it also helps the vegan believe that hislher
own life matters too by recognizing that hislher food choices have far-reaching impacts.
RQ4: Self-Interested versus Altruistic Values
In terms of the ARO messages' application to animal rights ideology, it was
encouraging to find (in answering RQ4) that most ofthe AROs, with the exception of
FARM, prioritized altruistic values toward NHAs over anthropocentric, self-interested
values. VO and COK put the largest proportion of emphasis on NHA altruism. FS and
PETA did as well, but, being larger groups, they also branched out into more
anthropocentric issues (both altruistic and self-interested). For ideological integrity,
AROs should list altruistic appeals toward NHAs first in all communication pieces that
include a variety of rationales for veganism. Then AROs could mention other altruistic
values, such as environmentalism, worker issues, and world hunger, followed by human
self-interest, such as health, at the end or in the smallest proportion. While deontological,
this emphasis on altruistic values also fits with Maurer's (2002) and the Humane
Research Council's (HRC, 2007) utilitarian theories that emphasizing the immorality of
meat-eating is essential to increasing the number of vegetarians, as opposed to just
encouraging meat reduction.
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Appeals to the self-interest of health can simultaneously promote altruism by
including the mental health benefits, such as consonance and pride, that vegans may
receive from making a difference and acting with moral integrity. FARM was the ARO
who prioritized health and food attractiveness frames based largely on human self-
interest. In fact, Alex from FARM spoke in the interview as if he saw himself more as a
marketer of vegan food products than a marketer of a social cause. However, I argue that
frames that prioritize altruism over human self-interest more accurately reflect the AROs'
primary commitment to NHAs, specifically, and social justice, generally.
To further reflect this dedication to NHA protection in support of overall animal
rights, AROs should place greater emphasis in environmental frames on the negative
effects of animal agriculture on wild animal species and their habitats. General
discussions of pollution are open to interpretation to be perceived in terms of altruistic or
self-interested concerns. This ambiguity can serve the utilitarian purpose of widening its
appeal to a variety of readers who have different interests (Perelman & Obrechts-Tyteca,
1969), but it lacks the deontological and transformational purpose of explicitly trying to
raise the status people place on the interests ofNHA species in comparison to human
interests (Singer, 1990).
RQ5: Ethics and Strategy in Communication Decision-Making
In answering RQ5, I concluded that most ARO leaders used a blend of
deontological and utilitarian approaches to communication decision-making. All AROs
except FARM were more deontological in their overall choice to be more NHA-centric
than anthropocentric, but within the spectrum of these NHA-centric appeals, they all
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often leaned more toward utilitarianism in their choice to privilege animal welfare frames
over animal rights frames, as the former is more widely-accepted. AROs asked people to
"extend" their existing animal welfare concerns out from companion animals to farmed
animals. To put this approach in terms of the frame alignment process, it is an example of
frame bridging but not an evolution in taking people from welfare to rights, which would
be closer to frame transformation (Snow et aI., 1986).
In this frame bridging process, AROs tended to use a two-pronged strategy of first
getting people to recognize farmed animals as sentient beings and then to recognize how
much farmed animals are suffering in agribusiness. The former approach is more aligned
with an animal rights perspective to see farmed animals as fellow subjects, but, as
discussed earlier, the transformational aspect of the frame could be improved by
including more comparisons to the human animal. The latter approach is more aligned
with a welfare perspective to emphasize a cruelty and suffering frame instead of putting
these within the context of an overall injustice frame critiquing the ownership, breeding,
and exploitation of the bodies of fellow subjects.
In deciding which visuals to use to highlight the animal cruelty frame, all AROs
were deontological in choosing images that are truthful and reflective of standard
agribusiness practices, but they were utilitarian in seeking pictures that would
emotionally affect people enough to hopefully inspire change. To add to this utilitarian
perspective, Matt (VO) also stated these selected emotional images could not be so
disgusting that they kept people from looking.
333
In selecting which species to feature in visuals, PETA was the most deontological
by including the animals, fish, with whom most ARO leaders felt Americans least
identified. va was the most utilitarian in largely excluding fish, but all other AROs also
marginalized fish in favor of land animals, despite the massive numbers of sea animals
who are used for food. FARM and FS could be said to privilege mammals the most, as
they believed Americans most identify with fellow mammals, so va and COK were
means-oriented in their choice to privilege birds, as birds are the land animals who are
most exploited. It would seem most deontological to show animal species in relative
proportion to the extent to which they are used for food, which would place sea animals
and birds as the species most in need of attention.
Regarding the connection between animal moral philosophy and the AROs'
message strategy, AROs either separated the two or simplified deeper philosophies to
gain greater consensus at a shallower level. FARM, and va, to an extent, tended to take
the former route of selecting strategies largely based on utilitarian concerns for what
works best to get people to go vegan or to reduce consumption of animal products rather
than privileging messages that best promote animal rights ideology. On the other hand,
COK, FS, and PETA were more deontological but still ultimately utilitarian in their
preference for simplifying animal rights ideology in their messages so that messages
appealed to more widely-accepted aspects of animal ethics, such as compassion and
welfare. va did this too, but Matt was overtly utilitarian in his admissions that (1) he
knew va's focused behavioral messages were limited to helping only farmed animals
and not animals in other exploitative situations, and (2) he might be willing to discredit
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animal rights if it would get more people to stop eating animals. This illustrates how an
ARO can emphasize animal cruelty, an ethical issue, in support of an animal rights goal,
veganism, yet not be committed to promoting the kind of animal ethics that is authentic to
animal rights ideology and serves the broader, long-term goals ofthe animal rights
movement. This constrains the discourse to welfare issues for farmed animals instead of
transforming the discourse to encourage people to reevaluate their relationship to animals
in all situations.
Regarding the AROs' tendency to embrace popular values and consensus, many
ARO leaders did not see themselves as producing persuasive messages. These leaders
seem to see their message strategy as more informative than persuasive, as they often
described their messages as providing "facts" and "reality" and appealing to animal
welfare values the public already holds. I concluded that ARO communication messages
could be conceptualized as a more progressive version ofjournalism that is largely
providing a different and untold perspective on agriculture so as to enable consumers to
make more informed choices in the marketplace - choices that will fit with their personal
values and priorities. While the public needs to be educated and learn the untold story of
the problems associated with an animal-based diet, and while it makes sense for AROs to
appeal to some common values for cultural resonance, AROs should not shy away from
embracing a more openly persuasive role in emphasizing key altruistic values that they
bridge, extend, or transform to support an animal rights philosophy.
While being more informative than overtly persuasive may seem more democratic
or even more ethical, it is not any less ethical for an ARO to serve in its role as an
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advocacy organization that is trying to argue for a change in attitudes based on the moral
principles the organization holds. It could be stated, according to Baker and Martinson's
(2001) ethical principle of communicator authenticity, that to be more openly persuasive,
as long as the advocacy organization is not misleading the public or concealing its
advocacy status, is more honest than trying to provide more objective information that
aligns with the public's values more so than with the values ofthe advocacy organization.
Additional Recommendations for Animal Rights-Informed Frames
In this section, problem and solution frames are suggested that I think AROs
should use to better represent animal rights ideology. First, I discuss recommendations
for problem frames focused on injustice, environmental destruction, and, to a lesser
extent, cruelty. Then, I suggest engaging the audience as both consumers and citizens to
explain their culpability and their capability toward individual and collective solutions.
These solutions include: appreciating the mutual subject status of all animals, humans
included; eating a solely plant-based diet; and working collectively to create a less
speciesist society.
Recommended Problem Frames
Injustice. I contend that the main problem frame should be one of injustice. This
frame would be transformational in nature, asking people to reconceptualize the accepted
practices of animal agriculture, fishing, and meat-eating as unacceptable practices on the
basis that they are, in most cases, unjust and exploitative. This frame could be
complemented by promoting values of respect for life, freedom, and the sentience of
individual animal subjects. The latter value requires frame bridging to extend people's
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respect for the sentience of fellow subjects out from humans and companion animals to
NHAs used for food.
The injustice frame should incorporate ethical aspects from nature and culture by
highlighting the natural and cultural appreciation for freedom and some allowance for
necessary violence. It could also highlight human society's appreciation for justice and
fairness in protecting the lives and rights of fellow subjects not to be unjustly killed or
exploited. The injustice frame should state that animal agriculture is unfair and unnatural
because it includes breeding fellow subjects in captivity, growing them to suit one's
needs, and exploiting their body and their offspring for one's own benefit. The exploited
subject does not have the natural opportunity to leave the situation and survive on his or
her own, nor the freedom to own his or her body and control what is done to it.
Animal agriculture is easier to fit in an injustice frame, especially one that relies
on naturalness and freedom, than is the practice of hunting animals for food. If animal
products are required for survival, as they are for human animals in some parts of the
world, and always in the case of wild omnivorous and carnivorous animals, then hunting
becomes more natural and more justified. Hunting does not involve the captivity and
lifelong ownership that agriculture does, so it is less associated with exploitation and
enslavement. Therefore, I contend that fishing by humans, as a form of hunting, primarily
becomes unjust and unnatural only if the capture and death of sea animals is not
necessary for basic human survival. To the extent that humans can survive on plant-based
foods and any necessary supplements, they should do this to avoid killing and
unnecessary violence per American cultural values (at least as they are consistently
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applied toward human subjects). This viewpoint incorporates flexibility around notions of
"necessity" in terms of what is required for survival, but it is better to have the debate
center on the concepts of necessity and justice over the basic killing and consumption of
other animals rather than centering on whether or not certain animal husbandry practices
are inhumane. This follows animal activist suggestions that AROs should control the
discourse around the problem of exploitation rather than husbandry practices (Dunayer,
2006; Francione, 1996; Hall, 2006a; LaVeck, 2006a). The notion of necessity within the
injustice frame relates it to the AROs' lesser-used frame problematizing the killing and
taking oflife for human food (discussed in RQ1).
Additionally, I believe the AROs' appeal to what I called "American populist"
values, which promotes siding with the little guy against elites and corporations, fits
better with the AROs' problem frame of corporate farming cruelty than it does with my
proposed injustice problem frame. While this may seem counterintuitive because
American populism is a pro-justice frame promoting egalitarianism, I think its reliance on
anti-corporate values implies that smaller or "family" animal farms are unproblematic
because they benefit the middle-class farmer and treat human workers and other animals
fairer. The injustice frame, as I am recommending it, is not specifically anti-corporate as
much as it is anti-exploitation, anti-enslavement, and anti-killing, whether the perpetrator
is a corporation or a single person. The American populism frame may be useful during
the limited anthropocentric altruism appeals that highlight the harm caused to humans by
modem farming and fishing.
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Environmental destruction. The frame of environmental destruction should
highlight that it is irresponsible to supply America's largely unnecessary demand for
animal products, as this diet requires that all animals, particularly NHAs, pay the costs
for the waste and contamination of natural resources needed to sustain all life. This
environmental frame extends animal rights goals ofveganism out via ecological
principles of interdependence to include the environmental movement goals of
preservation and ecological health, which makes it an example of the frame extension
alignment process (Snow et aI., 1986). The chance to unify with the environmental
protection movement on the issue of animal-based diets might create a wider appeal and
more support via frame extension, which serves both utilitarian and deontological
communication goals.
As discussed in Chapter Two, one of the main areas of overlap between animal
ethics and environmental ethics is the mutual desire to protect wilderness areas and
species from extinction, with animal rights privileging animal species as individuals and
seeing plant species more as collective entities which are integral to maintaining the
health of wildlife habitats (Regan, 2002). While it is in the interest ofboth the animal and
environmental protection movements to fight factory farming due to its excessive waste
and pollution, it is also in the mutual interest of these movements to promote a plant-
based diet as sustainable, particularly in the United States (FAO, 2006; Singer & Mason,
2006; World Watch, 2004). As AROs are dedicated to protecting the interests ofNHAs
where they face discrimination and exploitation at the hands of humans, it seems
appropriate for American ARO food advocacy to problematize an animal-based diet
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based on the notion that it unfairly disadvantages wild animals by unnecessarily
threatening their lives and habitats. This extends the AROs' food advocacy injustice
frame out from domesticated animals to include free or "wild" animals too.
I am not suggesting that AROs must ignore the negative environmental effects of
an animal-based diet on humans, but it is more in keeping with the goals of animal rights
to use its limited resources to speak out especially for NHAs wherever they are unfairly
threatened by humans. The environmental frame can also serve as a useful opportunity to
deconstruct the human/animal dualism and promote the idea that humans are fellow
animal beings who are dependent on the same ecosystems, and humans should not take
an excessive amount of the shared resources that all animals require for life (Devall &
Sessions, 1985; Taylor, 1993).
Cruelty and sz,ifJering. AROs framed problems around cruelty more so than any
other issue; earlier in this chapter, the trouble associated with employing a cruelty frame
was explained, so I maintain that it should be used selectively. However, there are aspects
of it that are in alignment with animal rights, as it shows a concern for NHAs as sentient
individuals who are equally interested in avoiding pain and suffering as are humans.
Therefore, it is best used to complement a solution that asks humans to see other animals
as fellow subjects and to value their sentience and individuality so that humans avoid
causing them suffering or treating them like objects.
A key challenge with the cruelty and suffering frame is that it usually constrains
the discourse to a debate over animal welfare within agriculture rather than debating the
necessity and justice of agriculture itself (Dunayer, 2006; Francione, 1996; Hall, 2006a;
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LaYeck, 2006a). If the cruelty frame can prioritize a discussion of how commercial
interests dictate animal suffering and commodification in almost all cases, even on
smaller farms, then people may begin to see that there are not many farms or fishing
practices that truly would be capable of eliminating animal suffering and still turning a
profit.
This frame of universal suffering in agriculture could, perhaps, be used for
utilitarian purposes as a preliminary strategy to explain the reality of modem farming to
the public and open the door to introducing the primary frame of injustice. Matt (YO) did
state that he viewed YO's approach to focusing on factory farm suffering as a pragmatic
"first step" for people who may then evolve toward animal rights over time. But I
contend that these initial cruelty frames must be supported to a greater extent by some
rights-oriented frames, like injustice, if people are going to be overtly encouraged to
begin to consider changing their values toward other animals and not just their dietary
behavior. I believe a cruelty frame alone does not ideologically lead viewers toward a
path of eventual transformation in deconstructing the human/animal dichotomy and
challenging speciesism.
Another approach would be to reconceptualize the cruelty frame as a subcategory
of an injustice frame, amplifying the idea of cruelty to not only mean suffering pain but
also suffering the injustice of being enslaved and used. Similarly, AROs could
incorporate a blame frame placed on the meat-eating public, saying it is cruel to create a
market demand for animal products knowing that it causes fellow animals to be subjected
to unnecessary objectification and suffering for food.
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Additionally, if cruelty frames prioritize the most blatant cruelty and suffering,
then factory farms will always get the most attention while fishing and less inhumane or
intensive farms will seem less problematic or unproblematic in comparison. Therefore, if
and when suffering is problematized, it would be better to emphasize the suffering
specifically involved in death (for both wild and domesticated "food" animal species) and
in other basic agricultural practices that tend to be standard to all farms, including
smaller, traditional farms. Suffering should include not only physical pain but also
emotional pain, from family separation, frustration, or fear, to further support the subject
status of farmed animals. To demonstrate that animal farming has always involved
suffering, even prior to the advent of factory farms, AROs could cite Plutarch's
description of the suffering of farmed animals as far back as ancient times and the many
nineteenth century descriptions of farmed animal suffering, particularly in
slaughterhouses (Walters & Portmess, 1999). The challenge is finding visuals that could
capture the notion of how all farmed and fished animals suffer and die to become food
without always resorting to intensive factory farm or industrialized slaughterhouse
images, which too severely limit the discourse to being anti-industrial.
Blame within problem frames. While Mika (2006) concluded that certain meat-
eating consumers responded better to a pro-vegetarian frame that blames agriculture not
them, I posit that blame should be placed more on consumer demand, as I argue for a
more deontological approach than Mika's utilitarian or strategic marketing approach. The
blame component of the problem frame should shift emphasis away from agriculture and
toward the culpability of consumers for creating a demand for animal products and
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supporting injustice and killing, as this will better align with the problem frames I
suggested in this chapter. Earlier in this chapter I discussed the dilemma with making
agriculture the problem, as it constrains the discourse to debating how animal agriculture
or commercial fishing should improve. While it makes sense that if agribusiness and
fisheries are to blame, then they should reform, this supports a welfare solution more so
than a rights solution. AROs should explain that, collectively, through America's legal
system and, individually, through consumer choices, Americans personally and publicly
support the exploitation ofNHAs for food and its resulting environmental destruction.
Linking consumers to the problem fits Derrida's (2004) projection that industrialized
violence against animals will ultimately end when we can no longer stand the spectacle of
our own immoral behavior.
It is appropriate to acknowledge, as most AROs did, that consumers have not
been given much information about the injustice, cruelty, or environmental destruction
associated with animal-based foods, so part of the ARO's job is to provide the public
with information as evidence supporting these problem frames. Additionally, this may
require an interrogation ofthe Western worldview that unfairly dichotomizes humans
from all animals to acknowledge that our society as a whole condones and naturalizes
certain animal exploitation. This may help explain why individual citizens are generally
willing to relinquish knowledge and awareness of exploitative practices and ignore issues
facing farmed animals, as society encourages this compliance and lack of consideration
(Adams, 1990; Dunayer, 2001; Derrida, 2002). As Derrida (2002) stated, "men do all
they can in order to dissimulate this cruelty or to hide it from themselves, in order to
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organize on a global scale the forgetting or misunderstanding of this violence" (p. 394).
This larger social validation for agricultural ignorance works to the advantage of each
individual consumer who wants to eat animals with a clean conscience. While I am
tempering individual blame here in favor of putting it in a larger historical, socio-political
context, once one's individual role in the system is elucidated, he/she bears a personal
responsibility for creating solutions both as a consumer and a citizen.
While it is more challenging to place blame on the very public you are seeking to
change, as it may be offensive, AROs can experiment with different utilitarian rhetorical
strategies to make the message less offensive or more effective (Mika, 2006). For
example, AROs can talk in terms of "consumer demand" or "we" instead of using more
accusing and personal "you" messages. In identifying problem frames (RQl), I provided
examples in the findings chapter of how AROs did use these techniques to accuse the
meat-eating public of being responsible parties in animal cruelty and environmental
destruction.
Recommended Solution Frames
I suggest three main solution frames that relate to the suggested problem frames
of injustice (due to exploitation and unnecessary killing) and environmental destruction
(that harms wild NHAs, human animals, and habitats), as well as the lesser frame of
cruelty and suffering inherent in farming and fishing. The three solutions are: (1)
recognizing the mutual subject status of all animals, including a subcategory of showing
compassion for the suffering of fellow animals, (2) eating a plant-based diet to avoid
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exploitation and killing, and (3) working collectively as citizens to deconstruct the
speciesist exploitive system and solve problems caused by an animal-based diet.
The first is an attitude or values-based solution, the second is a consumer behavior
solution, and the third is an engaged citizen solution. In keeping with the thesis that a
deontological communication strategy for animal rights must transform worldviews not
just behaviors, a values-based transformation is a critical part of the solution. And while a
consumer behavior change is necessary and useful within a market economy, the whole
issue should not be treated solely according to a neo-liberal philosophy that encourages
individual consumer actions as the premier way to regulate society. Therefore, I also
incorporated some governmental and collective action solutions which recognize the
target audience members as citizens in addition to consumers. In the following section,
each ofthese three solutions is discussed.
Attitude or values-related solution: Respecting the subject status offellow sentient
animals. As most ARO messages indicated, humans must begin to respect not just the
ability of other animals to feel pain but also respect their mutual status as individual
subjects of a life. To increase the relevancy and concreteness ofthis viewpoint, AROs
can include their common analogies between farmed animals and other NHAs with
subject status, such as dogs and cats. But to deconstruct the human/animal dualism,
AROs should also include analogies with the human animal and openly acknowledge that
humans are also animals. To reduce the humanism in this analogy, the frame should
blend ideas of kinship based on evolution and sentience with ideas of diversity to
celebrate that all animal species have unique traits that make them inherently valuable
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(Freeman, 2007b). This helps avoid the suggestion that other animals have to emulate
humans in all ways to be inherently valuable subjects.
Then AROs can ask Americans to consistently apply the values they hold for
humans and other subjects toward "food" animals, including fish, as well as toward the
"wild" animals with whom they share the planet. This includes valuing life, freedom, and
justice so as to avoid the exploitation and unnecessary killing involved in farming and
fishing. A related subcategory is to acknowledge and encourage the popular welfare
sentiment stating that Americans generally do not want to be responsible for causing
suffering to other sentient beings, clarifying that fanning and killing inherently involve
some suffering.
While this values-based transformation is listed in the solution section, it does not
mean that it must be listed so literally by the AROs in their "what can you do" call-to-
action message sections of their advocacy communication. It may be used as part of the
motivation component or to build a case for the problem component of the collective
action frame (Snow & Benford, 1988). The values and attitude transformation is listed
here in the solution section ofthis dissertation mainly to reinforce its importance as a
necessary component of the framing process in food advocacy so that solutions are not
just defined as behavior-based.
Consumer solution: Eating a plant-based diet. As all AROs stated, the premier
solution is to eat a plant-based diet and not consume any animal products. Veganism
aligns as a logical behavior-based solution to the recommended problem frames of the
injustice of animal farming and fishing's exploitation and killing of subjects as well as
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the resulting environmental destruction of wild animals and our shared natural resources.
The motivational component of the framing process should utilize the values listed in the
previous section to build a case for how this dietary change resonates with the public's
own values, mainly altruistic ones.
Additionally, AROs should continue to appeal to the self-interested value of
health, to a certain extent, as it is essential to the argument that killing animals is not
necessary for human survival. AROs did this through educating the public about the
health benefits of a plant-based diet and ways to avoid any health risks, as well as
providing tips and tools for transitioning to veganism and maintaining the diet for a
lifetime, which fits with vegetarian advocacy recommendations from the Humane
Research Council (HRC, 2007). The AROs' appeal to the value of having pleasurable
and convenient food on a vegan diet can serve a utilitarian purpose supporting the health
frame. Additionally, the AROs' symbolic use of the color green is useful and
representative of a plant-based diet, both in terms of the diet's association with healthy,
fresh, green plants and with "green" or environmentally-friendly living.
Promoting a vegan or total plant-based diet, especially organic, is preferred to
solutions that suggest consumers just reduce their consumption of animal products, as
veganism more closely aligns with an animal rights philosophy that states it is wrong to
exploit and kill other animals in the majority of cases (Regan, 1975,2003; Singer, 1990).
If AROs are not supportive of reforms to the agricultural industry, then they should not
be supportive of reforms to consumers' eating habits and should take an abolitionist
approach to both. This recommendation is more deonto10gica1 than the utilitarian
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recommendation by the HRC (2007) that vegetarian advocates would be more effective
with a meat-reduction message rather than with a vegetarian message. However, in
promoting veganism, AROs do not need to use language which states that it is an "all or
nothing" proposition, as that is phrased harshly and competitively, but I contend they
should be true to their values in recommending a boycott of animal products as a positive
reflection of those values. COK and PETA generally did this. Of course, consumers may
choose to just reduce their meat consumption, as the HRC (2007) found a quarter of
Americans are willing to do, or they may give up meat but continue eating eggs and
dairy, but that is the consumer's own choice and not the proposed solution ofthe ARO.
In Addition, AROs often appealed to the value of choice in emphasizing a vegan
diet, and this served to imply a neo-liberal value that social issues can and should be
solved primarily through individual market choices rather than through the
accompaniment of legal reform and social movements. It also threatens to limit veganism
to a consumer trend (Maurer, 2002). However, the vegan solution does connect
consumers with their role as citizens when the frame is accompanied by an appeal to the
values of moral integrity and desire to make a difference, as that implies that each
person's private actions have public consequences. Those altruistic values also work well
in appealing to consumers' other role as American citizens, in support of the following
solution.
Citizen solution: Working collectively to solve problems and change the system.
AROs favored the individual consumer solutions of changing one's diet, but sometimes,
AROs more overtly engaged consumers as citizens, such as when FS asked people to
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refonn the agricultural system by banning the worst cruelties or when AROs sometimes
engaged the public as potential activists who could join their organization and get
involved in campaigns. In order to better enable a cultural transfonnation in support of
veganism and animal rights, it is important that the consumer solution is not suggested in
isolation of addressing the broader systemic issues in American culture, politics, and
economics that support legalized animal exploitation and an animal-based diet over a
solely plant-based one. To do so, AROs should engage their target audience as both
consumers and citizens and ask them to take part in changing an exploitive system to
protect the lives of other animals and support freedom over domestication. AROs should
more actively try to provide a vision for the public ofthe kind of non-speciesist society
Americans can create together (Lakoff, 2004).
In keeping with Francione's (1996) idea of incremental abolitionism, AROs
should try to find collective action strategies that are in keeping with an animal rights
philosophy instead of suggesting welfare refonns to the agricultural industry. As Alex of
FARM stated in the interview, he is not against welfare refonns coming from animal
welfare groups, but he is against animal rights groups promoting it because it is not
authentic to their anti-exploitation position:
We are in favor of welfare refonns. We are just not in favor of animal rights
advocating those because it leaves the wrong impression with the consuming
public. It gives the impression that we approve ofthe use of animals - exploitation
of animals - for food as long as they are treated a little less reprehensibly. We feel
that welfare refonns is something that the animal exploiting industry should be
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introducing to try and entice the consumers, the socially conscious consumers, to
consume them.
Some collective action solutions could include making animal agribusiness and
commercial fishing industries pay for the environmental damage they cause or having
their executives serve jail time for breaking environmental laws. For this to be effective,
it would first require that citizens ensure that environmental laws do not exclude
agriculture. If the animal agriculture industry had to internalize the costs it currently
externalizes on society and other species, the price of animal products would likely rise,
which might serve some utilitarian purpose of reducing overall consumption of animal
products in America. Another agricultural solution is for citizens to ask the United States
government to cease subsidies to animal-based agriculture (including plant crops used as
farm animal feed) in favor of greater subsidies to plant-based agriculture, especially
organic.
An idea, similar to COK's honesty in product labeling campaign, is to require
more transparency from the animal agribusiness industry in labeling its products honestly
regarding animal welfare conditions, feed and additives, GMO use, and environmental
policies. Additionally, citizens should request agribusiness provide greater public and
media access to all facilities, including slaughterhouses, with the ability to visually record
practices. Related to this idea of increasing the transparency of the industry and the
public awareness ofthe problems associated with an animal-based diet, AROs could ask
citizens to request that the news media put these topics on the agenda, not just from a
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public health and environmental standpoint but also from an animal rights standpoint that
begins to question humans' right to use fellow animals in this way (Freeman, in press).
AROs could also recommend community-based collective action solutions, some
of which AROs did in "get involved" sections online. For example, AROs could suggest
people request more or solely plant-based food options in local schools or in other
community organizations. People could screen documentaries on animal agriculture or
hold public forums for discussion ofhumans' use of other animals for food. People could
be encouraged to produce their own media that either explores the problems and solutions
proposed by the AROs or simply documents agricultural practices, specifically killing, to
help facilitate the public bearing witness to the violent aspects ofan animal-based diet.
People could be encouraged to participate in civil disobedience or public protests such as
at a slaughterhouse. Or people could adopt rescued farmed animals as companions or
publicly support farmed animal sanctuaries to help provide more opportunities for the
public to engage with these animals as fellow subjects of a life instead of food objects.
Summary and Contributions to Communication Theory and Literature
This section provides a summary of findings and conclusions and expands upon
the relationship between the findings and their contributions to academic literature and
theory, particularly communications but also animal ethics. Based on Chapter Three's
communication theory and literature review, the following subsections are divided into:
social movement framing, which largely draws upon sociology; social movement
communication strategies and challenges, which draws upon public relations,
environmental communication, and sociology; rhetoric of social movements; and
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advocacy communication ethics. To begin this section, social movement framing is
discussed, including the typology of ARO problem, solution, and motivation frames; the
resonance of those frames; recommendations for ARO problem and solution frames; and
how those frames exemplify the frame alignment processes of extension, bridging,
amplification, and transformation (Snow et aI., 1986).
Social Movement Framing
Typology ofAROfood issue frames. This study defined and categorized the main
frames used by key United States AROs working on national food and farmed animal
issues. To structure the findings, Snow & Benford's (1988) collective action frame
categories were used as a guide, starting with diagnosis and prognosis, which have some
similarities to Gamson's (1992) framing components of injustice and agency. Findings
revealed that the problem frames used by AROs included: suffering of animals due to
cruelty; commodification of animals into economic objects; harmfulness of animal
agribusiness and animal products to humans and the environment; and the needless
killing and death of animals for food products. As part of these problem frames, AROs
largely blamed animal agribusiness, and to a lesser extent, the fishing industry, for
causing cruelty and destruction and hiding it from public view. The AROs sometimes
made American consumers of meat, egg, and dairy a secondary responsible party once
these consumers were informed of problems associated with an animal-based diet.
For solution frames used by AROs, the most popular was to suggest that
consumers eat fewer or no animal products, but FS also promoted humane farming
reforms by government and PETA also promoted some humane reforms by industry and
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meat retailers. While problem frames tended to show less variance between AROs,
solution frames did vary in terms of Benford & Snow's (2000) variance category of
flexibility and inclusivity, as some AROs were willing to suggest less rigid dietary
changes as well as including industry and government as part of the solution.
While Snow & Benford's (1988) motivation component of collective action
frames was not specifically identified, nor was Gamson's (1992) similar identity
component, they inspired this study's identification of the major values to which AROs
appealed in problem and solution framing. These values were: compassion and caring for
nonhuman animal suffering and an aversion to cruelty; respect for the sentience and
individuality of other animals; moral integrity and consistency; desire to improve the
world and make a difference; choice; pleasurable and convenient food; belonging; life;
naturalness; honesty; concern for fellow human beings; American populism and
accountability ofbig business and government to the people; freedom; and American
pride.
Frame resonance ofARO choices. It is important for frames to resonate with the
culture and values ofthe intended public (Benford & Snow, 2000; Johnston & Noakes,
2005; Polletta, 2006; Tarrow, 1998; Zald, 1996). Frame resonance is dependent on both
the credibility of the speaker and message and the salience of its fit with the prioritized
values of the individual and society (Benford & Snow, 2000). Regarding the credibility
component of frame resonance, in addition to ensuring factual accuracy, AROs could
increase their credibility if their message was more congruent with their stated beliefs
(Benford & Snow, 2000). This bolsters the thesis that there are utilitarian benefits to a
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deontological communication strategy of AROs being more candid in advocating based
on an animal rights philosophy rather than privileging animal welfare. However, to the
extent that AROs privilege NHA issues over anthropocentric issues in their message
strategy, as they usually did, it can only add to their credibility since the ARO's purpose
is to advocate on behalf ofNHAs. The AROs improved their credibility by not being
misanthropic or advocating violence or hatred, as those values would be out of alignment
with a movement based on morality and respect (Munro, 1999; Singer, 1990).
In addition, for resonance, Johnston & Noakes (2005) noted that it helps if the
speaker is charismatic. While the AROs largely kept their leaders out of the spotlight,
PETA's, FS's, and FARM's occasional use of celebrity spokespeople for vegetarianism
could be said to add charisma. Johnston & Noakes (2005) also stated that the social
movement organization's (SMO) message itselfmust be logically consistent,
timely/relevant, and amplified and compatible with the culture. The AROs' frames are all
of these things, except logically consistent in parts, as the problem frame of factory farm
cruelty does not fully align with a vegan solution, and industry welfare reform solutions
can seem contradictory to the simultaneous vegan solution.
Regarding the salience component of frame resonance, frames must fit within a
society's overall myths, narratives, ideologies, and identity (Benford & Snow, 2000;
Polletta, 2006; Ryan, 1991; Tarrow, 1998). The AROs took this to heart and appealed to
values that fit within American culture, particularly American pride, populism, freedom,
and choice. Polletta (2006) also suggested that SMOs use resonant stories by selecting
narratives that come from the cultural stock and seem familiar, such as linking one's
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movement to past freedom fighters and heroes. This concurs with Ryan's (1991) finding
that SMOs create resonance by framing themselves as a positive group trying to right
moral wrongs in a conflict, weaving facts into a story with mythic plots and characters
and culturally acceptable social goals, such as freedom, rights, and compassion. AROs
did sometimes use stories of rescues or abuse, where animal activists would be the
protagonist and animal agribusiness would be the antagonist, but they did not overtly
align themselves with other freedom fighters from American history or allude to human
rights movements as frequently as they could have.
Additionally, Benford & Snow (2000) said frames must be commensurate with
and relate to the target's personal experiences by not seeming too abstract or distant from
his or her everyday life. This fits with the AROs' emphasis on how going vegan allows
one to make a difference daily "at every meal" or "with every bite." Additionally, AROs
tried to connect with Americans' personal lives by alluding to their companion animals
and relating Americans' concern and love for companion animals to how they should
begin to treat and view farmed animals based on their equal sentience capabilities.
Related to resonance, Tarrow (1998) proposed tactics for addressing the following
three major framing challenges facing SMOs: (1) frame familiarity and its ability to
promote action, (2) public acceptance ofthe frame, and (3) identity inclusiveness. I posit
AROs followed Tarrow's advice. First, AROs largely used familiar frames, instead of
new ones, but linked them with action, in this case veganism, to avoid passivity. Second,
to create greater public acceptance ofthe frame, AROs used common values instead of
divisive ones. And last, to create an identity that avoids being too narrow, AROs did a
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good job ofbuilding an identity for veganism around the altruistic yet broad value of
wanting to make a difference and other popular values such as compassion, respect for
life, and freedom. In this way, veganism was framed as politically and morally significant
enough to create a positive identity for the vegan as an altruistic person without limiting
it to a certain demographic or cultural style.
Recommendations for AROfood issue frames. Through problem frames and
motivation/identity frames, AROs often used animal welfare ideology to achieve animal
rights solutions. If frames can be perceived as a recruiting tool for ideologies (Oliver &
Johnston, 2005), then these AROs are recruiting based on an expanded notion of animal
welfare ideology more so than rights. Therefore, changes to the ARO framing strategy
were recommended that would arguably create more alignment between theory and
practice, specifically, better aligning deontological ethics and animal rights ideology with
the AROs' communication strategy (Baker & Martinson, 2001; Francione, 2006; Hall,
2006a, 2006b; Lakoff, 2004; LaVeck, 2006a, 2006b).
Recommendations included making the main problem frame one of injustice
toward farmed animals based on morally consistent respect for the sentience, life, and
freedom of fellow subjects. The frame should center upon the exploitation, enslavement,
and unnecessary killing ofNHAs for food rather than on the cruelty ofhusbandry
practices. Although, based on the value of compassion for fellow subjects, animal
suffering could still be problematized where it exists, and has typically existed
historically, in all forms of agriculture and fishing, not just factory farming. In addition,
the environmental destruction problem frame should increasingly focus on agriculture's
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negative effects on wild animals and their habitats, which expands the problem of
injustice out to free NHAs not just domesticated ones.
To align with a vegan solution, the blame component of problem frames should
emphasize consumer demand and consumption of animal products, in the context of
acknowledging that speciesism is a systemic problem, more so than primarily blaming
the animal food industry. While much of the corporate food industry may use especially
unethical means to supply its products, it is not as if the consumer demand for these
products is innocent.
The AROs' promotion of a vegan diet would serve as a fitting solution to my
recommended problem frames of injustice and environmental destruction, but AROs
should be stricter in promoting a boycott of all animal products rather than encouraging a
reduction in animal product consumption, as several AROs did. While Benford & Snow
(2000) would rightly contend that this rigidity is too exclusive and reduces the appeal of
the solution to a larger number of adherents, I support the logical consistency and
credibility that AROs will show by adhering closer to their own principles that prohibit
the exploitation of other animals as an unnecessary food resource. The AROs' typical
allowance for a transition period from animal to plant-based consumption helps to
increase the flexibility of the vegan solution frame to a small extent. The vegan solution
frame must also explain health-related issues, including the many benefits and any
potential risks of eating a solely plant-based diet, for the purpose of fulfilling both
utilitarian (appeals to human self-interest) and deontological (truthfulness) goals.
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The AROs demonstrated ideological integrity in attempting to create a subject
status for NHAs and promoting morally consistent respect for subjects due to sentience.
In this effort to transform attitudes about NHAs, AROs are encouraged to more overtly
challenge the human/animal dualism by emphasizing humans' status as fellow animal
subjects. This enables AROs to use human rights, not animal welfare, as a basis for
appeals to moral consistency in treatment ofNHA subjects.
The last recommended solution was for AROs to more frequently include ideas
for collective action and engaged citizenry aimed at incremental abolition of animal
exploitation and property status (Francione, 1996). If AROs more frequently addressed
the public as citizens, they could avoid implying that individual consumer choices are all
that is necessary to overcome the systemic injustices of animal and environmental
exploitation in America. In,this way, ARO frames comply more with Gamson's (1992)
and Benford & Snow's (2000) notion of a "collective action" frame, since social
movement theory does not discuss SMOs primarily promoting individual consumer
solutions to social justice problems (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). In addition,
Hall (2006) and Maurer (2002) expressed concern that frames not limit veganism to a
trendy consumer lifestyle choice, as it loses some of its ideological edge and socio-
political relevance.
Frame alignment processes. The following paragraphs describe the categorization
of relevant frames from this dissertation into the frame alignment processes of extension,
bridging, amplification, and transformation, as defined by Snow et al. (1986).
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Through problem frames, AROs used frame extension to extend their concerns
over animal agribusiness and a meat-based diet to align with the concerns of other,
mainly anthropocentric, movements supporting fair labor and the rights of the working
class, equitable food distribution to the world's hungry, public health, disease prevention,
and environmental protection. Additionally, through the vegan solution frame, AROs
extended one's daily meal choices to helping not only farmed animals but these other
seemingly unrelated causes oflabor, health, hunger, and environment through appealing
to people's desire to make a difference.
Snow et al (1986) cautioned that extension can risk diluting the original or
primary cause and can be unethical if it is done insincerely just to gain greater resources.
For both of these reasons, AROs should continue to make these anthropocentric appeals
much less prominent than appeals directly on behalf of their primary constituents, NHAs.
However, because humans and wild animals are also animals, AROs can make a broad
claim that it is in the ARO's sincere interest to promote protection of all categories of
animals, besides just farmed animals, where problems converge as they do with animal
agriculture. And so long as the principles of the AROs are congruent with the principles
of the other movements to which they extend, such as those for social justice, then the
extension is at less risk ofbeing insincere or shallow. However, AROs should not resort
to leveraging society's anthropocentrism as a tool to save NHAs by default, as that tactic
does not challenge the human/animal dualism that is the root cause of animal exploitation
and can serve to inadvertently reinforce the idea that human life is more inherently
valuable than any NHA's life.
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Companion animal welfare was used as a tool for frame bridging people's
companion animal welfare concerns to farmed animals. AROs often used analogies
comparing the similar sentience of farmed animals to that of companion animals in an
attempt to use logic and a plea for moral consistency to get the public to transfer their
respect for the subject status and individuality of dogs and cats over to land-based farmed
animals. The argument is that moral integrity should compel the public to seek similar
protections for farmed animals as they seek for companion animals. These protections
would include not causing them suffering (welfare value) and not eating them (rights
value) because people respect the individual lives of each animal.
Frame amplification is particularly useful to movements, such as animal rights,
whose values somewhat contradict society's core values and are in need of greater
support (Berbrier, 1998). As an example of frame amplification, AROs amplified appeals
to American populism and skepticism over the trustworthiness of big business to apply to
a critique of animal agribusiness, in particular factory farming; AROs explained how
factory farming was cruel to NHAs, destructive to the environment, unfair to human
workers, and misleading to consumers. However, this was not a frame that I endorsed, as
it prob1ematized corporate farming more than meat-eating and was therefore not
promoting or fully aligned with an animal rights ideology specifically.
Another example of frame amplification was the AROs' implication that people's
compassion for many NHAs was deep enough to go beyond just concern over suffering
to a concern that NHAs not be killed. This definition indirectly amplifies the values of
justice and rights as a key component of compassion, although AROs avoided using the
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tenns "rights" and "justice" directly. It could be argued that these appeals to compassion
were closer to a frame bridging process connecting welfare-oriented compassionate
values with rights-oriented justice values, but it was done without overtly stating this
connection. Rather than amplifying compassion for animals to fit principles ofjustice, it
would be more authentic and logical to directly amplify notions ofjustice toward all
humans and certain NHAs to apply to justice toward animals used for food. Compassion
for fellow subjects could be a subcategory of this justice frame rather than being used as
the main frame, as compassion is farther removed from a rights frame.
Of all the frame alignment processes, frame transformation is considered the most
fundamentally transfonnative because it embeds new values in society, creates new
meanings, and reframes erroneous beliefs so that what previously seemed acceptable is
reframed as unjust and problematic (Snow et aI., 1986). Therefore, AROs should make
use of the frame transfonnation process, since they are a challenging movement seeking
fundamental transfonnation in speciesist worldviews, particularly to make meat-eating
socially unacceptable. Only one instance of this transfonnation process was identified in
this study when PETA attempted to create a subject status for fish. ARO leaders
concluded that the American public is less concerned about the welfare of fish than they
are about the welfare of land animals used for food, as people do not believe fish are as
sentient. So PETA's emphasis on establishing the sentience and capabilities of fish,
including having personalities, is an example of frame transformation, as it attempts to
radically change people's perceptions ofthese animals, a challenge from which other
AROs generally shied away.
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According to Snow et al. (1986), frame transformation alignment can be
facilitated by using a broad or global interpretive frame, such as a meta-narrative, which
reframes many domains oflife under a new universe of discourse. I propose that justice
be the global interpretive frame that AROs should use to create frame transformation. To
do so, AROs first need to further engage a more direct comparison of the sentience and
individuality of farmed animals to the human animal so that humans will be challenged to
recognize their own status as an animal and the farmed animal's own status as a fellow
subject of a life. This alignment process would then articulate that, for moral consistency
and fairness, many of the major justice values Americans already hold in favor of
protecting humans and their rights, such as compassion, respect, life, fairness, and
freedom, should transfer to protecting other animal subjects. These two major, related
transformation frames can be summarized as stating that we are all animals, and,
therefore, we should all have the same basic rights to life and liberty.
Based on a meta-narrative of compassion, AROs did use a similar tactic of
comparing the sentience capabilities between animals, but largely limited it to comparing
land-based nonhuman animals, such as farmed and companion animals, not humans. This
tactic was categorized as :Er:ame bridging and not frame transformation, as it did not
challenge the prominent human/animal dualism like the human comparison does in
justification of a more radical philosophical transformation toward animal rights.
However, a frame comparing the rights of domesticated NHA species to live as freely
and naturally as wild NHA species do, would be an example of frame transformation in
support of animal rights ideology. This animal rights ethic would also loosely align with
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a deep ecology ethic that values the naturalness and freedom of wild animals to live less
hindered by excessive or unnecessary human interference as fellow animal species who
contribute to the health of the ecosystem (Devall & Sessions, 1985). To consider the
rights of historically domesticated animals not to be domesticated and exploited,
especially when unnecessary for human survival, seems like a radical transformation in
American worldviews, which would qualify it as a frame transformation in my
estimation.
AROs frames were more likely to approach animal rights, or one might more
appropriately call it "animal liberation," from the standpoint of human rights and social
justice rather than environmental ethics. As discussed in Chapter Two, animal ethics is
ideologically aligned with human rights and the notion of individuals having inherent
value more so than it is aligned with environmental ethics and the notion of holism
valuing individuals primarily according to their utility to the maintenance of a viable
ecosystem (Varner, 1998). But since Wolfe (2003) and Derrida (2004) critiqued animal
rights philosophy for its illogical basis in humanism, perhaps AROs should consider
Regan's (2002), Hall's (2006a), and Varner's (1998) argument that environmental ethics
should better align with animal rights by beginning to privilege the individual's key role
within the whole. This would support Hall's (2006a) idea that the animal rights
movement should shift from protecting domesticated animals to protecting wild animals
and encouraging the rights of all animals to be free.
If AROs openly stated their vision that no animal should be domesticated, based
on the fact that the practice is largely uncommon according to natural principles and
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morally illogical according to anti-exploitation cultural principles, they would be using
principles from both human rights and environmental ethics to frame their animal rights
appeals for more respectful and natural relationships between humans and other animals.
This encourages a blend of natural and cultural ethics principles in governing how
humans treat NHAs (Freeman, 2007b; Jasper & Nelkin, 1992; Pollan, 2006). This would
also support some scholars' desires for more unification between the animal and
environmental protection movements (Beers, 2006; Hall, 2006a; Jasper & Nelkin, 1992;
Maurer, 2002), but do so using a frame transformation process that directly supports
animal liberation principles instead of solely using a frame extension process that
encourages people to stop eating animals for environmental reasons.
To conclude this subsection on frame alignment, the frame alignment conclusions
for this study should be compared to Mika's (2006) framing study categorizing PETA's
vegetarian messages from different campaigns into the frame alignment categories of
Snow et al. (1986). An adequate comparison cannot be made, however, because Mika
largely used different texts from PETA and did not attempt to further categorize and label
the specific campaign messages according to collective action framing components of
problems, solutions, and motivations as was done in this dissertation. Therefore, the
dissertation findings are more specific to creating a typology of ARO food frames, while
Mika's findings are more specific to empirically testing which frame alignment processes
create more resonance with non-vegetarian audiences.
In further differentiation between the studies, Mika (2006) chose to categorize the
"absent referent" (p. 920), a framing method which elucidates the live animal from within
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the food object, as being a practice on par with the framing alignment processes of Snow
et aI. (1986). However, the practice of elucidating the absent referent is too specific to be
an abstract alignment process, in my estimation. Therefore, this dissertation first
discussed a similar concept not as an alignment process but as a problem frame of
"objectification of other animals" and a values-based appeal of "respecting animal
sentience and individuality." These frames were then categorized using the broader frame
alignment process ofbridging or transformation to elucidate respect for the absent
referent, or animal subject, based on appeals to justice, life, and moral consistency.
Another differentiating factor is that Mika (2006) limited the transformation
alignment process to only those messages that were considered "moral shocks" (p. 923),
such as "meat is murder" or "to animals, all people are Nazis." The use of incendiary
language or shocking visuals does not necessarily define the transformation alignment
process as much as it describes levels of aggressiveness in making one's argument, and,
therefore, it could also apply to other alignment processes (Snow et aI., 1986). In this
dissertation, the logical substance ofthe message itself was prioritized, and its resonance
with animal rights ideology, more so than its tone, delivery style, or effectiveness.
Social Movement Communication Challenges and Strategy
Cox (2006) and Gitlin (2003) acknowledged that a key communication dilemma
SMOs face is balancing how critical they can be while still remaining within "symbolic
legitimacy boundaries" (Cox, 2006, p. 61) to maintain credibility. Yet it is hard to appeal
to values that are part of the very system the SMOs are challenging. Gitlin (2003) noted
that SMOs walk a line between being assimilated and "blunted" (p. 290) if they are too
365
moderate and being marginalized and trivialized if they are too critical. In this study, I
conclude that AROs' common use of animal welfare values is moderate enough to gain
them legitimacy, yet the sheer magnitude of the animal suffering they expose on factory
farms is powerful enough to keep even this moderate welfare message from being
blunted. However, this suffering frame runs the risk that industry can counter-frame itself
as solving the problem through humane reform, however misleading that may be, thereby
assimilating the issue and becoming animal welfare proponents themselves. Therefore,
AROs should frame killing and exploitation as the problem so their messages retain a
critical and ideologically-authentic edge, according to Ryan's (1991) suggestions. While
this more critical frame certainly does run the risk of the message being marginalized, the
risk is reduced if AROs skillfully use frame transformation alignment around the meta-
frame ofjustice.
Related to this debate, SMOs must decide whether to base their appeals on the
public's individual self-interest or on altruism (Cox, 2006). Evernden (1985) argued that
altruistic, non-anthropocentric appeals are necessary to win long-term support for the
environment because appeals to the public's self-interest are ultimately unproductive
short-term strategies that reinforce a view of nature as a resource. In support of this, most
AROs did tend to favor altruistic appeals, especially focused on altruism toward NHAs.
This differs from Maurer's (2002) findings that health was the main frame utilized by
most vegetarian advocates, but Maurer included a wider variety of vegetarian
organizations in her study besides just animal protection organizations. However, because
AROs placed higher emphasis on problematizing suffering and welfare instead of killing
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or injustice, they did not significantly work toward a long-term strategy that challenges
an instrumental worldview per Evemden's (1985) suggestion.
Cox (2006) distinguished between the pragmatism and short-term focus of
campaign rhetoric and the long-term goals of critical rhetoric, arguing the former often
benefit from self-interested, reasonable appeals, while the latter are meant to more
broadly challenge existing values to envision new worldviews. Many of the ARO
communication pieces studied in this dissertation were not limited to specific, short-term
campaigns, as they were mainly designed for direct distribution to the general public and
not as moderate, reform materials aimed at the news media, legislators, or industry.
Therefore, most of their messages have the flexibility to be more critical than they were
and should be aimed at achieving goals of creating a less speciesist society in practice
(short-term) and in worldview (long-term).
Regarding worldviews, SMOs need to reveal that the public's accepted view of
reality is based on a faulty premise (Stewart, Smith & Denton, 2001). To reveal the faulty
premise behind the American public's acceptance ofmeat-eating and farming, AROs
provided evidence that animal products are not required for a healthy diet and that farmed
animals endure much suffering. The lesser-used frame problematizing killing, and my
recommended problem frame of injustice, suggest that a more fundamental faulty
premise is Americans' assumption that it is ethical for humans to kill other animal
subjects when it is not in self-defense. Ironically, this is something that was denounced as
immoral by vegetarian scholars as far back as ancient times in Greece, such as by
Pythagoras (Walters & Portmess, 1999).
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Stewart et aI. (2001) also suggested SMOs define the status quo as a "problem"
that warrants the public's immediate attention because it is severe and left unresolved by
the authorities. AROs did define factory farming, in particular, and meat-eating, to a large
degree, as problems that require the public's immediate intervention through choosing
vegetarian foods. But the addition of PETA and FS's reform frames may have sent mixed
signals to the audience that government regulations or industry reforms could improve
factory farming on their own.
To inspire agency, SMOs should make the audience feel that its assistance will
indeed result in a better future and that overcoming the status quo is not impossible
(Stewart et aI., 2001; Snowet aI., 1986). The ARO messages were positive and
encouraging about how each person's vegetarianism makes a difference and saves lives.
But, considering the vastness ofthe problem and its roots in human history for thousands
of years, the AROs are challenged to provide a vision for a future without animal farming
and exploitation. Instead, they tend to focus on the power of each individual to do the
right thing. Emphasizing a solution frame based on promoting collective action by
engaged citizens can help toward creating a vision of how particular acts of incremental
abolition (Francione, 1996) will eventually lead to total abolition ofNHA exploitation.
AROs also followed the advice of Stewart et al. (2001) suggesting that SMOs:
improve the self-perception of members so that their participation is perceived as morally
important work; use co-active strategies that appeal to society's common values while
decreasing the credibility and legitimacy of opponents; and mobilize members based on
notions of shared identity and values, using nonviolent tactics that gamer public
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sympathy and support. While PETA tends to be a more controversial group that does not
always garner public support (Simonson, 2001), the food advocacy messages studied in
this dissertation did not seem offensive and violence was never advocated.
Rhetoric ofSocial Movements
Similar to how framing literature encourages the construction of messages that
resonate and align with audience values, rhetoric literature also suggests that arguments
begin from premises upon which the author and audience agree (Perelman & Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 1969). Rhetoricians Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) categorized premises
into two types: real and preferable. Real premises, such as those based on facts, truths,
and probabilities, make it easier for the author to obtain universal acceptance. AROs used
real premises when quoting statistics of animal deaths, describing standard agricultural
procedures, and citing scientific information in support of sentience, health, and
environmental claims. Preferable premises, based on values, have more limited appeal
due to their subjectivity, so to create agreement with a wider audience, Perelman &
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) suggest the use of abstract values rather than concrete values for
those communicators wanting to change the status quo.
AROs used abstract values such as: compassion, freedom, choice, life, honesty,
belonging, health, pleasure and convenience, moral integrity, and desire to make a
difference. ARO appeals to farmed animal sentience, environmental stewardship,
American populism, and American pride may be considered less abstract. Perelman &
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) suggest that authors help audiences rank values by emphasizing
quality over quantity to focus on the rightness or uniqueness of concepts or individuals,
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as that which is threatened, irreparable, or priceless is deemed valuable. This aligns with
my suggestion that AROs emphasize respect for the sentience, individuality, and life of
fellow subjects as inherently valuable as well as continuing to emphasize morality and
altruism more so than self-interest. The environmental stewardship frame is also relevant
to a quality-based appeal, especially regarding concerns about protecting endangered
species and preventing irreparable damage such as climate change and deforestation. The
abstract values I propose of emphasizing justice, rights, freedom, and life, and
compassion to a lesser degree, fit within rhetoricians' recommendations for creating
widespread support based on appealing to culturally accepted principles that are both
powerful and ambiguous (Burke, 1984; McGee, 1980; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca,
1969; and Therborn, 1980).
One challenge in using abstract ideas is that authors must create a sense of
"presence" or connection in order for the audience to better experience them (Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). Film is useful for creating presence, as is the use of
narrative and myth because it helps audiences get to know individuals. Similarly, Stewart
et al. (2001) said SMOs can create presence through the use ofpersuasive words, stories,
gory pictures, and revelations of inconsistencies in institutional practices. AROs often
used many of these tactics by showing video footage that takes the audience to the farm,
stockyard, or slaughterhouse, by introducing the audience to rescued animals, along with
rescue narratives, and by using visuals that allow the audience to look directly into the
eyes ofthe animal. Analogies between farmed animals and the family pet also seek to
create connection and relevance for viewers. This use of analogies to demonstrate
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sentience and individuality fits Black's (2003) recommendation that the animal rights
movement must animate other animals to raise their status to persons from the
reductionist metonyms of objects or property.
If AROs included more human analogies, then presence could be created by
asking the audience to put themselves in the place of the farmed animal or by featuring
quotes and portraits ofAmericans who faced oppression, likely from decades past,
describing how they were unfairly objectified and treated "like animals." However, these
kinds of challenges to the accepted human/animal dualism are likely to garner less
widespread agreement than the AROs' current method of comparing farmed animals to
other NHAs, but my thesis advocates for sacrificing some consensus in favor ofmore
openly supporting and promoting animal rights ideology.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) also suggested that communicators make
their notions flexible, adaptable, and progressive while making their opponents' ideas
seem rigid and outdated. Many AROs did highlight flexibility and some version of
progressiveness by discussing the ease of consumers choosing plentiful vegetarian
products as part of a moral integrity frame, based on compassion or environmental
responsibility. And conversely, AROs showed opponents, the factory farmers, as rigid in
the sense of being blinded to animal welfare and environmental stewardship, based on
profit motives. But AROs maligned factory farming not for being outdated but for being
too modern, huge, technological, exploitative, and destructive in opposition to bucolic
ideals ofmore traditional American family farming. However, in both of these cases, the
flexible and reasonable middle ground then becomes eating fewer animal products, but
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ensuring they come from the wild or so-called "humane" smaller farms, which aligns
with Pollan's (2006) idea of a conscientious carnivore.
The challenge for AROs is to not appear rigid while still remaining firm in their
ethical stance advocating for a vegan diet and the right ofNHAs not to be farmed and
domesticated. The flexibility ofthe diet can be expressed by AROs continuing to show
the variety of plant-based protein options one can enjoy. Some flexibility in morality
comes with applying ecological or natural principles of predation to acknowledge that
killing of wild NHAs by humans may be necessary in limited circumstances while still
declaring that human cultural principles ofjustice and rights, when used to govern human
behavior toward fellow animal subjects, dictates that killing is only justified when done
in self-defense or in times of extreme necessity. It is important that the "opponent" not be
limited to just factory farming but that animal agriculture itself be shown as outdated, not
technologically, but according to progressive morals that acknowledge the subject status
of fellow animals and condemn the slavery, exploitation, and unnecessary killing of other
subjects. It is ironic to say these morals are "progressive" when one acknowledges that
human animals may have naturally lived according to these principles over tens of
thousands of years ago, prior to the advent of farming (Mason, 1997).
Historic Rhetorical Debates in U.S. Human Rights Movements
Lessons from the rhetorical analysis of the introductory stages of human rights
movements in the United States, in particular the nineteenth century women's rights
(Campbell, 1989) and civil rights movements (Bormann, 1971), are relevant to the
communication challenges faced in the introductory stages ofthe modem U.S. animal
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rights movement. Similar to the description in Chapter Three of the framing factions
within the animal rights movement over whether or not to stick with critical rights-based
appeals instead ofmore moderate welfare appeals, the women's rights movement was
divided into factions that Campbell (1989) referred to as ideological purity versus
expediency. Bormann (1971) referred to similar abolitionist movement rhetorical factions
as agitation versus conversion. These were the inspiration for the dichotomous
terminology used in this dissertation to distinguish between deontological or "ideological
integrity" message strategies and utilitarian strategies by AROs. Campbell (1989) found
that if SMOs used the latter utilitarian strategy for political expediency, it created more
unity with the public because it was less threatening to the status quo, but these expedient
messages could create more disagreements and factions within the movement because
they sometimes contradicted shared ideology (Campbell, 1989). For example, expedient
strategies for women's suffrage perpetuated common sexist stereotypes to gain adherents
rather than critiquing these stereotypes as the source of the problem (Campbell, 1989).
Similarly, I argue that AROs must challenge the human/animal dualism and speciesist
worldviews that serve as the basis for NHA exploitation rather than perpetuating
speciesist values in an attempt to gain more widespread appeal that is more limited to
behavioral changes and welfare reforms.
Based on an analysis of factions within the abolition and civil rights movement,
Bormann (1971) recommended that SMOs stick to the strong moral values and rights
rhetoric of the agitators to avoid watering down the message like the conversionists did.
But conversely, SMOs should situate the rights message within American cultural values
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and heroic historical struggles, like the conversionists did, rather than using revolutionary
or inflammatory rhetoric like the agitators. AROs in this study loosely followed
Bormann's advice by often using a moral message and having it be culturally resonant,
positive, nonthreatening to the republic, and sometimes even patriotic.
However, AROs were more utilitarian or "expedient" in their choice to moderate
this moral rhetoric, constraining it to "conversionist" welfare appeals rather than more
openly appealing to more ideologically powerful concepts like rights and justice, as the
agitators did. If AROs are to follow in the footsteps of now celebrated human rights
leaders such as Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, William Lloyd Garrison,
Frederick Douglass, and Martin Luther King, they need to use messages that maintain
ideological integrity by unabashedly asking for rights based on a consistent and fair
application of the principles ofjustice and freedom that Americans hold dear.
Advocacy Ethics
My separation of communication strategies into deontological and utilitarian is
also inspired by those two ethical dichotomies within Western philosophy. The public
relations literature discussed in Chapter Three favors persuasive communicators making
deontological communication choices for fear that utilitarian choices allow the audience
to be disadvantaged or harmed in order to benefit the communicating organization
(Fitzpatrick & Gauthier, 2001). Deontological choices favor being truthful and avoiding
harm, with truthfulness comprising both accuracy and thoroughness (Bivins, 2004). A
nuance to this study is that it was not designed to test ARO messages based on a notion of
truthfulness that comprises factual accuracy and thoroughness, but rather a notion of
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truthfulness based on the authenticity ofthe message's representation of the animal rights
ideology that serves as the AROs' motivation. This follows Baker & Martinson's (20001)
ethical guideline that the persuader be authentic. According to this criterion,
communication choices that prioritized ideological integrity are categorized as
deontological choices, and choices that prioritized effectiveness and audience acceptance
are categorized as utilitarian choices.
In this study, I ascertained whether ARO leaders made communication decisions
based more on these deontological (ideological) or utilitarian (effectiveness) concerns. I
found AROs used a blend ofboth deontological and ideological communication
strategies. All AROs, except FARM, were more deontological (or authentic) in their
overall choice to privilege NHA issues over human issues, but within the spectrum of
these NHA-centric appeals, all AROs often leaned more toward utilitarianism in their
choice to privilege mainstream animal welfare values over more oppositional animal
rights values.
In addition to authenticity, the persuasive appeals used by AROs are ethical
according to other guidelines set by Baker and Martinson's (2001) TARES principles,
such as truthfulness, respect, equity, and social responsibility. This paragraph discusses
truthfulness and the subsequent paragraph discusses the remaining TARES principles.
While this study was not designed to adequately judge how factually truthful the
messages were, AROs appeared to be honest, even though messages were clearly
selective. Greater context could be supplied to improve truthfulness in parts, but the
limited resources of these non-profit AROs limits space for extreme thoroughness in
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printed pieces. One could argue a disclaimer in favor of ARO selectivity by saying that
the counter-movement, in this case the agribusiness industry, has vastly more resources to
provide their version of the truth to the public if they believe more context is necessary.
ARO leaders never stated they would consider willfully misleading the public, and, in
fact, several AROs expressed concern that the visuals used be an accurate reflection of
standard agricultural practices, not extremes.
Regarding the TARES principle of respect, ARO leaders showed respect for the
audience by assuming they were morally decent people who cared about animals and
were against cruelty, with Alex from FARM being the least optimistic and favoring
legitimate appeals to their self-interest. Leaders did not show contempt for the meat-
eating public and seemed optimistic that they would want to reduce animal suffering once
they were better informed about the cruelty on factory farms. Occasionally, messages did
blame meat-eating consumers for their role in the problem, but these messages were not
insulting or rude. The assumption was always that consumers want to do the right thing.
In support of the TARES principle of equity, leaders never stated that they were targeting
vulnerable populations, especially not with a misleading message, although VO did
discuss the common utilitarian strategy of privileging audiences, such as college students,
who were more receptive to change. PETA and FS do have communication pieces aimed
at children, a vulnerable public, but this study only included text aimed at adults.
Regarding the last principle of social responsibility, ARO leaders see themselves as
socially responsible, caring people who are dedicating their careers to supporting the
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common good, expanding that category to include NHAs. They genuinely believe that the
vegan diet they promote will be better for people, other animals, and the planet.
Limitations
Overall, this study attempts to tackle many research questions and pull from
multiple academic literatures, which complicates the effort, increases its length, and
likely creates more breadth than depth in places. In addition, readers may wish that
instead ofmerely describing what AROs did and what they should do that I had been able
to prove that my suggestions would be effective and resonate with the public. However,
that kind of audience analysis is a different project than a production and representation-
focused project like this one. The aim was both to describe how frames could better align
with animal rights ideology for increased communication integrity and to build a case for
how these animal rights-inspired frames could also be aligned to resonate with the values
of the American public, even while attempting to transform some of the more speciesist
values. While the goal was to identify frames that could satisfy both deontological and
utilitarian requirements, deontological frames were favored, which makes short-term
notions of effectiveness less of a priority in this study.
In advocating deontological approaches, I did not emphasize the more primary
deontological values of factual accuracy, complete context, and avoidance of harm
(Bivins, 2004). Some may argue that these are more important to analyze than the
deontological value of ideological authenticity/integrity. This argument has merit. But
because I generally do not think that these AROs employ deceitful or harmful
communication messages, with the possible exception of some of PETA's more
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controversial campaigns being perceived as offensive, I did not choose to prioritize those
deontological values. Instead, I chose to focus where, as an activist and scholar, I did see
a problem, and that was the disconnect between theory, or ideology, and practice.
In speaking to these experienced ARO leaders about their strategic
communication strategies, I became concerned that I was suggesting they make strategic
changes that might not fit with their more pragmatic goals as small, non-profit
organizations. While they are animal rights organizations, they may not share my belief
that their organization must or should promote a critical animal rights discourse that
seeks a change in worldview along with, or prioritized above, a more tangible
improvement in short-term behavior. Therefore, in advocating my thesis, I may run into
the problem that Cox (2006) identified that most SMOs actually promote campaign
rhetoric which is necessarily more moderate than critical rhetoric. If this is the case, it is
not certain who is supposed to promote the critical rhetoric of animal rights if it is not the
leading national organizations within the social movement.
Perhaps it might just be scholars and independent activists, as they are freer to
speak candidly than SMOs are, and are less burdened by fundraising concerns that
necessitate that they achieve tangible progress and victories. But, paradoxically,
independent activists may lack the resources to adequately mass communicate their
critical rhetoric. This fits with the HRC's (2007) pragmatic recommendations that the
animal protection movement employ a variety of appeals, both critical and moderate,
from different organizations. It also reminds us of the point that each ARO is a different
organization, and the organizations in this sample vary in size and history, which affects
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resource mobilization and political opportunity factors. This dissertation did not
significantly take those organizational differences into account.
For the discourse of AROs to pose a "critical" challenge to speciesist worldviews,
AROs need not always directly promote animal rights philosophy, per se, using academic
references and terminology. But I propose that whatever frames AROs choose should be
supportive of and informed by animal rights ideology instead of animal welfare or
anthropocentrism so that they are logically aligned to pose a philosophical challenge to
the root cause of exploitation, the human/animal dualism. If a convincing case has been
built toward this thesis, then the AROs can hopefully find some ideas in the framing
recommendations of this dissertation that they could apply in their message construction,
in keeping with the strategic approach they determine to be successful based on their own
experienced communication perspectives.
Future Research
Areas for related future research could include: (a) audience studies on the
resonance of AROs' ideologically authentic frame transformations with non-vegetarians,
both from the United States and from other cultures, (b) textual analysis of ideology in
food advocacy frames of environmental protection organizations, (c) identification of
opportunities for ideological frame alignment between the advocacy discourses of AROs,
environmental protection organizations, and human social justice organizations to
facilitate coalitions, and (d) identification of how ideologically authentic frames and
critical rhetorics of all social movements are most successfully mass communicated and
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by whom, in contrast to the processes and sources for communicating more moderate
messages.
Final Summary
This research adds to the literature on framing, social movements, communication
ethics and strategy, and philosophy related to animal and environmental ethics. The
textual analysis portion of the dissertation serves as the basis for a unique typology of
frames and values constructed by five U.S. animal rights organizations in their national
advocacy communication addressing issues with animal farming and fishing and
promoting a major dietary shift toward veganism. Interviews with ARO leaders also
provide insight into the ethical and strategic basis upon which they made framing
choices, and in what ways those chosen frames related to or reflected their ideological
beliefs on animal ethics.
Findings reveal AROs framed problems with agribusiness around farmed animal
cruelty and commodification, human and environmental harm, and unnecessary killing..
ARO solution frames suggested consumers eat a total or largely plant-based diet, and
some proposed industry welfare reforms. To motivate audiences, AROs appealed to
values, such as: compassion,sentience, moral consistency, desire to make a difference,
choice, pleasurable and convenient food, belonging, life, concern for fellow human
beings, honesty, American populism, naturalness, freedom, and American pride.
Strategically, AROs leaders applied both deontology and utilitarianism in choosing to
prioritize NHA altruism rather than human self-interest, but most leaders favored
utilitarianism in choosing to privilege animal welfare over animal rights for wider appeal.
380
Overall, while some ARO messages supported animal rights, promoting veganism and
respect for NHA subject status, many frames used animal welfare ideology to achieve
animal rights solutions, conservatively avoiding a direct challenge to the dominant
human/animal dualism.
In addition to an empirical study, the ideology of animal rights is explored in
great detail in this dissertation's chapter on animal ethics, as this ideology serves as the
foundation of the belief system motivating AROs and the messages they mass
communicate. The goal was to strengthen the ideological and philosophical foundations
of animal rights discourse through an interrogation of the dominant human/animal
dualism and the tensions related to the relationship between animal ethics, humanism and
human rights, and environmental ethics.
This dissertation not only builds theory on animal rights ideology and empirical
descriptions on framing that ideology, it is also prescriptive. Strategic recommendations
are made in this discussion and conclusion chapter for increasing the ideological integrity
of ARO collective action frames (diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational components)
and creating opportunities for frame alignment, especially the lesser studied process of
frame transformation (Benford & Snow, 2000). To do so, ARO frames should emphasize
justice toward domesticated and wild NHAs (embracing animal rights and environmental
perspectives), respect, life, freedom, and a shared animality.
The topic of mass communication related to animal farming and a meat-based diet
is understudied in communication research, yet it has profound real-world effects on the
billions of nonhuman animals killed annually in the food industry, cultural acceptance for
-----------------
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animal rights and/or animal welfare, promotion of anti-instrumental and altruistic moral
values in society, equitable food distribution and human health, and environmental
protection and sustainability, including the critical issue of reducing global warming.
While this study focuses on the communication challenges facing the animal
rights movement, the findings can be abstracted to apply to the common dilemma of
challenging movements in determining how they can be critical ofthe status quo while
still remaining resonant and effective at creating major social change, both behaviorally
and ideologically. This ideological integrity in social movement discourse can enact a
true transformation if it successfully results in people having "trouble thinking things the
way they have been thought" (Foucault, 2000, p. 457).
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APPENDIX
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS
• How does your group conceive of humans in relation to other animals?
• What is the mission of your group?
• In what ways does your mission fit or not fit with an animal rights/liberation
philosophy (and how would you define animal rights/liberation)?
• To what extent and in what ways does your animal rights/liberation philosophy
influence your message strategy related to your food campaigns?
• Explain the history of your food campaign message strategy and why you have
chosen your current approach?
• In your current food campaign messages, what is the basic problem as you have
chosen to define it for the audience?
• In your food campaigns, do you emphasize dietary changes based on the audience
member's self-interested motives or more altruistic motives? Explain your choice.
• To what extent does your choice of motive (self-interest vs. altruistic) affect how
your audience members would or would not change their view of other animals?
• What values related to other animals do you assume the proposed audience
member already possesses?
• What human values related to other animals do you intend to promote in your
food campaign message?
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• Do any of these values conflict with each other? If so, how do you reconcile that
conflict?
• In what way, if any, do you see your strategy as promoting similarity between
humans and other animals?
• In your messages, in what ways, if any, do you think: there is a place for the
concept of diversity - or difference - regarding humans and other animals?
• What is your strategy with visual imagery?
• How does this visual strategy relate to how you would like your audience to view
human beings in relation to other animals?
• Do you believe your campaign messages are influenced more by your theories on
animal rights or your theories of what works best to get people to switch their
diet?
• How have external factors (like socio-economic, cultural or political factors or
counter-framing by opponents) influenced your choice of messages? What about
reaching out to Americans in particular?
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